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Constitutional Politics: 
The Republic Referendum 
and the Future 
The idea for this book was conceived after the November 1999 Republic 
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1990s, and to look forward to the future of constitutional politics in the new 
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together. It would not have reached completion without his efforts. We are also 
most grateful for the assistance of many others, including: Richard Nile and his 
team at Curtin University of Technology; Rosanne Fitzgibbon and her team at 
Universit}' of Queensland Press; and David Lovell of the School of Politics, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, for financial support. 
John Warhurst and Malcolm Mackerras 
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Chapter One 
Constitutional Politics: 
The 1990s and Beyond 
John Warhurst and Malcolm Mackerras 
Constitutional politics revolves around proposals to alter the Constitution. The 
Australian method of doing so, laid out in s. 128 of the Constitution, 
culminates in a constitutional referendum. In contemporary Australia 
constitutional discussion has involved a number of issues. These have included 
the role of the state Governments in the making of international treaties, the 
division of powers between Commonwealth and state Governments for 
controversial policies such as the environment and industrial relations, and the 
recognition of Indigenous Australians in the Constitution. The major issue has 
been proposals to change from a constitutional monarchy to a republic. 
Australian debate about republicanism became serious, if the measure is 
some prospect of constitutional change, in the 1990s. The decade saw a 
transformation of the debate through the emergence of organised groups in 
the community, changing attitudes within the political parties and a generalised 
concern to discuss constitutional reform as the centenary of federation 
approached on 1 January 2001. Nonetheless, constitutional reform did not 
eventuate. On 6 November two referendum questions — on a republic and on 
a new preamble to the constitution — were defeated. This book examines the 
constitutional politics of the 1990s and discusses the possibihty of 
constitutional reform in the first decade of the new century. It looks both 
backwards and forwards. 
Debating the republic 
Australians have long discussed the idea of replacing the constitutional 
monarchy with a republican constitution, even during the century before 
federation in 1901. This discussion continued throughout the twentieth 
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century, but repubUcans were in a minorit>' and the issue had always been 
peripheral to the main political debates (McKenna 1996; Headon et al 1994). 
From the 1960s onwards, public debate quickened and well-known public 
identities, including Geoffrey Dut ton, Donald H o m e and Max Harris, declared 
themselves to be republicans and argued for constitutional change (Dutton 
1966; 1977). None of the major pohtical parties — Liberal, Labor or Country 
were committed to the repubUc and repubUcans remained in the clear 
minority according to public opinion polls. The 1975 constitutional crisis drew 
attention to Australia's constitutional arrangements, though the lessons for 
republicanism of Labor PM Gough Whitlam's dismissal were mixed, and over 
the years that followed the Labor Part}' edged towards declaring itself for the 
republic. This it eventually did in 1982 (Warhurst 1993). It was in this context 
that there was considerable criticism of the Hawke Labor Government's 
appointment of the former Labor leader. Bill Hayden, as Governor-General in 
1989. He was presumed to be a republican and, according to his critics, unfit 
for Vice-Regal office. 
The 1990s was the decade in which the republican debate flourished, 
generated by communit)- action for change and reaction in support of the 
stams quo (Hide 1996; McKenna 1996; Constitutional Convention 1998, 
volume 1, chapter 3). In April 1991 a Constitutional Centenary Conference was 
held in Sydney, convened by leading legal figures, including Professor Cheryl 
Saunders. From a decision of this meeting the Constimtional Centenary 
Foundation (CCF), a body devoted to public education about constitutional 
issues in the decade leading up to the centenary of federation in 2001, was 
created (Warhurst 1995). 
O n 7 July 1991 the Australian Republican Movement (ARM), the first major 
republican organisation, was launched by author Thomas Keneally. In turn, this 
led to similar organisational efforts to defend the status quo and, less than a 
year later, on 4 June 1992, Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM), 
under the leadership of two senior legal figures, Lloyd Waddy and Michael 
Kirby, held their first public meeting (Grainger and Jones 1994). 
Some state Premiers had also entered the debate on both sides of the 
argument, and they became important figures, alongside their Commonwealth 
colleagues, in the debate. Of greatest political significance, given that Labor was 
the only 'republican' part}', was the emergence of two pro-republic Liberal state 
Premiers, Nick Greiner and John Fahey, in New South Wales. Greiner and 
Fahey helped to make republicanism a bipartisan issue that Liberals could 
support. 
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Paul Keating replaced Bob Hawke as Labor Prime Minister in December 
1991, and immediately began to campaign on issues to do with Australia's 
national identit}-. On 24 February 1993, in his policy speech for the March 1993 
federal elections, Keating announced his intention to form 'a committee of 
eminent Australians to develop a discussion paper that would consider the 
options for an Australian republic' (Constitutional Convention 1998, vol 1, 13). 
This committee, the Republic Advisory Committee (RAC), was established on 
28 April 1993. Its chair was the Sydney lawyer and investment banker Malcolm 
Turnbull, head of the ARM (TurnbuU 1993). The other members were: 
Greiner; Mary Kostakidis, SBS TV presenter and CCF member; Lowitja 
O'Donoghue, chair of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC); Susan Ryan, former Labor Senator and Minister for Education; 
George Winterton, Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales 
and the leading legal scholar of an Australian republic; Dr Glyn Davis, of the 
School of Public Policy at Griffith Universit}', who was the nominee of the 
Queensland Premier; and Namoi Dougall, the nominee of the New South 
Wales Prehaier (each state Premier had been asked to put forward a name for 
consideration) (Republic Advisory Committee 1993). 
The RAC reported on 5 October 1993 and concluded that a republic was 
constimtionally achievable. It was 'both legally and practically possible to 
amend the Constitution to achieve a republic without making changes which 
will in any way detract from the fundamental constitutional principles on which 
our system of government is based' (Republic Advisory Committee 1993, 10). 
The Keating Government committed itself to this position and, on 7 June 
1995, Keating gave a televised address to Parliament in which he reiterated this 
view and set a timetable for a republic by 2001 (Ryan 1995, 173-84). 
By this time, surveys of public opinion suggested that a majorit}' of 
Australians supported the move to a republic in principle. The early 1990s also 
saw a quickening of the public debate and a number of books examining the 
constitutional and political issues were published by academics and republican 
activists (Hudson and Carter 1993; Lawson and Maddox 1993; Winterton 
1994). Most of these authors wrote in favour of a move to a republic. As the 
Australian Democrats by this stage had joined the Labor Party in support of a 
republic, it became an issue of some urgency for the Coalition parties to 
address as the 1996 election approached. 
Earlier, in November 1994, then Leader of the Opposition, Alexander 
Downer, had suggested the idea of a people's convention to discuss the issue, 
a procedure first advocated by the CCF. This first step enabled the subsequent 
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Opposiuon Leader, John Howard, to later put forward a more detailed proposal 
along these lines, in response to Paul Keating's June 1995 initiative. 
W hile state Governments have no formal role in the referendum process, 
the issue was of constitutional concern to them and several states conducted 
their own inquiries. The Western Australian Government did so in 1995 and 
South Austraha followed in 1996 (Western Austrahan Constitutional 
Committee 1995; South Australian Constitutional Advisory Council 1996). 
When the Coalition parties won the March 1996 federal elections, this 
convention proposal was one of its campaign promises, even though the 
repubUc question did not play a major part in its campaign. At the time the 
Labor Government countered with an indicative plebiscite, a non-binding vote, 
that would test support for a repubUc in principle before the Government 
proceeded to put forward a referendum on a particular repubUc model (Bean 
et al 1997). The stage was now set for a constitutional battie. 
The Constitutional Convention 
The new Howard Governmen t proceeded to implement its proposed 
convent ion and from this time onwards the debate accelerated. The 
Constitutional Convention (Election) Bill 1997 received its second reading on 
26 March 1997. The bill was held up in the Senate for some time, because it 
proposed that the 76 elected convention delegates would be elected by 
voluntary postal baUot, rather than by the tracUtional compulsory voting by 
attendance at a poUing place method used for elections. But eventually the bill 
passed through the Senate and planning for the convention proceeded 
(Austrahan Electoral Commission (AEC) 1998). 
The election of delegates is the subject of detailed analysis by Antony 
Green in Chapter Two. He argues that, while the republican candidates were 
more successful, the results help in explaining the subsequent defeat of the 
referendum by those voters least interested in the issue who did not participate 
in the convention election. The date of the election was announced on 12 
September 1997. Voting papers were to be mailed out in the period 3-14 
November and the poUing closed on 9 December. The results were made 
pubUc on 24 December. 
Elections were held in each state and territory The distribution of seats was: 
New South Wales (20), Victoria (16), Queensland (13), Western Austraha (9), 
South AustraUa (8), Tasmania (6), AustraUan Capital Territory (2), and 
N o r t h e r n Territory (2). A Senate-style voting me thod , with some 
modifications, was used. The mrnout, 45.3 percent of eUgible voters was, under 
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the circumstances, quite respectable. But it did leave open the question of 
whether this was a representative sample of the whole electorate, and just what 
the views of the remaining 54 percent would be at any subsequent referendum. 
There were 609 candidates, including 80 groups and 176 non-aUgned 
individuals (AustraUan Electoral Commission 1998, 18). The two most 
prominent groups, ARM and ACM, did best and won the bulk of the elected 
positions. ARIVl poUed 30.3 percent and ACM 22.5 percent (AustraUan 
Electoral Commission 1998, 19). RepubUcan candidates led the count in NSW, 
Victoria, WA, ACT and NT, while anti-repubUcans led in Queensland, SA and 
Tasmania (AustraUan Electoral Commission 1998, 33—4). 
The Prime Minister appointed the other 76 delegates: 40 parUamentary and 
36 non-parhamentary (Constitutional Convention 1998, 58-60). The 
parUamentary delegates included both Commonwealth and state Government 
representatives. The Commonwealth representatives included all the party 
leaders and some backbenchers. The state representatives included the state 
Premiers and Opposition leaders, and the Chief Ministers of the ACT and the 
Northern Territory. 
The selection of the non-parUamentary appointees followed considerable 
prior speculation and argument about the representation of young people and 
Indigenous AustraUans, and about the balance between women and men. 
Those selected included seven youth delegates, some IncUgenous leaders such 
as Lowitja O'Donoghue and GatjH Djerkurra (past and present chairs of 
ATSIC), and prominent women such as Professor Judith Sloan, JuUe Bishop (to 
become Liberal MHR for Curtin in 1998), Dame Leonie I-Cramer, Helen Lynch 
and Dame Roma MitcheU. Church leaders appointed included AngUcan 
Archbishop Peter HoUingworth and CathoUc Archbishop George Pell. Other 
notables included Professor Geoffrey Blainey, Major-General WilUam 'Digger' 
James, BiU Hayden, Professor Greg Craven, Sir Arvi Parbo, Peter Sams and 
Lloyd Waddy. Howard also appointed two senior parUamentarians, Ian Sinclair 
(National Party) and Barry Jones (Labor) as Chair and Deput}- Chair of the 
Convention. 
The Constimtional Convention met in Canberra at Old ParUament House 
for 10 working days, 2-13 February 1998. The proceedings were televised and 
it attracted considerable favourable attention from both the mecUa and the 
pubUc, who were able to watch from the visitors' galleries (WilUams 1998; 
Vizard 1998; Jones 2000, 105-19; TurnbuU 1999, 43-77). 
Just before the Convention a Women's Constitutional Convention (WCC) 
was held in Canberra on 29-30 January 1998. The WCC was convened by 
representatives of AustraUan Women Lawyers, CCF, National Women's Justice 
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Coalition, Women's Electoral Lobb\', Women into PoUtics and YWCA 
AustraUa. \X CC aimed to 'ensure that the debate concerning the potential shift 
to a repubUc is not one-sided but includes the interests of women' (Curtin 
1997-98). 
WCC was a successful event, attended by 300 delegates, including a number 
who would be attending the Constitutional Convention itself While it added to 
the momentum for a repubUc it did not support a particular model. However, 
a majoritv' of delegates indicated their wish to go beyond a minimaUst repubUc, 
as parUamentary election of the President had come to be known. A majority 
'endorsed a repubUc that recognised and accepted indigenous AustraUans, 
enshrined gender equit}' in the poUtical process, promoted social cohesion, 
poUtical stabiUty and a democratic culmre, and included a bill of rights' (RolUns 
1998). 
Purpose and outcomes of the Convention 
The Convention had a narrowly defined purpose. It was asked by the Prime 
Minister to consider three questions. First, whether or not AustraUa should 
become a repubUc. Second, which repubUc model should be put to the voters 
to consider against the current system of government. Third, in what time 
frame and under what circumstances might any change be considered. Howard, 
in his opening address, promised delegates that 'If clear support for a particular 
repubUcan model emerged from the Convention, my government would, if 
returned at the next election, put that model to the AustraUan people in a 
referendum before the end of 1999' (Constitutional Convention 1998, 1). 
Howard then promised the Convention that, if the referendum were successful, 
the repubUc would be put in place for the centenary of federation, 1 January 
2001. 
In response to the Prime Minister's three questions, the Convention: 
supported by 89 votes to 52 with 11 abstentions, in principle, the idea that 
AustraUa should become a repubUc; supported by 73 votes to 57 with 22 
abstentions the Bipartisan Appointment of the President Model (BAPM) 
(while this was less than an absolute majority the chair declared it carried and a 
motion of dissent in the chair's ruUng was overwhelmingly defeated); and voted 
by 133 votes to 17 with 2 abstentions to recommend to the Prime Minister and 
ParUament that this model be put to a referendum. It also recommended that 
the referendum be held in 1999 and that, if successful, the repubUc should 
:ome into effect by 1 January 2001. 
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The Convention also discussed the imphcations that a republic would have 
for the states (Constimtional Convention 1998, 43). It resolved that the 
Commonwealth Government and ParUament extend an invitation to state 
Governments and ParUaments to consider: the imphcations for their respective 
Constimtions of any proposal that AustraUa become a repubUc; and the 
consequences to the federation if one or more states should decUne to accept 
repubUcan status. In any case, it resolved that state autonomy not be infringed. 
The Convention preferred the BAPM to three other models that were put 
to it. The first, moved by the WA Opposition Leader, Dr Geoff GaUop, was 
the Direct Election Model, involving: the election of the head of state by the 
AustraUan people foUowing a two-stage process for identifying candidates 
(Constitutional Convention 1998, 38) in which 'not less than three candidates 
would be selected from the nominees by a special majority of a joint sitting of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate'. The second, moved by the 
former Governor-General, BiU Hayden, was another direct election model. It 
involved 'nomination of candidates for the election by way of petition 
endorsed b\' at least one percent of voters' (Constimtional Convention 1998, 
38). 
The third, moved by the former Victorian Governor, Richard McGarvie, 
and hence known as the McGarvie Model, involved the least change from the 
present system. In Chapter Six of this book McGarvie explains his beUef that 
his model, which he continues to advocate, is both 'simple' and 'safe'. Under 
this model, the head of state would be appointed by a new, three person 
Constimtional Council, whose only role would be to ratify the Prime Minister's 
selection. Any citizen could put a name forward to the Prime Minister. 
The choice of model was carried out by exhaustive baUot. The Hayden 
Model received only four votes and was eUminated in the first round. The 
Direct Election Model was narrowly eUminated in the second round after 
receiving 30 votes. FinaUy, the BAPM prevailed in the final round by 73 votes 
to 32 for the McGarvie Model, 43 for no model at aU and three abstentions. 
Finally, the Convention recommended a continuing process of 
constitutional review. It resolved: 'that, if a repubUcan system of government 
should be introduced by referendum, at a date being not less than three years 
or more than five years thereafter the Commonwealth Government should 
convene a further Constitutional Convention' (Constimtional Convention 
1998, 49). The first item on the agenda of such a convention, with two-thirds 
of the delegates directly elected by the people, would be to review the operation 
of the new system of government. It would also be able to address any other 
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matter related to the new arrangements, including ways to better involve people 
in the poUtical process. 
A new Preamble 
The second major substantive issue was whether a new preamble should be 
added to the Constitution, whUe allowing for the existing preamble to remain 
intact. The Convention recommended that there should be a new preamble and 
that It should include the foUowing elements: 
• Introductory language in the form 'We the people of AustraUa'; 
• Reference to 'Almight}- God'; 
• References to the origins of the Constimtion and acknowledgment that the 
Commonwealth has evolved into an independent, democratic and sovereign 
nation under the Crown; 
• Recognition of our federal system of representative democracy and 
responsible government; 
• Affirmation of the rule of law; 
• Acknowledgment of the original occupancy and custodianship of AustraUa 
by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples; 
• Recognition of AustraUa's culmral cUversity; 
• Affirmation of respect for our unique land and the environment; 
• Reference to the people of AustraUa having agreed to reconstimte our 
system of government as a repubUc; and 
• Concluding language to the effect that '[we the people of AustraUa] 
asserting our sovereignty, commit ourselves to this constimtion'. 
The Convention also agreed that other matters might be considered for 
inclusion in the preamble. These included the foUowing: 
• Affirmation of the equaUt}' of aU people before the law; 
• Recognition of gender equaUt}'; and 
• Recognition that Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders have 
continuing rights by virtue of their stams as AustraUa's indigenous peoples. 
The Convention resolved that the preamble should not be used to interpret the 
other provisions of the Constitution and that this stipulation should be written 
into chapter three of the Constitution which deals with the judicature 
(Constimtional Convention 1998, 47). 
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These issues aU became part of a strenuous pubUc debate when the Prime 
Minister decided that a new preamble should be put to a referendum at the 
same time as the repubUc referendum. Howard asked the distinguished poet, 
Les Murray, to assist him in drafting the preamble. Murray had long been a 
repubUcan (see Murray 1977). In Chapter Seven Murray writes of his 
experience in doing this. 
The bipartisan appointment of the President model 
The Convention addressed a number of the details of the recommended 
model. It recommended that the Prime Minister should present to a joint sitting 
of the ParUament a 'single nomination for the office of President, seconded by 
the Leader of the Opposition' (Constitutional Convention 1998, 45; see also 
CCF 1998). The nomination would need the approval/support of a two-thirds 
majorit}'. 
In presenting a single name the Prime Minister would take into account the 
report of a committee estabUshed by ParUament to consider nominations. This 
committee should be: 
Of a workable size, its composition should have a balance between parliamentary 
(including representatives of all parties with part}- status in the Commonwealth 
ParUament) and community' membership and take into account as far as practicable 
considerations of federaUsm, gender, age and cultural diversit)' (Constitutional 
Convention 1998, 44). 
Nominations should be invited from as wide a range of individuals and 
organisations as possible so as 'to ensure that the AustraUan people are 
consulted as thoroughly as possible' (Constitutional Convention 1998, 44). 
Consultation shaU involve the whole community, including 'State and Territory 
ParUaments; local government; community organisations, and individual 
members of the pubUc' (Constimtional Convention 1998, 44). 
The Committee should compile a short-Ust of candidates for consideration 
by the Prime Minister, being mindful of 'community diversit}''. No nomination 
should be made pubUc without the consent of the nominee. The quaUfication 
for office is that the person be an AustraUan citizen quaUfied to be a member 
of the House of Representatives under s. 44 of the Constitution. 
The term of office is five years. The President can be dismissed 'at any time 
by a notice in writing signed by the Prime Minister' (Constitutional Convention 
1998, 45). This action would have to be approved within 30 days by the House 
of Representatives. If it were not approved this would constitute a vote of no 
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confidence m the Prime Minister. The powers of the President would be 'the 
same as those currentiy exercised by the Governor-General' (Constitutional 
Convention 1998, 45). To achieve this the Convention recommended that 
ParUament speU out as far as practicable the powers that are exercised on the 
advice of ministers (known as non-reserve powers), and issue a statement that 
'the reserve powers and the conventions relating to their exercise continue to 
exist'. 
Constitutional change by the referendum process 
In his introduction to the official report of the Convention, the Chairman, Ian 
Sinclair, noted that the outcomes of the Convention, including the 
recommendation that the repubUc question be put to the people at a 
referendum, 'should be assessed against the history of rejection of 
constitutional change' (Constimtional Convention 1998, 3). He further noted 
that 'only eight of the 42 propositions submitted by referendum have been 
approved'. The details of aU the constimtional referendums held prior to the 
1999 repubUc referendum are to be found in McAUister, Mackerras and 
Boldiston (1997, 107-13; see also Bennett and Brennan 1998-99). 
This record shows that it is difficult to achieve constitutional change by 
referendum. Various reasons are advanced for these conservative results, 
ranging from the compulsory voting system (inherentiy Ukely to favour 
conservatism in constimtional matters) to the perspicacity of the AustraUan 
people in resisting 'grabs for power' by the federal Government. However, it 
should also be noted that the AustraUan record might not be too conservative 
at aU when it is compared with attempts to change constitutional arrangements 
in other comparable countries, such as Canada (Galligan 1995, 121). 
Constimtional change is rarely easy to achieve, whatever the method, because it 
always involves the most major changes possible and is, therefore, conducted 
according to stringent rules (GalUgan 1997; Saunders 1994). 
There is, however, general agreement that any significant poUtical party 
opposition to a referendum proposal wiU speU its defeat. This was the case in 
1988, when aU four proposals were so overwhelmingly defeated (no proposal 
achieved even 40 percent support) that the future of constitutional change by 
referendum appeared to be bleak (Galligan and Nethercote 1989). 
Consequently, one strategy has been to attempt to 'depoUticise constimtional 
change' in an attempt to 'buUd constimtional change on effective consensus' 
(Saunders 1994, 54). In the past this non-partisan consensus building has been 
undertaken by constimtional committees, commissions and inquiries, most 
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recentiy by the Labor Government's Constimtional Commission in the 1980s. 
On this occasion the Constitutional Convention was meant formaUy to serve 
this purpose, whUe the CCF attempted to do so informally. Cheryl Saunders, 
the CCF's driving force, discusses in Chapter Fourteen the lessons for the 
future that the CCF learnt while trying to do this. 
The formal process of alteration of the Constitution by referendum is set 
out in s. 128 of the Constitution. It is a two-stage process: initiation by the 
ParUament and ratification by the people. First, the proposed biU must pass 
both houses of the Commonwealth ParUament (although under certain Umited 
circumstances the Governor-General can authorise a referendum question that 
has only passed one house). Secondly, the proposal must be put to the people 
and passed at a referendum. 
The referendum campaign is always accompanied by government 
distribution to each household of a pamphlet including the cases for Yes and 
No (each in 2000 words or less) and a statement outUning the textual alterations 
and additions to the Constitution that foUow from the proposal. This is in 
accordance with the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) A.ct 1984 (s. 11). The 
preparation and authorisation of these cases is the responsibiUty of those 
parUamentarians who voted accordingly in ParUament. The No case is prepared 
only if there are votes cast against the biU in the ParUament. 
The Umitations of this method of informing electors have previously been 
recognised (CampbeU 1989; Lenaz-Hoare 1984; Saunders 1984). The 
Commonwealth Government, the proposer of the referendum, has been 
prevented from spending any other money in support of the Yes case, whatever 
spending is undertaken by other organisations, including state Governments. 
The official arguments have tended to be partisan cases rather than the 
provision of reasonably factual information. It was for these reasons that 
alterations to the process were agreed to this time under the Referendum 
Legislation Amendment BiU 1999. However, John Uhr beUeves that further 
changes are necessary and puts forward his case in Chapter Thirteen. 
Once the vote is taken the proposed change is approved if two majorities 
are achieved: firstiy, an overaU majority of voters; and, secondly, a majority of 
voters in a majority (four or more) of the states. The votes from the two 
territories are only counted in the calculation of the national result. These 
stringent, double-majorit}' requirements have caused some referendums to faU. 
Five proposals, including most recentiy, the so-caUed Simultaneous Elections 
for the House of Representatives and the Senate, in 1977, have failed despite 
attracting overaU majorities (Saunders 1994, 54). There have been no cases of 
the reverse occurring, though such is always logicaUy possible. 
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P u b U c o p i n i o n o n m o n a r c h y a n d repubUc 
Surveys of Australian attitudes towards the monarchy and republican 
constitutional change have been undertaken by polling organisations since 
1953, at which time support for a repubUc was 15 percent (Goot 1987; Bean 
1993; Goo t 1994). Analysts of these surveys point out that they need to be 
interpreted cautioush' as the wording of the questions is rarely identical and 
attitudes vary according to the question asked. It was for this reason that the 
wording of the repubUc referendum question itself was to become so heatedly 
contested. 
Majority communitv support as measured by public opinion poUs does not 
necessarily translate into majorit}' support for the Yes case at a referendum. 
Support often evaporates during the referendum campaign. In one famous case 
of this, the Mcnzies Government 's referendum in 1951 to ban the Communist 
Party was defeated, after a N o campaign led by the Labor Part}' leader, Dr H V 
Hvatt, despite previously enjoying 80 percent community support (Webb 1954, 
121). 
Broadly speaking, AustraUans favoured the retention of the monarchy until 
the 1990s. There was not a single case of a majority of survey respondents 
favouring a repubUc, although the size of the minority steadily grew, reaching 
about 25 percent in the 1960s and about 30 percent in the 1970s. During the 
1980s the majorit}' for the monarchy was usually about 60 percent with about 
30 percent supporting a repubUc and about 10 percent undecided (Bean 1993, 
193, Table 1). 
This changed quite quickly in the 1990s for a number of reasons, including 
growing nationaUsm stimulated by earUer events such as the 1988 bicentennial 
celebrations, the changing demographic character of the AustraUan community 
and the active support for a repubUc now emanating from some poUtical parties 
and communit}' organisations. By 1991-92 support for republicanism had 
increased and individual surveys began to report either majorit}' opinion (more 
than 50 percent) or pluraUt}' opinion (greater than support for the monarchy 
but less than 50 percent because of undecided respondents) in favour of a 
repubUc. 
Attitudes towards the monarchy/repubUc vary according to the social and 
poUtical backgrounds of the respondents in ways that, given the general 
character of /VustraUan political Ufe, are fairly predictable. Liberal and National 
voters are much more Ukely to support the retention of the monarchy than are 
Labor voters. So too are a number of other categories, including: women rather 
than men; older rather than younger citizens; rural rather than urban residents; 
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members of the main Protestant denominations rather than Catholics and 
those of no reUgious affiUation; and those born in England rather than other 
AustraUans (Bean 1993, 196-201). As for regional differences, according to one 
smdy, Queenslanders and Tasmanians stand out as supporters of the status quo 
(Bean 1993, 199). Many of these attitudinal differences were to become clear 
as the referendum campaign got under wa\'. Ultimately, they were reflected in 
voting patterns at the referendum. 
By the time of the Convention in February 1998, surveys regularly reported 
a majority in favour of an AustraUan repubUc, though this was never taken as a 
strict guide to how AustraUans would vote in a referendum. A Roy Morgan 
Research Centre PoU found Yes 53 percent. No 39 percent and 8 percent 
undecided {Australian Finandal Kivieir, 14 February 1998). As the like!}- model 
became more clearly defined, surveys began to test pubUc opinion towards this 
ARM/Keating 'minimaUst' model. They reported that, faced with a choice 
between a President elected by ParUament (BAPM) and a President directly 
elected by the people, a large majorit}- supported the latter. For instance, a poll 
taken in the first week of February 1998, during the Constitutional Convention, 
reported that 66 percent supported election by popular vote compared with 
election by ParUament (17 percent) and the McGarvie model (10 percent) 
(Australian, 10 February 1998). When pitted against the stams quo onh' the 
popular election model produced a majority for the repubUc. At the 
Convention itself, advocates of direct election, notabi}' the late Associate 
Professor Patrick O'Brien from Western AustraUa, emphasised these results 
(Australian, 11 February 1998). 
From then until the referendum, most surveys addressed this aspect of the 
question as weU as opinion for/against the repubUc. Surveys continued to show 
majority support for a directiy elected president. They showed also that, despite 
continued majority support for a republic, the parliamentary model 
recommended by the Convention would not have majorit}' support and, hence, 
would fail to pass. For instance, this was the case in both an Age / AC Nielsen 
poU in January 1999 and a NewspoU in March 1999 {Age, 26 January 1999; 
Australian, 3 March 1999). The former, presented under the headUne 'Voters 
reject repubUc' reported that only 41 percent would vote for a repubUc with an 
appointed president. The figure in the latter instance was only 33 percent, under 
the headUne 'RepubUc case in crisis'. The repubUcans were in trouble, although 
on both occasions general support for a repubUc was far greater, by about 15 
percent, than general support for the monarchy. 
Nevertheless, there could be no agreement as to what these results acmaUy 
meant (McKenna 1999). The wording of survey questions continued to make 
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quite a difference to the result, suggesting that the wording of the reterendum 
itself might also be crucial to that outcome. Furthermore, there continued to 
be a substantial number of 7\ustraUans, between 10 percent and 17 percent of 
the community, who remained uncommitted. 
The most favourable response in favour of the repubUc about that time 
came from a poU commissioned by the ARM itself and conducted by Newspoll 
in January 1999. The question read: 
The referendum later this year will propose to amend the Constimtion to replace 
the Queen with an AustraUan Head of State chosen by a two-thirds majorit)' of 
Pariiament with the support of both sides of poHtics. This will very Ukely mean that 
the new Head of State will not be a poUtician. With this in mind will you \'OLirself 
vote Yes or will you vote No in the referendum to make this change to the 
Constitution? 
The result was 58.3 percent Yes, 30.7 percent N o and 10.8 percent Don't 
know/Refused (NewspoU Market Research 1999). 
Major participants in the constitutional debate 
As the process moved from the Convention to the referendum itself, the 
pattern of the participants in the party poUtical debate became clearer.'The 
Liberal Party was divided and there were both monarchists and repubUcans in 
about equal numbers among Cabinet Ministers. The declared monarchists 
included not only the Prime Minister himself, but also Cabinet Ministers such 
as Senator Nick Minchtn, who had carried responsibiUt}' for the Constimtional 
Convention. Other prominent monarchist ministers included Bronw}'n Bishop 
and, most outspoken of aU, Tony Abbott. 
RepubUcan Liberals on the frontbench included: the Treasurer, Peter 
CosteUo; Environment Minister, Senator Robert HiU; Finance Minister, John 
Fahey; and Senator Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Justice. Prominent 
backbenchers included Senator Marise Payne (NSW), once ARM's Deput\' 
National Convener, and Senator Alan Eggleston (WA), patron of the ARM in 
WA, who convened a group of parUamentary Liberals for the repubUc. Peter 
Reith, Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business 
supported a popularly elected President and announced that he would vote N o 
at the referendum. 
The National Party was officiaUy monarchist, as both the Nationals ' leader 
r im Fischer and his deput}'John Anderson proclakned in their addresses to the 
Convention. However, Fischer stated that individual National MPs would be 
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aUowed a conscience vote, and as the campaign unfolded several backbenchers, 
including Larry Anthony, declared that they were repubUcans. Among the 
Nationals, Senator Ron BosweU, the party's leader in the Senate, was the most 
outspoken monarchist. 
The ALP was formally and soUdly repubUcan. Since June 1991 it had been 
committed to the repubUc by I January 2001. The party was committed to 
campaigning for a Yes vote at the referendum and the Leader of the 
Opposition, Kim Beazley, restated this position on a number of occasions. A 
preUminary discussion was held at the ALP National Executive as to whether 
the party should declare the repubUc a conscience vote for MPs and party 
members. Former Labor Lord Mayor of Sydney, Doug Sutherland, represented 
the ACM at the Convention, and the direct electionists campaigning for No 
included Clem Jones, an ALP Ufe member, and Paul TuUy, both of whom were 
also Convention delegates. No federal MPs broke ranks. 
The most prominent national Labor republicans were the shadow Attorney-
General, Robert McCleUand, and former Deputy Leader, Gareth Evans. 
Graham Edwards MHR (Cowan, WA) was an elected ARM delegate to the 
Convention prior to his 1998 election to ParUament. 
Senator Natasha Stott Despoja (SA), then deputy leader of the AustraUan 
Democrats, was the most prominent spokesperson for the party's official pro-
repubUc position. She was a parUamentary delegate to the Convention. The 
Democrats advocated greater pubhc participation in the process of 
constimtional reform, and wanted the Constimtional Convention to be a fully 
elected body (Senator Stott Despoja, Hansard, 29 March 1999, 3045-8). 
Senator Andrew Murray (WA) expressed some disquiet at the official 
Democrats position, claiming a directiy elected President would make the 
executive more accountable [Australian, 30 December 1998; West Australian, 13 
January and 28 January 1999). The part}' then baUoted its members to elaborate 
its poUcy by adding specific items to its Constitutional Reform PoUcy on the 
matter of choosing a head of state (Murray 1999; Austen 1999). 
The Greens were not prominent in the debate and were unrepresented 
among the Commonwealth parUamentary delegates to the Convention, 
although delegates included Christine Milne, then Greens' Tasmanian leader, 
and an elected NSW delegate, Catherine Moore. In general. Greens are direct 
election repubUcans. Greens (WA) Senator Dee Margetts was critical of the 
Convention process. She supported a further constitutional convention 
'preceded by extensive communit}' consultation' if the referendum was 
successful, and, if it was not, she advocated that a plebiscite be held at the time 
of the next federal election (Margetts 1999). PauUne Hanson's One Nation 
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part\- was not represented at the Convention, and did not play a prominent role 
in the debate. It was, in general, soUdly on the No side of the debate. 
The major part of the advocacy during the debate was carried out not by 
the parties but by committed communit}' groups. On the Yes side these 
included the ARAI, the newly formed Conservatives for An AustraUan Head of 
State, members of Yes coaUtions in most states and a number of smaUer 
repubUcan groups and unattached individuals. The No side included the ACM, 
the Remrned Services League (RSL), and some minor monarchist groups. Their 
efforts were significantiy supplemented by the Real RepubUcans, a coterie of 
prominent direct election repubUcans led by Ted Mack, Clem Jones and Phil 
Clear\'. Ted Mack explains his position in Chapter Five. 
Important roles were played by uncommitted educational organisations, the 
most important of which was the Constitutional Centenary Foundation (CCF) 
that continued its pubUc education activities up until the referendum. Its 
educational pubUcations were widely regarded as the most objective and 
attractively presented materials available. In Chapter Fourteen Professor 
Saunders reflects on the CCF's experience during the decade. 
From Convention to referendum 
The issue began to take real form in early 1999, foUowing the October 1998 
federal election in which the Howard Liberal government was re-elected. In 
February 1999 the Prime Minister decided that there would be two referendum 
questions — one on the repubUc and one on a new preamble to the 
Constitution. He announced that he would take a personal interest in the 
drafting of the preamble. The Attorney-General, Daryl WiUiams, would take 
responsibiUt}' for the carriage of the repubUc question. CoaUtion MPs were told 
at this time that the repubUc question would ask whether the 'Constimtion 
should be altered to estabUsh the Commonwealth of AustraUa as a repubUc 
with a president chosen by a two-thirds majority of ParUament' (Australian 
Financial Review, 17 February 1999). The wording of each question was the 
responsibiUt}' of Cabinet. Andrew Robb, for the Conservatives for an 
AustraUan Head of State, claimed that, by faiUng to mention the Queen, the 
question 'includes a clever selection of words most Ukely to provoke a negative 
reaction from people at the very moment they go to vote'. Robb proposed an 
alternative wording: 'A BiU for an Act to alter the constitution to provide for an 
AustraUan citizen, chosen by a two thirds majority of a joint sitting of the 
Federal ParUament, to replace the British Monarch as AustraUa's head of state' 
(Robb 1999, 4). 
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From this time onwards there was considerable lobbying about the wording 
of the question. Among repubUcans there was also continuing distrust of the 
Prime Minister's role. This was despite Howard, while maintaining his personal 
position in support of the status quo, giving an undertaking not to campaign 
for either side {Age, 18 December 1998). The ARM made clear that it beUeved 
that repubUcans would have to fight for a level playing field against Howard's 
attempts to favour the status quo. The ACM defended the PM. 
On 19 February 1999, the Attorney-General announced the names of the 
two ten-member teams responsible for planning and managing national paid 
media campaigns to supplement the official Yes and No campaigns prior to the 
referendum. The composition of the teams had been negotiated with the ACM 
and ARM. The Yes team comprised Malcolm TurnbuU, Janet Holmes a Court, 
NevUle Wran, Lowitja O'Donoghue, Gareth Evans MHR, Senator Natasha 
Stott Despoja, Chris Gallus MHR, Jason Yat-Sen Li, Professor Greg Craven 
and Steve Vizard. This was a mix of four leading ARM members, three 
parUamentarians and three non-parUamentarians from wider repubUcan circles. 
The No team comprised Kerry Jones, Cr Julian Leeser, Major-General 'Digger' 
James, Senator Ron BosweU, Dame Leonie Kramer, Senator Alan Ferguson, Sir 
David Smith, Heidi Zwar, Ted Mack and Clem Jones. The first eight were a mix 
of ACM leaders and CoaUtion parUamentarians, whUe the last two were direct 
election repubUcans. 
Each team was made responsible for half ($7.5 milUon) of the $15 milUon 
aUocated for the national media component of the Yes and No cases. The 
campaigns would be restricted to the month leading up to the referendum. 
Later, in April, the Attorney-General released guideUnes under which the two 
committees would operate {Australian Finandal Review, 13 April 1999): 
• The committees must restrict their activities to the use of the 
Commonwealth Government funding and cannot accept donations or raise 
other funds; 
• Competitive selection processes should be considered for work contracted 
out where this is feasible and there should be proper monitoring of the 
performance of contractors; 
• Records are to be made avaUable for audit and are to be transferred in fuU 
to Prime Minister and Cabinet; 
• The committees wiU be required to submit a proposed budget for 
consideration by the Ministerial CouncU on Government Communications; 
and 
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• Administrative costs are limited and committee members are onh' allowed 
travel expenses. 
The Government announced that the traditional paper versions of the \ e s 
and N o cases would be supplemented on this occasion by wider distribution, 
including via the internet. It also aUocated $4.5 milUon funding to a separate 
pubUc education campaign, to be conducted prior to the partisan campaign 
itself (ElUson 1999). It would have three elements: information on the current 
system of government ; information on the referendum process; and 
information on the acmal questions. 
The education campaign would be advised by a panel of experts, chaired by 
Sir Ninian Stephen, and also comprising Professor Geoffrey Blaine}', Dr CoUn 
Howard QC, Professor Cheryl Saunders and Dr John Hirst (WilUams and 
ElUson 1999). The NewspoU organisation was commissioned to survey the 
communit}''s existing knowledge of the three elements of the information 
campaign. 
O n 9 March 1999 the government released the Exposure Draft of the 
Constitution Alteration (Estabhshment of RepubUc) BiU 1999 for pubUc 
c o m m e n t by 16 April. The draft did not depart from the major 
recommenda t ions of the Constitutional Convention in regard to the 
appointment, removal and powers of the President (Constimtional Centenary 
Foundation 1999). The same was true of another potentiaUy controversial 
issue, the position of the states. It indicated that any state 'that has not altered 
its laws to sever its Unks with the Crown by the time the office of Governor-
General ceases to exist retains its Unks with the Crown until it has so altered its 
laws' (Exposure Draft, section 5, 'The States'). The biU removed aU 
constitutional references to the Queen and the Governor-General, and 
addressed some additional matters, such as the positions of Acting and Deput}' 
President. At the same time the Government released the Exposure Draft of 
the Presidential Nominations Committee BiU 1999. 
The next step occurred on 10 June 1999 when the Attorney-General 
introduced the two biUs into pariiament. The biUs were amended, with the 
assistance of The Referendum Task Force in the Depar tment of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, following the reception of over 100 submissions on the 
exposure drafts (Commonwealth of AustraUa 1999, 6). Just prior to this, in 
May, the ParUament had appointed a Joint Select Committee on the RepubUc 
Referendum (Commonwealth of AustraUa 1999). The committee comprised 
Liberal M H R Bob Charies (chair), Shadow Attorney General Robert 
McClelland (deput}' chair) and fifteen other senators and members. It extended 
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over 200 invitations to make submissions and also made a pubUc caU for 
submissions. 
On 22 June, in Canberra, the committee met for the first time. On 29 June 
it commenced an extensive series of round table discussions and pubUc 
hearings that ranged across the country The discussions were vigorous and 
animated within the strict terms of reference of the committee. There were 122 
original written submissions. The committee reported to ParUament on 9 
August, in time for the referendum to proceed on 6 November. The first of its 
14 recommendations was that the titie of the main biU be as foUows: 'A BiU for 
an Act to alter the Constitution to estabUsh the Commonwealth of AustraUa as 
a repubUc, with the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by an 
AustraUan President'. 
The bills passed through the parUament on 12 August, with the words now 
being: 'A Bill for an Act to alter the Constitution to establish the 
Commonwealth of AustraUa as a republic with the Queen and Governor-
General being replaced by a President appointed by a two-thirds majorit}' of 
the members of the Commonwealth ParUament'. 
The referendum campaign 
Once the legislation passed through ParUament, the skirmishing became more 
frequent. It was encouraged further b\' the launch of the Government's pubUc 
education campaign on Sunday 19 September (Commonwealth Government 
1999). The production of the education campaign materials for the press, radio 
and television was bitterly divisive behind the scenes. According to TurnbuU 
one of the members of the committee, Saunders, declared 'the whole process 
was a disaster'. TurnbuU thought 'the brochure is incomprehensible and serves 
to make the simple complex' (TurnbuU 1999, 159). The main theme of the 
advertisements was that the choice before voters represented a crossroads. This 
jarred with the long-advanced message from the ARM that the repubUcan 
model represented minimal change. On the central issue of 'Who is the Head 
of State?' the brochure put both answers to the question. Queen and 
Governor-General, without reaching a conclusion. However, the Government 
brochure did emphasise that the new President would have 'the same powers 
that the Governor-General now has'. 
The official campaign period began four weeks before the polUng day on 
the weekend of 9—10 October with the media launches of the two advertising 
campaigns (TurnbuU 1999, 182-5; Jones 2000, 197-9). The No advertisements 
centred on their campaign song, 'The People's Protest', sung by James BlundeU. 
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Closer to the poUing da\' the AustraUan Electoral Commission (AFIC) delivered 
to each person on the electoral roll a copy of official \ 'cs and N o cases 
(AustraUan Electoral Commission 1999). These cases are the most accessible 
statement of the arguments. They became controversial because the \ c s case 
was very short, only 14 of a possible 25 pages. According to Jones, 'Whenever 
we debated from now on we used the AEC booklet. It clearly demonstrated the 
Yes case did not want to promote the detail of their republic or argument' 
(Jones 2000, 197). 
The official Yes case concentrated on the simple message that it was now 
time for a mature, independent nation to 'have our own Head of State'. It 
emphasised that the change would be: 'A smaU step, important and safe' (AEC 
1999, 8). 'Replacing the Queen with an AustraUan Head of State is a small but 
important symboUc step for aU AustraUans. It is the final step to confirm our 
independence' (AEC 1999, 10). 
The more detaUed N o case urged voters to 'Vote ' N o ' to the 'poUticians' 
repubUc'. It continued: 
This referendum is not just about whether AustraUa should become a repubUc. It is 
about the type of repubUc. And the repubUc model being proposed is seriously 
flawed — it is untried, unworkable, undemocratic and eUtist. The poUticians will 
appoint the President, not the people. It removes the checks and balances from the 
current system (AEC 1999, 9). 
There were four types of voters, according to the N o case, who would vote No: 
those 'who don't know'; those 'who want to elect their President'; those 'who 
don't want an appointed President' (because this President would be 'a Prime 
Minister's puppet, subject to instant dismissal'); and those 'who value the 
certaint}' and stabiUt}' of our current Constimtion' (AEC 1999, 9). 
Ten detailed reasons for voting N o foUowed. The central Yes argument in 
support of an AustraUan head of state was addressed in the N o case by the 
claim that: 'Our constitutional Head of State, the Governor-General, is an 
AustraUan citizen and has been since 1965'. The N o case concluded with the 
message: 'Any change should only be for the better — reject this third-rate 
repubUc'(AEC 1999,25). 
O n 22-24 October a deUberative poll was held in Old ParUament House in 
Canberra. Rachel Gibson and Sarah Miskin describe and analyse this event in 
Chapter 12. The poU, reporting a swing among the delegates towards the Yes 
side gave last minute hope to ARM and Yes campaigners. WhUe he was initiaUy 
sceptical, TurnbuU saw the results as 'an extraordinary vindication of the 
model ' (TurnbuU 1999, 209). Jones 'deeply regret[ted] 1 ever aOowed the N o 
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case to be part of such a sham. But 1 do not criticise the organisers, but the 
ARM which infiltrated the process' (Jones 2000, 197). 
The two campaigns rarely connected with one another despite innumerable 
media debates and other contests between the two sides. The Yes case 
concentrated largely on the general case for an AustraUan head of state, as 
TurnbuU put it, the core message was 'a No vote is a vote for the monarchy' 
(TurnbuU 1999, 185). As the campaign continued it made greater attempts to 
reject criticisms of the model on offer and to 'defend the model as the best for 
AustraUa' (TurnbuU 1999, 190). The No side carefully chose to concentrate on 
what they saw as the Umitations of the model and to throw doubt in the minds 
of voters about the desirabiUt}' of an}' change. 
The referendum result: 6 November 1999 
The repubUc referendum on 6 November faUed to pass, as did the referendum 
on the preamble (AustraUan Electoral Commission 2000; Irving 2000; Newman 
1999). The result was very clear in both cases. The national No vote was 54.9 
percent on the repubUc question and 60.7 percent on the preamble question. 
This meant that the Yes vote for the repubUc was amongst the lowest third of 
all 44 referendum results, while for the preamble it was the seventh worst ever 
(Irving 2000, 111). Chapter Eight by Malcolm Mackerras and WilUam Maley 
provides more detaU about the result and a number of other chapters, including 
those by participants such as Barns and Jones, discuss the outcome. 
The repubUc referendum failed to pass in each of the six states, succeeding 
only in the AustraUan Capital Territory (63.3 percent). It went closest in 
Victoria where the Yes vote was 49.8 percent. The pattern of voting produced 
some intriguing outcomes. OveraU 28 percent of electorates voted Yes and 72 
percent voted No. Those that voted Yes included a mix of CoaUtion and Labor 
electorates, including the Prime Minister's own electorate of Bennelong. Those 
that voted No were Ukewise mixed, including the Opposition Leader's 
electorate of Brand and aU National Part}' electorates. In general terms 
(Newman 1999) the Yes vote was strongest in metropoUtan electorates, 
especiaUy in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra, and weakest in rural electorates. 
It was strongest in Labor seats, though overaU Labor could not carry its own 
seats, and weakest in National Part}' seats. It was, by and large, strongest in 
electorates of high socio-economic status (see Table 8.15). 
The size of the defeat is arguable and dependent on context. Whether it was 
a huge landsUde for the status quo (Jones 2000, 214 and Chapter Three in this 
book) or 'a substantial achievement' for repubUcans (Barns in Chapter Four) is 
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a matter of opinion. In comparison to the defeated 1988 referenda the result 
was quite good for the repubUc. Of greater future importance is the 
interpretation of the results. \X'h\' was the referendum defeated? There are five 
broad lines of argument, which can also be combined in any number of ways. 
They shade into each other in various ways. 
The first is based on the socio-economic breakdown of the results and 
summed up by the titie of Kerr\- Jones ' memoir of the ACM campaign. The 
People's Protest (Jones 2000). Irving (2000, 112) expresses this hypothesis: 'this 
particular referendum failed because it represented the aspirations of an "eUte" 
and it aUenated the "people", especially the "battiers"'. The immediate media 
response commonly accepted this Une of thinking that the voting revealed that 
Australia was a society divided, not along party Unes, but between 'a confident, 
educated, cit}'-based middle class and a pessimistic, urban and rural battier 
constituency hostile to the 1990s change agenda' (KeUy 1999). The latter, given 
the chance, were keen to reject a proposal championed by the eUte. Andrew 
Robb, the leader of Conservatives for an AustraUan Head of State, considered 
that: 'For these people it was a costiess way of poking the better off and the 
poUticians and aU the sociaUy progressives in the eye' (quoted in Snow 1999). 
The second argument depends on the historic difficulty of achieving 
successful referendums. This interpretation concentrates on many of the 
general reasons given for the failure of referendums, such as the inherent 
UkeUhood of a negative campaign being easier to run. Barns, in Chapter Four, 
condemns 'the monarchists ' use of scare campaigning' and is supported by 
Mark McKenna in Chapter Eleven. Reactions in this case concentrated 
especiaUy on the need for strong bipartisan support. As Irving (2000, 112) 
argues, 'referendums have no chance of succeeding if they do not have wide, 
cross-part}' support and particularly the support of the Prime Minister'. 
TurnbuU, in remarks to which Jones took great offence (Jones 2000, 215), 
reserved his strongest criticism on the night of the poU for John Howard: 'there 
is only one person who could have made the vital difference, who could have 
made November 6 a landmark in our history, and that, of course, is the Prime 
Minister' (TurnbuU 1999, 245). These remarks are repeated by Barns, his 
successor, in Chapter Four. 
The third argument considers the particular circumstances and processes of 
this occasion. TurnbuU reflected after the defeat along these Unes: 'AustraUans 
felt that they had been excluded from this process, that they had been rushed, 
that there had been insufficient debate about what sort of repubUc we should 
have and, most of all, that diey had not been given enough information' 
(TurnbuU 1999,247). 
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Whether the timetable was too short is a matter of opinion, but the charge 
that there was no hurry was effective during the campaign. Irving considers 
'insufficient voter knowledge' as an aspect of one common hypothesis, put 
forward by Barns in this book. Barns considers that the Government education 
campaign was biased, a position supported by John Uhr in Chapter Thirteen. 
Survey data confirms that Yes voters were better informed than N o voters 
(McAUister 2000). Compulsory voting magnified the N o victory Despite this, 
it is not certain that more information and a longer period for discussion would 
have bridged the gap between ignorance and knowledge. WhUe Uhr sees the 
deUberative poU as the 'only reaUy fair test of the 1999 repubUc model', Gibson 
and Miskin contend in Chapter Twelve that, because of the distortions 
introduced by the mass media, 'the poU failed to optimaUy educate participants'. 
The fourth Une of argument is that the flaw lay in the repubUcan model that 
was put to the electorate. Perhaps a direct election model would have been 
successful. Jonathan KeUey's survey, reported in Chapter Nine, suggests this. 
Much of the N o campaign's strategy was directed against the particular model, 
the 'poUtician's repubUc', and the presence of some of the direct election 
repubUcans, Mack, Jones and Cleary, on the N o side certainly hurt the 
repubUcan cause. 
The fifth and final interpretation, subscribed to strongly by Ted Mack in 
Chapter Five, is that the Yes side ran a poor campaign. Jones beUeved that ACM 
and N o 'outcampaigned' their opposition, which she describes as 'amateurish' 
(Jones 2000, 201). The Yes campaign was criticised in hindsight for its use of 
poUtical, judicial, social and sporting eUtes to communicate its message. At the 
time, it beUeved that pubUc figures, such as Malcolm Fraser, made a positive 
contribution. 
Future directions 
The November 1999 referendum result led to various reflections on the fumre. 
Justice Michael Kirby, one of the founders of the ACM, concluded that: 'One 
day AustraUa may weU become a repubUc. But it wUl not happen until the 
lessons of the referendum of 1999 are learnt' (Kirby 2000, 535). According to 
I<jrby: 
The repubUcan referendum of 1999 showed once again the difficulties of changing 
the AustraUan Constitution. But it also showed the special difficulties of changing 
the Constimtion from a monarchy to a repubUc. Those difficulties are Ukely to 
remain for the foreseeable fumre. Those who persist with the proposal for change 
need to reflect on the errors made that evenmaUy contributed to the 1999 
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republican defeat. Unless those errors are addressed and repaired, the prospect in 
the immediate future of an alteration to the AustraUan Constitution to a repubUc 
being appro\-ed as Section 128 requires appears (to use a word much deplo)'ed in 
the months before 6 November 1999) minimal (Kirby 2000, 534). 
Helen Ir\ing's conclusion was, if anything, bleaker: 
RepubUcans will need to ask themselves how ardendy they desire a repubUc and just 
how many processes they are prepared to endure along the way. The alternative is 
to wait until Britain itself takes the constitutional steps that wUl render the relevant 
sections of AustraUa's Constitution either redundant or inappUcable. A referendum 
in the wake of such a move would most Ukely succeed (Irving 2000, 115). 
Future prospects for a repubUc rest firstiy on an understanding of the 1999 
result. They involve an analysis of the institutional reasons for its defeat, the 
question of the model to be put to the electorate, and the Umitations of the 
repubUcan campaign. Each of these issues needs to be addressed in mrn. 
Kirby is right to emphasise the difficulty of the AustraUan constimtional 
amendment process. No change to s. 128 is Ukely. Only the admission of the 
Northern Territory to statehood would change the poUtical arithmetic of 
achieving a majority of states easier. Some change to the referendum processes, 
as discussed by Uhr, is, however, within the realms of possibiUt}'. 
There is no agreement yet among repubUcans, as demonstrated by some of 
the contributors to this book, as to whether an alternative model would be 
more Ukely to succeed. The ARM has withdrawn its support for the minimaUst 
model and now is committed to an open process of discussion and education 
prior to a model being chosen (TurnbuU 2001). It supports the proposal of the 
AustraUan Labor Party, put to the 2001 federal election, for a three-stage 
approach. The first would be an 'in principle' plebiscite on a repubUc. If this 
passed then a second plebiscite would offer choices between competing 
repubUc models. FinaUy, there would be another referendum. Labor assumes 
that the process would take about a decade. There is no consensus within the 
Labor Part}' itself about the best model. The state Labor Premiers include 
minimaUst repubUcans, such as Bob Carr and Steve Bracks, and direct 
electiomsts Uke Peter Beattie and Geoff GaUop. For a final referendum to be 
passed Labor would have to agree to a united front in favour of the model that 
emerged from the plebiscites. 
The Umitations of the repubUcan campaign can only be addressed when the 
occasion arises. The chief vehicle is Ukely to remain the ARM. It has 
reconstimted itself as a democratic national organisation. In October 2000 new 
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national and state executive committees were elected. The organisation now 
formaUy included on its national committee a wider range of repubUcans, 
including Tim CosteUo, Jason Li and Natasha Stott Despoja (elected leader of 
the AustraUan Democrats in April 2001). The new chairman, replacing 
Malcolm TurnbuU, is Greg Barns (Barns 2000). 
What is sure is that any future repubUc referendum wiU be as bitterly fought 
as was the case in 1999. The ACM, now convened by Professor David FUnt, 
has also maintained and renewed its organisation. However, it is unclear just 
what support the ACM wiU have. While organisations Uke the Remrned 
Services League may remain opposed to change, much wiU depend upon the 
disposition of the parUamentary wings of the Liberal and National parties. The 
Liberal Part}' might be led, in a future referendum campaign, b\' a repubUcan 
such as the current Treasurer, Peter CosteUo. CosteUo, Uke most Liberal 
repubUcans, supports the minimaUst model but would probabL be unwilUng to 
support a directly elected President. 
The greatest uncertaint}' Ues in the potential impact of the passage of time. 
Here there are competing scenarios, one favourable and the other unfavourable 
to a fumre repubUc. The unfavourable scenario assumes that, in Kerry Jones' 
words, 'They had their chance and they blew it'. In this scenario the repubUc 
wiU fade away. There will not only not be events that will revitaUse the 
repubUcan movement, but the operation of AustraUa's 'crowned repubUc' by 
the Governor-General wiU diminish republican sentiment for an Australian 
head of state. If the Governor-General wins community acceptance as 
AustraUa's de facto head of state then the task of repubUcans will be much 
more difficult. 
The favourable scenario continues to rely on the 'inevitabiUt}'' of the 
repubUc and assumes that clear majorit}' support in principle for an AustraUan 
repubUc wiU in some wa}-, at some time, translate into constitutional reform. 
The favourable scenario assumes that the question of the appropriate 
repubUcan model, especiaUy the dispute between the direct and parUamentary 
election models, can be resolved and unit}' therefore restored among 
repubUcans. 
The time since the referendum, in particular the events during the centenary 
of federation in 2001, iUustrates these alternative scenarios. PubUc debate has 
continued and proposals continue to emerge. Most encouragingly for 
repubUcans the centenary of the first sitting of the AustraUan ParUament, in 
Melbourne in May 2001, was a platform for repubUcan sentiment. RepubUcans 
have taken this opportunit}' and others, such as the appointment of Archbishop 
Peter HoUingworth as Governor-General from July 2001, to keep the issue on 
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the pubUc agenda. Opponents of constitutional reform, Uke Kerry Jones in this 
book, continue to argue that reform is too costiy and that it is an elitist issue. 
On matters of substance they defend the Governor-General as an 'Australian' 
head of state. 
Future developments are Ukely to address matters of process. A number of 
the authors in this book address matters of process for decision makers to 
consider with a view to broader community deUberation. In Chapter Thirteen, 
L"hr proposes an all-part}' committee on referendums and constitutional 
change, and a Referendum Commission. In Chapter Five, Mack looks forward 
to a more ordered process involving both a plebiscite and a fully elected, 
properly structured constitutional convention. In Chapter Six, Richard 
McGarvie opposes a plebiscite and puts his faith in expertise, including an all-
part}' committee. In Chapter Eleven, Mark McKenna proposes a broader 
debate with less concentration on national identity and greater Unks with 
contemporary issues such as reconcUiation and citizenship. George Williams in 
Chapter Ten suggests a process of constitutional renewal with a broader debate 
of issues such as a BiU of Rights. Frank Brennan, in Chapter Fifteen, stresses 
the need, if the community decides to move to a directiy elected President, to 
'redraw the public understanding of the different roles of Prime Minister and 
President'. George Winterton, in Chapter Sixteen, addresses the codification of 
the powers of a directiy elected president. 
In late 2001 and early 2002 there were events that might have served to 're-
ignite' the debate. A major pubUc conference was held in Corowa on 1-2 
December to formulate a process for moving the repubUc issue forwards 
(Corowa Shire CouncU 2000; Hammond 2000; Fischer 2001). It proposed a 
process to include a parUamentary committee, a plebiscite and a constitutional 
convention prior to a referendum. In February and March 2002, pubUc debate 
about the fumre of the Governor-General, Dr Peter HoUingworth, reached a 
crescendo. Criticism of his handUng of child abuse incidents while he was 
Archbishop of Brisbane led to caUs for his resignation or removal. This 
directed attention to the method of appointment of the Governor-General by 
the Prime Minister. 
The next step probably Ues with the Commonwealth ParUament, but no 
AustraUan government wiU ever again embark Ughtiy on constimtional reform. 
Furthermore, the re-election of Howard's CoaUtion Government on 10 
November 2001 means that immediate action is unUkely Labor's plans are in 
abeyance whUe Howard's personal support for the stams quo means that 
Liberal repubUcans must wait for his retirement and Peter Costello's 
ascendancy An AustraUan repubUc may be years away The opinions on this 
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question of the authors in this book range confidentiy from 2005 to never. A 
republic before 2010 must be unUkely. 

Chapter Two 
The Constitutional Convention 
Election 
Antony Green 
The first opportunitv AustraUans had to vote on AustraUa becoming a repubUc 
was not the November 1999 referendum, but two years earUer with the election 
for delegates to the 1998 Constitutional Convention. Rather than the simple 
Yes/No option offered by the referendum, the Convention election presented 
voters with candidates representing a range of repubUcan and monarchist 
opinions, and the results help in explaining the defeat of the referendum. Also, 
as the first federal election since 1922 conducted under voluntary voting, the 
Convention election provides an insight into the possible impact of 
compulsory voting on AustraUan poUtics. 
The origin of the Convention 
Debate on AustraUa becoming a repubUc did not enter the realms of inter-party 
poUtics until 27 February 1992 when, in response to a 'Dorothy Dixer' question 
on whether 'the 1950s were a time of great advancement ... a golden age for 
AustraUa?', Prime Minister Paul Keating launched an attack on past CoaUtion 
support for AustraUa's Unks with Britain (Hansard, 27 February 1992, 373-4). 
While the answer can be seen as the starting point for the repubUcan debate, 
Keating made no reference to AustraUa becoming a repubUc, and it is clear his 
main purpose was to open a new front of his attack on the CoaUtion's 
'Fightback' package, which at the time was still fresh and electoraUy popular. 
Coming at the end of Keating's first week in ParUament as Prime Minister, it 
also helped remove any Ungering bitterness on the Labor backbench over the 
method by which he had deposed Bob Hawke the previous December as, for 
the first time that day. Labor MPs finished Question Time in fuU voice behind 
his performance. 
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Keating's answer did not progress the issue of Australia becoming a 
public, but merely put it on the poUtical agenda. The republic became the first 
f man}' attacks by Keating designed to make the 1993 election a stark choice 
betvxccn Labor and the Coalition. While Keating was to raise the republican 
issue from time to time over the next year, the CoaUtion saw no reason to 
respond, viewing the issue as merely an attempt to divert attention from the 
main issue of the economy, and perhaps to goad more conservative supporters 
of the Coalition into outright opposition. 
The re-election of the Keating Government in March 1993 changed the 
political dynamics of the issue. One of the Government 's first acts was to 
appoint a RepubUc Advisory Committee on 28 April 1993; its two volume 
repcjrt was released later that year. This required a policy response from the 
CoaUtion rather than a simple refusal to countenance the issue. Divisions 
between repubUcans and monarchists within the Liberal Part}' made the 
development of a part}' poUcy that stated a position on the repubUc almost 
impossible. Instead, the CoaUtion under new Liberal leader Alexander Downer 
chose to blur the issue, settiing on caUing a Constitutional Convention, with 
half of the delegates to be popularly elected. RepubUcanism as the key 
constitutional issue was also downplayed by allowing the Convention to 
consider other constitutional issues. 
When John Howard supplanted Downer as leader in January 1995, he also 
inherited the Convention policy, despite his own personal preference for 
Australia to retain its Unk with the crown. In the year leading up to the 1996 
election, the CoaUtion again viewed the repubUc as a diversion from the main 
issues of the economy and the actions of the Keating Government. Paul 
Keating's ministerial statement on the repubUc (Hansard, 7 June 1995, 434—41), 
forced Howard to try and clarify the CoaUtion's position. (Hansard, 8 June 
1995,1620-5). 
After his own speech had been weU received, Keating launched a pre-
emptive attack on Howard, stating that he had only one question to answer: 
'Did he support having an AustraUan head of state instead of a foreign 
monarch?' (Sydney Morning Herald, 9 June 1995). Howard decUned to address the 
question in his speech, and media reviews of his reply were critical. Alan 
Ramsey described his speech as 'facile, contrived, pedestrian and disingenuous. 
It had no commitment, no passion and no clarit}' ... Paul Keating's speech on 
his republican timetable was everything in substance that Howard's wasn't. It 
was clear, precise and weU crafted' (Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1995). Even 
worse for Howard, Liberal Part}' divisions were revealed as Victorian Premier 
Jeff Kennet t described the Constitutional Convention as 'just another 
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committee', South AustraUan Premier Dean Brown claimed a repubUc was 
inevitable and Tasmanian Premier Ray Groom declared himself a repubUcan 
and promised a referendum in his state (Australian, 12 June 1995). 
The weakness of the poUcy Howard had inherited was that if no consensus 
was reached at the Convention, there would be no vote. 'Howard in backflip on 
referendum' (Australian, 12 June 1995) was one headUne that greeted the re-
write of the poUcy over the weekend. It now included a plebiscite if consensus 
was not reached on a particular model, effectively matching Labor's promise of 
a guaranteed vote on a repubUc. As Glenn Milne pointed out, this new position 
aUowed Howard to present the CoaUtion as offering a choice to the electorate, 
where aU Labor offered was a vote on 'Keating's RepubUc' (Australian, 12 June 
1995). It aUowed Howard to take the moral high ground, stating Keating had 
no more right to insist on his views on the repubUc than Howard himself had 
to demand retention of the monarchy. 
The decision in February 1996 of the New South Wales Government to 
downgrade the role of the state Governor aUowed Howard to attack Labor's 
undemocratic methods in pushing for a repubUc, 'high-handed, authoritarian 
behaviour — typical of the crude, strong-arm tactics about which the Ukes of 
Paul Keating and Mr Carr have constandy gloated' (Sunday Telegraph, 28 January 
1996). Instead of Labor using the repubUc to paint Howard as old fashioned, 
the CoaUtion was using it to paint Keating as arrogant, and had some success 
according to its poUing (WilUams 1997, 96). Voter attitude to AustraUa 
becoming a repubUc was strongly related to opinions of Keating (Leithner 
1994), and the direction of the causal relationship was doing more harm to the 
repubUcan cause than it was helping the Labor Part}''s chances for re-election. 
The repubUc was a low order issue at the 1996 election, but not one that could 
be ignored by the Howard Government once it took office. 
From policy to poUing 
Within a month. Senator Nick Minchin, the ParUamentary Secretary to the 
Prime Minister who was given carriage of the Constitutional Convention, was 
promising early action (Australian, 23 March 1996). In May the Prime Minister 
reiterated his support for the Convention at a joint part}' meeting after 
backbenchers had expressed some concern about the cost (Australian, 30 May 
1996). There were reports the Government was considering abandoning 
popular election, concerned the election could 'fall prey to weird and extreme 
groups' (Australian Finandal Review, 28 August 1996), with cost and concern 
about repubUcan victory other factors raised by ministers (Sydney Morning 
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Herald, 14 December 1996; Australian, 27 January 1997). The agenda of the 
convenuon was also changing, initially proposed to cover a wide range of issues 
(Australian, 19 August 1996), before finaUy narrowing down to just considering 
the repubUc (Sydney Morning Herald, 27 March 1997). 
DetaUs of Cabinet's decision were announced in eariy February 1997. 
Delegates were to be elected from state-wide electorates using a modified form 
of the Senate's quota preferential electoral system. The number of delegates 
elected from each state was to be roughly equal to its representation in the two 
houses of the federal ParUament, weighted in favour of the smaller states. The 
key feature of the election was that it would be conducted by voluntary postal 
baUot, significanti\' cutting the cost. Some repubUcan advocates saw the 
voluntary vote as a deliberate ploy to downplay the importance of the election, 
and allow a low turnout to become an argument against pubUc interest in the 
issue. 
The bUI passed the House of Representatives in May 1997 but faced a 
rockier passage through the Senate, where the Government was in a minority. 
Non-government Senators had made it clear that given Senator Minchin's past 
advocacy of voluntary voting, they viewed the Convention election's rules as a 
'Trojan horse' to introduce voluntary voting for all elections. The bill was 
amended to conduct the election by compulsory attendance baUot, an 
amendment the Government rejected when the biU returned to the House on 
23 June. With this impasse, the Government seemed prepared to let the 
convention lapse, happy to blame the Labor Part}' and AustraUan Democrats 
for preventing them from honouring an election promise that many in the 
Government were happy to abandon anyway. 
The election was resurrected when Greens Senator Bob Brown decided to 
take the Government at its word that it wanted to proceed with the Convention 
election. In his speech (Senate Hansard, 28 August 1997, 5917-19) Brown 
spoke of how his discussions with the Prime Minister and his advisers had left 
him with the impression the Government was happy to let the legislation lapse, 
not wanting the repubUc to progress. Brown expressed his misgivings about 
voluntary voting, but felt he could not use this to prevent the one oppormnit}' 
to progress the repubUc issue in the term of a CoaUtion Government. With 
only minor amendments, the bill passed the Senate on 28 August. 
A unique campaign 
The 609 candidates paid a $500 non-refundable deposit to contest the election. 
Each elector received a package of voting material consisting of a baUot paper 
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and envelope, an information booklet on the election that included statements 
from contesting candidates and groups, and a reply paid envelope to return 
completed baUots. WhUe based on the Senate's system of 'above' and 'below 
the Une' voting, not all candidates' names appeared on the baUot paper, and 
below the Une votes required blank voting squares to be filled with candidate 
numbers found in the accompanying booklet. Above the Une voting included 
the same system of registered preference tickets as used in the Senate. WhUe 
the counting method was the same, a major difference was the use of optional 
rather than full preferential voting. A formal vote required only that a vaUd first 
preference vote be shown. 
The maU-out of voting material began on 3 November 1997, with ballot 
papers to be returned by 9 December. For secrecy and security, a baUot paper 
had to be sealed in the accompanying envelope, which included a detachable 
flap with a unique bar code for scanning against the electoral roU. For secure 
identification, the flap also included a declaration which voters had to sign as 
weU as include their date of birth. If the envelope was unsealed, unsigned or 
had an incorrect date of birth, it could not be admitted to the count. Once an 
envelope had passed these checks, the identif}'ing flap was detached and the 
envelope placed in a baUot box for counting after the close of poU. 
The election provided for a unique campaign. There was no fixed polUng 
day, and voters were to receive their voting material over a two week period as 
a simple window faced envelope competing for attention with biUs and junk 
mail. While the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) ran pubUcit}' 
campaigns, first to get people on the roU, and then to encourage voting, it was 
stiU the first election since compulsory voting was introduced in which 
candidates had to worry as much about turning out the vote as attracting votes 
for themselves. It was a throwback to poUtics on the cheap, as no pubUc 
funding was avaUable, the poUtical parties did not get directiy involved, and 
corporations and lobby groups were Uttie interested in an election where the 
fate of Government was not at stake. With the exception of the Australian, few 
media outiets went out of their way to give the campaign major attention, and 
the low level of the campaign highUghted how difficult it is in AustraUa to have 
a poUtical debate outside of the normal processes of party poUtics. 
The results 
In aU 5,625,754 baUot paper envelopes were returned, a participation rate of 
46.92 percent. Of these, 3.18 percent were rejected, mainly through faUure to 
sign the declaration, include a date of birth, or seal the envelope. A further 0.28 
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percent of envelopes were rejected once opened, usuaUy for containing 
multiple ballot papers. Ballot papers admitted to the count represented 45.30 
percent of the electorate, 2.18 percent of those baUot papers being informal, 
making formal votes 44.31 percent of enroUed voters. A total informal vote, 
representing aU rejected envelopes and informal ballot papers, was 5.57 percent 
of returned envelopes. 
In New South Wales, the large number of voters who took the opportunit}' 
to vote for individual candidates, along with some divided group preference 
uckets, resulted in Hazel Hawke being elected as one of the seven ARM 
delegates, despite being placed 12th on its ticket. Of the 76 elected delegates, 
optional preferential voting resulted in 18 being elected with less than a full 
quota. .Across the country, the larger groups tended to elect delegates in 
proportion to their vote, but the filUng of final vacancies often came down to 
incestuous preference deals done between individual candidates and smaller 
groups. 
Onh' the main protagonists in the debate, the AustraUan Republican 
Movement (ARM) and Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM, 
campaigning as N o RepubUc — ACM) contested every state. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
summarise the results after grouping candidates into four broad categories 
based on their position on the RepubUc. As Table 2.1 shows, support for 
republicans was more fragmented, while the only division on the monarchist 
side was betu'een an emphasis on maintaining the current constitution by the 
ACM, versus smaUer monarchist groups giving greater prominence to the 
Queen. The category of non-ARM RepubUcans included opinions ranging 
from broad agreement with the ARM, to those who called for more 
fundamental change, in particular supporting a directiy elected President. 
Table 2.2 breaks the result down by state, region and electorate party status. 
The combined repubUcan vote recorded a majority in aU states except South 
AustraUa and Tasmania. The three smaUer states saw the lowest vote for non-
ARM repubUcans, perhaps suggesting less support for direct election. Support 
for repubUcans was strongest in cit}' electorates and Labor electorates, and 
generaUy the more rural an electorate, or the greater the CoaUtion margin, the 
higher the monarchists ' vote. 
Surprisingly, the difference in mrnout showed greater variation between 
states than between part}' categories. This was also true within states. There was 
a higher turnout than many would have expected in safe Labor electorates, even 
those with a high propor t ion of voters from non-EngUsh speaking 
backgrounds who could have struggled with the complex voting forms. The 
lower participation in National Party electorates may reflect the lower remrn 
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Table 2.1: Summary of results by position on republic 
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Source: AEC (1998). Classification of votes into categories by author. Classification of the 
republic position of candidates: groups and candidates have been classified according to the 
statements supplied to voters with their voting material. The Australian Republican Movement 
total includes the separate ARM regional tickets in Queensland. The monarchist total includes all 
candidates whose statement expressed a preference for maintaining the existing constitutional 
link with the crown. Non-ARM republicans includes groups and candidates expressing support 
for any form of Australian republic. Votes for Other includes all candidates whose position on 
an Australian republic was not clear from their candidate statement. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of constitutional election results by electorate 
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Source: AEC (1998). Classification of votes and seats into categories by author. Rejected and 
Informal Votes: Table 2.2 provides a broader category of Informal votes than that provided by 
the AEC in the official statistics. It includes envelopes rejected at the initial scrutiny stage, baUot 
papers rejected once the envelopes were opened, as well as ballot papers declared informal during 
vote scrutiny. The figure is calculated from the difference between the number of envelopes 
returned, and the number of ballot papers admitted to the count. The Constitutional Convention 
election was conducted on the boundaries used at the 1996 election, except in Western Australia, 
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rate in large rural and remote electorates, suggesting the frequency of postal 
services may have affected the return rate. 
However, a different picture emerges when the participation rate is analysed 
b}' age. The electoral roU includes dates of birth, and scanning envelopes as 
they were returned aUowed an age profile of who voted to be produced (see 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4). The response rate was heavUy skewed towards older voters. 
Three-fifths of voters aged over 55 participated in the poU, compared to only 
a third of those under 25. Given opinion poUs indicated older voters were more 
Ukely to support the monarchy, this suggests that the support for monarchists 
was inflated by the voluntary vote, and the 34.2 percent support for monarchist 
groups may represent a high point in their support. The results indicate that 
whUe there may be an implicit majorit}' for AustraUa to become a repubUc, there 
is no clear majorit}- for a particular model. 
What is not possible to know directly from the results is whether 
repubUcans or monarchists were more Ukely to vote. Formnately, NewspoUs 
were commissioned twice by the Australian to assess public interest in voting at 
the same time as asking about intended vote. The first poU (Table 2.5) indicates 
that repubUcans were more Ukely to vote than non-repubUcans. However, the 
poU indicated no difference in intended participation by age, which we now 
know is not correct. With the Convention election producing a lower 
participation b}' younger voters who were more Ukely to support the repubUc, 
NewspoU's participation rate amongst repubUcans may have been inflated. 
A second poU was conducted just before the close of poU in December 
(Table 2.6). Amongst those who had voted or intended to vote, the results 
broadly correspond to the actual results in Table 2.1. Interestingly, 53 percent 
of the sample said they had voted, with another 22.5 percent claiming that they 
would vote. This is far higher than the actual participation rate, suggesting 
voters were giving a 'right' answer rather than a true response. Significantly, 
amongst those who were not going to vote, the support for the monarchy was 
roughly the same as amongst those who voted. The big shift was from strong 
support for the repubUc amongst those who voted, to weak support or no 
opinion amongst those who did not. This poU backs the view that the 
where the 1998 boundanes were used. All electorates have been classified as Inner Metropolitan, 
Outer Metropolitan, Provincial or Rural based on Kopras and Newman (1996). This classification 
was unaffected by the new boundaries in Western Australia. The party classification of electorates 
is based on 1993 results adjusted for redistributions, in other words the margins in seats in the 
1996 election. This is a more useful categorisation than the landslide post-1996 results. The safety 
of seats has been modified slightiy, Marginal seats being those less than 6 percent, Safe seats 6-12 
percent and Ver\' Safe seats over 12 percent. 
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Table 2.3: Participation in convention election by age group 
Asj;c group 
Age 1 8 - 2 5 
Ai;e 2 6 - 3 5 
.-\ge 3 6 - 4 5 
,\ge 46—55 
.\iie 56—65 
.\ne over 65 
AU ages 
parricipininn 
National 
33.9 
38.0 
44.2 
50.1 
59.2 
59.2 
46.9 
NSW 
32.4 
35.5 
41.8 
4^.4 
56.1 
57.1 
44.9 
1 
N'lC 
41.3 
45.2 
50.0 
54.1 
62.2 
60.0 
51.7 
Participation rate 
Q L D 
.50.5 
35.6 
42.0 
49.0 
59.4 
60.1 
45.2 
W. \ 
27.9 
33.3 
41.4 
48.1 
58.0 
60.0 
43.8 
('"„) 
S.'\ 
30.0 
34.2 
42.0 
51.1 
62.1 
61.7 
46.7 
TAS 
36.3 
40.0 
46.4 
52.5 
60.1 
59.6 
48.8 
ACT 
38.1 
44.0 
52.7 
59.0 
66.5 
68.3 
52.3 
N T 
29.3 
35.S 
41.9 
47.9 
49.3 
49.8 
40.0 
Source: .\I.(; (1998). Percentages based on return rate of ballot envelope 
Table 2.4: Age break-up of electorate versus participants 
,'\ge Grcjup 
At,re 1 8 - 2 5 
Age 2 6 - 3 5 
Age 3 6 - 4 5 
Age 46—55 
Age 5 6 - 6 5 
Age over 65 
,\s a propi rirtion of 
13.2 
19.9 
20.6 
17.8 
11.9 
16.6 
roll ("/,.) /\s a proporti on of envelopes (%) 
9.5 
16.1 
19.4 
19.0 
15.0 
20.9 
Source: ,\EC (1998). Calculations by author 
Table 2.5: Percentage likely to vote in voluntary ballot 
Likelihcjcjd of Voting 
\ 'er \ Likelv 
Somewhat Likely 
Total Likelv 
Not Likelv 
Uncommit ted 
All 
Adults 
36 
20 
5,6 
32 
12 
Favour 
Republic 
46 
25 
71 
23 
6 
Against 
Republic 
33 
14 
47 
43 
10 
Age 
16-.34 
23 
30 
53 
40 
7 
Age 
35-49 
39 
19 
58 
32 
10 
Age 
Over 50 
46 
12 
58 
26 
16 
Source: Newspoll 7—9 February 1997 {Australian, 13 February 1997) 
Table 2.6: Attitude to republic by whether voted in convention election 
Attitude to Republic 
Strongly in Favour 
Parti\' in Favour 
Total in Favour 
Pardy Against 
Strongly Against 
Total Against 
Uncommit ted 
Total 
32 
19 
51 
15 
20 
35 
14 
Already Voted or 
Intend to 
37 
18 
55 
14 
21 
35 
10 
Vote 
Will No t Vote or 
Uncommitted 
15 
22 
37 
18 
20 
38 
25 
Source: Newspoll 5 - ^ December 1997 {Australian, 10 December 1997) 
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Table 2.7: Comparison of convention election, referendum and 1998 
federal election results 
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Source: AEC (1998). Classification of votes and seats into categories by author. This table is 
based on data prepared by the Author for the ABC referendum coverage. To allow comparison, 
the Convention election results for Queensland and the ACT have been apportioned to 1998 
election boundaries. While this may distort the comparison in individual electorates, it does not 
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Convenuon election correctiy measured monarchist support, but also suggests 
it overestimated support for the repubUc. The NewspoU result suggests that 
despite almost half of the electorate participating, the Convention election was 
a self-selected sample based upon interest in the issue, and not a sample of the 
electorate as a whole. 
Table 2." compares the Convention election, referendum result and the 
Labor two-part\' preferred result from the 1998 federal election. The faU in the 
Yes support on the continuum from very safe Labor to very safe Liberal 
foUowed the pattern of support for the repubUc in the Convention election. 
However, Yes support was much lower than Labor support in safe Labor seats, 
and much higher than Labor support in safe Liberal seats, with a clearer trend 
being the difference m Yes support between inner and outer suburban seats. 
There also seemed to be a positive relationship between support for a repubUc 
and an electorate's average level of education and income. As is also so often 
the trend at referendums, there were huge differences in the result from state 
to state. 
It IS clear that the abiUt}' of the N o campaign tcj harness distrust of a 
'poUtician's repubUc' was critical to the result of the referendum. The question 
is, did this campaign work by detaching those who voted for non-ARM 
repubUcans at the Convention, or by attracting the support of the disinterested 
who chose not to vote? With the exception of the result in Queensland, 
support for direct election repubUcans such as Ted Mack and PhU Cleary 
tended to be highest in electorates where the Yes vote was high, suggesting the 
desertion of non-ARM repubUcans did not defeat the referendum. The 
NewspoU results in Table 2.6 point more strongly to the referendum being 
defeated by those who did not take part in the Convention election. In aU 
UkeUhood, the referendum was defeated by those least interested in the issue, 
and given the theme of the N o campaign, those most distrustful of poUticians. 
distort the overall picture. Electorates have been classified according to Bennett, Kopras and 
Newman (1998), again with a broader Safe Seat category of 6~12 percent. 
Chapter Three 
Why Australians Voted N o in the 1999 
Republican Referendum 
Kerry Jones 
On 6 November 1999 the people of AustraUa voted No to becoming a 
repubUc. They voted No in 72 percent of federal electorates; in poUtical terms, 
a landsUde. Many commentators and analysts have told us, and wiU continue to 
teU us, why we voted No in such vast numbers. There wiU be lots of angles. 
Being at the front Une of the debate for five years of the lead time I beUeve I 
can speak with good authority for both the constimtional monarchists and the 
No case. There are and wUl remain essential reasons unique to us as AustraUans 
as to why we voted No in the referendum. These same reasons would see the 
rejection of a repubUc in any referendum to be held in the fumre. 
Our strong constimtional history makes us one of the best democracies in 
the world. Our attimde to poUticians is that they already have enough power 
and have a pattern of misusing it. Our disUke of eUtes and our distrust for the 
media have equaUy been earned through reputation. We have an inherent disUke 
of change for change's sake. The lack of an AustraUan national identit}' debate 
was one of the many diversions fabricated by repubUcans in an attempt to 
muddy the waters. Our response to poUtical campaigns where diversionary 
tactics or smnts are used, particularly in referendum campaigning, is one of 
caution. We tend to distrust and vote against people who treat us arrogantiy or 
as if we are smpid. 
The Yes case repubUcans faUed abysmaUy to justify their cause. For the 
purpose of this condensed chapter I have summarised the key faUures of the 
repubUcans into six major arguments. For a comprehensive analysis my own 
book. The People's Protest (Jones 2000), complements this analysis in detaU. 
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Our constitutional history is against republicanism 
The strength of our AustraUan constitutional arrangements is in the 
recognition of our system of government as one of the best in the worid. 
Thousands of people have come to Uve in AustraUa for the unit}', stabiUty and 
prosperm- we offer. Our constitution was developed by AustraUans for 
AustraUans and absorbed the very best ideas from constitutions around the 
world. Federation in 1901 was an outstanding achievement of unity with no 
civil war or unrest. The constitution is the backbone to our democracy The 
repubUcans tried to discredit the constitution, they attacked it and, worst of aU, 
tried to avoid it despite the fundamental necessit}' of having to rewrite it to 
implement any change to a repubUc model. 
Despite vears of concentrated time and money the repubUcans never came 
up with a model for a repubUcan constitution that measured up to the 
safeguards of our current system. The more they tried the more they divided 
amongst their own ranks. By the time of the Constitutional Convention in 
February 1998, the AustraUan RepubUc Movement (ARM) under the 
chairmanship of Malcolm TurnbuU claimed it had a more workable model. By 
the end of the convention, it had changed and compromised this model in 
critical constitutional areas such as the appointment, dismissal and powers of 
the prospective President. The critical constimtional issues affecting the 
federation of the states were ignored and put in the too hard basket. The fact 
that polls consistentiy showed that most AustraUans who would consider a 
repubUc wanted to popularly elect the President was Ukewise ignored by the 
ARM despite compulsory voting being one of the great strengths of our 
democracy. 
B)' the time of the referendum the Yes repubUcans were so afraid of any 
constimtional debate they used only three and one half pages of the aUowed 
eight pages in the official AustraUan Electoral Commission (AEC) booklet 
provided to all voters. The No case, concentrating on the complex 
constitutional change, stood unopposed on page after page of opposite blanks. 
TurnbuU had earUer argued to the Joint Select Committee, 5 July 1999, that 
the wording of the question for the baUot paper not include the words 
'president' or 'repubUc'. Such avoidance of the constimtional debate backfired. 
It treated AustraUan voters as if they were stupid and constimtionally iUiterate. 
Our own polUng showed that as referendum day approached, people were 
wanting information. The No case countered with the slogan 'if it ain't broke 
don't fix it'. 
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Politicians used the republic as a diversion 
When he was Prime Minister, Paul Keating loved to divert to 'the repubUc' 
debate or to the 'change the flag' debate whenever economic or unemployment 
issues would hot up. He knew the poUs consistentiy showed the vast majorit}-
of AustraUans had absolutely no interest in the repubUc debate. The Premier of 
New South Wales, Bob Carr, would Ukewise use it as a diversion such as when 
he swung pubUc attention from the privatisation of tollways to evicting the 
New South Wales Governor from his official Government House residence. 
AustraUans feel poUticians have enough power already. They inherently distrust 
their use of this power and vote against change for change's sake. 
RepubUcanism by stealth became the term coined for the numerous 
attempts, usually by poUticians, to convert pubUc sentiment towards 
repubUcanism. We have faced continual attempts to remove the Queen's head 
from our coins, to remove the Royal prefixes and the crown or the Queen's 
portrait from pubUc places and attempts to change the flag. Each instance was 
a diversion to move off the constitutional model of repubUc debate. 
Particularly poor of the repubUcans were attacks on individual members of the 
Royal family when from time to time they faced the personal issues that face all 
famiUes confronting the difficulties of coping in the modern world. 
Such diversions added to the perception of distrust in hidden agendas. The 
numerous stunts performed by the ARM were mostly seen through as such. 
When in the final months the people wanted information, the Yes case was too 
far down the diversionary track to provide it. It was the No case that had ready 
numerous resource kits, books and materials culminating in The No Case Papers 
(Brown 1999) and a campaign buUt on providing facts. 
The ARM reUed too heavily on poUticians promoting their cause. For 
instance, as AustraUans increased in their disUke of Keating, they equally 
distrusted his strong advocacy of the repubUc. TurnbuU made the mistake of 
courting poUticians as the key promoters of his repubUc at a time when pubUc 
distrust had peaked. Conversely, for the constimtional convention election, the 
ACM non-poUtical figure Kym Bonython from South AustraUa proportionately 
won the highest vote of aU. By the time of the referendum, the ARM still had 
not got the message. Mavericks from the National Part}' such as former speaker 
Ian Sinclair and former Deputy Prime Minister Doug Anthony caused huge 
unrest at the grass roots membership of their own part}'. Our own polUng 
showed that the Yes case advertisements featuring former Prime Ministers 
Malcolm Fraser and Gough Whitlam (with arms around each other supporting 
the repubUc) was one of the biggest turnoffs in the entire campaign. 
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The repubUcan model on offer at the referendum indisputably gave a lot 
more pcnver to politicians. This would translate into the No campaign slogan 
'Abte No to the politicians' republic'. The ARM should have left the poUticians 
out of the debate and poUtical parties should have allowed a conscience vote as 
encouraged in the Liberal Part}' by Prime Minister Howard. After all, the 
referendum was the first time in AustraUan history that communit}' groups, not 
poUticians, would run a referendum. In the final referendum vote AustraUans 
of aU poUtical persuasions ignored traditional part}' Unes. They voted as 
individuals. In the leader of the Opposition's own seat of Brand, only a meagre 
33 percent of voters supported Yes, although Kim Beazley led the AustraUan 
Labor Part}- (ALP) with a pro-republic platform. The ALP were decimated 
across AustraUa in their grass roots heartiand. 
Dislike of elites 
Prior to the referendum, the y\CM spent huge energy building a grass roots 
organisation across Australia. We were completely open in this, perpemally 
boasting our supporter base as the largest community based organisation in 
AustraUa. Our database recorded 55,000 supporters by referendum da}'. The 
ARM were a top-down organisation. The media regularly reported gUtzy $500 
per head dinners and glamorous Toorak parties with the eUte and powerful. The 
profile of the Yes voter by referendum day would be the image of success. 
Male, aged 35-55, earning an income of $80,000 per annum or more — 
merchant bankers, academics, lawyers, poUticians, people in big business and 
journaUsts. According to the poUtical analyst Malcolm Mackerras, they Uved in 
approximately 0.1 percent of the geographical area of AustraUa: Sydney's 
eastern suburbs and north shore, Melbourne's Toorak and the ACT. The vast 
majorit}' of the rest of AustraUa were not aware the referendum was even 
coming up until the last couple of months of the campaign. Australians 
generaUy distrust and do not like tall poppies, yet the eUte of AustraUan society 
hijacked, funded and ran the 1990s repubUc campaign and agenda. 
Distrust of the media 
The AustraUan media, particularly the print media, were completely, openly and 
unashamedly in favour of the Yes case. The Murdoch press even resorted to 
issuing free '^'es' vote stickers in the final weeks leading to the referendum. 
Some dubbed the Australian the Republican. Blatant media support for the 
repubUc included open intervention from both Lachlan and Rupert Murdoch 
in the final weeks (|ones 2000). A smdent studying the print media of the time 
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would find it hard to understand how the final vote was so strongly against the 
repubUc. 
The only avenue for a media voice for the No case was talkback radio and 
letter writing. The final result suggests the same blatant distrust by most 
AustraUans for the media and its owners as for those running the repubUcan 
agenda. We are told that over 95 percent of readers of the Australian fit the Yes 
voter profile. The media had clearly joined the eUte pushing the repubUc. 
The issue of media bias and its effect on the referendum result offers 
fascinating smdy for the future. It may be proven to have advantaged the No 
case in some ways by continually giving us the underdog stams. For our 
campaign, we concentrated as much of our finance as possible on television 
and radio advertising, recognising that most undecided voters were going to get 
their information through these mediums, and within the last couple of weeks, 
when we samrated the market. 
The national identity debate 
The Yes case underestimated a national resurgence for history and heritage. 
They used the mrn of the cenmry to argue emotionaUy for independence at a 
time when we were wanting to celebrate our national identit}'. They ignored the 
huge increase in support for the Anzac day celebrations, the increasing gusto 
with which we were singing the national anthem and waving our AustraUan flag 
at sporting events. For too long they had reUed on their 'the repubUc is 
inevitable' argument. They ignored the stronger counter argument 'change for 
change's sake wUI not be tolerated without a clear definition of what is on offer 
in that change'. An AustraUan National Universit}' post referendum survey 
reported in Bob BirreU's book Federation — The Secret Story (2001) suggests 
people passionately attached to Australia were more Ukely to vote No. It 
suggests that many AustraUans were rejecting a wider agenda they associated 
with the repubUc campaign: a negative view of the nation's past, a fumre of big 
city eUtism, global economics and social cosmopoUtanism. 
Some six months before the referendum, prominent repubUcan supporters, 
many eminent legal leaders, pubUshed over fift}- attacks on deficiencies of the 
repubUcan model in the University of New South Wales Taw journal. Talk-back 
radio discussion was fiUed with distressed caUers. As a proud nation with a 
stable history of unity we resent those who dictate that we should change 
because 'they' know best. For these sorts of reasons the No case presented a 
campaign totaUy focused on providing fact and information on what was, after 
aU, a constitutional debate. Many eminent AustraUans, including Archbishop 
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Peter HolUngworth, would indicate their heart suggested a Yes vote but their 
head would incUne to a N o \()tc. 
A house divided cannot stand 
Disunm- was reflected continuaUy in the Yes campaign. Soon after the Prime 
Minister announced the Yes and N o case teams, Turnbull went on the ABC's 
7.30 Report and attacked fellow repubUcan Ted Mack. Ted and his Real 
RepubUcan coUeagues had consistentiy argued for a populariy elected President. 
At the constitutional convention the ARM treated with disdain and contempt 
anyone who would not agree to the letter with their flawed and compromised 
model. There were numerous reports of fallouts amongst the ^'es case 
committee itself This resulted in the campaign being all over the place and 
lacking a core message. They came across as individuals, not a team. The No 
case remained united behind our own core message, 'Vote N o to this republic'. 
The disunit}' amongst the ^es case repubUcans created further divisions 
across society: country versus city (country AustraUa voted almost unanimously 
No); across poUtical parties and their membership; and even amongst 
Australian famiUes. Many of the "i'es case spokespersons such as Paul Keating 
and Harold Scruby (AusFlag) promoted distinct anti-British sentiment and 
arguments. Confusion in their core messages aUowed the N o case to win vital 
arguments across a wide range of technical issues. While the Yes campaign tried 
to build an argument based on a resident for President, we pointed out that the 
Governor-General is already proudly AustraUan. 
By trying to run an 'it's simple' argument, the Yes case had no real substance 
to back the case for complex constitutional change. As the final days of the 
campaign led to referendum night, the divisions in ranks and argument were 
stark. The No case remained focused on our core message. Our leaders were 
not poUtical or of outstanding credibiUty. We retained unity As referendum day 
approached, our pollsters described the undecided voter as hungry for 
information. Our advertising provided it through focusing on facts. 
Conclusion 
AustraUa's constitutional arrangements are the best in the worid. Our job for 
the fumre is to make our Constimtion a Uving document that inspires 
ownership and pride in AustraUans across our great nation. Why would we 
waste hundreds of thousands of doUars on further repubUcan debate that 
nobody wants? Why would we again risk constitutional division when we have 
such a great working democracy? The repubUcans had their chance. They have 
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been around since the 1850s. Those promoting a repubUc in the last ten years 
have had the time and money to come up with a better model for a repubUc. 
They have failed abysmally to do so. They had their chance and they blew it. 

Chapter Four 
The 1999 Yes Case 
Greg Barns 
First, let us demoUsh one of the most widespread myths concerning the 1999 
Yes campaign for an AustraUan Head of State — that the then Chair of the 
ARM, Malcolm Turnbull, was responsible for the defeat or, as some put it, the 
wrong person to lead the campaign. The reaUty was vastly different. The polUng 
conducted for the Yes case by AustraUan National Opinion PoUs (ANOP) 
showed unambiguously the reasons the Yes case lost and TurnbuU did not rate 
at any time of the campaign as a reason that people would vote No. 
If we want to talk personaUties, then the real impact was made by one of 
the most cynical leaders this country has ever had the misfortune to have been 
saddled with — Prime Minister John Howard and his loyal foot soldiers. South 
AustraUan Senator, Nick Minchin, New South Wales' Tony Abbott and other 
lesser Ughts who did untold damage to the cause for an AustraUan head of state 
with a daih' barrage of Ues and crude tactics. The core issues in the 1999 
campaign were the monarchists' use of scare tactics, a lack of knowledge in the 
electorate, a spUt amongst repubUcans and, above aU, a Hanson style campaign 
by the No case that fed off the extensive disenchantment with the poUtical 
process. 
The setting 
The 1999 repubUc referendum was the culmination of a process that started 
under former Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating, some seven years earUer. 
The Howard Government inherited the issue — one that the monarchist-
loving Howard would gladly have killed off — due to a rash promise made by 
Howard's predecessor as Liberal leader, Alexander Downer, who promised a 
Constitutional Convention to look at the issue. 
There is Uttie doubt that Howard's insistence on the need for only one 
model to be put to the AustraUan people at the convention was a clever ploy to 
make the success of the Yes case as difficult as possible. Secondly, Howard's 
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tactic also had the effect of spUtting the RepubUcan cause with leading direct 
electionists, Ted Mack and PhU Cleary — rwo former Independent members of 
the federal ParUament and at that time both were suffering severe cases of 
Gareth Evans' 'relevance deprivation syndrome' — joining the No cause. 
Whilst Clear\- and Mack, along with their feUow 'RDS' sufferer, former 
Brisbane Lord Mayor and Gabba curator, Clem Jones, did not on their own 
make a substantial difference to the No case individuaUy or even collectively, 
their presence on the official No case further confused an electorate that had 
Uttie knowledge of the issue. As Turnbull put it, the impact of the direct 
electionists joining the monarchists was to ensure that 'the No camp would use 
direct election as their principal and ver\ powerful weapon against us' (Turnbull 
1999,77). 
\X hat was the alternative for repubUcans? To have walked away from the 
Convention unable to agree on a model would have set the cause back many 
\'ears, as would have a strategy based on refusing to play by Howard's rules. In 
short, there was little choice other than to prepare for a campaign that was 
about selUng a yer\' workable and conservative model that would have some 
chance of success, notwithstanding the nation's propensity to reject 
constitutional change on all but seven occasions since 1901. 
The Yes team 
The first benchmark study of community attitudes on the repubUc was carried 
out by the Yes case poUsters, ANOP. Rod Cameron, Margaret Gibbs and 
Monique Rotik formed an outstanding team, and along with the Yes case 
advertising agency. Singleton Ogilvy Mather, this was a formidable 
combination. The ARM/Yes case campaign committee was cleverly 
constructed by TurnbuU. Former Hawke staffer Peter Barron, the recently 
departed federal Liberal Part}' Director Andrew Robb, Democrats strategist 
and former Senator Karin Sowada and the author of this chapter made up the 
committee. 
The views of these seasoned professionals on whether or not the Yes case 
would succeed varied from pessimistic to cautiously optimistic. Barron was 
definitely in the former camp, whUst Robb, Sowada and the author beUeved 
that, with some luck, and if there was momentum based on a positive 
campaign, then victory might be a possibihty. However, there was general 
agreement that Prime Minister Howard and the Government generaUy would 
do the Yes case no favours in ensuring the electorate was fuUy informed of the 
issues at hand. However, six months prior to the referendum, Uttie did the Yes 
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case know how biased Howard and the monarchists of his Government would 
be with the taxpayers' doUars that it was aUocating for various facets of the 
campaign. 
The first poUing 
ANOP carried out its first benchmark survey for the Yes case in July 1999. It 
was both quantitative and quaUtative polUng. The quantitative poU was 
extensive — 4500 voters across the nation — 750 voters in each state. The 
quaUtative polUng consisted of 15 focus groups of 10-12 people held in Sydney 
(inner and outer), Perth, Hobart, Coffs Harbour and Devonport. Two major 
themes emerged from that poUing. Both were to remain constants throughout 
Table 4.1: A referendum vote indication 
All Australia 
Key Targets 
Direct Elects 
Maybe Yes 
Total Direct Elects 
Media 
Rely on TV for news 
Watch commercial TV 
Demography 
Age 
Under 30 
30-39 
40-54 
55 plus 
Gender 
Men 
Women 
Education 
University 
Tech/TAFE 
Full Secondary 
Part Secondary 
location 
Urban 
Regional 
Yes (%) 
48 
33 
39 
47 
46 
54 
50 
41 
40 
51 
45 
61 
50 
44 
38 
50 
42 
No (%) 
44 
69 
53 
44 
45 
37 
40 
43 
53 
43 
44 
32 
41 
47 
52 
42 
49 
Undecided/won't vote (%) 
8 
S 
1 
9 
9 
9 
10 
§ 
7 
6 
11 
7 
9 
9 
10 
% 
9 
Voters were told there would be only one question in the November referendum, which would 
outline the way of Australia becoming a republic. The question then foUowed: 'You will be asked 
to vote Yes or No to the head of state being chosen by a two-thirds majoritv of parliament from 
a list of names nominated by the people. Will you vote Yes or wiU you vote No to this 
referendum?' 
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the campaign. ANC^P noted that pessimism about economic and social changes 
and a consequent distrust of poUticians underlay the initial negative reaction to 
the 't\yo-thirds majority of ParUament', and that the 'politicians' republic' was 
the strongest No case. 
The other major theme was the underiying 'ignorance of system of 
government, particulariy about low profile and less newsworthy aspects — 
head of state, GG's role, the constitution.' This, noted ANOP, meant that it was 
'difficult for man\' "softly commit ted" supporters of the \ 'cs vote to 
comprehend the nature and extent of change under a republic (even after an 
explanation is given)'. When one driUed down into the results by age, income 
and gender some interesting patterns emerged. ANC^P observed that the '\'cs 
vote is very age and class related with a step-wise reduction in Yes support 
down the age ladder from young to old and a simUar step-wise reduction in Yes 
suppcjrt down the income scales from high to low' ( A N O P 1999, 7). The 
figures backed up this assertion. 
The gradations seen in Table 4.1 were set in stone — they did not change 
throughout the campaign. However, note that in August 1999 the possibiUt\' of 
the M's vote succeeding was still a Uve option. 1 noted in a contemporaneous 
diary atter receiving a briefing on these early results that 'I can't help thinking 
that my opponents have an easier job than me — the scare campaign is easier 
than selUng the positive when the electorate is tired and scared already' (Barns 
1999, 4 August). 
Despite the claims of some right-wing commentators, such as the Daily 
Telegraph's Miranda Devine, that those who ran the Yes campaign falsely blame 
voter ignorance of constitutional matters for the referendum defeat, the 
empirical evidence gathered by A N O P suggests otherwise. ANOP's polUng 
showed that a major concern amongst 'soft' or 'swinging' voters who were at 
this stage incUned to vote Yes or N o was that they needed more information to 
be convinced to vote Yes. Furthermore, there was widespread confusion about 
ho AustraUa's head of state was with only 13 percent of voters indicating it 
was the Queen, 29 percent the Governor-General, and 26 percent the Prime 
Minister. The figure that beat aU those was the 32 percent of voters who were 
either unsure or had no idea, a figure that was highest amongst voters under 30 
(46 percent) and those with part secondary or full secondary education (36 
percent). 
One other result from this research is worth noting. Voters were asked if 
they thought a successful Yes vote would mean a big or moderate change for 
AustraUa or no change at aU. The results set out in Table 4.2 clearly demonstrate 
that the same groups in the community that had Uttie knowledge of the current 
w 
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Table 4.2: A Yes vote: How big a change for Australia? 
All Australia 
Key Targets 
Kfferendum Vote 
Soft Yes 
Soft No 
Total soft 
Direct Elects 
Maybe Yes 
Total Direct Elects 
Media 
Rely on TV for news 
Watch Commercial TV 
Demography 
Age 
Under 30 
30-39 
40-54 
55 plus 
Gender 
Men 
Women 
Education 
University 
Tech/TAFE 
Full Secondary 
Part Secondary 
Eocation 
Urban 
Regional 
Big change 
" (%) 
32 
25 
34 
29 
38 
36 
35 
33 
29 
28 
31 
38 
27 
36 
23 
30 
34 
39 
30 
35 
Moderate 
change(%) 
31 
34 
27 
31 
30 
29 
M 
32 
39 
33 
21 
25 
m 
33 
32 
3S 
31 
m 
32 
29 
Not much 
change(%) 
32 
.34 
32 
33 
27 
29 
29 
30 
28 
34 
35 
30 
39 
25 
41 
31 
30 
27 
32 
29 
Unsure 
(%) 
5 
7 
7 
7 
5 
6 
5 
S 
4 
5 
fi 
7 
5 
6 
4 
fi 
5 
,8 
6 
7 
Voters were asked if, overall, they thought a successful Yes vote in the referendum would mean 
a big change for Australia, a moderate change or not much of a change. 
constimtional arrangements and who wanted further information to help 
harden up their voting intention also beUeved that the move to a repubUc would 
mean big or moderate change. 
A very arguable case can be made that, making the relatively safe 
assumption that the No case had simUar poUing material avaUable to it at 
around the same time, the No case and the monarchists within the federal 
Government knew that it was in their interests to do two things: ensure that 
unbiased and facmal information was hard for people to obtain; and play on the 
fears of those who felt, and in many cases had been, the most traumatised by 
change of an economic and social variet}' over the past ten years. 
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The first tranche of polUng threw up one of the great ironies of the 
behaviour of the AustraUan poUt}' — that despite the contempt for poUticians 
that man}' AustraUans express, when it comes to matters involving the 
Constitution at least, it is poUticians who have the most credibiUt}' in their eyes. 
~5 percent of voters thought they would take a lot or a Uttie notice of Kim 
Beazle\ on the issue of a repubUc, 72 percent John Howard and 57 percent 
Peter CosteUo. The only non-poUtician to approach these figures was Hazel 
Hawke with a 65 percent credibiUt}' rating. Kerry Jones, the leader of the No 
campaign, poUed only 12 percent and Malcolm TurnbuU, 39 percent. In the last 
10 da\s of the campaign the poUticians, particularly Howard, would swamp the 
media and their credibiUt}' would be a much more telUng factor than TurnbuU, 
Jones or any other non-poUticians involved on either side of the campaign. 
The Government's bias 
One of the interesting features of the referendum campaign was that despite 
the fact that there were many repubUcans in the federal CoaUtion Government, 
including the Treasurer and heir apparent to the Liberal Part}' leadership, Peter 
CosteUo, and the Government's leader in the Senate, Robert Hill, the Prime 
Minister and his office heavily influenced the taxpayer funded pubUc 
information campaign to inform the pubUc about the referendum. 
The Government's communications committee approves pubUc 
information campaigns and was influenced by the Prime Minister's 
representative on the Committee and monarchist, Tony Nutt. The Attorney-
General, Daryl WUUams QC, was the responsible Minister for the assembUng 
of the communications campaign along with the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. WilUams, a repubUcan smaU '1' Uberal, was unable to 
prevent an advertising campaign that Andrew Robb described as 'another $9 
mUUon for the No campaign' (Barns 1999, 15 September). 
The Government's idea of an objective, unbiased communications 
campaign was to show an advertisement that depicted the choice before voters 
as a fork in the road — UteraUy. The advertisement showed a car heading to a 
t-intersection. This advertisement was deUberately designed to make the viewer 
beUeve that what was being proposed by the Yes case was a radical change. The 
print media advertisement was two pages of dense script designed to ensure 
that as few people as possible could be bothered reading them. 
The Government also decided that if people wanted to obtain further 
information about the Referendum then they would have to make the effort to 
obtain it for themselves, unUke the case with the Government's tax reform 
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project that was being pushed through at the same time, where each household 
received a booklet explaining the changes. This was yet another roadblock 
erected by Howard and his determined advisers in his private office, led by Nutt 
and another right-wing apparatchik, Gerard Wheeler. This pattern of 
obfuscation and bias was to continue throughout the remainder of the 
campaign. 
The Yes Case Response 
Faced with the polUng that demonstrated that support for the Yes vote was soft 
and uncertain and the level of ignorance was high, the Yes case decided to run 
a series of advertisements designed to get people thinking about the issue and 
to reassure them that the change was safe. The advertisements consisted of 
'vox pops' and a couple that were scripted. That the Yes case felt the need to 
expend money on an expensive advertising campaign some six weeks before 
the vote demonstrated the enormit}' of the task before it. The No case simply 
had to keep raising scares on a weekly basis, as it did. 
Despite the fact that some of the No case's tactics were crudely offensive, 
such as the No case Campaign Director, David ElUott's speech in Albury where 
he compared an AustraUan repubUc to Nazi Germany (Australian, 20 August 
1999), or Tony Abbott's 'ethnic cleansing' Une in relation to British migrants' 
right to vote in the referendum, the fact remains that they feU on fertile ground 
given that the soft voters tended to be those whose understanding of the issues 
was not good and who had, in many cases, been the 'losers' from economic and 
social change. In that state of mind, any suggestion of radical change to our 
way of Ufe takes on a magnified and suddenly real significance. 
The fact that the No case deUberately sought to frighten the voters was 
borne out by the questionable tactics of the polling company it had engaged — 
Quanmm Market Research. In a survey that it compUed in September 1999, the 
aim of the questions asked of participants was to ensure that as many fear 
'buttons' as possible were pressed. For example, there was this question: 
Which of the foUowing would you most prefer? 
• AustraUa doesn't become a repubUc at aU; 
• AustraUa becomes a repubUc but only if the people get to elect the 
President; 
• AustraUa becomes a repubUc where the President is elected by poUticians; or 
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• Don't know/don't care (Quantum Market Research, Referendum Tracking 
(1), Final, 2 September 1999). 
The survey questionnaire also contained a number of statements that were 
asserted as fact about the repubUcan model on offer that were palpably false. 
For example, 'If this model is successful other things may change including the 
flag, [and] Commonwealth connections'. In short, this was the No case's 
exercise in what is commonly referred to as 'push polUng' — a dubious practice 
used b\' some less reputable polUng companies in the USA to communicate 
negative messages about a candidate or organisation under the guise of a 
supposedly neutral market research exercise. 
The other difficult}- that the Yes case had at this time was that its advertising 
and media strategy was trying to achieve two aims: firstly, to generate the 
momentum that was needed to convince AustraUans of the necessit}' of 
change; and secondly, given the Government's deUberate tactic of 'keeping 
voters in the dark on the issue', the communications strategy had to be 
educative. The futilit}' of trying, on a Umited budget, to ensure that the vast 
bulk of voters, particularly 'soft' voters in regional AustraUa and outer suburban 
areas, understood what was entailed in the change proposed by the referendum 
itself, was apparent at the time but there was no choice in the matter if the Yes 
case was to combat the Government's manifest bias and the No case's tactics. 
The Referendum question 
In the analysis of the referendum, much has been made of the issue of the 
question that was to appear on the baUot paper itself There are some who have 
suggested that the 'wrong question' was asked and that the question should 
simply have been 'Are you in favour of AustraUa becoming a repubUc?' There 
are a number of points that need to be made about the question. To have 
simply asked a question along the Unes of the one put above was not possible 
in the circumstances of a referendum. Under the referendum legislation, the 
long titie of the specific Constitutional Amendment BiU must be the question 
that is on the baUot paper. 
The alternative simple question that some said should have been asked 
would not have effected constitutional change — it would have made the vote 
a plebiscite and not a referendum. Mind you, there is Uttie doubt that if that had 
been the question, the No case would have mounted an even more outrageous 
scare campaign along the Unes of 'why would you vote for a proposition that 
hands a blank cheque to evU poUticians?' 
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From the Yes case perspective, it was important that the referendum 
question set out all the elements of the repubUcan model that was being put to 
the Australian people. It had to at least contain the foUowing facts: that an 
AustraUan citizen would replace the Queen as AustraUa's head of state; that the 
pubUc could be involved in the nomination of candidates for the position of 
head of state; and that approval of the successful nomination would occur by 
a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of both houses of ParUament. 
As TurnbuU said, the accurate framing of the question that was to appear 
on the ballot paper was 'a critical antidote to the campaign of misinformation 
being waged by our opponents' {Australian, 7 July 1999). The referendum 
question on which Howard agreed with the Democrats contained some but not 
aU of these elements and cruciaUy left out any reference to the involvement of 
the pubUc through the pubUc nomination process. 
In the final analysis, how much did the referendum question itself matter 
when the voter was confronted by it in the privacy of the polUng booth? It is 
arguable that, given the potency of the scare campaign of the No case, which 
was based on a relentless attack on poUticians, the question itself did Uttie to 
persuade a 'soft' voter who was undecided as he or she went to vote on polUng 
day. The fact that the question did not contain any reference to 'pubUc' 
involvement, however, certainly did not help the Yes case. 
The NESB vote 
The importance of the non-EngUsh speaking background (NESB) vote in the 
referendum campaign was something that both the Yes case and No case 
recognised early. The capacit}' to reach a large pool of voters through the 
NESB media and community leaders makes the poUtical strategy involved in 
winning support a good deal easier than the more diffuse nature of the general 
electorate. 
The Government commissioned a major market survey of NESB 
communities to gauge attitudes to the RepubUc in May 1999. This research, 
carried out by Emigre Multicultural Communications and NewspoU, focussed 
on six communities: Arabic speaking, Greek, Turkish, Chinese speaking, 
Macedonian, and Vietnamese (Emigre Multiculmral Communications in 
association with NewspoU 1999). The research results were instructive and the 
No case's scare campaign probably had a greater impact amongst many NESB 
communities than was evident to many involved in the Yes case campaign at 
the time. 
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The use of the word 'repubUc' was problematic — while all groups 
surveyed associated the term 'with independence and autonomy tor the nation' 
(Emigre Multicultural Communications in association with NewspoU 1999, 22), 
for many the term impUes repression and authoritarianism (particularly for 
those whose origin is the former Eastern Bloc). The major stumbUng block to 
a successful Yes vote amongst NF>SB communities lay in the fact that awareness 
of the referendum was much lower amongst the surveyed groups than in the 
general communit}- — some 13 percent lower — and that the knowledge of the 
issues to be covered in the referendum was also lower than the general 
population. The fact that the Government refused to send to each household 
impartial material explaining what the referendum was about was a blow tcj the 
\'es case in the communit}' generaUy, and amongst culturally diverse groups it 
had a severe impact. 
The media 
One of the other great myths of the referendum campaign peddled by the No 
case campaigners was that the media was manifestiy biased in favour of the Yes 
case. In fact, the Prime Minister was aUeged to have told his cabinet coUeagues 
that the Australian newspaper should be renamed the Republican. Whilst it is true 
that the Australian took an unashamed pro-repubUc Une in its editorial, its news 
stories were generaUy balanced. However, the News Limited papers in general 
could not be said to have had a consistent Une. Brisbane's Courier-Mail was a 
direct election supporter and did not give the issue major coverage. The Daily 
Telegraph, possibly the most influential paper in this country, ran a helpful 
educative daily series entitied 'Queen or Country' from September 1999 
onwards but this section was often placed well into the paper itself 
Melbourne's Herald Sun did not give great prominence to the issue but was 
sympathetic to the Yes case. The Hobart Mercury and Adelaide Advertiser were 
in favour of the Yes case. 
The Fairfax media was quirky. The Sydney Morning Herald was inconsistent 
and often pessimistic in tone about the chances of the Yes case succeeding, 
although the Melbourne Age was more consistently pro-repubUcan. In Perth 
the independendy owned West Australian was a supporter of the No case, 
primarily due to the direct election views of its then editor, Paul Murray. Even 
if the print daiUes on balance could be said to be pro the Yes case, there was a 
healthy phalanx of forces that were stridently anti the Republic and 
importantiy, most of these forces were on the powerful medium of talkback 
radio. 
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The case of 2UE's Alan Jones, a weU patronised breakfast announcer, 
referred to by Smart Littlemore as 'the parrot' is a case in point. Jones' lack of 
fairness on the issue of the repubUc is a statistical fact, as a Rehame report 
found. Rehame, a national media monitor, analysed Jones' repubUc comments 
on his three media outiets — 2UE, Brisbane's 4BC and the Channel 9 Today 
program — between 1 July and 30 September 1999. Of the 118 mentions of 
the repubUc between those dates, a staggering 75 percent were negative, 25 
percent neutral and not one was positive. Jones' coUeague, John Laws, was 
more measured but could at best be said to have been neutral. In other states 
such as South AustraUa, commercial talkback radio was agnostic or hostUe to 
the repubUcan cause. On television it has to be said that the news programs on 
aU channels were generaUy fair to both sides and the Bulletin magazine 
editoriaUsed in favour of a repubUc. 
The killer blow 
Despite the setbacks and the inherent difficulty that the Yes case was 
experiencing in selUng the case for constimtional change to a weary, cynical and 
disinterested electorate, it is fair to say that a month before the referendum the 
possibiUt}' of winning was stiU open, just. ANOP's research taken over the 
period 3—6 October showed that in New South Wales the Yes vote was 52 
percent but in South AustraUa, 44 percent. ANOP noted that the major scare 
issues were that voters saw the change as major, and that the change was costiy 
and a waste of money. The No case Une that the model was a 'poUticians' 
repubUc' was poUing in the mid-30 percent region, although support for a 
directiy elected president was high: 67 percent in New South Wales and 69 
percent in South AustraUa. 
In a major benchmark survey undertaken in September by ANOP, other 
interesting points emerged. Table 4.3 demonstrates the point that the Yes case 
was stiU in the race to win the referendum despite the No case onslaught and 
the rantings of Alan Jones and those of his Uk in the media. Note that the 
cascading demographics and educational standards in terms of support had not 
changed since the first survey in July. 
What changed between early October and the vote on the 6 November? It 
was the advertising strategy of the No case and the media bUtz that attended it. 
The No case advertising campaign was launched on Sunday 10 October. The 
slogan of the No case was 'Vote No to the PoUticians' RepubUc'. A simple, 
researched, cynical Une that resonated immediately with a community that has 
for over 15 years distrusted the poUtical estabUshment and blamed it for the iUs 
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Table 4.3: A referendum vote indication 
All .Australia 
Kr] Targets 
Total Direct Elects 
Dcmognipl.iy 
. -1 ^ v 
Under 3(1 
30-39 
4(1-54 
55 plus 
Gendir 
Men 
\X (imen 
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Uruversin-
Tech, T. Ml ' , 
Full Secondar\' 
Part Secondan-
/ jjcatioH 
Urban 
Regional 
YesCo) 
4H 
39 
54 
3(1 
49 
4(1 
51 
45 
61 
50 
44 
38 
50 
42 
July 
N o ( " , 
44 
53 
3 " 
40 
43 
53 
43 
44 
32 
41 
47 
52 
42 
49 
1999 
i) Undecided/ 
won' t vote 
8 
8 
9 
10 
8 
7 
6 
11 
7 
9 
9 
1§ 
8 
9 
('!/«) 
\ ' e s (%) 
47 
41 
55 
49 
47 
37 
51 
42 
60 
47 
4 3 
35 
49 
40 
Sept 1999 
N o (%) 
48 
53 
41 
44 
49 
58 
46 
51 
36 
49 
51 
59 
46 
54 
Undecided/ 
won't vote % 
5 
6 
4 
7 
4 
5 
3 
7 
4 
4 
6 
5 
5 
6 
You will be asked to vote Yes or No to the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by a 
President appcjinted by a tu-f)-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
Will vou vote \'es or will \'ou vote No to this referendum? 
that have befallen many in AustraUa due to the transition from the industrial to 
the information age and globaUsation. 
The Yes case slogan was 'Vote Yes for our RepubUc' and the advertising 
campaign was based around positive images of being an AustraUan, and the 
campaign theme song was Bruce Woodley's '1 am, you are, we are AustraUan'. 
The vehemence -v^ 'ith which the No case theme bit the 'soft' voters and 
persuaded them that the referendum gave them yet another opportunity to 
strike a blow against the poUtical estabUshment can be seen in the polUng 
carried out by ANOP on the weekend before the referendum vote. 
As Table 4.4 iUustrates, the coUapse in the Yes vote covered every 
demographic and income group except smdents. It was a coUapse that occurred 
over two weeks from 10 October. Interestingly, the final vote of 45.7 percent 
that the Yes case achieved in the referendum demonstrated what many in that 
campaign beUeved: that the longer the campaign went and the more informed 
people were, the more Ukely it was that the Yes case would go close to winning. 
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Table 4.4: Trend in Yes support 
All Australia 
Age 
Under 30 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60 plus 
Gender 
Men 
Women 
Political Leaning 
Labor 
Liberal/N ational 
Dem., Green, Ind. 
Education 
University 
Tech/TAFE 
Full Secondary-
Part Secondary 
Employment Status 
Full Time Job 
Part Time Job 
Student 
Home 
Retired 
Residence 
Urban 
Regional 
July % 
48 
54 
50 
49 
47 
37 
51 
45 
59 
43 
50 
61 
50 
44 
31 
51 
•47 
57 
45 
40 
50 
42 
Sept % 
47 
55 
49 
47 
44 
34 
51 
42 
60 
39 
53 
60 
48 
43 
35 
52 
48 
62 
34 
37 
m 
40 
Voting 
Early 
Oct % 
47 
51 
52 
48 
46 
35 
50 
44 
62 
37 
57 
62 
43 
46 
35 
49 
W 
60 
J« 
M 
49 
40 
Yes at this stage 
Late Oct 
% 
42 
46 
45 
45 
35 
34 
43 
41 
60 
31 
46 
55 
41 
36 
33 
40 
44 
61 
34 
34 
45 
34 
Change Early-Late 
Oct %' 
(-5) 
(-5) 
(-7) 
(-3) 
(-11) 
(-1) 
(-7) 
(-3) 
(-2) 
(-6) 
(-11) 
(-7) 
(-2) 
(-10) 
(-2) 
(-9) 
(-6) 
(+1) 
(-5) 
(-2) 
(-4) 
(-6) 
The role of Malcolm Fraser 
The role of former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in the Yes media and 
advertising campaign is worthy of special mention. Fraser, and his two former 
prime ministerial coUeagues, Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke, aU contributed 
to the Yes case in both free media and in the advertising campaign. AU three 
poUed weU when voters were asked by ANOP in September about their 
credibiUty on the issue of a repubUc. Fraser, particularly so — his credibiUt}' 
rating was as high as Kim Beazley at 77 percent and higher than that of John 
Howard at 72 percent. Fraser's high approval rating was due, to some extent, to 
the fact that he had played a pivotal role as chair of Care AustraUa in rescuing 
two AustraUans from spying charges in Serbia during the Kosovo conflict that 
year. 
^'es 
46.43 
49.84 
37.44 
41.48 
43.57 
40.37 
63.27 
48.77 
45.13 
No 
53.57 
50.16 
62.56 
58.52 
56.43 
59.63 
36.73 
51.23 
54.87 
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Table 4.5: Republic referendum results by state and territory 
Xcws Soudi Wales 
N'ictoria 
Queensland 
W estern Australia 
South .Australia 
Tasmania 
Australian Capital Territor)-
Northern Territon" 
Naaonall\' 
Conclusion 
History records that the Yes case was defeated in the 1999 referendum and as 
Table 4.5 shows, only Victoria, of the states, was nearly won. However, the final 
national vote of 45.1 percent was a substantial achievement given the disunity 
amongst republicans and the Prime Minister's determination to sink the 
repubUcan ship from the time he took office in March 1996. Whilst there is 
nothing inevitable in this Ufe, and particularly in poUtics, the probabiUty of 
AustraUa becoming a republic within the next ten years remains high. 
Some key lessons however emerged from the 1999 referendum. Firstiy if 
constitutional change is to have any chance of success in AustraUa then the 
Prime Minister and Opposition leader must support it. Secondly, it would be 
highly desirable for the AustraUan people to be given a choice of models in a 
plebiscite prior to a referendum — this will lock out the monarchists and 
provide the opportunit}' for greater unity amongst repubUcans and for the 
pubUc to feel more involved in the process. FinaUy, there is an ongoing need to 
inform the communit}' about how our current system of government and the 
institutions of governance operate. This is critical if the unscrupulous scare 
campaigners are to be thwarted from cyrucally manipulating miUions of voters. 
Chapter Five 
The ^Real Republic' and the 
Referendum 
Ted Mack 
From around 1997, a successful repubUcan referendum appeared likely. This 
was confirmed by the 1998 Constitutional Convention elections resulting in 27 
AustraUan Republican Movement (ARM) delegates, 19 republicans, 27 
monarchists and three others. Despite this, the seeds of faUure had been sown 
some years earUer. In 1991 a smaU eUte group formed: the ARM. The eUtist 
namre of this group was to result in one of the more poUticaUy inept 
campaigns in AustraUan history. In addition, from the time Paul Keating 
divisively cast the debate in terms of traditional AustraUan repubUcanism — a 
negative anti-British approach invoking old historical controversies and 
overtones of sectarianism — the debate was effectively poisoned. 
The negative Keating agenda and the ARM's eUtism locked them into a 
position of ignoring both the pubUc's increasing dissatisfaction with the 
poUtical system and the virmes and opportunities of a repubUcan system of 
Government. It is ironic, in retrospect, that the ARM at no stage campaigned 
against a monarchical system of Government, it merely argued against the 
nationaUty and method of appointment of the monarch. As Harry Evans, 
Clerk of the Senate, arguably AustraUa's foremost authorit}' on the Constimtion 
and ParUamentary procedure observed '[t]he palace of Buckingham was 
anathema whUe the palace of Westminster was sacred'. 
The ARM rejected the pubUc's consistently expressed desire to vote for any 
future President. It took this position contrary to the views of expert poUtical 
judges such as Robert Ray, NeviUe Wran, Hugh MacKay, Gary Morgan and 
Peter Beattie. It also ignored the worldwide movement of people wanting 
greater participation in Government, not less. The view that people have a right 
to be involved in aU decisions that affect them did not enter into the ARM's 
thinking. 
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As a consequence, it is hard to think of any pubUc issue in AustraUan history 
where the combined urgings of such a galaxy of public figures, lawyers, 
academics, past and present poUticians, business leaders, media pundits, 
prominent expatriates and celebrities were rejected. It nonetheless occurred in 
spite of being backed by a disproportionate amount of mone\- and possibly 90 
percent media support. 
The February 1998 Constitutional Convention, in effect, accelerated the 
ARM on its suicide course. The Convention, initially a political response to 
then Prime .Minister Keating, was laudably held out by then Opposition leaders 
Downer and Howard as a genuine Convention, canvassing wide constitutional 
issues. In practice, once the false euphoria of celebrities at play was cleared 
awa\-, it \yas clearly a carefully crafted arrangement to frustrate the republic. The 
appointment of 76 poUticians and high achievers was structured to prevent any 
clear majoritv repubUcan model arising. It also ensured that no wider 
consntutional reform, or anything that threatened the interests of government 
and opposition parties, could emerge. 
The Convention was a successful Machiavellian ploy to frustrate the wiU of 
the people and to stave off a repubUc for some years. Incredibly, the ARM 
conspired with a monarchist Prime Minister to achieve this end. Firstiy, it did 
this by acquiescing in the decision to hold such a convention before a plebiscite 
to establish the repubUc in principle. This ensured a double-barrelled 
referendum question that dramaticaUy reduced its Ukely success. In effect, do 
you want a republic and do you want this republic? 
Secondly, it proceeded with a referendum question which had only minorit}' 
support: only 45 percent of the elected delegates (ironically the same level of 
support as the referendum). Even that was only achieved by a misleading 
Convention election campaign. The ARM election material had stated that 'if 
the Australian people indicate that they want to elect the Head of State directiy, 
then the ARM would support this'. 
Thirdly, it spht republican support through electoral cheating and 
disregarding the consistent 70 percent of the pubUc who wanted the right to 
elect a President. The ruthless caucusing and arrogant behaviour by the ARM 
at the Convention further aUenated many repubUcans. The poUtical axiom that 
'disunit}- is death' was ignored to the glee of monarchists. 
Fourthly, it altered the ARM model to give power to the Prime Minister to 
instantiy dismiss the President. This opened up weU-founded charges, by Harry 
Evans, of fundamental and undesirable constitutional change. His view was 
reinforced by a wide range of other constitutional experts who commented on 
the inappropriateness of the arrangement. 
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The 1998 Constitutional Convention concluded by endorsing a repubUcan 
model the pubUc had consistenti}- shown it did not want, a model that was a 
worse form of Government than the status quo and one that had an 
entrenched repubUcan opposition. N o wonder a beaming Prime Minister 
instantiy leaped to his feet at the final vote announcing he would put the model 
to a referendum. The ARM and its celebrit}- acolytes stood and applauded as 
John Howard directed them, Uke lemmings, over the cUff AU those, both at the 
Convention and around AustraUa, who beUeved in a repubUc but recognised 
what had happened, were profoundly depressed. 
Nevertheless, with the initiative and inspiration of Clem Jones and, to a 
great extent, the inteUectual underpinning provided by the writings of Harry 
Evans and David Solomon in his book Coming of Age — A Charter for a New 
Australia, a relatively smaU group of repubUcans was formed to oppose the 
referendum under the banner of 'The Real RepubUc'. Clem Jones and David 
Muir in Brisbane, Ted Mack and Ed Haber in Sydney, Phil Cleary in Melbourne 
and Professor Mart}'n Webb, a long-term associate of the late Paddy O'Brien 
in Perth. 
The campaign strategy was obvious to any experienced poUtical strategist. 
The polls showed that the referendum could only be defeated if repubUcans 
voted No. The campaign could not support the monarchy, oppose a repubUc 
in principle or indicate that a fumre referendum would not be held. AU 
campaigning had to be directed against 'this repubUc'. N o model of direct 
election should be canvassed, thereby preventing the ARM from diverting 
attention from the referendum question. It also left the ARM in the virtuaUy 
impossible position of convincing the electorate that the poUticians should be 
trusted with the vote but not the people. 
The official ' N o ' committee and its campaign advisers agreed with this 
strategy without demur as did, I suspect, the Prime Minister and Senator Nick 
Minchin. While this strategy did create difficulties for some monarchists, they 
were always going to vote 'No ' . The campaign was summed up in a 30-second 
'Real RepubUc' television commercial in the last weeks of the campaign as 
foUows: 
Of course AustraUa wiU become a repubUc. But in November we certainly don't 
want a pretend repubUc Uke the one the poUticians and big business are trying to 
seU. 
A repubUc that concentrates more power in Canberra and takes away our right to 
vote for our President. Let's do it the AustraUan way and leave our chUdren with the 
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ri>;ht to vote as well as the right to become president. XIakc the poUticians listen. 
Tell them wc want a Real Republic by voting NO! 
The "No' committee, with eight monarchists and t\\-o repubUcans, surprisingly 
operated without dissension. The planning and implementation of the 
campaign proceeded in an ordered and effecti\-c \\-a\', much to the credit of the 
Chair, Kerry lones. 
What was also a surprise was the chaos and ineptness of the ARM 
campaign, often complementing the N o strategy. Endless 'head-kicking' 
reinforced the arrogance of the ARM. The use of celebrities arguing that, as 
Patrick C^ook of the Bulletin put it, 'AustraUans would be dumb witiess sheep not 
to agree with them' (Cook 1999, 114), and the pubUc could not have the right 
to vote because they might elect a celebrit\-, was bizarre. The resurrection of 
rejected ex-Prime Ministers reminded everyone of the 1975 Constitutional 
crisis. The ARM proclaimed that the pubUc couldn't have the vote because a 
politician would be elected. This emphasised that poUticians could not be 
trusted. At the same time, again quoting Cook, the electorate was denounced 
'as cringing, sycophantic boofheads, who shouldn't be trusted with the cutlery, 
much less the vote' (Cook 1999, 114). 
The referendum result revealed three grim skeletons. First, the split in 
Australian societ}- with the Yes vote being primarily based on wealth. Second, 
the vast majority- of the media at odds with the electorate. Third, the failure of 
representative Government with only three out of 224 federal 'representatives' 
openly supporting the pubUc's right to vote for a President. 
After this false start on the way to a repubUc, the stage has now been set for 
a more ordered process. First, a plebiscite to estabUsh clearly that AustraUa 
should break constitutional Unks with the monarchy. Second, a deUberative 
process over some years through a fully elected, properly strucmred convention 
to evolve a genuine repubUc offering real benefits to the people. 
N o individual or group can hope to evolve a model of a repubUc and 
impose it on the AustraUan communit}'. A repubUc can onl\- be achieved by a 
high degree of consensus. N o repubUcan model that centraUses power is Ukely 
to succeed. This is the real message of a century of mostiy failed constimtional 
referendums. 
Chapter Six 
Safe Constitutional Change at the 
Turn of the Millennium 
Richard E McGarvie 
I use the repubUc issue to iUustrate the reaUties of constimtional change at a 
time when AustraUa is much influenced by the mass media and postmodernism. 
This chapter is based on a previous conference paper (McGarvie 1999e). 
Making major constimtional change without creating unnecessary risk to the 
democratic quaUties we value in our constitutional system is possible but quite 
difficult. First we need to understand what our constimtional system is, how it 
acmaUy works and why it works that way. The Constimtion, the basic set of 
legal rules of our system of Government, is complemented by the operative 
organisational part of the constimtional system, which is based on and greath' 
influenced by it. That part contains the constitutional conventions which 
acmaUy bind office-holders because they are backed by effective penalties for 
breach, imposed by the operation of the system itself It also contains other 
non-legal incentives and disincentives which exert great influence on the way 
office-holders exercise power (McGarvie 1999a, 7-12, 46-8, 53-63, 79-80). 
AustraUans have been extraordinarily successful in building one of the 
world's best and most durable democracies within one of the harshest poUtical 
and constimtional culmres of any democracy (McGarvie 1999a, 6—7, 36—8). 
The explanation is neither that we are the lucky country nor that AustraUans are 
inherentiy resistant to the temptations of power. Our constimtional system has 
been developed with a consciousness of Lord Acton's truism that 'Power tends 
to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. Office-holders are bound 
by laws of the Constimtion or by effective constimtional conventions to 
exercise their powers in the way that keeps our system a democracy. The system 
also influences them in other ways to do that. It is not enough that a changed 
system wiU provide democracy when people are behaving themselves, as is 
usuaUy the case. Durable democracy requires that its safeguards wiU be effective 
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in the exceptional situations when people are behaving badly (McGarvie 1999a, 
78-9). 
.\ book by Dr Evatt in 1936 has fostered the idea that the operation of the 
constimtional system is akin to that of the legal system, and that la-w}'ers have 
great advantage in understanding it (Evatt 1936). That is wrong. What is needed 
mainh- is an understanding of human behaviour in relation to power, 
indi\'iduallv and within organisations. Most people have this understanding 
from their experience of Ufe. Any intelUgent citizen who takes the trouble to 
find out can understand how the constimtional system works (McGarvie 1999a, 
4"^ , 82-3). Constitutional changes t}'picaUy last for a centur}' or centuries, but 
their full impact upon the operation of the system is usually not felt until there 
is a new generation in electorate and government (McGarvie 1999a, 77-8). 
AU that is necessary for AustraUa to become repubUcan is to eUminate the 
monarchy from the Commonwealth and state systems (McGarvie 1999a, 2). 
Most of the seven years' debate has been on the easy, symboUc question of 
whether an AustraUan should be head of state. By about September 1999 there 
was overwhelming support for that, so the question was for practical purposes 
resolved. A Newspoll survey conducted on 6—12 September 1999 showed some 
95 percent agreement (88 percent strongly agreeing) that the head of state 
should be an AustraUan (WeekendAustralian, 9-10 October 1999). Support for 
continuing the colonial legacy of a head of state in a country on the other side 
of the world has almost evaporated. 
The two questions of vital importance in the last couple of months before 
the referendum were whether the proposed model would preserve the 
strengths and safeguards of our democracy in a repubUc, and whether 
confining the decision to the Commonwealth system posed substantial risk to 
the strength of our federation. The constitutional changes in the flawed 
referendum package would have introduced substantial risks to the strength 
and stabiUtv' of our democracy and federation. The Prime Minister's power of 
instant dismissal of a President would have crippled the fail-safe mechanism 
that enables an exceptional constimtional malfunction to be referred in the last 
resort to the ParUament or people for resolution (McGarvie 1999a, 193-201). 
The selection process would have given Presidents a great mandate 
encouraging rivalry with the elected government, and produced celebrity 
presidents of very cUfferent caUbre from those who have been our Governors-
General (McGarvie 1999a, 124-35; 1999b, 82-5; 1999c). Constitutional 
provisions relating to the reserve powers would have required a president to 
foUow supposed conventions which are non-existent and unworkable, and have 
left it open to an activist High Court to shift great constimtional influence to 
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itself by exercising jurisdiction in relation to the powers (McGarvie 1999a, 
145-7, 157-62, 189-90, 213-16; Constitutional Alteration [EstabUshment of 
RepubUc] 1999, Schedule 1, substituted s. 59; Schedule 3, Transitional 
provisions, ss. 7 and 8). Dissenting states would have been forced into a 
Commonwealth repubUc they did not trust with their democracy, and forced by 
circumstance and ridicule to change to repubUcs at state level. This would have 
produced tensions and weakened the federation (McGarvie 1999a, 252-3). 
Government and Opposition 
Ordinarily a Government puts forward a referendum proposal and in the 
interests of its political future is careful to ensure that it is a sound one. The 
Opposition does not give the support essential for a successful referendum 
unless it has criticaUy scrutinised it and found it free of major flaws. Neither of 
those quaUt}' assurances was available to voters in the recent referendum. The 
Government had undertaken to hold a convention and put to referendum a 
model which had clear support. The CoaUtion did not accept responsibiUt}' for 
the quaUty of the referendum model. For every CoaUtion member who said 
there were flaws in the model, another said there were none. Because the model 
was Paul Keating's original one with some alterations and extras, the opposition 
was protective of it and not prepared to concede, much less expose its flaws. 
Media 
We have had a good example of the effects of the massive shift from the 
poUtical power of Government to the economic and information power of 
media organisations throughout the world in recent years (McGarvie 1999d). It 
raises concern for the fumre of democracy when, increasingl}-, its Ufeblood, the 
flow of views and information, is held and controUed by fewer and more 
powerful media hands. We have been reminded that media power has the same 
tendency to corrupt as poUtical power. With centuries of experience in 
tempering abuses of poUtical power, democracies have hardly started to think 
about coping with abuses of mecUa power. 
UnUke the Government, the media took sides, almost unanimously giving 
support to the referendum package (for example, only two major newspapers, 
the Australian Financial Review and the West Australian, editoriaUy opposed the 
referendum proposal). UsuaUy support went far beyond an objective reporting 
of the debate and an expression of editorial opinion. Some units acted as 
principal parties in the debate, using every means, save one, to persuade people 
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to vote \ 'es. The exception was that aU gave access to supporters of a No vote 
to express their opinions. 
Yes and N o cases 
Those putting the Yes and the N o cases, with some justification accused each 
other of engaging in some misleading conduct. The community was deprived 
of a real debate on the effect that the constitutional changes of the referendum 
would have on the acmal operation of the constitutional system and upon the 
federation. The Yes case supporters were strong on the symbolic question of 
an Australian for head of state and even after that question had resolved itself 
in their favour sought to confine the debate to that. When flaws of the 
referendum package were raised they normally avoided debate and thus avoided 
drawing attention to them. Instead, the person who had raised the flaws was 
usually ridiculed and called an alarmist running a scare campaign. Because most 
of the media were supporting the referendum there was seldom any pressure 
put on the \ 'es campaigners to answer the argument that the package was 
flawed and would introduce unacceptable risks. The avoidance of debate, 
however, suggested to people that there was a desire to cover something up. 
Intellectuals 
Most AustraUan inteUectuals either failed to give, or faUed to report the result 
of, adequate critical scrutiny of the model in any of the forms it took from the 
Report of the RepubUc Advisory Committee in 1993 to the referendum in 
1999. That is iUustrated by the events of the nine months before the 
Constitutional Convention of February 1998. The preferred model of the 
RepubUc Advisory- Committee, adopted by Paul Keating in 1995, provided for 
a two-thirds majorit}- of a joint sitting of the federal ParUament to elect and 
dismiss a president (McGarvie 1999a, 95-7). In a paper pubUshed prominendy 
in the Australian, Age, and Herald Sun on 1 May 1997, a week after I ended as 
Governor of Victoria, I pointed out that the model in practice provided for an 
undismissible President which meant that the basic constitutional convention 
requiring the head of state to act as advised by Ministers would lose its binding 
quaUt}'. For the first time I put forward the McGarvie model for pubUc 
consideration (McGarvie 1997, 31; see also McGarvie 1999a, 99-100). 
On the first day- of the Constitutional Convention Malcolm TurnbuU 
abandoned that dismissal mechanism and on the second-last dav substituted 
instant dismissal of a President by the Prime Minister. Later he conceded the 
\-ice of dismissal by a two-thirds majority (McGarvie 1999a, 101). It is now 
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virtuaUy common ground that the original provision for dismissal would have 
had a disastrous effect by rendering ineffective the basic constimtional 
convention on which the democracy of our system depends. 
During the nine months there was an election for delegates to the 
Constimtional Convention in which the most successful ticket was that of the 
AustraUan Republican Movement whose preferred model was the one 
providing for dismissal by the two-thirds majorit}'. Apart from Malcolm Fraser 
and George Winterton, few, if an}-, of the many inteUectuals who later gave 
fulsome praise to the referendum model and assurances as to its safet}-, had 
publicly voiced the sUghtest concern about the disastrous model receiving 
strong media support during the nine months (Fraser 1997, 13; Winterton 
1997b, 16). 
There could be a number of explanations for the sUence of the intellecmals 
on the successive flaws of the model. In the second half of the cenmry it 
cannot be assumed as it could in the first, that educated people have a general 
understanding of the working of the constimtional system. For three and a half 
decades to the mid-1990s most people received no grounding in our system of 
democracy from their schooUng (McGarvie 1999a, 268—9). Also, many 
inteUectuals have been influenced by postmodernism so as to lose the 
confidence in their own opinions that would enable them to say in pubUc what 
is unpopular with the media. Deconstructing the office of Governor-General, 
which AustraUans have buUt, has its attractions. The influence of the concerted 
media push for the referendum package cannot be discounted. Exposing its 
flaws courted media ridicule and being lumped with those described as 
alarmists running a scare campaign. By contrast, unquaUfied support for the 
package earned from the mecUa instant fame and heroic stams. Further, unUke 
most proposals for constitutional change, which have come from 
parUamentarians, this model at aU stages received a heft}' input from 
inteUectuals. Other inteUectuals tended to identify with it. 
Of course, there were others who looked at the package with knowledge 
and a reacUness to reveal any significant flaws perceived, but concluded there 
were none. The lesson is that if we are to resolve the repubUc issue in a way 
that wiU preserve the strengths of our democracy and federation for fumre 
generations. Government, Opposition, the media and inteUecmals must do 
better. 
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Referendum decision 
It was no surprise that the referendum package was rejected by about 55 
percent of .Australian voters. Before the model was even moved for adoption 
at the Constitutional Convention I warned that 'Its fundamental flaws would 
see it confined to the wastepaper basket in a referendum' (Department of the 
Prime .Minister and Cabinet 1998, vol 4, 839). The NewspoU on peoples' main 
reason for an intended No vote, taken the weekend before the referendum, 
indicated the thinking behind the rejection. Only 9 percent indicated their main 
reason as a desire to retain the Queen as head of state. Considerations of the 
workability of the constitutional system activated 78 percent: 45 percent 
holding the view that the present system is fine and there is no need to change 
it and 33 percent indicating there was too much uncertainty about the proposed 
republic model. Only 16 percent gave as their reason that they would only vote 
Yes for a directly-elected President (Herald Sun, 4 November 1999, 4; the 
percentages are approximate, and total 106 because a small portion interviewed 
were unable to give one main reason and gave more than one). The indication 
is that some 78 percent of No voters were not primarily motivated by either a 
desire to retain the Queen or a desire for a directiy elected President but were 
not satisfied that overall there was advantage in voting for the referendum 
changes. 
One factor in the referendum outcome was clearly the ordinary voters' 
assessment of the reUabiUt}- of the information they were given. When 
attention started in abcjut September to move from the symboUc issue to the 
effect of the package on democracy and federation, only the skiUs of the media 
were equal to providing people before the referendum with the balanced, 
concise and readily absorbable information necessary for voters to make an 
informed decision on that issue. Instead, much of the media was so blatantly 
one sided in supporting the referendum and so obviously treating the people as 
ignorant customers who would tamely do as they were told, that voters could 
place Uttie reliance on what came from it. Life has taught them how to cope 
with salespersons using those techniques. In The New Prince, Dick Morris 
emphasises that people of the information age have developed capacities to see 
through slant and manipulation (Morris 1999). 
After the vote many media people, resenting the faUure of the majority of 
voters to do as they were told, made no attempt to conceal that they regarded 
them as ignorant, apathetic, pessimistic and lacking confidence. In the 
referendum the vote of the majorit}' was contrary to what had strongly been 
urged by most of the mecUa and most of the inteUecmals. Andrew Bolt has 
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warned that we risk being a nation that has lost its head (Bolt 1999, 10). The 
reassuring feamre is that without the assistance of most of the media and 
inteUectuals the majorit}' of the electorate voted down the flawed package. 
I consider that AustraUans voted wisely. Anyone who proposes a reform 
such as a constitutional change accepts the responsibiUt}' of convincing a 
constimtional majorit}- that it is desirable. Those who were satisfied that the 
referendum package had deep flaws were wise to vote No. So were those who 
were not satisfied of the absence of such flaws. So were those who were not 
satisfied there was overaU communit}- advantage in a Yes vote. I regard the 
poUtical and constimtional wisdom and instinct of the ordinary practical 
AustraUan as the anchor of our democracy. Over my Ufetime I have always been 
interested in elections and referendums. Looking back, I consider that 
AustraUans have usuaUy got it right, even when I voted on the losing side. M\-
experience with juries has taught me that AustraUans almost always get it right 
there. Because it wiU involve AustraUans voting in a referendum, I am sure that 
no decision would be made to become a repubUc unless it preserves our 
democracy and federation intact and strong. 
Promptly resolving the issue 
AustraUans and AustraUan Government have no reaUstic option but to resolve 
the repubUc issue as soon as practicable. The opinion poUs indicate that there 
is now an overwhelming preference for an AustraUan head of state or, in other 
words, a repubUcan form of Government. A large number of AustraUans who 
strongly favour a repubUc but put the democracy and federation of future 
generations first and voted No at the referendum are entitied to resent that they 
have never been given the opportunit}' to express their preference by voting for 
a viable repubUc. Most importantiy, we must learn from Canada's experience. It 
has had a series of running disputes on basic constitutional issues since the 
1970s which has greatly weakened the bonds that unite that federation 
(McGarvie 1999a, 5-6). We must not aUow our differences on the repubUc 
issue to develop into a constimtional weakness. People and events determine 
what will be the issues in pubUc Ufe more than poUticians. 
Method of resolution 
Holding a plebiscite on whether a repubUcan or monarchic form of 
Government is preferred would have the advantage of putting beyond doubt 
the preference the opinion poUs indicate. That would slough off the symboUc 
question of an AustraUan for head of state with its high emotional content, and 
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move concentration to the much more difficult questions of retaining the 
health and strength of our democracy and federation in a republic. It would 
have the disadvantage of introducing substantial delay into the process and 
leaving the nation, between the plebiscite and the conversion b\- constimtional 
amendment to a repubUc, -with a constitutional system with which most had 
declared dissatisfaction. I consider that we should proceed without delay to 
determine the best model, and the best method of making the decision on 
becoming a repubUc. Then, in a second referendum, everyone has the 
advantage of knowing what sort of repubUc would be introduced if the 
referendum passed. 
The suggestion of first having a plebiscite and, if it favours a repubUc, then 
voting on what kind of repubUc is preferred, would be of Uttie advantage 
unless voters had before them the actual models proposed and the 
constitutional amendments designed to introduce them. Otherwise people 
would not have the information necessary to form an opinion on the actual 
effect the various models would have upon the operation of the constitutional 
system. That would involve the delay and expense of three fumre national 
votes, because there would finally be a referendum to make the necessary 
constitutional changes. In deciding how we should proceed, we must remember 
that the issue of whether we should become a repubUc is no longer a real issue. 
The task is to identif\' the best model and the best way of the nation making a 
decision on whether to act on it. The adversarial contest between private 
organisations such as the AustraUan RepubUcan Movement (ARM) and 
AustraUans for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM), which largely resolved the 
former issue, is not suitable for the present task. 
The aim is to resolve the repubUc issue, not perenniaUy to keep wrangUng 
over it. In reaUty, passing a referendum does not involve one side beating the 
other. It involves building a consensus that wiU produce the almost universal 
support necessary in practice to change AustraUa's constimtion. AustraUa is 
Ukely to change to a repubUcan form of government within the foreseeable 
fumre only if that is supported by most current repubUcans or monarchists and 
most supporters of the CoaUtion, Labor and other parties. So far the issue has 
been poUticised: Keating raising it as a partisan poUtical issue and John Howard 
defusing poUtical disadvantage by the offer of a constitutional convention and 
referendum. We have the unique advantage at present that the issue is not 
politicised. The only model that owed its origin to a poUtical party has been 
decisively rejected. We must build firmly on that advantage whUe it lasts. 
The choice is whether to rely for the initial work on another constimtional 
convention or high-powered parUamentary committees. A rationale for having 
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a Constitutional Convention in 1998 with half the delegates elected was that its 
first question was whether or not AustraUa should become a repubUc. Most of 
those elected in the repubUc interest devoted the majorit}' of their speeches to 
this issue and the Convention decided in favour of becoming a repubUc. 
A convention is not well suited to making decisions on the best model or 
the best method of the nation making its decision. Those elected to the 
constimtional conventions that built our federation last century were almost aU 
weU-known parUamentarians with a great deal of knowledge and experience of 
the practical working of our constitutional system. In the election for the 1998 
Constimtional Convention, where parUamentarians were ineUgible and poUtical 
parties cUd not run candidates, the organisations thought people most Ukely to 
vote for someone they knew of So tickets were crowded with people who were 
weU-known, regardless of whether they had constitutional knowledge or 
experience. However worthy as persons, being weU-known is no more a 
quaUfication to design a repubUc model than a passenger airUner. The flawed 
package that emerged from the Convention is evidence of that. The average 
AustraUan is weU quaUfied to pass judgment in a referendum on a designed 
model, but few without constitutional experience would claim the abiUty to 
design one. 
It is best to adopt the approach that produced our good state and federal 
constimtions, and rely on experienced members of parUament to inquire and 
report upon the model which will best maintain our democracy, and the 
method of deciding the repubUc issue least Ukely to overstrain the federation. 
It is desirable that this can be first done by aU-part}' committees in each state 
and territory ParUament (McGarvie 1999a, 260-2; Centenary of Federation 
Victoria, 2002, 14). Besides having first hand knowledge and experience of the 
acmal working of our constimtional system, such committees would almost 
certainly be guided by the merits and not by partisan poUtics. 
Direct election 
With the referendum's rejection of the parUamentary election model the choice 
is between a model such as the McGarvie model which leaves the constimtional 
system operating as it has for years, and a direct election model which would 
fundamentaUy change the system and its operation. Until the Constitutional 
Convention the option for having a directly elected President had been stated 
in general terms along the Unes of the description of that option in An 
Australian Republic: The Options (RepubUc Advisory Committee 1993, vol 1, 
69-73, 81-2, 95-106). At the Convention, models had to be specified in some 
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detail. The kind of provisions that would be included in such a model were 
demonstrated by the GaUop model and Hayden model which were two of the 
four models the Convention finally considered (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 1998, vol 1, 123-30). That brought to public attention for 
the first time, that, unless our system of government were changed 
fundamentally so as to accommodate a directly elected President, such a model 
would inject into the working of our constitutional system far greater risks to 
the strengths and safeguards of our democracy than the rejected referendum 
model. 
A directly elected President, as the only official elected b}- the whole of 
.AustraUa, would have a greater electoral mandate than the Prime Minister or 
Government. A President would inevitably have been the candidate of one of 
the major poUtical parties. When the President had been the candidate of the 
Opposition part}' there would be the strongest tendency for the President to 
operate as a rival centre of poUtical power opposed to the Government 
(McGarvie 1999a, 137—40). Under our system of democracy the Governor-
General is the only one who can exercise vital constimtional powers central to 
the system of Government (McGarvie 1999a, 12). It is essential to our 
democracy that m ordinary circumstances the Governor-General be bound by 
the basic constitutional convention to exercise those powers within a 
reasonable time whenever advised by Ministers of the Government to do so. 
The convention is bincUng because it is backed by the penalty that a Governor-
General who refused to comply would be dismissed within a week or two 
(McGarvie 1999a, 10-11, 61-3, 88-91, 95). 
This convention would lose its binding quaUty under the direct election 
models because the penalt}- of prompt dismissal for breach would in practice 
not be avaUable. Dismissal would be by one or both houses of ParUament on 
specific grounds and experience shows that the process would be poUticised 
from the outset and even if dismissal resulted it would be inordinately slow 
(McGarvie 1999a, 103-7). A President not bound by the basic constimtional 
convention would be able to veto actions of the Government. UnavailabiUt}' of 
the penalt}' of prompt dismissal would also deprive of their binding quaUty the 
conventions that a President not make poUtical statements and not coUaborate 
poUtically with the Opposition. It would be impracticable to impose on the 
President legal obUgations to the effect of the withered conventions (McGarvie 
1999a, 107-19). 
The fail-safe mechanism mentioned earUer consists of the reserve authority 
of the Governor-General to act independently of ministerial advice in respect 
to the exercise of the reserve powers of appointing or dismissing a 
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Government or dissolving or decUning to dissolve ParUament. It is to be used 
only as a last resort when it has become absolutely necessary in order to ensure 
the operation of the constitutional system and its safeguards of democracy. It 
has the effect of referring an exceptional constimtional malfunction to the 
ParUament or people for resolution (McGarvie 1999a, 145-9). It would be open 
to an elected political President to abuse the reserve authorit}- for poUtical 
purposes, for example, to dissolve ParUament for a premamre election at a time 
when the opinion poUs indicate the Government would lose (McGarvie 1999a, 
110, 201-2). Supporters of direct election models accept that those models 
would have to include a codification of the reserve authorit}'. This was 
proposed by Evatt in 1936 but is quite impractical (McGarvie 1999a, 202-5). 
Introduction of a direct election model in an AustraUan repubUc would lead 
to an inevitable drift towards the United States' system without that system's 
checks and balances (McGarvie 1999a, 140). TheoreticaUy we could change our 
system fundamentaUy to make it correspond to the American system where the 
elected President is head of state and head of Government, or to the Irish 
system where the elected President has virtually no constitutional powers of 
consequence (McGarvie 1999a, 11-13, 92-5, 140-2, 140-4). In theory we 
could change our language to that of Finland or our law to that of ChUe. In 
reaUt}-, it is highly unUkely that in the absence of invasion or revolution we 
would see it as an advantage, or summon the wiU to make such a fundamental 
change to the constitutional system, language or law we are used to and which 
has served us weU. The practical result of a serious attempt to convert to a 
repubUc with a directiy elected President would most Ukely be postponement 
of the resolution of the repubUc issue for a long time. 
The prospect of AustraUa becoming a direct election repubUc was 
exaggerated during the referendum campaign. For their own purposes leaders 
of the Yes and No cases put it that voting their way would improve the 
prospects of ultimately obtaining a directly elected President. Other leading 
proponents of the Yes case put it that the referendum amounted to a choice 
between the referendum model and a direct election model. The three jurists. 
Sir Zelman Cowen, Sir Anthony Mason and Sir Gerard Brennan, described 
those models as 'the two models from which voters must choose at the 
referendum' (1999, 13). People who accepted that as the choice were open to 
persuasion that the Yes case had more strength than it had. 
Some Yes case supporters warned that unless the referendum passed we 
would get a direct election model posing a threat to democracy. That shows a 
lamentable lack of faith in the commonsense of the AustraUan voter. It is 
saying to voters that unless you adopt our model you wUl later be so unwise as 
Rjchard h McGarvie 
to adopt a model that degrades your democracy A^oters are too smart to do 
that. .\ lesson from the 1999 referendum is that even though the majorit}-
favour an AustraUan head of state they will not vote for a republic package 
unless satisfied it is safe for democracy and federation. 
The referendum model was often presented in a better light than it 
deserved, through being compared only with the model that would be worse 
for democracy, direct election, and never with the McGarvie model, which 
would preserve our democracy intact in a repubUc. One of the worst examples 
of that was the deUberative poU in Canberra, 22-4 October 1999. People were 
not reminded that the runner-up to the referendum model at the Constitutional 
Convention was not a direct election model but the McGarvie model. 
There is a present tendency for people to want to make decisions for 
themselves instead of leaving it to their elected representatives (Morris 1999). 
However, once people are aware of the effect of a directly elected President in 
our kind of democracy-, the\- will no more favour it than they would favour 
electing the judges. This was iUustrated at the Constitutional Convention. On 1 
May 1997, when I first advanced the McGarvie model in pubUc and compared 
its impact on our democracy with that of the models for a President elected by 
ParUament or by direct election, the prevaiUng preferences were indicated by 
the Mcjrgan Poll of the year before. It showed 76 percent support for direct 
election, 18 for parUamentary election, 3 for a model such as mine, and 3 
percent not stating a preference (Morgan PoU Finding Number 2915, June 
1996). After advancing my case over the nine months, without organisational 
or funding backing but relying on what 1 wrote and said, the McGarvie model 
attracted sufficient votes from delegates at the Convention uncommitted to 
vote as the ARM or ACM decided, to eUminate both direct election models in 
the votes for preferred model, finishing second to the parUamentary election 
model (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 1998, vol 4, 872-85). 
McGarvie model 
The McGarvie model is as simple as it is safe. The Governor-General continues 
and becomes actual instead of de facto head of state. The Queen's one remaining 
active dut}-, appointing or dismissing the Governor-General as advised by the 
Prime Minister, would be performed in exactly the same way by a 
Constitutional CouncU of three members determined automatically by 
constitutional formula. The Prime Minister wiU still choose a new Governor-
General. It is important to emphasise that a Constitutional CouncU wUl not 
propose, choose or select a new appointment, because there have been 
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extensive misrepresentations that it would choose or select. The 
misrepresentations are made by those who do not understand the model, or 
opponents who fully understand it and its appeal to the orcUnar\- AustraUan, 
and deUberately misstate its strucmre in order to ridicule it. A Constimtional 
CouncU wiU be bound by an effective constitutional convention to appoint or 
dismiss within two weeks of advice (McGarvie 1999a, 86-7, 217-24; the model 
is set out in Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 1998, vol 4, 838. 
Although the head of state retains the title, 'Governor-General' under the 
McGarvie model, the name 'President' had to be used in the description there, 
because of a decision of the Convention). 
The members of the Constimtional Council wiU be designated from those 
who have retired from non-poUtical constitutional positions of Governor-
General, Governor, High Court or Federal Court judge and are not over 74. It 
accords with cenmries of tradition throughout the world to have a high 
community responsibiUty, as important as appointing or dismissing the head of 
state on the advice of the Prime Minister, performed by a CouncU of Elders. 
It draws especiaUy on the central principle of the oldest civiUsation in this 
country — that of the Aboriginal people. 
Governors wiU become heads of state of their state systems, appointed or 
dismissed on the advice of the premier by a Constitutional Council under the 
state constimtion. The monarchy wiU be entirely eliminated from our s}-stems 
of Government and AustraUa wiU become a repubUc. The McGarvie model 
makes only the changes necessary to convert to a repubUc and leaves the 
constimtional system operating in the same way- as has produced one of the 
world's best democracies. It is a myth that our constitutional conventions are 
only binding because we are a monarchy. They are made binding by the 
operation of the system. As the system wiU continue to operate in the same 
way, they wiU continue to bind (McGarvie 1999a, 207-25, 232). 
With their instinctive constimtional wisdom, AustraUans would only be 
Ukely to vote for a repubUc based on a model such as the McGarvie model. It 
would keep our democracy as safe as the present system, which they trust, and 
the more it is investigated and debated the clearer that would become. Every 
referendum that has passed since 1910 has been supported by the overaU 
majority of voters and a majority in every state. The obvious way of making a 
decision without risking the tensions created by forcing a dissenting state into 
a repubUc is to make a decision for the whole federation requiring the support 
of aU states. This can be done with a referendum where the systems of the 
Commonwealth and each state would together change to repubUcan form if 
supported by an overaU majority, a majority in at least four statesand a request 
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under s. 15(1) of the Australia Acts 1986 and s. 51(38) of the Commonwealth 
Constitution by each state ParUament (McGarvie 1999a, 255-63; Centenary of 
Federation X'ictoria, 2002, 24—6, 34—7). I predict that the repubUc issue is Ukely 
to be resolved early this century in a referendum of that type based on a model 
such as the McGarvie model. 
Final thoughts 
I close with two thoughts, the first quoted from my book: 'No one has a 
contribution to the working and preservation of our democracy which is more 
important than that of our teachers in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education' (McGarvie 1999a, 269). The second is that we should renew our 
faith in our democracy as a practical working system and our faith that 
AustraUan voters wiU only make referendum changes which preserve the 
strength and stabiUt}- of our democracy and federation. 
Chapter Seven 
Mates Lost and Saved: Drafting the 
Constitutional Preamble 
Les Murray 
In January 1999, constimtional change was in the air. The hurried token 
deUberations of the Constitutional Convention were over, with repubUcans 
fatefuUy divided on the mode of selecting a head of state, and all sorts were 
trying their hand at composing resonant new preambles for our country's 
constitution. JournaUst Tony Stephens, of the Sydney Morning Herald, phoned 
me on the eve of my flying overseas to do some readings in Britain and then 
go on to New York to launch my verse novel Fredy Neptune. He asked me to 
contribute a sample preamble, and I quickly scribbled one and dispatched it in 
handwritten form, more or less as I left for the airport. A week or so later, I 
heard from the AustraUan consulate in New York, and from my pubUshers 
there, that Prime Minister John Howard urgendy wished to talk with me. 
I took Howard's caU at the Consulate, learned that he had Uked my sample 
preamble and that he wanted to see me and to discuss writing the real one. I 
promised to visit him in Canberra en route to a short reading tour I was to do 
in South AustraUa. After a mere day's turnaround at home, I drove to Sydney 
to do a performance and stay the night at the Hilton, and it was in that hotel 
that I wrote out a draft preamble to present to Howard in Canberra the next 
day When I arrived at ParUament, amazed to see that journaUsts and camera 
crews were already in wait for me there, Howard's staff t}'ped up my draft and 
he smdied it intensely and qtUetiy right through lunch at the Lodge, between 
bouts of conversation with me. I promised him confidentiaUt}' regarding our 
deUberations and stiU feel bound by that, but it is probably fair to say that 1 was 
impressed to discover that he knew the old Sydney Universit}' Songbook far 
better than I did. We didn't sing any of those fifties poUtical cUtties together, but 
we quoted several. I told him frankly that my position on headship of state was 
the polar opposite, or antipodes, of that which he was known to espouse: I 
think that headship of state should be vested in aU citizens equaUy, with 
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elections and referenda the ultimate checks on parUamentary and official good 
behaviour. 
Passing with a nervous wave through the crowds of newshounds back at 
ParUament House, I hurried on to Gawler in South AustraUa with my left eye 
watering painfully from an attack of BeU's palsy which had struck me just as 1 
had got ready to go abroad a few weeks before. My tour in the late summer heat 
had its highUghts, but what I remember most are my drooping asymmetrical 
face and the messages at nearly every stop: 'Mr Murray, please ring the Prime 
Minister'. Urgenth-. Sometimes the only wa}- was to go out and find a public 
phone box which would permit reverse charges. Howard would be on the other 
end, requesting a rewrite of one or other clause of the draft. Ivnowing that the 
first and last clauses were dear to me, he considerately left those alone, but all 
the middle clauses got worked over, and it was in respect of one of those that 
we had our poUte disagreement about the word 'Mateship'. I can talk about that 
because Howard himself acknowledged in the press that we had agreed to 
differ about that word. I could only tell him that it was out of tune with the rest 
of the draft preamble, and would draw opprobrium upon it; he dearly loved the 
term, though, and he was the cUent. I was, and understood myself to be, the 
cop}--writer, though one with an agenda of my own. 
On 23 March 1999, after a few last-minute pin-mcks, the draft preamble was 
released to the press. It read as follows: 
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of AustraUa is constituted by the equal 
sovereignty of aU its citizens. 
The AustraUan nation is woven together of people from many ancestries and 
arrivals. 
Our vast island continent has helped to shape the destiny of our Commonwealth 
and the spirit of its people. 
Since time immemorial our land has been inhabited by Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders, who are honoured for their ancient and continuing cultures. 
In e\-er)- generation immigrants have brought great enrichment to our nation's Ufe. 
AustraUans are free to be proud of their country and heritage, free to realise 
themselves as individuals, and free to pursue their hopes and ideals. We value 
exceUence as w-eU as fairness, independence as dearly as mateship. 
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AustraUa's democratic and federal system of government exists under law to 
preserve and protect aU AustraUans in an equal dignity' which may never be 
infringed by prejudice or fashion or ideology nor invoked against achievement. 
In this spirit we, the AustraUan people, commit ourselves to this Constimtion. 
People wiU remember the brown bUzzard of contempt and viUfication which 
got vented on this text in the media in March and April 1999. This was termed 
pubUc debate, but as a veteran of the fight to stop Bob Hawke's AustraUa Card 
in the 1980s, I knew how readily- newspapers could orchestrate their Letters 
pages, even salting them with fake letters of their own composition. I was 
briefly tempted to defend the invocation of hope, not faith, in God, on the 
grounds that federal Government statistics show that 74 percent of us beUeve 
in Him, which in electoral terms is a landsUde. I wasn't at all sure a letter from 
me would be run, however, or run uncut. After a day or two I lost interest in 
the media hoo-ha, and looking back now I can almost sympathise with it. 
Although mutterings about a 'polemic against poUtical correctness' surfaced at 
times, no clear acknowledgement that the draft preamble's bottom Une was 
aimed directiy at the throat of our over-mighty media was ever made. The fact 
that the impUcit menace of the final clause had the tacit approval of the Prime 
Minister must have been unnerving for them, though I am sure that wiU never 
be admitted. 
In the only part of the media that remains hard to manage completely, 
talkback radio, I understand the March draft eUcited a lot of pubUc approval 
and enthusiasm from many parts of the country. An amusing part of the great 
debate was the number of rival preambles people came up with. Some were 
syrupy, many were predictably scornful. Along with the rest of AustraUa, 1 
laughed heartUy at Jeff Kennett's might}' prolegomenon. The only one of these 
texts I had much respect for, though, was that of journaUst and editor David 
McNicoU. I knew that his disdain of mine, or mine and Howard's, was at least 
not compeUed by adherence to any poUtical Une. I was sUghtiy nauseated to 
hear, while overseas on another tour in late May, that an Opposition questioner 
in Federal ParUament had enquired whether the Prime Minister had put the job 
of preamble writing up for tender among aU of AustraUa's poets. Of course he 
hadn't, any more than Labor's Justice Minister Senator Tate had done when he 
hand-picked me to rewrite the Oath of AUegiance some seven years before. I 
never seem to get used to appUed poUtical h}^ocrisy; I'm just not a part}' 
animal. 
In April, when the media response began to die down, I sent Tony Stephens 
the foUowing letter and rewrite for pubUcation in his newspaper. The letter was 
i4 Les Murray 
paraphrased into a news item but the revamped text was printed verbatim 
(Sydney Morning Herald 1999): 
Dear Tony Stephens, 
You wanted me to show you and the Heralds readers how I would rewnte the 
Constitutional preamble now, in the light of the pubUc reaction to it. I suppose I 
owe vou that, since it was you who got me into this perilous genre of preamble-
writing. What I offer here is not an official re-draft, nor is it meant to compromise 
the Prime Minister. Contrary to reports in the Hobart Mercury and elsewhere, there 
is no rift berween Mr Howard and me, but inserts and recastings did make our 
coUaborative document rather baggy. This is an attempt to pull it together into a 
crisper statement of the nation and some of its core values. 
The one soUd fact that I learned from the so-called debate was that, in a rare legal 
usage, 'time immemorial' can mean about 700 years. I have replaced that phrase 
accordingly. A lot of people privately complained that we had passed over native-
born Australians, and in the end it seemed unreal for me to separate them from 
immigrants. To do so would fly in the face of sex, of ancestry and intermarriage. 
My early drafts carried a specific mention of Tasmania, and I have restored it, but 
on mateship I have bowed to the Prime Minister's preference, and his sense of the 
broad community'. Wide approval for the term has come from many quarters, not 
least from younger women, including some lesbians. Others wUl always disdain it, 
but the preamble itself doesn't promote uniformity! If nothing else, my right 
honourable cUent and I may have helped to clarify the modern AustraUan usage of 
'mate' and 'mateship'. In the Aboriginal paragraph, both Labor's word 
'custodianship' and my suggested 'stewardship' of land seem to be unsuitable, 
because both primarUy refer to taking care of the property- of others. I've had to 
rethink the formula there, and put more warmth into it. Here is my new version of 
the preamble: 
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of AustraUa is constimted by the sovereign 
equaUr\- of aU its citizens. 
AustraUa's people are woven together from many ancestries, both immigrant and 
native born. Their Uves continue to be enriched from ancestral culmres and by 
traditions and achievements of their own. 
The great island continent of AustraUa with Tasmania has set its people crucial 
chaUenges, but it has also given sanctuary and the good Ufe to many, and remains a 
distinctive inspiration for aU. 
Since great antiquity, it has been inhabited by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, 
whose spirit is nourished above aU by their deep kinship with their lands. 
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Australians are free to be proud of their country and heritage, free to reaUze 
themselves as individuals, free to be generous and exercise moral courage. The 
nation values excellence as weU as fairness, and independence as dearly as mateship. 
AustraUa's democratic federal system of government exists under law to preserve 
each person in an equal dignity which may never be infringed by prejudice or 
fashion or ideology, nor invoked against merit. 
I sent a copy of this text to the Prime Minister with a note to the effect that 
I hoped it might be of use in further deUberations. I received no reply, and that 
was the end of my direct involvement. In discussions with the AustraUan 
Democrats, the March 1999 draft was compromised away, and when what 
became the final version was released in early August that year, 1 reaUsed I 
would not be voting for it myself I said so to the media when asked, adding 
that there was merit in the compromised text's Aboriginal clause, and in the fact 
that an acknowledgement of our indigenous people was stiU in the draft at all. 
I gather the Democrat's new Senator Aden Ridgeway, of the Gumbay}'nggir 
people up the north coast of New South Wales, had Uked the new 'kinship' 
formula I had come up with in my re-draft and adopted it. Someone must also 
have fought to keep God in. The final draft of the preamble read as follows: 
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of AustraUa is constituted as a democracy 
with a federal system of government to serve the common good. 
We the AustraUan people commit ourselves to this Constitution: 
proud that our national unity has been forged by AustraUans from many ancestries; 
never forgetting the sacrifices of aU who defended our country and our UberU' in 
time of war; 
upholding freedom, tolerance, individual dignity and the rule of law; 
honouring Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation's first people, for their 
deep kinship with their lands and for their ancient and continuing cultures which 
enrich the Ufe of our country; 
recognising the nation-building contribution of generations of immigrants; mindful 
of our responsibUity to protect our uruque natural environment; 
supportive of achievement as weU as equaUty of opportunity for aU; 
and valuing independence as dearly as the national spirit which binds us together in 
both adversity and success. 
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The Sydney Morning Her-ald headUne for 12 August 1999 was 'Mates Make 
Way for Aborigines', but journalist MicheUe Grattan noted that the revised 
preamble, with its vote-seeking inserts about wartime sacrifice and the 
environment, immediately came under attack from Aboriginal leaders. The 
usual cast of old Labor Aborigines did indeed repeat their Unes in favour of 
'custodianship' of land, but the gutted text -v^ 'as passed in the Senate and in due 
order went to referendum on 6 November, where it was resoundingly defeated. 
In all of AustraUa, only 16 electorates out of the total 148 voted Yes to it I was 
asked by the media for my response to this and repUed that the thing had been 
crippled by compromise, whereat the people in their mercy took it out and shot 
it. 
So ended my second and final foray into poUtical copy-writing. For the 
pledge of aUegiance I had drafted in 1993, Senator Tate had offered me a fee 
of S3,000. I waived that, on pro bono grounds, even though 1 was sore that they 
had rewritten my text into a legaUstic formula that eUminated both euphony 
and a reciprocaUt}' between Government and citizen that I had proposed. This 
time I had been promised payment too, but no figure had ever been mentioned. 
People suggested huge amounts I might ask for — barristers' fees, an 
emolument on a par with the daily earnings of a judge etc — but I was not sure 
I would ask for anything, even as a solatium for the many Ubels and insults I 
had suffered in the media. In the end, because our family is at the expensive end 
of teenage and student needs, I decided to ask for $9,000, on the basis that the 
draft preamble was three to four times as long, in inches if not in words, as the 
Pledge of AUegiance had been. I didn't ask for any expenses, because my travels 
in South AustraUa and to and from there had been covered by those who 
invited me, and the page of Hilton Hotel notepaper had come free of charge. 
The Australian, a newspaper which Ukes to viUf}- people and then impute 
paranoia to them when they object, tried for a day or two to make a mini-
scandal out of my fee, but I kept silent and no one took them seriously. 
In contradistinction to print, verbal reactions to the preamble that people 
have made to me have been overwhelmingly poUte and friendly. Looking back 
on the w-hole adventure, I'm glad the March draft and even my revised 
unofficial draft never survived to be voted on by the electorate, because it 
means that the preamble's bottom Une, the covert two-Une Bill of Rights which 
I wrote and John Howard let stand, has never been defeated at the poUs. Nor 
has it been locked away in a ceremonial space of guiding principles having no 
legal force and prohibited from use in interpreting either the Constimtion or 
any part of state and federal law; those were the restrictions which would have 
been formaUy laid upon the preamble if it had been approved by the voters. As 
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things stand now, commentators with the big money behind them, and activist 
gangs with media support, are constrained by nothing except a leftist agenda of 
protected human groups and 'relevant' causes. I only re-learned in 1999 what 1 
had long known in hard detaU about buUying, slanting and the sUencing of 
support. 
My formula for bringing prejudice, fashion and ideology into Une with 
democratic values and the enUghtenment's state support for equaUt}' and 
freedom has appUcabiUt}- throughout modern societ}-. The need for checks and 
balances on trendsetters and opinion-makers is a matter for what may be hard 
poUtical battles in the future. I rather horrified Opposition Leader Kim Beazley 
in 1997 by telUng him frankly that of course ParUament cUdn't rule the country, 
fashion did. If the helpless and the poor are to be protected against, say, 
destruction of their morale in advance of destruction of their employment so 
as to advance the ideology of globaUsation, someone in the future with the 
numbers and the wUI might find my formulation useful as a law, with teeth. 

Chapter Eight 
1999 Republic Referendum Results: 
Some Reflections 
Malcolm Mackerras and William Maley 
The November 1999 referendum on whether Australia should become a 
republic was one of the most unusual in the history of the Commonwealth. 
The republic was rejected b\' a 55—45 division of the vote and rejected in all six 
states. Altogether, 42 of the 148 electorates voted Yes and 106 voted No. These 
simple figures mask some much more arresting features of the result. First, a 
majority of the 55 Australians per hundred voting for the Queen identified 
themselves to pollsters as being republicans. Second, the Prime Minister of the 
day, Howard (Liberal), campaigned for a No vote. Third, the 42 electorates 
voting Yes consisted of 25 held by Labor and 17 held by the Liberal Part}'. 
Furthermore the 17 held by the Liberal Party included Howard's own seat of 
Bennelong. The former seat of Sir Robert Menzies, founder of the Liberal 
Party, gave a 23,000 vote majorit}' for the republic (Kooyong) while the seat 
formerly held by Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam gave a 13,000 vote 
majority to the Queen (Werriwa). Using plausible assumptions, of those who 
gave their two-party preferred vote to Labor in 1998, the split in 1999 was 
57^3 in favour of the republic. Of those who gave their two-party preferred 
vote to the Liberals in 1998 the split in 1999 was 65-35 against. Around 80 
percent of the 1998 National Party vote was cast against the republic in 1999. 
Clearly more was at work than simply partisan contestation, which has tj^pically 
been a key determinant of a proposal's prospects. Why was the influence of 
party so reladvely weak, and what were the other factors at work? 
Our point about the usual impact of partisan contestation is best 
demonstrated by reference to recent past experience. The Curtin-Chifley Labor 
Government (1941-49) presented five referendum proposals to change the 
Australian Constitution. Four of those were directly opposed by the then 
Liberal-Country Party Opposition and were defeated. The Menzies Coalition 
Government (1949-66) presented one proposal only. It was opposed by Labor 
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and defeated. The Holt CoaUtion Government (1966-67) presented two non-
partisan proposals, of which one was carried. The Whitiam Labor Government 
(19"'2-75) presented six proposals, aU of which were opposed by the Liberals 
and defeated. The Fraser CoaUtion Government (1975-83) presented four non-
partisan proposals, of which three were carried. The Hawke Labor 
Government (1983-91) presented six proposals, aU of which were opposed bv 
the Liberals and Nationals and defeated. That adds up to 19 rejections from 
1944 to 1988 (inclusive) of which 17 were rejected on Unes of voting, which 
were unambiguously partisan. 
The point of the preceding paragraph can be further Ulustrated by taking as 
npical cases just the first in each of the sets of questions presented to 
referendum by the Hawke Government. In December 1984 the 'Terms of 
Senators' proposal was carried in New South Wales, Victoria, the ACT and the 
Northern Territory but was lost in the four least populous states. With an 
Australia-wide Yes vote of 50.6 percent it was carried in 74 of the 148 
electorates. Of those 74 electorates 69 were won by Labor at the general 
election held on the same day. At that general election Labor won 82 seats (69 
Yes and 13 No) and the CoaUtion won 66 seats (five Yes and 61 No). In 
September 1988 the 'ParUamentary Terms' proposal (four year terms for all 
members and senators) was lost in every state and territory and secured an 
overaU Yes vote of only 32.9 percent. Nevertheless, there were four electorates 
voting Yes, aU rock soUd Labor seats in the Melbourne metropoUtan area. In 
addition there were 22 seats with a No percentage below 60 percent, all Labor 
seats in Sydney, Canberra, WoUongong, Melbourne and Brisbane. 
Now to November 1999 and some further overaU statistics. There were 
12,392,040 electors enrolled to vote and the mrnout was 95.1 percent. On the 
repubUc question the total formal vote was 11,683,811 and the informal vote 
was 101,189. That meant the total votes cast were 11,785,000. On the preamble 
question the total formal vote was 11,672,561 and the informal vote was 
112,474. That meant the total votes cast were 11,785,035. Ballot papers for the 
two questions were separate and dropped into different boxes, creating the net 
35 extra votes on the preamble. (In 1967, 1973, 1974, 1977, 1984 and 1988 the 
two or more questions were placed on a single piece of paper.) The purpose of 
this chapter is to consider the repubUc question with a view to shedcUng Ught 
on the questions with which we began our analysis. 
Table 8.1 sets out the formal position. The 45.1 percent Yes vote for the 
repubUc ranked it 30th (in terms of overaU Yes vote) out of the 44 questions 
put since federation. In other words, there were 14 proposals which received 
even less overaU support than the repubUc which, in any event, was markedly 
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Table 8.1: Formal votes and percentages for republic referendum 
State/Territor}-
NSW 
Vic 
Qld 
WA 
SA 
Tas 
ACT 
NT 
Australia 
Yes 
Votes 
1,817,380 
1,489,536 
784,060 
458,306 
425,869 
126,271 
127,211 
44,391 
5,273,024 
% 
46.4 
49.8 
37.4 
41.5 
43.6 
40.4 
63.3 
48.8 
45.1 
No 
Votes 
2,096,562 
1,499,138 
1,309,992 
646,520 
551,575 
186,513 
73,850 
46,637 
6,410,787 
% 
53.6 
50.2 
62.6 
58.5 
56.4 
59.6 
36.7 
51.2 
54.9 
Total formal 
3,913,942 
2,988,674 
2,094,052 
1,104,826 
977,444 
312,784 
201,061 
91,028 
11,683,811 
more successful than the preamble proposal put on the same day as the 
repubUc proposal. The dismal defeat of the preamble was shown by its 39.3 
percent affirmative vote, placing it at number 38 when ranked by national Yes 
percentages. Of the 11 proposals which faUed to gain acceptance by a single 
state, the repubUc was the second best supported, second only to the 
'Interchange of Powers' proposal put to the people in December 1984. That 
had gained an affirmative vote of 47.1 percent. The preamble was the fifth best 
supported of those proposals carried in no state. 
The 45.1 percent affirmative vote means that the repubUc would have 
gained an overaU national majority with a mere Uft of five percentage points in 
its support. However, an overaU five percentage point support increase would 
not have carried the repubUc proposal. There are, in fact, seven different vote 
values in an AustraUan referendum, since support from 'electorates' of 
different size — the country as a whole, and four out of six states — is 
required. Seen from the perspective of the Yes campaigners, the unformnate 
fact is that, by and large, their support was greatest where vote values were least. 
By contrast, opposition to the proposal was strongest (again, by and large) in 
the states with the highest vote values. A vote cast in either the AustraUan 
Capital Territory or the Northern Territory has the same value as the other. 
However, such a vote has the least value of aU since it is counted nationally but 
not by state. Of the seven values, therefore, the Territory vote is the least 
valuable. The second least valuable vote is that cast in New South Wales. At the 
other extreme of value is the vote cast in Tasmania. If we combine the two 
votes we get 58.7 percent Territory support for the repubUc. The only 
affirmative vote among the seven was the one with the least value. On the 
theory of uniform swing a national Yes vote of 54 percent would have seen 
success for the repubUc. It would then have carried the four states needed for 
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passage, Victoria, New- South Wales, South AustraUa and \Xestern AustraUa. 
That would have left Queensland and Tasmania as the dissenting states. 
It is often asked why the Australian Capital Territory was the only 
jurisdiction to vote for the repubUc on 6 November 1999. Throughout this 
chapter readers w-iU come to understand that the ACT has every feature that 
would predict its high ^ es vote. The three main characteristics are those of 
residence, party and socio-economic status. The repubUc was always a Labor 
cause and the ACT is the most strongly Labor of the eight jurisdictions. The 
referendum result, however, was one in which the Yes vote was essentiaUy an 
inner metropoUtan phenomenon with a Unk to part\- and high socio-economic 
status. As the most Labor, most inner metropoUtan jurisdiction, with high 
indexes of relative socio-economic advantage, the referendum vote in the ACT 
should cause no surprise. 
These points are brought out by the data set out in Tables 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. 
On the question of place of residence and poUtical part}- these data say a great 
deal. The combined votes of the adjoining seats of Sydney and Grayndler give 
Table 8.2: Electorates by Yes and N o and by AEC description 
Yes No Total 
N.SWandACT 
Inner metropolitan 
Outer metropolitan 
Provincial 
Rural 
Total 
Victoria 
Inner metropolitan 
Outer metropolitan 
Pro\-incial 
Rural 
Total 
The rest 
Inner metropolitan 
Outer metropolitan 
Pro\-incial 
Rural 
Total 
Australia 
Inner metropolitan 
Outer metropolitan 
Provincial 
Rural 
Total 
13 
2 
1 
-
17 
9 
9 
— 
-
11 
5 
2 
— 
-
7 
27 
13 
,2 
,-
.j^ § 
5 
9 
5 
16 
35 
_ 
6 
4 
9 
19 
9 
14 
9 
20 
52 
14 
29 
18 
45 
106 
18 
11 
7 
16 
52 
9 
15 
4 
9 
37 
14 
16 
9 
20 
59 
41 
42 
20 
45 
148 
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a higher Yes percentage than the combined votes of Canberra and Fraser. The 
combined votes of adjoining Melbourne and Melbourne Ports give an even 
higher Yes percentage. Inner metropoUtan Labor seats in Melbourne, Sydney 
and Canberra provided the heartland of support for the repubUc. Furthermore, 
in every jurisdiction the most cleariy inner metropoUtan seat gave the highest 
Yes percentage. For example, in the ACT a look at the map teUs the observer 
that Fraser is more clearly inner metropoUtan than Canberra, and its sUghtly 
higher Yes vote is therefore not surprising. In Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, 
Canberra and Hobart the most clearly inner metropoUtan seat is held by Labor. 
In Adelaide and Perth the most clearly inner metropoUtan seat (Adelaide and 
Curtin, respectively) is held by the Liberal Part}'. 
The point about place of residence is so clear from the aggregate data that 
recourse to opinion poll findings has not yet been necessary in our analysis. 
From now on that changes. We rely increasingly on the findings of the opinion 
poUs and survey research to answer this question: which was the second best 
predictor of the referendum vote? We conclude that party — weak though it 
was by historical precedent — was probably stiU the second best predictor. On 
the day of the referendum itself, 6 November, the Weekend Australian carried 
the results of the Newspoll taken on 3—4 November. Overall it showed a Yes 
vote of 47 percent, a No vote of 50 percent and three percent uncommitted. 
That was a moderately accurate prediction of the outcome, albeit an under-
estimate of the magnimde of the repubUc's defeat. However, a truly interesting 
statistic is to be found on page 8 of the Weekend Australian. It showed Labor 
voters as spUtting 61-38 in favour of the repubUc (with one percent 
uncommitted) while CoaUtion voters spUt 62-35 against (with three percent 
uncommitted). When the votes were actuaUy counted the results were fuUy 
consistent with such a finding. 
The figures in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 shed Ught on what happened in more 
detaU. In the absence of opinion poll findings the data in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 
might not be so persuasive. However, when we combine the two we think these 
estimates of part}' voting are highly plausible. The terms 'Safe Labor' and 'Safe 
Table 8.3: Electorates by Yes and N o and by party 
Labor 
Libera] 
National 
Independent 
Total 
fes 
25 
17 
-
-
42 
No 
42 
47 
16 
1 
106 
Total 
67 
64 
16 
1 
148 
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Table 8.4: Electorates voting Yes 
Labor 
1 
2. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
m 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
seats 
Melbourne (A'ic) 
Sydney (NS\X) 
Melbourne Ports (Vic) 
Grayndler (NSW) 
Fraser (.VCT) 
Canberra (ACT) 
Batman (\'ic) 
Wills (\'K) 
Brisbane (Qld) 
Chisholm (A'ic) 
Gellibrand (Vic) 
Jagaiaga (\'ic) 
Maribvrnong (\^ic) 
Lowe (NSW) 
Scullin (Vic) 
Kingsford-Smith (NSW) 
Bruce (Vic) 
Watson (NSVC) 
Hotham (Vic) 
Calwell (Vic) 
Cunningham (NSNX') 
Denison (las) 
Fowler (NSW) 
Barton (NSW) 
Ne-v -^casde (NSW) 
Average Yes in Labor ^'es seats 
Liberal seats 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Kooyong (Vic) 
Higgins (\^ic) 
North Sydne>' (NSW) 
Wentu'orth (NSW) 
Menzies (Vic) 
Goldstein (Vic) 
Adelaide (SA) 
Bradfield (NSW) 
Curtin (WA) 
Ryan (Qld) 
Bennelong (NSW) 
Warnngah (NSW) 
Sturt (SA) 
Deakin (Vic) 
Boothby (SA) 
Berowra (NSW) 
Aston (Vic) 
Average Yes in Liberal Yes seats 
AEC description'' 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
"/. \-L'S 
70.9 
67.9 
65.9 
64. H 
64.5 
62.1 
61.2 
58.7 
57.3 
57.3 
56.9 
56.8 
56.8 
56.6 
56.3 
55.2 
54.5 
54.4 
54.2 
5.3.9 
53.6 
52.4 
51.9 
51.8 
51.0 
57.9 
64.2 
63.7 
6L3 
60.2 
59.9 
58.0 
564 
55.6 
55.5 
55.3 
54.6 
54.5 
53.7 
52.9 
51.9 
517 
51.6 
56.5 
Cunningham and Newcasde should be shown as 'Inner Metropolitan WoUongong and 
Newcasde' rather than 'Provincial'. 
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Table 8.5: Aggregates of two-party preferred votes by types of seat, 
3 October 1998 
Seat type 
Safe Labor 
Fairiy safe and marginal Labor 
Fairly safe and marginal Liberal 
Safe Liberal 
Independent 
National Party 
Totah 
Number 
of seats 
36 
31 
48 
16 
1 
16 
148 
Votes preferring 
Labor 
Votes 
1,826,903 
1,257,986 
1,638,680 
428,317 
34,068 
486,850 
5,672,804 
% 
67.3 
54.2 
45.4 
35.2 
46.8 
41.3 
51.1 
Votes pref( 
Liberal-Na 
Votes 
886,584 
1,060,895 
1,968,960 
788,028 
38,744 
693,048 
5,436,259 
string 
tional 
% 
32.7 
45.8 
54.6 
64.8 
53.2 
58.7 
48.9 
Our aggregates are 65,223 votes higher than those of the AF.,C. The reason is that our totals 
include an estimate for the 65,223 formal votes cast in Newcasde. The AEC totals of 
5,630,409 for Labor and Lib-Nat 5,413,431 are those for 147 contests only. The missing seat 
of Newcasde is caused by the fact that there was no Coalition candidate at the supplementary 
election on 21 November 1998. A candidate for the 3 October election died before polling 
day. 
Table 8.6: Aggregates of republic votes by types of seat, 
6 November 1999 
Seat Type 
Safe Labor 
Fairly safe and marginal Labor 
Fairly safe and marginal Liberal 
Safe Liberal 
Independent 
NaUonal Part)-
Total 
Number 
of seats 
36 
31 
48 
16 
1 
16 
148 
Yes 
Votes 
1,477,580 
1,091,302 
1,708,956 
563,859 
27,938 
403,389 
5,273,024 
% 
51.4 
45.0 
44.9 
44.1 
36.9 
32.9 
45.1 
No 
Votes 
1,396,615 
1,331,151 
2,099,345 
713,874 
47,788 
822,014 
6,410,787 
% 
48.6 
55.0 
55.1 
55.9 
63.1 
67.1 
54.9 
Liberal' refer to aU those seats above ten percent on the then Mackerras 
Pendulum (Bean and McAUister 2000, 238, Figure 2). For example, on the 
Labor side, the strongest 'Safe Labor' seat was Batman and the weakest 
Fremande. For the Liberal Part}-, the strongest 'safe seat' was Bradfield and the 
weakest Indi. 
On the rught of the referendum, Howard had to suffer from continual 
sneering references by broadcasters to 'the RepubUc of Bennelong'. His inner 
metropoUtan Sydney seat of Bennelong was one of the 17 Liberal seats to vote 
Yes. However, a glance at Table 8.6 makes it clear that the Prime Minister had 
good reason to be pleased by the results, taken overaU. With the exception of 
'Safe Labor' seats, aU categories mrned in an overaU negative vote. It is true that 
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'Safe Liberal' seats, taken as a whole, did not vote as soUdly No in 1999 as they 
had voted Liberal in 1998. However, taking all the 64 Liberal seats together we 
find that the Liberal two-party preferred vote in 1998 was 57.2 percent while 
the No vote in 1999 was 55.3 percent. 
At this point we strike a problem with terminology. The part}' line for Labor 
was clearly a recommended Yes vote. The party Une for the National Party was 
equaUv clearly No. What are we to say of the liberals? It is probably true that 
a majorit}' of parUamentarians of that party (federal, state and territory 
combined) voted for the repubUc, yet the Prime Minister, and the most senior 
Liberal state Premier, Richard Court, were advocates for a No vote. Since it 
appears that, among the electorate at large, about two-thirds of Liberal votes 
were cast in the negative, we have decided to say that the 'party Une' of the 
Liberal Party was for No, using the stance of the two most senior Liberal 
poUticians as our guide. It should be noticed that we place the term 'party Une' 
in inverted commas. We do not use inverted commas when we write of the 
part}- Une of the Labor or National parties. Despite this, the most arresting 
question as far as party support is concerned relates not to the Liberal Party, 
but to the ALP: how could the Labor Party (with virmaUy every poUtician and 
senior figure in the part}' saying Yes) persuade only 57 percent of its voters to 
foUow the party Une? 
VirmaUy every Labor member of ParUament and office holder advocated a 
Yes vote. Consequendy, it should have been possible for the Labor Party to do 
better than persuade only 57 percent of its 1998 supporters to say Yes. That 
failure is the essential reason why the repubUc was defeated. It is best Ulustrated 
by what happened in the safe Labor seats. This is done in Table 8.7. The right-
hand column 'Relative socio-economic advantage rank' is a concept to which 
we shaU remrn. The correlation is clear. The greater the socio-economic 
advantage of the seat the more Ukely it was to vote for the repubUc. The drop 
from the Labor vote of 67.3 percent in 1998 in Table 8.5 to the Yes vote of 
51.4 percent in Table 8.6 was very far from uniform. In the inner metropoUtan 
'safe Labor' seats of Melbourne, Sydney, Grayndler, Fraser, Canberra and 
Kings ford-Smith the average drop was only two percent. At the other extremity 
were the 15 seats set out in Table 8.8. The single most extreme case was 
Bonython which mrned in the highest No percentage of aU the 36 'safe Labor' 
seats as weU as showing the biggest defection from the Labor vote. Bonython 
is also the most disadvantaged socio-economicaUy. 
Kim Beazley was made to suffer the indignity of losing the referendum as 
weU as having a disastrous defeat in his own seat of Brand, which may weU be 
caUed 'the Kingdom of Brand'. Howard had to put up with sneers about 'the 
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Table 8.7: Yes percentages in safe Labor seats 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Seat 
Melbourne (Vic) 
Sydney (NSW) 
Grayndler (NSW) 
Fraser (ACT) 
Canberra (ACT) 
Batman (Vic) 
Wills (Vic) 
Gellibrand (Vic) 
Maribyrnong (\'ic) 
Scullin (Vic) 
Kingsford-Smith (NSW) 
Watson (NSW) 
Hotham (Vic) 
Calwell (Vic) 
Cunningham (NSW) 
Denison (Tas) 
Fowler (NSW) 
Newcasde (NSW) 
Prospect (NSWO 
Reid (NSW) 
Blaxland (NSW) 
Lalor (V i^c) 
Holt (Vic) 
Fremande (WA) 
Port Adelaide (SA) 
Perdi (WA) 
Throsby (NSW) 
Shortiand (NSW) 
Corio (Vic) 
Chariton (NSW) 
Chifley (NSW) 
Werriwa (NSW) 
Hunter (NSW) 
Brand (W'A) 
Lyons (Tas) 
Bonython (SA) 
AEC Description 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Provincial 
Provincial 
Provincial 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Rural 
Provincial 
Rural 
Outer Metropolitan 
% Yes 
70.9 
67.9 
64.8 
64.5 
62.1 
61.2 
58.7 
56.9 
56.8 
56.3 
55.2 
54.4 
54.2 
53.9 
53.6 
52.4 
51.9 
51.0 
49.8 
49.0 
49.0 
48.7 
48.7 
48.3 
47.5 
47.4 
46.9 
45.4 
44.5 
43.7 
42.2 
41.8 
36.8 
33.7 
33.5 
33.3 
Relative socio-
economic 
advantage rank 
4 
3 
12 
2 
1 
22 
17 
27 
14 
19 
9 
26 
10 
21 
7 
6 
35 
11 
25 
33 
32 
23 
28 
5 
30 
8 
29 
18 
24 
13 
34 
31 
20 
16 
15 
36 
RepubUc of Bennelong' as weU as watch 17 of the 64 Liberal seats turn in Yes 
majorities. There was, however, one leader who had every reason to smile — at 
least in the short term. John Anderson succeeded in getting every one of his 
party's seats to vote No. The extent of his success is shown in Table 8.10. In 
only one National Part}' seat cUd the No vote faU below 60 percent. That was 
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Table 8.8: Rank order of loss of Yes vote 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Seat 
Bonython (SA) 
Cl-ufley (NSW) 
Brand'(VV-M 
Hunter (NSWO 
Lvons (Tas) 
Throsby (NSW) 
Fowler'(NSW) 
Blaxland (NSW) 
Reid (NSW) 
Lalor (Vic) 
Werriwa (NSW-O 
Prospect (NSW) 
Charlton (NSW) 
GelUbrand (\'ic) 
Port Adelaide (SA) 
Average 
AEC description 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Rural 
Rural 
Provincial 
Outer Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Outer Metropolitan 
Prtjvincial 
Inner Metropolitan 
Inner Metropolitan 
\ 'cs /No majority-
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
^'es 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
^'es 
No 
No 
Loss' 
31.2 
2S." 
28.6 
27,9 
27.1 
25.6 
24.4 
2,M 
22.6 
21.1 
20.9 
19.9 
19.3 
19.0 
18.6 
23.9 
a The term 'Loss' refers to the reduction from the Labor share of the ttt'o-party-preferred vote 
in 1998 to the ^'es percentage in 1999. h'or example, in Gellibrand in 1998 Labor had 75.9 per 
cent of the t^ >.'o-party preferred vote. The Yes vote in 1999 was 56.9 per cent, so the loss was 
19 per cent. 
in Richmond (NSW) where the member, Larry Anthony, was a self-proclaimed 
repubUcan and advocate for a Yes vote. 
In our opening paragraph, we wrote of an estimate that 80 percent of the 
1998 National Part}- vote was cast against the repubUc in 1999. A major 
problem with estimating the National Party separately from the Liberals is that 
opinion poUs t}'picaUy lump the two together under the heading 'CoaUtion'. 
Where poUs do distinguish there is a strong tendency to over-estimate the 
Liberals and under-estimate the Nationals because voters do not really 
differentiate the two. That leads t}'picaUy to very smaU and, therefore, unreUable 
samples of National Party voters. In the Ught of Table 8.10 and such survey 
research as has been done, we think the 80 percent figure is highly plausible, if 
unprovable. 
Survev results are as instructive as aggregate data. The 1999 AustraUan 
Constitutional Referendum Study (ACRS) was conducted to investigate the 
AustraUan electorate's attitudes towards the significant poUtical issues 
surrounding the 1999 constitutional referendum. The principal investigators 
were David Gow of the UrUversity of Queensland, CUve Bean of the 
Queensland Universit}' of Technology and Ian McAUister of the AustraUan 
National Universit}-. As part of the AustraUan Election Smdy series, the 1999 
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Table 8.9: John Anderson: Total success in N o advocacy, 
two-party-preferred votes in National seats, 3 October 1998 
Votes preferring Labor Votes preferring National 
Seat Votes % Votes % 
New South Wales 
Cowper 32,002 43.6 41,335 56.4 
Farrer 24,493 55.4 44,733 64.6 
Gwydir 24,330 36.4 42,480 63.6 
Lyne 30,650 40.3 45,451 59.7 
New England 25,377 37.1 43,086 62.9 
Page 35,724 47.6 39,265 52.4 
Parkes 33,617 45.9 39,638 54.1 
Richmond 40,013 49.2 41,270 50.8 
Riverina 25,801 34.7 48,552 65.3 
41.2 
30.6 
45.6 
49.7 
38.8 
35.6 
47.1 
41.3 
4
2
5
43,506 
52,328 
42,228 
36,423 
46,254 
48,576 
37,923 
693,048 
Victoria 
Gippsland 30,445 .  ,  58.1 
MaUee 23,109 .  ,  69.4 
Queensland 
Dawson 35,375 .  54.4 
Kinkier 35,933 .  50.3 
Kennedy 29,341 . 2  61.2 
Maranoa 26,826 . 64.4 
Wide Bay 33,814 . 52.9 
Total Nadonal Party^ seats 486,850 .  58J 
ACRS provides a perspective on the poUtical attitudes and behaviour of the 
AustraUan pubUc, which, in turn, can be compared to those attitudes recorded 
at past and fumre electoral events. The 1999 ACRS also functions more 
specificaUy as a means of investigating the patterns of pubUc opinion 
concerning the repubUc and its specific feamres. 
Variables include: voting preference; degree of exposure to media reporting 
of the referendum; level of interest in the referendum debate; past and present 
poUtical affUiation; party voted for at the last (1998) election; evaluation of 
parties, poUticians and key participants in the referendum debate; views on 
national identit}' and AustraUa's standing in the world; preferred head of state 
and the importance of the Queen to AustraUa; knowledge of the current role 
of the Queen and Governor-General and future role of the president if 
AustraUa became a repubUc; perceived changes to powers held by the prime 
minister and the president; attimdes to a range of issues including unions, big 
business, income distribution, law enforcement, equal opportunities for 
migrants/women, Aboriginal land rights; and views on the preferred function 
of society, government and the law. Background variables include level of 
education, employment status, occupation, type of employer, position at 
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workplace, trade union membership, sex, age, own and parents ' country of 
birth, parents' poUtical preferences, reUgion, marital status, income and, where 
apphcable, the occupation, trade union membership and political preference of 
the respondent's spouse. 
Of the many findings from the ACRS, the two most significant are those on 
the referendum and part\' votes. For the referendum the question was: 'In the 
Constimtional Referendum held on Samrday 6 November, did you vote ^T.S ot 
N O for AustraUa to become a RepubUc?' Answers from respondents were 
1,533 for Yes (47.7 percent) and 1,683 for N o (52.3 percent). That was close to 
the result of the referendum, albeit with a marginal over-estimate of support 
for the republic. By- contrast, the party votes iUustrated the points made above. 
There was a clear tendency for people to say they had voted Liberal in 1998 
when a significant number of such respondents probably did not vote Liberal. 
After all, the election was more than a year earlier, so memory of election vote 
would be poorer than that of referendum vote. The ACRS question was: 'In the 
last Federal election in October 1998, when the Liberals were led by Howard 
and Labor by Beazley, which party got your first preference in the House of 
Representatives election?' As shown in Table 8.11, answers from respondents 
were 1,322 for Liberal Part}', 1,304 for Labor, 96 for National Party, 202 for 
Democrats , 96 for Greens, 119 for O n e Nation and 64 for another 
part}-/Independent. 
Table 8.12 cross tabulates party voted for in the 1998 election by social class 
and vote at the referendum. It shows that, of Liberal voters who consider 
themselves upper class, 47.2 percent voted Yes and 52.8 percent No. Of Liberal 
voters who consider themselves working class, however, only 30.2 percent 
voted Yes and 69.8 percent No. So the higher the social stams that Liberals saw 
themselves, the less Ukely they were to foUow the 'part}' Une'. For Labor voters 
who consider themselves upper class, 66.7 percent voted Yes and 33.3 percent 
No. Of Labor voters who consider themselves working class, by contrast, there 
was only a bare majorit}' for the Yes side. The higher the social status of Labor 
voters, therefore, the more they were Ukely to follow the part}' Une by voting for 
the repubUc on offer. 
Table 8.13 shows the party for which respondents would vote in an election 
today by social class and vote in the referendum. A different measure of party 
support is used and more parties are included in the table. However, the 
findings of Table 8.12 are not varied in any significant way by Table 8.13. 
EssentiaUy, this information is somewhat paradoxical. While Liberals are more 
Ukely to think of themselves as upper class than Labor voters, the part}' Une for 
Labor (Yes in the referendum) was the upper class vote. Liberals considering 
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Table 8.10: John Anderson: Total success in N o advocacy, republic 
referendum votes in National seats, 6 November 1999 
Seat 
New South Wales 
Cowper (4.2) 
Farrer (1.5) 
Gu'ydir (8.6) 
Lyne (1.9) 
New England (4.5) 
Page (8.8) 
Parkes (15.4) 
Richmond (3.1) 
Riverina (1.2) 
I 'ictoria 
Gippsland (6.3) 
Mallee(l,8) 
Queensland 
Dawson (14.6) 
Hinyer(19.I) 
Kennedy (9.0) 
Maronoa (12.8) 
Wide Bay (21.4) 
Total National Party- seats (8.4) 
Yes 
Votes 
30,100 
24,008 
19,274 
31,045 
23,328 
29,925 
22,592 
39,208 
25,701 
27,335 
22,395 
25,167 
22,989 
23,326 
17,944 
19,052 
403,389 
% 
39.4 
33.9 
27.8 
38.4 
32.6 
38.8 
30.5 
46.1 
33.5 
34.9 
28.8 
31.0 
30.6 
29.8 
22.8 
25.7 
32.9 
No 
\'otes 
46,319 
46,823 
50,081 
49,785 
48,203 
47,213 
51,549 
45,790 
51,017 
51,092 
55,426 
55,945 
52,031 
54,977 
60,610 
55,153 
822,014 
% 
60.6 
66.1 
72.2 
61.6 
67.4 
61.2 
69.5 
53.9 
66.5 
65.1 
71.2 
69.0 
69.4 
70.2 
77.2 
74.3 
67.1 
Note: The figures in brackets beside the name of each seat are the percentage differential 
between both (a) the Labor vote and the Yes vote, and (b) the National and No votes. In every 
seat the Yes percentage was lower than the 1998 Labor percentage of the rv^'o-parry-preferred 
vote. 
Table 8.11: Percentages at 1998 election and in ACRS 
Party 
Labor 
Liberal 
One Nation 
Nadonal 
Democrats 
Greens 
Other 
Total 
% 1998 
40.1 
34.2 
8.4 
5.3 
5.1 
2.1 
4.8 
100.0 
Australian Constitutional Referendum 
Number % 
1,304 40.7 
1,322 41.3 
119 3.7 
96 3.0 
202 6.3 
96 3.0 
64 2.0 
3,203 100.0 
Study 
Variation 
+0.6 
+1A 
A.l 
-2.3 
-(-1.2 
-^0.9 
-2.8 
themselves as working class were very Ukely to foUow the 'party Une' while 
upper class Liberals were not. Labor supporters from the upper class were very 
Ukely to vote Yes in accordance with the party Une while those from the 
working class were not nearly as Ukely to do so. (IncidentaUy some 1,500 
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Table 8.12: Social class cross tabulation: ACRS 
Social Class 
Upper Class 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Working Class 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Parn 
Liberal 
Number 
17 
19 
36 
146 
337 
483 
,- voted fo 
% 
47.2 
52.8 
100.0 
30.2 
69.8 
100.0 
r in 
Nt 
1998 
Labor 
imber 
6 
3 
9 
389 
337 
726 
% 
66.7 
33.3 
100.0 
53.6 
46.4 
100.0 
Total 
Number 
23 
22 
45 
535 
674 
1,209 
% 
51.1 
48.9 
100,0 
44.3 
55.7 
100.0 
Table 8.13: Further social class cross tabulations: ACRS 
Social Class 
Upper Class 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Working Class 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Liberal 
No. 
13 
15 
28 
112 
307 
419 
% 
46.4 
53.6 
100.0 
26.7 
73.3 
100.0 
If election today. 
Lab 
No. 
9 
3 
12 
395 
307 
702 
or 
% 
75.0 
25.0 
100.0 
56.3 
43.7 
100.0 
, who vote for 
National 
No. 
1 
3 
4 
11 
34 
45 
% 
25.0 
75.0 
100.0 
24,4 
75.6 
100.0 
Democrat 
No, 
1 
1 
14 
14 
28 
% 
100,0 
100,0 
50,0 
50,0 
100,0 
Total 
No, 
24 
21 
45 
532 
662 
1,194 
% 
53,3 
46,7 
100.0 
44.6 
55.4 
100.0 
Table 8.14: Income cross tabulations: ACRS 
Income Level 
Above S80,000 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Below $80,000 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Partv' voted for in 
Liberal 
Number 
146 
129 
275 
413 
716 
1,129 
% Nl 
53.1 
46.9 
100.0 
36.6 
63.4 
100.0 
,1998 
Labor 
amber 
157 
36 
193 
714 
466 
1,180 
% 
81.3 
18.7 
100.0 
60,5 
39,5 
100.0 
Total 
Number 
303 
165 
468 
1,127 
1,182 
2,309 
% 
64,7 
35,3 
100,0 
48,8 
51,2 
100,0 
respondents caUed themselves middle class and their patterns, not surprisingly, 
lay between the two categories shown in Tables 8.12 and 8.13.) 
This story is repeated for income, as shown in Table 8.14. For Liberals with 
incomes below $80,000 there were 716 No votes and 413 for Yes, a soUd 
margin in support of the 'party Une'. However, Liberals with incomes above 
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180,000 showed Yes in the majority. There were 146 Yes votes and 129 for No. 
For Labor voters with incomes below $80,000 there were 714 Yes and 466 No, 
a reasonable majorit}' for the part}' Une but by no means resounding. By 
contrast. Labor voters with incomes above $80,000 spUt 157 to 36 in favour of 
Yes. Part}' is statisticaUy significant in both income levels, which means that the 
income effects are not being over-ridden by party. Table 8.15 shows the part}' 
voted for in the last election by employment stams and vote in the referendum. 
Liberal voters who were employed were sUghtly less Ukely to vote Yes than No. 
However, Liberal voters who were unemployed were much more Ukely to vote 
No (68 percent) than Yes (32 percent). Two-thirds of Labor voters in both 
categories, however, voted Yes. For both parties, support for the repubUc was 
greatest among those undertaking their own education. 
Questions of social class, income and occupation are essentially ones of 
socio-economic advantage and disadvantage. Included in the relationship also 
are educational attainment (or lack of it), levels of skiU, property ownership (or 
lack of it) and race. For example. Aboriginal AustraUans and Torres Strait 
Islanders are the most disadvantaged, but renters and one-parent famiUes are 
also disadvantaged. It is interesting, therefore, to measure the referendum vote 
against these criteria. Formnately, the Australian Bureau of Statistics has 
measurements of socio-economic advantage, economic resources and 
education and occupation. Nearly a year before the referendum, the 
ParUamentary Library produced the Socio-Economic Indexes for Electoral Divisions 
(Department of the ParUamentary Library 1998a). 
In Table 8.7 we ranked the 36 safe Labor seats by Yes vote and by relative 
socio-economic advantage/disadvantage. We show that, of the 36 safe Labor 
seats, Bonython was the most cUsadvantaged (36), Fowler the second most 
disadvantaged (35) and Chifley the third most (34). It should be noted that the 
ranks in the Socio-Economic Indexes for Electoral Divisions do not merely apply to 
safe Labor seats. Of aU the 148 electorates Bonython, Fowler and Chifley are 
the three most disadvantaged. These three divisions were striking cases of 
Labor's faUure to persuade its own voters to say Yes. However, a look at the 
other end of the scale is, perhaps, more interesting. 
Table 8.16 shows the 34 Electoral Divisions with the highest Indexes of 
Relative Socio-Economic Advantage, together with the party holding the seat 
on referendum day and whether it voted Yes or No in the repubUc referendum. 
(Notice the absence of Tasmania and the Northern Territory from the Ust.) A 
quotation from page 2 of the pubUcation explains the index: 
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The Index ot Relative Socio-Economic Advantage includes variables that measure 
relative social and economic weU-being, Indicators included are: high income 
famiUes; professional occupations; tertiary educational qualifications; dwellini^ s 
owned or being purchased; dwellings with a large number of bedrooms and a large 
number of motor vehicles, A higher score on this index means that the Klectoral 
Division has a relatively large proportion of people with the above attributes (i.e, 
high incomes, professional occupations, tertiary quaUfications, etc.). Conversely, a 
lower score on this index means that the Electoral Division has a relatively low 
proportion of people with these characteristics (Department of the Parliamentary 
Library 1998a, 2). 
Of these seats, 24 voted Yes (16 Liberal and 8 Labor) while only 10 voted 
No . In other words, whereas the 148 electorates Australia-wide split more than 
two-to-one in favour of No, the 34 'rich' electorates spUt more than two-to-one 
in favour of Yes. It is no surprise to learn that aU 10 No-voting high socio-
economic electorates are Liberal-held. The totals for the 16 'rich' Yes-voting 
Liberal seats (Bradfield, Kooyong, Ryan, Berowra, Nor th Sydney, Menzies, 
Curtin, Higgins, Warringah, Goldstein, Wentworth, Bennelong, Aston, 
Boothby, Deakin and Smrt, mean index 1118.3) were 732,045 for Yes (56.5 
percent) and 563,303 for N o (43.5 percent). The totals for the 10 'rich' No-
voting Liberal seats (Mitchell, Tangney, Mackellar, Hughes, Cook, Mayo, 
Moore, Pearce, Moreton and Macquarie, mean index 1077.9) were 433,024 for 
Table 8.15: Employment cross tabulation: ACRS 
Employment 
Status 
Employed 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Unemployed 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Retired 
Yes 
No 
Total 
School! University 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Party- voted for in 
Liberal 
Number 
389 
439 
828 
9 
19 
28 
74 
227 
301 
19 
18 
37 
% 
47.0 
53.0 
100.0 
32.1 
67.9 
100.0 
24.6 
75.4 
100.0 
51.4 
48.6 
100.0 
1998 
Labor 
Number 
521 
252 
773 
40 
21 
61 
153 
125 
278 
38 
12 
50 
% 
67.4 
32.6 
100.0 
65.6 
34.4 
100.0 
55.0 
45.0 
100.0 
76.0 
24.0 
100.0 
Total 
Number 
910 
691 
1,601 
49 
40 
89 
227 
352 
579 
57 
30 
87 
% 
56,8 
43,2 
100.0 
55.1 
44.9 
100.0 
39.2 
60,8 
100,0 
65,5 
34,5 
100,0 
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No (54 percent) and 369,564 for Yes (46 percent). The total votes for the 8 
'rich' Labor seats (Canberra, Fraser, Melbourne Ports, Jagajaga, Chisholm, 
Lowe, S}-dney and Brisbane, mean index 1065.4) were 422,615 for Yes (61.1 
percent) and 268,608 for No (38.9 percent). A crude analysis might be to say 
that the t}'pical Yes voter Uves in an inner metropoUtan suburb of Sydney (say, 
in Lowe or Sydney), Melbourne (say, in Chisholm or Melbourne Ports) or 
Canberra, votes Labor, has a job with a 'high' income, a universit}' degree, a 
middle-upper occupational stams, is not old and was not born in the United 
Kingdom. 
The eight electorates named in the two preceding sentences are Labor-held. 
Consequently, the federal member was advocating a Yes vote. Such was also the 
case for most of the Liberal Yes-voting seats where the member was advocating 
a Yes vote, for example Kooyong, North Sydney, Higgins and Curtin. Perhaps 
the most interesting cases, therefore, are the two Yes-voting upper SES Liberal 
seats held by the 'arch monarchist' members Tony Abbott and Howard. 
Warringah holds 10th place and 'the RepubUc of Bennelong' 16th place in 
Table 8.16, showing seats -with the highest indexes of relative socio-economic 
advantage. In conversations with the present writers both Abbott and Howard 
made this claim: 'I estimate that about two-thirds of those who voted for me 
in October 1998 took my advice and voted against the repubUc in November 
1999'. We agree with that estimate, which is based on the view that the Labor 
voters in that kind of seat voted so soUdly Yes that each man could claim that 
a substantial majorit}' of those who had voted for him at the general election 
took his advice and voted No at the referendum. Consider the case of 
Bennelong, where the two-part}- preferred vote in 1998 had been 42,075 Liberal 
and 33,013 Labor. At the referendum the Yes vote was 43,950 and the No vote 
36,508. If nine out of ten of those 33,000 Labor voters did vote Yes, the Yes 
Liberal vote would have been, say-, 12,000. About two-thirds of those who had 
voted for him at the election did take the Prime Minister's advice on the 
referendum. 
Our analysis of voting at the 40 poUing places within Bennelong and 34 
within Warringah does nothing to undercut the claim of either man. If we take 
the nine poUing places within Bennelong, where the general election vote was 
weakest for Howard, we find the Yes vote was 56.2 percent compared with 54.6 
percent for Bennelong as a whole. If we take the seven poUing places within 
Warringah, where the general election vote was weakest for Abbott, we find the 
Yes vote was 54.1 percent compared with 54.5 percent for Warringah as a 
whole. In Warringah, however, a pattern can be found which does not appear 
to exist in Bennelong. In Warringah, the further the polUng place lay from the 
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S\dney CBD, the more Ukely it was to vote No. The outiying poUing places of 
Allambie, Allambie Heights, Beacon HUl, Brookvale, Dee Why Central, 
ForesU'iUe East and North Manly voted No. By contrast, Mosman West was the 
only inner polling place to vote negatively. 
Let us be coUoquial and caU the 34 seats in Table 8.16 'the Rich List' and 
make tw.'o further observations about it. The first is to compare Table 8.16 with 
Table 8.16: Electoral divisions with the highest indexes of relative 
socio-economic advantage 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Division 
Bradfield (NSNX") 
Mitchell (NSVC) 
Koovong (V-'ic) 
Ryan (Qld) 
Berowra (NSW) 
Nor th Sydney (NSVC) 
Menzies (V'ic) 
Curtin (\X'A) 
Higgins (Vic) 
NX'arringah (NSVC) 
Goldstein (Vic) 
Tangney (WA) 
Wentworth (NSW) 
Canberra (ACT) 
Fraser (ACT) 
Bennelong (NSW) 
MackeUar (NSW) 
Hughes (NSVC) 
Cook (NSW^ 
Melbourne Ports (Vic) 
Jagajaga (VK) 
Mayo (SA) 
Chisholm ( (Vic) 
Moore (WA) 
Pearce (WA) 
Aston (Vic) 
Boothby (SA) 
Lowe (NSW) 
Moreton (Qld) 
Sydney (NSW) 
Bnsbane (Qld) 
Deakin (\'ic) 
Sturt (SA) 
Macquarte (NSW) 
Party-
Liberal 
Liberal 
l iberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Labor 
Libera! 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Uberal 
Labor 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Index 
1261,4 
1176,3 
1168,2 
1151,0 
1149,0 
1145,5 
1145,2 
1143,0 
1123,6 
1120,2 
1111.3 
1110.9 
1098.2 
1097.5 
1091.6 
1083.7 
1081.5 
1076.1 
1068.5 
1068.5 
1065.6 
1061.1 
1060.5 
1060.3 
1056.8 
1055.4 
1053.2 
1052.8 
1048.5 
1043.3 
1043.1 
1042.2 
1041.7 
1039.1 
^'es or No 
N'cs 
No 
\ e s 
\'cs 
Yes 
^•cs 
\ e s 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Divisions appearing only in Table 
Moreton and Macquane. 
16 are shown in italics. They are Fraser, Moore, Pearce, 
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Table 8.4, which gave detaUs of the 42 seats which voted Yes. That table Usted 
25 Labor seats voting Yes, of which only eight are also on 'the Rich List' 
(Sydney, Melbourne Ports, Fraser, Canberra, Brisbane, Chisholm, Jagajaga and 
Lowe). Table 8.4 gave 17 Liberal seats voting Yes, of which ordy Adelaide is not 
on 'the Rich List'. The second observation about Table 8.16 is to notice how 
closely it correlates with Table 8.17, which shows aU the seats where the Yes 
percentage in 1999 was higher than Labor's share of the two-party preferred 
vote in 1998 ('The Yes Gain Table'). There are only five seats of the 34 on 'the 
Rich List' in Table 8.16 not on 'The Yes Gain Table'. (The seats are Fraser 
which voted Yes and Moore, Pearce, Moreton and Macquarie which voted No.) 
Conversely, there are only five seats on 'The Yes Gain Table' not on 'the Rich 
List' (Adelaide which voted Yes and Murray, Moncrieff, Hindmarsh and Casey 
which voted No). 
At the other end of the scale it is possible to compile 'the Poor List'. We 
have taken the 15 highest ranked seats from the table 'Electoral Divisions 
Ranked by the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage' from the Socio-
Economic Indexes for Electoral Divisions. The 15 seats on 'the Poor List' comprise 
ten held by Labor (Bonython, Fowler, Chifley, GeUibrand, Port Adelaide, 
Oxley, Throsby, Reid, Blaxland and Braddon), four held by the National Party 
(Wide Bay, Cowper, G-w}'dir and Hinkler) and one held by the Liberal Part}' 
(Grey). Only two of these 15 seats voted Yes (Fowler and GeUibrand) and in aU 
cases the Yes vote was weU below the Labor share of the two-party preferred 
vote in 1998. If we look back to Tables 8.7 and 8.8 we notice that Bonython 
and Chifley were the two seats where the Labor Party most conspicuously faUed 
to persuade its supporters to vote Yes. In Fowler and GelUbrand, too, the faUure 
was there, but it was not enough to deny the repubUc a majority. What, then, 
are the characteristics of Bonython, Chifley, Fowler and GelUbrand (aU safe 
Labor seats on 'the Poor List') that should produce such divergent results? We 
turn again to the ParUamentary Library and the Electorate Reinkings: Census 1996 
(Department of the ParUamentary Library 1998b). 
On the referendum vote, Chifley is the one closest to the t}'pical electorate. 
With an AustraUa-wide Yes vote of 45.1 percent, we find Chifley on 42.2 
percent. By contrast, GeUibrand on 56.9 percent and Fowler on 51.9 percent 
were weU above AustraUa as a whole. Bonython on 33.3 percent was weU below. 
An examination of the rankings shows Chifley as the seat among the four 
usuaUy closest to the median ranking number 74. However, that is not always 
the case. For example, the population of Chifley is notably young. Only 5.6 
percent of its population was aged 65 years and over compared with seat 
number 74 at 12.4 percent. The median age of Chifley was 28, the third lowest 
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in the country At seat number 74 the median age was 34. Another unusual 
characteristic of Chifle\- Ues under the heading 'proportion of one parent 
famiUes with dependent children'. The Chifley figure is 15.1 percent, the 
highest in .Australia. Bonython comes in third at 14.4 percent 
The three safe Labor seats other than Chifley (Bonython, Gellibrand and 
Fowler) provide an interesting contrast. In Bonython only 19.9 percent of the 
population -was of the CathoUc reUgion. In GeUibrand and Fowler the figures 
w-ere 33.8 percent and 32.2 percent, respectively The proportion of persons of 
non-Christian reUgion in Bonython was 2.5 percent. In Fowler the figure was 
20.3 percent, the highest in AustraUa. In GelUbrand the figure was 9.8 percent, 
the 11th highest. The proportion of persons of 'No Religion' in Bonython was 
28.3 percent, the highest in the country. 
In terms of place of birth Fowler was highest in AustraUa by proportion of 
persons born overseas. It was the only electorate where a majority of the 
population was born overseas. On that score the percentages for Fowler, 
GelUbrand, Chifley and Bonython were 51.3 percent, 40.1 percent, 30.6 percent 
and 28.1 percent, respectively. Every one of the top dozen electorates by birth 
in the United Kingdom and Ireland mrned in a No majorit}'. Bonython came in 
at number four. The proportions for Moore, Brand, Canning and Bonython 
were 22.4 percent, 19.8 percent, 18.2 percent and 16.3 percent, respectively In 
Chifley, very close to the median, the figure was five percent. In Gellibrand and 
Fowler, the proportions were 3.7 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively 
GelUbrand and Fowler were in the top 15 by birth in Southern Europe, 
Gellibrand (fifth) at 13.2 percent and Fowler (15th) at 8.9 percent 
However, w-here Fowler and GelUbrand really stand out are in the 
descriptions 'Proportion of Persons Born in South East Asia' (Fowler first, 
GelUbrand second), 'Proportion of Persons Born in Non EngUsh Speaking 
Countries' (Fowler first, GeUibrand eighth), 'Proportion of Persons Born 
Overseas and AustraUan-Born persons with Overseas-Born Parents' (Fowler 
first, GelUbrand 10th, with Fowler the only electorate where more than two-
thirds of the population met the description), 'Proportion of Persons Not 
Fluent in EngUsh' (Fo-wler first, GelUbrand third) and 'Proportion of Persons 
Speaking a Language Other Than EngUsh at Home' (Fowler first, Gellibrand 
ninth, with Fowler the only electorate where more than 60 percent of the 
population met the description). The imphcations from these data are clear 
Very poor electorates Uke GelUbrand and Fowler wiU vote Yes because of their 
high ethnicit\- and relatively high non-Christianity or (where Christian) 
CathoUcit\'. By contrast, a very poor electorate Uke Bonython wiU solidly vote 
No because of high proportions born in the United Kingdom and low 
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CathoUcity. Yet aU three are among the four electorates with the highest 
unemployment rates. At the 1996 census the unemployment rates of Fowler, 
Bonython and GelUbrand were 17.9 percent, 16.2 percent and 16.1 percent, 
respectively There was only one other seat with an unemployment rate above 
15 percent, namely the National Part}' seat of Cowper (NSW). 
These inferences might not be of so much value, were it not for the 
existence of survey data. Consequently let us now look at Tables 8.18 and 8.19, 
Table 8.17: The Yes gain 
Rank 
1 
2 
1 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
f 
10 
11 
l l 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
21 
.23 
'24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
m 30 
31 
3,2 
33 
34 
Division 
Bradfield (NSW) 
Kooyong (Vic) 
North Sydney (NSW) 
Higgins (Vic) 
Curtin (WA) 
Warringah (NSVC) 
Mitchell (NSVC) 
Wentworth (NSVC) 
Goldstein (Vic) 
Menzies (Vic) 
Berowra (NSVC) 
Mackellar (NSVC) 
Ryan (Qld) 
Sturt (SA) 
Bennelong (NSVC) 
Melbourne Ports (Vic) 
Boothby (SA) 
Mayo (SA) 
Adelaide (SA) 
Cook (NSVC) 
Aston (Vic) 
Chisholm ((Vic) 
Deakin (Vic) 
Hughes (NSVC) 
Brisbane (Qld) 
Murray (Vic) 
Tangney (WA) 
Lowe (NSVC) 
Canberra (ACT) 
Moncriepf {Q\d) 
Sydney (NSVC) 
Jagajaga (Vic) 
Hindmarsh (SA) 
Casey (Vic) 
Party 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Labor 
Labor 
Liberal 
Labor 
Labor 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Yes gain 
28.8 
25.6 
23.5 
23.3 
18.8 
17.5 
16.7 
16.5 
16.1 
15.3 
15.2 
15.0 
14.8 
11.0 
10.6 
10.1 
9.3 
9.1 
7.3 
6.0 
5.8 
5.2 
4.8 
4.7 
2.7 
2.6 
2.4 
2.0 
2.0 
1.8 
1.0 
0.9 
0.7 
0.3 
Yes % higher than 
% Labor 2PPV 
26.8 
38.6 
37.8 
40.4 
36.7 
37.0 
30.2 
43.7 
41.9 
44.6 
36.5 
34.4 
40.5 
42.7 
44.0 
55.8 
42.6 
40.1 
49.1 
41.1 
45.8 
52.1 
48.1 
44.5 
54.6 
27.9 
441 
54.6 
60.1 
37.2 
66.9 
55.9 
48.8 
45.1 
Labor's 
»/o Yes 
55.6 
64.2 
61.3 
63.7 
55.5 
54.5 
46.9 
60.2 
58.0 
59.9 
51.7 
49.4 
55.3 
53.7 
546 
65.9 
51.9 
49.2 
56.4 
47.1 
51.6 
57.3 
52.9 
49.2 
57.3 
30.5 
46.5 
56.6 
62.1 
39.0 
67.9 
56.8 
49.5 
45.4 
Divisions appearing only in Table 17 are shown in italics. They are Adelaide, Murray, Moncrieff, 
Hindmarsh and Casey. 
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which come from the ACRS data. Table 8.18 tells us that Liberal voters who 
were born in Australia were more Ukely to vote No (62.7 percent) than Yes 
(3"^ .3 percent). However, Liberal voters born in the United Kingdom were the 
least Ukely to vote Yes in the referendum (35.8 percent). No wonder a 'rich' 
electorate Uke Moore (Liberal, WA) should vote so soUdly No when its other 
characteristics suggested a Yes vote. Table 8.19 teUs us that Liberal voters of 
the CathoUc reUgion voted No over Yes in the ratio 55-45. That is 10 percent 
lower for 'the part}- Une' than Liberal voters taken as a whole. The big contrast 
is w-ith Orthodox Church Liberals, of whom 73.7 percent voted Yes. 
What ultimate conclusions can we draw about the results of the 1999 
RepubUc Referendum? In our view, three stand out. First, voting for the 
repubUc was an inner metropoUtan phenomenon. Second, voting for the 
republic was correlated -with income and socio-economic stams, which to a 
considerable degree explains the failure of the ALP to successfuUy mobiUse a 
decent majorit}- of its 1998 supporters to vote for the repubUc in 1999 (we are 
not w-ilUng to call 57 percent 'a decent majorit}''). To these factors we would add 
a third, which augurs poorly for future attempts to bring about a republic. This 
is that 'repubUc', in the abstract, is an expression of a nebulous concept. One 
of the reasons opinion poUs show high support for a repubUc is that their 
questions are often cast in a nebulous form. In a referendum, however, k is 
always necessary to specify exactiy what the term is to mean and, in 1999, this 
Table 8.18: Country of birth cross tabulation: ACRS 
Country- of birth 
Australia 
Yes 
No 
Total 
New Zealand 
Yes 
No 
Total 
United Kingdom 
\'es 
No 
Total 
Other 
\'es 
No 
Total 
Part}' 
Liberal 
No. 
430 
722 
1152 
11 
8 
19 
49 
88 
137 
71 
65 
136 
% 
37.3 
62.7 
100.0 
57.9 
42.1 
100.0 
35.8 
64.2 
100.0 
52.2 
47.8 
100.0 
voted for in 1998 
Labor 
No. 
684 
404 
1088 
11 
5 
16 
57 
67 
124 
138 
46 
184 
% 
62.9 
37.1 
100.0 
68.8 
31.2 
100.0 
46.0 
54.0 
100.0 
75.0 
25.0 
100.0 
National 
No. 
33 
79 
101 
5 
5 
% 
21.8 
78.2 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Tota 
No. 
1,136 
1,205 
2,341 
22 
13 
35 
106 
160 
266 
209 
\n 
320 
1 
% 
48.5 
51,5 
100.0 
62.9 
37.1 
100.0 
39.8 
60.2 
100.0 
65.3 
34.7 
100.0 
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very act of specification spUt repubUcans into two hostile camps: those 
concerned with national symbols and those concerned with popular 
empowerment. 
The latter worked to defeat the brand of 'repubUc' on offer, since this was 
the only way to keep 'their' repubUc aUve. Should 'their' repubUc one day be on 
offer, it is by no means certain that those -who voted for a nominal repubUc in 
1999 would support a substantive repubUc at that time. From this, a poUtical 
scientist might conclude that the monarchical status quo is the Condorcet 
-winner, namely that option which, even if not supported itself by a majority, 
can garner enough support to defeat any alternative. To put it another way (as 
one commentator did on the night of the referendum), one might fairly 
describe the repubUcans as a circular firing squad. 
We have just introduced what many wiU think of as a new term. It is one we 
think should appear in any glossary of AustraUan electoral stucUes: 'Condorcet 
winner', after the French mathematician, phUosopher, historian and repubUcan 
Table 8.19: Religion cross tabulations: ACRS 
ReUgion 
Roman Catholic 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Anglican 
Yes 
No 
Total 
UnitingI Methodist 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Orthodox 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Presbyterian 
Yes' 
No 
Total 
No Religion 
Ym 
No 
Total 
Party 
Liberal 
No. 
151 
18:6 
337 
145 
309 
454 
75 
135 
210 
14 
5 
19 
31 
49 
80 
105 
101 
206 
% 
44.8 
55.2 
100.0 
31.9 
68.1 
100,0 
35,7 
64,3 
100.0 
73,7 
26,3 
100,0 
38.7 
61.3 
100.0 
51,0 
49.0 
100.0 
' voted fc >rin 1998 
Labor 
No. 
273 
157 
430 
181 
157 
338 
63 
52 
115 
36 
11 
47 
26 
37 
63 
236 
86 
322 
% 
63.5 
36.5 
100.0 
53.6 
46,4 
100.0 
54.8 
45.2 
100,0 
76.6 
23.4 
100,0 
41,3 
58,7 
100,0 
733 
26,7 
100,0 
National 
No, 
4 
21 
25 
10 
32 
42 
2 
11 
13 
3 
9 
12 
7 
3 
10 
% 
16,0 
84,0 
100,0 
23,8 
76,2 
100,0 
15,4 
84.6 
100.0 
25.0 
75.0 
100.0 
70.0 
30.0 
100.0 
Total 
No. 
428 
364 
792 
336 
498 
834 
140 
198 
338 
50 
16 
66 
60 
95 
155 
348 
190 
538 
% 
54.0 
46.0 
100.0 
40.3 
59.7 
100.0 
41.4 
58.6 
100.0 
75.8 
24.2 
100.0 
38.7 
61.3 
100.0 
64.7 
35.3 
100.0 
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poUtician, Marie lean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet 
(1743-94). Any significant work of international psephology includes a 
definition for this term, namely 'a candidate who can beat an)- other in a 
pairu'ise contest'. To be a Condorcet winner you need a decent level of 
minorit\- support. If your support faUs too much you then become a 
'Condorcet loser'. 
While the idea of the Queen as a candidate for election ma\- seem strange, 
that is the AustraUan reaUty. Our picture of the future is that there will be a 
plebiscite some day in which, say, 75 percent of voters assert that they want 'a 
repubUc with an AustraUan head of state'. Then an actual repubUcan 
constimtion (with a popularly elected president) wUI be put to the people. Not 
only -^ iviU that 'maximaUst' model be more heavUy defeated than its 'minimaUst' 
predecessor, it will give Sir Robert Menzies joy from his grave. Having watched 
his beloved Kooyong give a 23,000 vote majorit}' for the repubUc in 1999, he 
wiU laugh as Kooyong gives a 23,000 vote majority for the Queen in 2009. 
Another term wUI then be added to the glossary: 'Neverendum'. Faced with 
the Queen's victory in Referendum One, then Referendum Two, people wiU 
switch off, muttering this new word. As the Americans would say, 'If it ain't 
broke don't fix it'. 
Chapter Nine 
Public Opinion on Britain, a Directiy 
Elected President, and an 
Australian Republic 
Jonathan Kelley, M D R Evans, Malcolm Mearns 
and Bruce Headey 
The 1999 referendum on becoming a repubUc with a President selected by 
ParUament was the first — but probably not the last — time these issues came 
to a vote in AustraUa. The issues involved are far from novel. The AustraUan 
pubUc has longstanding views on issues raised by the referendum. Most voters 
formed their opinions on these issues years before the referendum was called 
and few changed their opinion in the course of the referendum campaign. Our 
goal in this chapter is to describe the pubUc's views on these issues, to show 
how these views combined to shape their vote on the question put to them in 
the referendum and to describe how opinion has developed in the first few 
years after the referendum. To do this, we examine the attimdes of the 
AustraUan pubUc towards the Queen and the Royal FarrUly, towards a 
repubUcan future for AustraUa, and towards different methods for selecting the 
head of state. 
This chapter draws heavily on our earUer article (KeUey, Evans, Mearns and 
Headey 1999). The 2001 data and the analyses based on them are new. Also, 
results from the 1999/2000 survey have been updated to include new cases that 
were not available at the time the earUer article was written. We draw on data 
reaching back more than 20 years, mainly from the International Social Science 
Surveys/AustraUa (IsssA) in which we have queried large, representative 
national samples of AustraUans about their views on social and poUtical issues 
since 1984 (KeUey and Evans 1999; 2001). DetaUs are provided in the Technical 
Appendix. 
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Background 
Monarch\- arose as a method of societal governance with the first large-scale 
societies, and the king's authority in those societies rested on his success in 
warfare, his (sometimes brutal) intimidation of his own people, and his 
ancestry. He was hallowed both by tradition and by the supernatural, with the 
favour of the local gods towards him being tested and demonstrated on the 
battiefield. It was b\- far the most t}'pical method of governing large scale 
societies for thousands of years, although there were notable exceptions such 
as the Roman repubUc. Recentiy, democracy has emerged as an alternative 
method of providing governance and peaceful transitions between 
governments, with its legitimacy derived from the people, specifically through 
the ceremony of voting. Does the EngUsh monarchy, with this patina of 
history, still enjoy a powerful legitimacy in the eyes of AustraUans? Is the wiU 
of the people the more appropriate authority for consecrating our head of 
state? Does the lack of pressure for direct democracy in pubUc poUcy making 
(Uhr 1998a) mean that the populace would be content to delegate the choice of 
head of state to Parliament? 
Referendums are often referred to by poUtical scientists as a manifestation 
of direct rather than representative democracy (Lijphart 1984). However true 
this may be for poUcy referendums, it is misleading in respect of constitutional 
referendums (GaUigan 1999). The Australian Constimtion permits only the 
latter, not the former, so AustraUa has a pecuUar 'duaUst democracy' (Ackerman 
1991): the people vote only in elections and to decide constitutional 
arrangements, while pubUc poUcy decisions are taken by elected representatives, 
not directiy by the pubUc. Although the referendum is recent, it addresses a 
longstanding issue. Prior research shows that royaUsm versus repubUcanism is 
one of the few enduring non-economic issues in AustraUa's poUtical ideology, 
which is otherwise dominated by enduring economic cleavages and transient 
non-economic issues (Bean and KeUey 1988, 81-3; 1995; Kelley 1988). 
Constitutional referendums on other topics have usuaUy faUed. There have 
been 44 proposed changes put to the people on 19 separate occasions, 
including the head of state and preamble proposals in 1999. Only eight 
proposals have passed and only two of these would generaUy be considered 
significant: the granting of power to the Commonwealth to pass social services 
legislation in 1946 and the granting of Aboriginal citizenship in 1967. 
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Figure 9.1: Hov^ ^ important do you feel the Queen and Royal Family are 
to Australia? 
i—I Fairly important 
B i Very important 
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Queen versus republic 
Don Aitkin's (1982) pioneering political science surveys inquired into 
AustraUans' feeUngs about the importance of the Queen, and found that the 
citizenry at this time felt the Queen was quite relevant, with a majorit}' (54 
percent) saying that she was 'very important' or 'fairly important' to AustraUa 
in 1967 and again in 1979 (Figure 9.1). The dismissal of the Whitiam 
Government seems to have had no immediate repercussions for the citizenry's 
feeUngs about the monarchy. 
The majorit}' finding the Queen 'very' or 'fairly' important plunged to a 
minority, 45 percent, by 1984—85 (Figure 9.1, see also Bean 1991). In a survey 
of 2,979 people in 1984, a smaU majorit}' of AustraUans, 55 percent, felt that 
the Queen and the Royal Family were not too important to AustraUa — 
SpecificaUy saying that the Queen and Royal Family were 'not very important' 
(31 percent) or 'not important at aU' (24 percent). By contrast, 28 percent felt 
that the Queen was 'fairly important' and 16 percent felt that she was 'very 
important'. 
The decUne halted in the mid 1980s, at least temporarUy, and the relevance 
of the Queen held fairly stable for the rest of the decade. Even as late as 1990, 
45 percent stiU found the Queen 'very' or 'fairly' important. The Queen's 
importance decUned to just 33 percent 'very' or 'fairly' important in 1994. It was 
31 percent in 1995 and then fluctuated between 25 and 30 percent from 
1996/97 to 2001. AU in aU, that is a remarkable decUne: from a 54 percent 
majority feeUng the Queen was at least moderately important to AustraUa in 
1979, to only a smaU 25 to 30 percent minorit}' holding that view now. 
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Even though support for the Queen had ebbed, that did not at first mean 
majorit}' support for a repubUc. In 1984—85 we asked: 'Do you think AustraUa 
should retain the Queen of England as head of state or become a repubUc?' At 
that time, only 41 percent thought AustraUa 'probably' or 'definitely' should 
become a repubUc, although this was up sharply from 36 percent in the late 
1970s (Figure 9.2). That balance of opinion then held steady through to 1990 
(Bean 1991). Support for a republic skyrocketed to 60 percent by 1994. After 
that, support continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace, with 62 percent 
favouring a repubUc by 1995 and 66 percent the next year. Support for a 
repubUc has held steady at around 65 percent in favour in the referendum year 
(1999) and on into the beginning of the post-referendum era (2001). In aU, this 
was a dramatic shift in favour of a repubUc, from 36 percent in favour in 1979 
to 66 percent in favour less than two decades later. 
It is noteworthy that support for the Queen had begun to fade before 
support for a repubUc rose: it is not so much that a repubUc displaced the 
monarchy as a pubUc ideal, but rather that the monarchy was on the wane 
Table 9.1: 1984: Monarchy or republic? 
Definitely retain the Queen 
Probably retain the Queen 
Probably become a republic 
Definitely become a republic 
(2,907 cases in 1984) 
35% 
24%, 
20% 
21% 
100% 
Figure 9.2: Do you think Australia should retain the Queen of England 
as head of state or become a republic? 
'^ < ^ 
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before the repubUc's star rose. It is also noteworthy that support for a repubUc 
was not fading in the year that the referendum failed, but rather was holding 
steady at a soUd majorit}- of around 65 percent. Moreover, the faUure of the 
referendum induced no backlash against the repubUc, rather support continued 
to hold steady at least into the beginning of the post-referendum era. 
Social differences in support for a republic 
A multiple regression analysis shows which groups support and which oppose 
a repubUc (Figure 9.3). These data are from a large IsssA panel survey in 1995 
and 1996. For simpUcity, and to reduce measurement error, we combine the two 
questions on the Queen and a repubUc into a single measure (detaUs are in the 
Technical Appendix). The figures shown in the graph (standardised partial 
regression coefficients) show the relative importance of each influence. 
This analysis clearly shows that, by the mid 1990s, support for the repubUc 
was widespread, not just concentrated among a sophisticated, weU-educated 
Melbourne-Sydney eUte. Support was only a few percent higher in the cities 
Figure 9.3: Sources of support for a republic, 1996: 
IsssA 1995-97 panel survey 
Social factors: 
Age 
Education 
Occupational status 
Government employee 
Self-employed 
Supervisor 
Family income 
Trade union member 
Urban residence 
Political factors: 
Supports National party 
Supports Labor party 
Distrusts politicians 
Is interested in politics 
alues citizen participation 
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than in the countr\-. It was equaUv common among the well-educated and the 
poorly educated, among those in routine, low status jobs, and those in 
management and the professions, among rich and poor, and (surprisingly) 
equalh- common among government employees and those in private enterprise. 
The self-employed were a Uttie keener on a repubUc than were employees, 
perhaps because of a generaUsed preference for autonomy. Support was just a 
fraction higher among the young than the old. Trade union members were a 
Uttie keener on a repubUc than non-members. These differences are all in the 
direction that stereot}'pes would lead us to expect, but the differences were 
small, with standardised regression coefficients under 0.10. In aU, rather than 
sharp social cleavages, there was majority support for the repubUc in almost aU 
social groups, but not overwhelming support in any one. 
Political differences in support for a republic 
Political differences were important, much more important than social 
cleavages (Figure 9.3). Labor supporters being a great deal keener on a repubUc 
than were Liberal supporters, who, in turn, were a Uttie keener on a repubUc 
than were National Part}' supporters. Liberal supporters are the reference or 
comparison group, and so not shown expUcitiy in the diagram. The 0.24 for 
Labor supporters shows how much more supportive they are compared to 
Liberal supporters, while the —0.06 for National supporters shows how much 
less supportive they are compared to Liberals. 
PoUtical culture or ideology also played a very large role. These attitudes 
were almost aU measured in 1995, a year or more before we asked respondents 
about their views on the repubUc in 1996—97. This panel survey contacted the 
same respondents twice, once in 1995-96 and once in 1996-97. Panel surveys 
are particularly useful for analysing change and stabiUty over time. The survey 
found that: 
• Citi2ens who are distrustful of poUticians were substantiaUy less keen on a 
repubUc (standardised regression coefficient of -0.16); 
• Interest in poUtics matters too, although less so — the standardised 
regression coefficient of 0.08 shows that people who find poUtics 
interesting were more incUned to favour a repubUc; 
• Interestingly, advocacy of citizen participation in poUtics is unrelated to 
republican attimdes. The repubUc was not seen as a way to give ordinary 
people greater voice in government; 
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• Admiration for the British system of government had a strong anti-
repubUcan effect; 
• Admiration of the American system of government had a smaU pro-
repubUcan effect; and 
• Except for these other things, admiration (or not) of AustraUa's system of 
government was unrelated to repubUcan attimdes. Opposition to a repubUc 
had Uttie to do with AustraUan government per se, but much to do with 
British, and a Uttie with American, models of government. 
FinaUy, there is a substantial emotional current in views about a repubUc, but 
again more to do with Britain than with AustraUa. HostiUt}' to Britain was an 
important source of repubUcan support; conversely, people who have warm, 
positive feeUngs about Britain were less keen on a republic. By contrast, positive 
feeUngs about AustraUa had no influence on repubUcan attitudes. People did 
not support the repubUc because they Uked AustraUa, nor oppose it because of 
doubts about AustraUa. In short, emotion had a lot to do with attimdes to the 
repubUc, but it was emotion about Britain, not about AustraUa. 
Attitudes were mostly formed long before the referendum 
In the mid 1990s, there was a great deal of continuity in repubUcan attitudes — 
this was not a new issue, but an old one on which people had, for the most part, 
already formed their views. By far the strongest determinant of repubUcan 
attitudes in 1996-97 was republican attitudes a year or more earUer (Figure 9.4). 
Its standarcUsed effect was a massive 0.80, dwarfing aU other effects. 
The results of this analysis (Figure 9.4), with its expUcit measurement of 
past views on the repubUc and our earUer analysis (Figure 9.3) ignoring it, 
appear to be very different. The earUer analysis shows that various aspects of 
class position and ideological preference shape people's views toward the 
repubUc. The later analysis shows that this mostiy happened long ago, and its 
effects persist into the present mainly because, once formed, views on the 
repubUc are quite stable over time. This is true of many other poUtical attimdes 
as weU (Bean and KeUey 1988, 85-8). 
Other than that, most change was almost random, being evenly scattered 
through the population rather than strongly concentrated in particular groups. 
It is especiaUy interesting to note that the city versus country divide was not 
widening over this period. There were, however, a few smaU intensifying effects. 
The self-employed were sUghtly more supportive of a repubUc than one would 
have expected in Ught of their attimdes in 1995-96. Supporters of the National 
120 Jonathan Kelley, M D R Evan.!, Malcolm Mearns and Bruce Headey 
Figure 9.4: Changes in support for a republic, prior to the referendum 
campaign: Effect of attitudes in 1995 on attitudes in 1996 
Social factors: 
Age 
Education 
Occupational status 
Government employee 
Self-employed 
Supervisor 
Family income 
Trade union member 
Urban residence 
Political factors: 
Supports National party 
Supports Labor party 
Distrusts politicians 
Is interested in politics 
Values citizen participation 
Warm toward Australia 
Warm toward Britain 
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Likes American system 
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Part\' were even less keen on a repubUc than their attitudes in 1995-96 would 
have predicted. People with warm feeUngs towards Britain and those who 
admire the British system of government both became more anti-repubUcan 
than their prior attimdes about the repubUc would have predicted. All these 
effects are small, so the key point is that change was not particulariy 
concentrated in any subgroups, but insofar as there was any change at aU, it was 
widespread throughout societ}'. 
The referendum campaign 
To examine the course of events during the referendum campaign, we narrow 
our focus to Canberra, where two Canberra Times/Datucol surveys coUected the 
relevant data at the ver\- beginning of the campaign in 1998 and again two 
weeks before the vote in 1999 (details are in the Technical Appendix). As one 
Public Opinion on Britain, a Directly Elected President, and an Australian Republic 121 
would expect, support for a repubUc is higher in Canberra than in the rest of 
the country, in part because there are more Labor supporters in Canberra than 
in the nation as a whole and Labor supporters are keener on a repubUc. 
However, there is no reason to suppose that the patterns of change observed 
in Canberra would be any cUfferent in the countr}- as a whole. 
Support for a repubUc cUd not flag: there was no significant decline from the 
beginning of the campaign to the end (a regression analysis of a pooled dataset 
containing both surveys, controlUng age, sex, political part}-, and interest in 
poUtics, shows no significant difference between opinion on the repubUc at the 
beginning of the campaign and the end, t=0.30, p=0.77 based on 1714 cases). 
There may have been a very sUght polarisation of opinion, with sUght growth 
in both support (growing from 68 percent to 73 percent) and a growth in 
opposition (from 13 percent to 14 percent), with fewer undecided (decUning 
from 19 percent to 13 percent). 
Over the campaign there was no significant change in the level of support 
for a directiy elected president either, with over 60 percent favouring direct 
election by the voters both before and after (in the pooled regression anahsis, 
t=-0.82, p=0.41, with 1,515 cases). Canberrans' views on this closely parallel 
those of the country as a whole (Figure 9.5). By contrast, support for the 
referendum feU substantiaUy, from 69 percent in favour before to 53 percent 
after the campaign (in the pooled regression analysis controlUng age, sex, 
poUtical part}' and interest in poUtics, b= -15.6 (s.e.= 2.6) with t=-5.89, 
p<0.0001, based on 1,711 cases). A smaU faU is usual in AustraUan referendums, 
but this may be rather more than usual. 
The usual pattern for referendums in AustraUa is support at the outset of 
the campaign for general principles of reform, but then decUne as the details 
of proposals are attacked by the part}' in opposition. Only if both parties agree 
on the referendum does it succeed, and even then there is some sUppage of 
support over the course of the campaign. 
Thus, there was a dramatic shift during the campaign, but not on the basic 
issues of repubUc rather than a monarchy, nor on how a repubUcan head of 
state should be chosen. Rather, there was a change in the way these attitudes 
were Unked to views on the referendum. What happened? Those in favour of 
a repubUc were hugely more supportive of the referendum at the beginning of 
die campaign (89 points). By the end of the campaign, that enormous gap had 
shrunk by about 25 points (to 66) — still by far the main factor but not as 
overwhelming as earUer. 
Looking into these cUfferences in more detaU shows that some groups 
hardly changed their views about the referendum, but others changed 
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Figure 9.5: Preferred method of choosing the head of state, Australia 
1995/96 (N = 2,332) and Canberra, 1998 (N = 860) and 1999 (N = 521) 
son 
70-
g60-
> 
,250-
c 
— 40-
§30i 
^ 2 0 ^ 
10-
0-
[ D Australia 1995/96 
CD Canberra 1998 
H i Canberra 1999 
71 70 
2 2 2 
^^ 
"t* 
dramaticaUy (Figure 9.6; detaUs on the analysis are in the Technical Appendix). 
Regression based estimates controlUng for age, sex, and poUtical party indicate 
that support for the referendum was near zero both before and after the 
campaign among those opposed to a repubUc, as one would expect. Support for 
the referendum was overwhelming both before and after the campaign among 
citizens who favour a repubUc and prefer a head of state chosen by parliament. 
There was just a sUght decUne — from 96 percent pro-referendum to 89 
percent — in the course of the campaign. 
An important coUapse of support occurred among people who were 
undecided on the repubUc per se. At the beginning of the campaign, a near-
majorit}- of them, 46 percent, favoured the referendum, but only 23 percent did 
so by the end of the referendum campaign. The most dramatic collapse of 
support was among supporters of a repubUc who wanted the head of state to 
be chosen directiy by the people. Support for the referendum was runtung at 
an impressively high 89 percent before the referendum campaign, only 
fractionally lower than support among pro-repubHcans who favoured 
parUamentary appointment of the President. Support for the referendum 
among these 'people's choice' repubUcans plunged to 57 percent, a decUne of 
32 percentage points over the course of the campaign. This is stiU majority 
support, but a smaU majorit}' rather than a huge majorit}'. 
The way the head of state was to be chosen became a much more saUent 
issue. By the end of the campaign, the gap between the 'people's choice' 
repubUcans and the 'parUamentary selection' repubUcans was over 4 times as 
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Figure 9.6: Support for the referendum by views on the republic and 
method of choosing a President: Predicted values from a regression 
analysis controlling age, sex and political party 
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large as at the beginning. It was originaUy only 96 percent versus 89 percent, a 
gap of just 7 points, but rose to 89 percent versus 57 percent, a gap of over 30 
points. It is tempting to speculate that at the beginning of the campaign, this 
group's views were dominated by their general enthusiasm for a repubUc but, 
as they thought over whether a repubUc with a head of state chosen by 
ParUament was superior to the current monarchy, they turned against the 
referendum. In the aftermath of the referendum, it has been suggested that it 
was the word 'President' rather than the method of selection that turned voters 
off the referendum. However, our 1995 question asked about the method for 
choosing AustraUa's 'head of state', and found equaUy strong support for direct 
election. The word 'President' is not the explanation: Australians 
overwhelmingly favour direct elections, whether the position is called 
'President' (as in recent poUs) or 'head of state'. 
This referendum result is rather different from its predecessors. What has 
kUled prior proposals for constitutional change? The answer is poUtical parties, 
maverick state premiers and 'the devU in the detaU' (GaUigan 1995, 1999). 
DiscipUned parties and an electoral system that makes majorities easy to attain 
perhaps promote deUberative democracy and 'responsible' poUcy making. They 
also certainly perpetuate divisions and, one might argue, mindless team loyalty'. 
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When AustraUa goes to a referendum, what happens is usually this: the partv in 
Government proposes, the Opposition part}- and some state Premiers oppose 
and the proposal goes down. Quite often the Opposition party has eatiier 
indicated general support for the principle behind a mooted change, but it does 
not want to give the Government a success to crow about, so it finds a w-a\- of 
opposing the specifics of acmal proposals in order to secure an electoral win. 
1999 was rather different. The main proposal for change was favoured more 
strongh- by the Opposition than the Government, and the Prime Minister was 
vigorously negative. The simation was reversed for the secondar\- preamble 
proposal. The devU was again in the detaU. Powerful part}' leaders who may 
attract team loyalt)- opposed change in principle (Howard) or opposed the 
specifics (for example opponents of indirect election of the President and of 
the \\-ording of the preamble). The gap between what the citizenry wanted (a 
repubUc w-ith direct election) and what they were offered (a repubUc without 
direct election) was the subject of well-designed advertising campaigns by 
opponents of the referendum towards the end of the campaign. There is some 
evidence for the traditional factor of party discipUne, with the gap between 
Labor and CoaUtion supporters (net of their own attitudes about the repubUc 
and the Queen) growing over the course of the campaign (Technical Appendix 
Table 9.3). 
One could read the 7 percent decUne in support for the referendum (from 
96 percent to 89 percent) among those who favour a repubUc and prefer a head 
of state chosen by parUament as the 'normal' level of decUne for a referendum. 
If support had only decUned by this amount among the undecided and among 
those favouring a direct-election repubUc, the referendum would have passed. 
But the much greater than 'normal' coUapse in support among these groups led 
to the faUure of the referendum. 
What if the referendum had offered a directly elected President? 
We have seen that the head of state issue appears to loom very large among 
supporters of a repubUc. What, then, would have happened if the referendum 
had offered a repubUc with a President elected by the voters, instead of chosen 
by ParUament? That was one of the possibiUties considered, but rejected, when 
the referendum was drawn up. 
To estimate how such a referendum would have fared, we begin with the 
parameters of a regression model estimated on the Canberra data. There are 
two key assumptions. Firstiy, we assume that the Unks between party, attitudes 
to a repubUc, preferences for how the head of state is chosen, and referendum 
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vote found in Canberra are similar to those for AustraUa as a whole. In effect 
we assume that, for example, a middle aged, male Labor supporter who favours 
a repubUc and Uves in Canberra would vote on the referendum in much the 
same way as a middle aged, male Labor supporter who favours a repubUc but 
Uves in Melbourne. AppUed to the Australia-wide distribution of party 
preference, the Canberra equation correctly precUcts the AustraUa-wide vote on 
die referendum. That gives us confidence that the pattern of relationships (the 
parameters of the model) for Canberra appUes to the country as a whole. 
Secondly, we assume that the degree to which voters who wanted an elected 
President (but were not offered it) turned against the actual referendum teUs us 
the degree to which voters who want a President selected b}- ParUament would 
turn against a hypothetical referendum offering an elected President. With 
these assumptions, we can then use the AustraUa-wide distribution of part}-
preference, attitudes toward a repubUc, and preferred way of selecting the head 
of state to estimate what would happen to a hypothetical referendum offering 
an elected President. These calculations imply that a referendum offering a 
repubUc with a head of state elected directiy by the people would have won 
easUy in AustraUa as a whole. According to this micro-simulation, the vote 
would have been about 55 percent in favour and 45 percent against. 
Who prefers direct election of the head of state? 
It is not just any repubUc that the AustraUan pubUc wants. It is a repubUc with 
a head of state elected directly by the people. As we have seen, the majorit}' 
favouring this was already huge, 71 percent, as early as 1995. That represents a 
degree of consensus rarely seen in electoral poUtics. Indications are that those 
views held steady up through the referendum, with a Datacol poll in Canberra 
just days before the referendum yielding a virmaUy identical percentage in 
favour of cUrect election. 
Who is it that favours a directly elected head of state? Our multivariate 
regression analysis shows that there are few differences among social or 
economic groupings (Figure 9.7). A harbinger of fumre views on this issue is 
the significant age difference, with the young being significantly more in favour 
of direct election than the old. There is also a significant education effect, 
although not a yawning gulf, with early school leavers being somewhat keener 
on direct election than are their more highly educated peers. Importantly, city 
folk and country folk are equaUy supportive of a direct election, as are rich and 
poor, and as are those at the top of the occupational ladder and those at the 
bottom. 
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Figure 9.7: Support for elected head of state: Standardised partial 
regression coefficients for Australia, 1995 
Social factors: 
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Desire for a directiy elected head of state was therefore not a 'revolt of the 
battiers' — the battlers mostly support direct election, but their more 
prosperous feUow citizens are equaUy supportive. Nor is it a 'battle of the 
bush': cit '^ and country people aUke strongly support direct election. Instead, it 
is attitudes and values that most seriously divide AustraUans on the issue of 
direct election: 
Ivhstrust of poUticians is substantially the most important source of support 
for direct election, as shown by the standardised regression coefficient of 
0.20; 
About two-thirds as important is valuing citizen participation in poUtics: 
AustraUans who greatiy value individual involvement in poUtics are more 
supportive of direct election, with a standardised regression coefficient of 
0.14; 
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• Having a positive assessment of the American system of government also 
contributes to support for direct election (standardised regression 
coefficient of 0.12), but assessments of AustraUa's system of government 
and of the British s}-stem do not affect view-s on direct election; 
• Those who find poUtics interesting are a Uttie less supportive of direct 
election; 
• Labor voters are a Uttie less supportive of direct election than are National 
and Liberal partisans; 
• Emotional patriots, those with warm feeUngs about AustraUa, are no more 
Ukely than those with cooler feeUngs to support (or oppose) direct election; 
and 
• In contrast to the issue of favouring a repubUc per se, on the matter of 
direct election feeUngs about Britain play no role: AnglophUes and Britain-
bashers are equally strongly supportive of direct election. 
In short, support for direct election -w-'as already running at over 70 percent 
in 1995, was equally strong in aU social classes, and was heavily fueUed by 
distrust of poUticians and by highly valuing citizen participation. The 
importance of citizen participation suggests that there is an important 
legitimacy issue here, that in the eyes of most AustraUans, parUament does not 
have the moral authorit}' to 'consecrate' or 'anoint' a head of state. AustraUans 
may not yearn for direct democracy in poUcy making (Llhr 1998a), but many do 
place a value on citizen participation, and those who do apparently see direct 
election of a head of state as a legitimate and desirable form of citizen 
participation. The strong effect of poUtical distrust suggests that had prior 
generations of parUamentarians behaved in a more public-spirited and 
exemplary manner, the outcome might have been different. 
After the referendum: Opinion in 2001 
At the dawn of the post-referendum era, there has been no baclclash against the 
repubUcan ideal, with around 65 percent continuing to support it (Figure 9.2). 
Who supports it and who opposes? Our multiple regression analysis (detaUs in 
the Technical AppencUx) provides some clues (Figure 9.8). 
There are few socio-demographic differences in support for a repubUc in 
2001. Age has no effect. Gender has a smaU significant effect with men being 
sUghtiy more in favour (as shown by the smaU positive standardised regression 
coefficient of 0.09). Education is of about the same importance, with highly 
educated people sUghtiy keener on a repubUc than early school leavers (as 
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Figure 9.8: Support for a republic in 2001, after the referendum 
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shown by the smaU positive standardised regression coefficient of 0.10). 
Neither government employment nor trade union membership has a significant 
effect on support for a repubUc in 2001. 
Interestingly, support for the repubUc seems to have Uttie or no connection 
with views on economic reform. Supporters of privatisation of government-
owned enterprises are neither more nor less repubUcan than are opponents of 
privatisation. Nor do perceptions of the balance of economic good and harm 
done by the corporatist economic system that held sway in AustraUa in the eatiy 
postwar period matter: those who look favourably on the traditional economy 
are neither more nor less Ukely to look favourably on the traditional head of 
state. Nor are those in favour of AustraUa's present, more market focused 
economic system either more or less Ukely than their opponents to view the 
repubUc favourably. 
There is a moderately important party-poUtical element in support for a 
repubUc. Warmth towards the Liberal Party has a smaU puU, reducing support 
for a repubUc (standardised regression coefficient of -0.11). Attraction to the 
National Part}' also has a moderately important influence, reducing support 
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(_0.14). By contrast, positive feeUngs towards Labor have a moderately 
important effect, increasing support for the repubUc (standardised regression 
coefficient of 0.14). Positive feeUngs towards the AustraUan Democrats also 
have a moderately important effect, increasing support (0.14). 
Interestingly, AustraUan national identit}' is not strongly impUcated in 
supporting or opposing a repubUc. FeeUng that being AustraUan is important to 
one's identity has a sUght, statisticaUy significant influence, encouraging support 
for a repubUc (standardised regression coefficient of 0.07). Neither pride in 
AustraUa's system of government, nor pride in Australia's economic 
achievements, nor pride in AustraUa's cultural achievements (arts, Uteramre, 
science and sport) has a significant impact on support for the repubUc. It seems 
fair to say that there is no one AustraUan identity that necessarily puUs one for 
or against the repubUc, but rather that the varieties of national identity 
common in AustraUa today encompass both repubUcan and monarchical 
varieties. 
Attimdes towards Britain are quite another matter: anti-British feeUng is the 
single most important source of support for a repubUc (standardised regression 
coefficient of 0.39). Indeed, anti-British sentiment is more than twice as 
important as any other variable in the model. This may prove a growing 
impems for a repubUc, for as Britain gets drawn closer to Europe by ceding 
authority to the European Union, it wiU probably become increasingly foreign 
to AustraUans. 
Conclusion 
The pubUc's preference for an elected President, for a 'people's choice' repubUc 
— already weU known at the time the referendum question was being drawn up 
— is the principal reason the referendum failed. Perhaps the large size of the 
majority in favour of a repubUc may have given a feeUng of invincibiiit}' to eUtes 
favouring the referendum, tempting them to try to impose their preference for 
a head of state chosen by ParUament. The pubUc, however, distrustful of 
poUticians, was not wilUng to be imposed on in 1999. 
The failure of the referendum did not produce a backlash against the 
repubUcan ideal. A strong majorit}' (65 percent) are stiU in favour of a repubUc 
in 2001, so support for a repubUcan future stiU runs high. If this level of 
support holds, there could weU be a repubUc in AustraUa's future, provided the 
AustraUan people are offered one with a cUrectiy elected president. The motive 
for the repubUcan push is partiy party poUtical, with Liberal and National 
supporters tending against, while Labor and the Democrats tend to be 
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favourable. Pride in AustraUa is not a motive for supporting a repubUc. Rather 
the most important motive, albeit a largely unspoken one, is hostiUt}' toward 
Britain. 
Chapter Ten 
Sifting the Ashes 
George Williams 
On 6 November 1999, AustraUans were seemingly faced with a simple choice: 
become a repubUc with an AustraUan as head of state, or retain the Queen and 
remain a constitutional monarchy. The results were clear and decisive. 
AustraUans rejected the proposed change and kept the Queen. This chapter 
explains why AustraUans voted against what might be seen as an obvious and 
desirable step forward in their constimtional development. Certainly, many 
remain perplexed as to just what went wrong. Much of the answer Ues in how 
constitutional history has played out in contemporary debates, and the way in 
which AustraUans are aUenated from their pubhc instimtions. This chapter has 
been developed from previous work on the same subject (WilUams 2000b). 
The Constitution as enacted 
The Constitution that came into force in 1901 was not a people's Constitution, 
but 'a treat}' between States' (La Nauze 1972, 190). Customs duties and tariffs, 
and the capacit}' of the upper house of the federal ParUament to veto mone}' 
biUs, were of far greater concern than the protection of human rights. 
According to one historian, the drafters 'wanted a constitution that would make 
capitaUst society hum' (Clark 1977, 18). The framers were certainly not 
prepared to insert a BiU of Rights, and instead sought to give the new federal 
ParUament the power to pass raciaUy discriminatory laws (WilUams 1999a, 
33-45). This is clearly demonstrated by the drafting of certain provisions. For 
example, the Constitution, as drafted in 1901, said Uttie about Indigenous 
peoples, but what it cUd say was entirely negative. Section 51 (xxvi) enabled the 
federal ParUament to make laws with respect to the 'people of any race, other 
than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make 
special laws', whUe under section 127 'aboriginal natives shaU not be counted' 
in taking the census. 
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Section 51 (xxvi), the races power, was inserted into the Constitution to 
aUow the Commonwealth to take away the Uberty and rights of sections of the 
community on account of their race. By today's standards, the reasoning behind 
the provision was clearly racist. Barton stated at the 1898 Convention in 
Melbourne that the power was necessary to enable the Commonwealth to 
'regulate the affairs of the people of coloured or inferior races who are in the 
Commonwealth ' (Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention 
1986, vol 4, 665). One framer, Andrew IngUs Clark, the Tasmanian Attotney-
General, supported a provision taken from the United States Constitution 
requiring the 'equal protection of the laws'. This clause might have prevented 
the federal and state ParUaments from discriminating on the basis of race, and 
the framers were concerned that Clark's clause would override Western 
AustraUan laws under which 'no Asiatic or African aUen can get a miner's right 
or go mining on a gold-field' (Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian 
Federal Convention 1986, vol 4, 228—9). 
Clark's provision was rejected by the framers who instead inserted section 
117 of the Constitution, which merely prevents discrimination on the basis of 
state residence. In formulating the words of section 117, Henry Higgins, one 
of the early members of the High Court, argued that it 'would allow Sir John 
Forrest [the Premier of Western AustraUa] ... to have his law with regard to 
Asiatics not being able to obtain miners' rights in Western AustraUa. There is 
no discrimination there based on residence or citizenship; it is simply based 
upon colour and race' (Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal 
Convention 1986, vol 5, 1801). In a 1967 referendum AustraUans chose to strike 
out the words 'other than the aboriginal race in any State' in section 51 (xxvi) 
and to delete section 127 entirely. 
Constitutional monarchy 
The Constitution entrenched the monarchy at the apex of AustraUan law and 
the Queen as AustraUa's head of state. Section 2 provides that the Governor-
General, 'appointed by the Queen shaU be Her Majesty's representative in the 
Commonwealth, and shaU have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during 
the Queen's pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and 
functions of the Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to assign to him'. The 
monarchical system permeates the text of the Constimtion. The preamble to 
the British Act that sets out the Constimtion begins: 'Whereas the people of 
New South Wales, Victoria, South AustraUa, Queensland, and Tasmania, 
humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one 
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indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constimtion hereby estabUshed': 
legislative and executive power are conferred upon the monarch. Section 1 
provides that 'legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a 
Federal ParUament, which shaU consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of 
Representatives', while under section 61 executive power 'is vested in the 
Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's 
representative'. 
The Constimtion also incorporates references to the monarchy in a way that 
reflects AustraUa's stams in 1901 as a Dominion of the United Kingdom. 
Section 59 provides that the Queen 'may disaUow any law -within one year from 
the Governor-General's assent'. This power has never been used and is now 
obsolete. Its continuing presence in the Constimtion is a reminder of the 
initiaUv Umited scope of AustraUan independence. It also highUghts the 
ongoing ambiguity of AustraUa's constimtional stams. 
Although the Australia Acts 1986 marked the end of the power of the 
British ParUament to legislate for AustraUa, the AustraUan Constimtion has 
never been formaUy repatriated. In official reprints, the Constitution is prefaced 
by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. This might suggest that 
the British ParUament is the continuing source of the sovereignty of the 
Constitution. Sir Owen Dixon, a Chief Justice of the High Court, stated in 
1935 that the Constimtion 'is not a supreme law purporting to obtain its force 
from the direct expression of a people's inherent authority to constimte a 
government. It is a stamte of the British ParUament enacted in the exercise of 
its legal sovereignty over the law everywhere in the King's Dominions' (Dixon 
1935, 597). 
More recentiy, judges of the High Court have developed the concept of 
popular sovereignty. In 1994 in Theophanous v Herald i& Weekly Times Ltd (1994 
182 CER 104 at 171), Justice Deane attributed the vaUdity of the Constimtion 
'exclusively [to] the original adoption (by referenda) and subsequent 
maintenance (by acquiescence) of its provisions by the people'. In 1999 in Sue 
V Hill (1999 199 CER 462), a majority of the High Court held that, for the 
purposes of the Constimtion, the United Kingdom should be considered a 
'foreign power'. This finding was reached despite it being recogrused by Justice 
Gaudron at 523 that 'at federation, the United Kingdom was not a foreign 
power'. The High Court has acknowledged the reaUty of AustraUa's poUtical 
and legal independence, despite the text of the AustraUan Constimtion. It has 
tecognised that AustraUa is an independent sovereign nation that has shed its 
stams as a Dominion of the United Kingdom. This shows that recent debate 
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on a repubUc is not about whether AustraUa should amend its Constitution to 
become an independent nation. The debate is about whether the text of the 
Constitution should be altered to reflect what has already occurred and to make 
the final symboUc shift of replacing the Queen with an AustraUan President, 
The republic debate 
AustraUans have debated the idea of becoming a repubUc for many \-ears. The 
debate can even be traced back to before federation. At the 1891 Constitutional 
Convention, George Dibbs, a former Premier of New South Wales who 
possessed 'a sUght tinge of repubUcan notions', described 'the repubUc of 
AustraUa' as 'the inevitable destiny of the people of this great country'. Sit 
Henry Parkes, then Premier of New South Wales, repUed: 'I have no time to 
talk of this question of repubUcanism which has been so ungraciously launched 
amongst us' (Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention 
1986, vol 1, 185-6,323). 
The republic only recently emerged as a central political issue. It was one of 
the poUtical issues of the 1990s. Contemporary repubUcan models have 
focused mainly on poUticaUy pragmatic 'minimaUst' change, that is, a republic 
created by the 'minimal constitutional changes necessary to achieve a viable 
federal repubUc of y\ustraUa while maintaining the effect of our current 
conventions and principles of government' (RepubUc Advisory Committee 
1993, vol 1, 1). Minimalist change might mean no more than altering the 
Constitution to delete references to the Queen and to replace the office of 
Governor-General with a President appointed by the Prime Minister. Other 
minimaUst options involve sUghtly more change in that they propose that the 
President be appointed by some other method consistent with the existing 
system of responsible government, such as by the federal ParUament. 
AhnimaUsm has been sharply chaUenged on several fronts. Some have 
argued for a stronger form of repubUcanism that would involve radical 
constimtional and political change aimed at enhancing the citizenship of the 
people. Non-minimaUst models have, in particular, incorporated a greater role 
for the AustraUan people in the selection of the President by, for example, 
providing for the President to be directiy elected by the people or even through 
the estabUshment of a United States style presidency with fuU executive power. 
Other models have moved outside the narrow terrain of head of state issues 
and have included changes such as a BiU of Rights or reconciliation between 
AustraUa's Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. 
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The non-minimaUst option of direct election of the President has 
considerable popular support. It has, however, been opposed by many of 
AustraUa's poUtical leaders because it may amount to a radical revision of the 
poUtical system that would be inconsistent with responsible government. 
Direct election would certainly add a new ingredient to the AustraUan system 
and has the potential to create a new, and potentiaUy destabiUsing, centre of 
poUtical power with a popular mandate. A directly elected president might be 
in a position to chaUenge the poUtical leadership of the prime minister. This 
could be avoided if the powers of the president were carefully defined and 
Umited. However, minimaUst repubUcans argue that codification of the powers 
of the President would be too difficult. Codification may also be poUticaUy 
unachievable because it would mean reopening stiU divisive questions about the 
use of the reserve powers by Governor-General Sir John Kerr to dismiss the 
Whitiam Government on 11 November 1975. 
The debate over repubUcan models revealed many misconceptions about 
what it means to be a repubUc, and that the concept of a repubUc is itself hotiy 
contested. It has been argued that AustraUa is already a repubUc in aU but name 
('a crowned repubUc'), while others stressed that many of the proposals for a 
'repubUc' would represent nothing more than 'cosmetic constimtional change' 
that may not amount to a 'genuinely repubUcan movement at aU' (Fraser 1993, 
37). A repubUcan system of government must, as a minimum, possess two core 
feamres (Winterton 1994, 2). First, sovereign power must ultimately rest with 
the people. Second, the head of government must be directiy or indirectiy 
chosen by the people, and cannot be a herecUtary monarch. AustraUa is clearly 
akeady a repubUc except as to the latter criterion. In order for AustraUa to 
become a repubUc, the Queen must be replaced by a person who, at a 
minimum, is indirectly chosen by the AustraUan people. This would transform 
AustraUa's constitutional status. However, it would amount only to a weak form 
of repubUcanism. A stronger version requires more than a head of government 
chosen indirectiy by the people. It demands a high level of popular engagement 
with the poUtical process. MinimaUst proposals, which do not enhance popular 
involvement in the poUtical process and merely make a switch at the highest 
level from a monarch to a President chosen by the Prime Minister or the 
ParUament, may bring about an AustraUan repubUc, but do not satisfy a more 
robust repubUcan agenda. 
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The republic runs aground 
The repubUc model put to the AustraUan people was opposed by a strong and 
weU organised coaUtion of interests. The No coaUtion was made up of two 
extremes: monarchists who opposed any change, and direct election 
repubUcans who opposed this change on the basis that it did not go far enough. 
Despite the obvious confUct in their positions, they had enough in common to 
wage a coherent and effective campaign. Both wished to see this model 
defeated. Caught in the middle were the proponents of the minimaUst model, 
most notabh' the AustraUan Republican Movement, who had to convince the 
AustraUan people to vote Yes to a model that lacked bipartisan political support 
(or even the support of the Prime Minister), that had obvious weaknesses in 
design and that had been unable to gain an absolute majorit}' on the floor of 
the 1998 Constitutional Convention. 
The No coalition was effective in tapping into a cynical and negative 
reaction in the electorate to the referendum. It was able to reinforce a growing 
perception among many AustraUans that the whole constitutional reform 
process was dominated by poUticians to the exclusion of community views and 
aspirations. The experience with the preamble made this difficult to refute. 
Even monarchists were prepared to argue that the failure of the repubUc model 
to involve any direct popular participation meant that this would be a 
'poUtician's republic'. Communit}- concerns were also fed by misinformation 
and by fostering fears that a Yes vote might lead to the succession of one or 
more states from the federation. 
The task of comprehension was made more difficult for AustraUans by the 
complex legal issues raised by the repubUc and preamble. The official 
advertising stated that 'there is currently no preamble in the AustraUan 
Constitution itself. WhUe strictiy correct, this was misleading. There is already 
a preamble to the British Act, which precedes the Constitution. This preamble 
has always been seen as prefacing the Constitution, and it is included when the 
Constitution is printed for sale. The official advertising material masked deep 
problems with the new preamble, including that a Yes vote to this question 
would insert a new preamble whUe also retaining the old version, thereby 
leaving the Constimtion with two preambles. This would have caused setious 
anomaUes if both the preamble and repubUc had been passed at the 
referendum. The current preamble states that the AustraUans 'have agreed to 
unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown'. The 
reference to the Crown should obviously not have been retained if AustraUa 
became a republic. 
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A Yes vote on the preamble question would not only have inserted a new 
preamble, it would also have added a new section 125A. That section provided 
that the preamble 'has no legal force and shaU not be considered in interpreting 
this Constimtion or the law in force in the Commonwealth or any part of the 
Commonwealth'. This would not have appUcd to the existing preamble, with 
the result that judges could continue to take account of values in the original 
preamble, including the reference to the Crown, but could not similarly use the 
newer version. Sir Harry Gibbs, a former Chief Justice of the High Court, 
argued that, in any event, section 125A would not prevent the new preamble 
from having a legal effect. Sir Harry argued that the preamble could amount to 
evidence of the connection between Indigenous peoples and the land, and that 
this might be used in cases raising questions about land ownership. The counter 
argument was that, even if the preamble could have legal effect, in recognising 
the 'deep kinship' of incUgenous peoples with the land, it failed to go as far as 
decisions of the High Court in cases such as Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992, 
175 CLR 1). The basis for section 125A was, in any event, misconceived 
(McKenna, Simpson and WilUams 2001, 401). A simUar provision does not find 
a place in other constimtions, and it would have demeaned the values set out 
in, and the symboUc force of, the proposed preamble. The fear that it would be 
used inappropriateh- by judges was misplaced. Having no texmal foundation in 
the Constitution proper, the preamble could not have been used to imply 
substantive rights. 
The legal debate created by the proposed new preamble was of minor 
sigruficance compared to the questions raised by the repubUc. Much was made 
of the fact that the repubUc involved 69 separate changes to the Constimtion, 
as if to suggest that the mere number of changes reflected a radical revision of 
the AustraUan system of government. In fact, apart from five major changes 
designed to estabUsh the new office of President, the remainder of the changes 
were largely consequential, and many merely replaced 'Queen' or 'Governor-
General' with 'President'. 
The Prime Minister entered the fray in the last days of the campaign. He 
strongly supported a No vote, arguing that AustraUa is already an independent 
nation, and stating that the proposed model was unsafe and flawed. He 
ctiticised the dismissal mechanism and the pubUc nomination process for 
candidates for the office of President, correctiy stating that the latter would 
give AustraUans no real say. He also sought to undermine the Yes case argument 
that the repubUc was necessary to give AustraUa an AustraUan as head of state. 
Howard adopted the monarchists' position that the Governor-General, and not 
138 George Williams 
the Queen, is effectively AustraUa's head of state and thus, the shift to a 
repubUc was unnecessary. 
It is true that the Governor-General performs the functions of the Queen 
in AustraUa and hence, the functions of the head of state. It is also true that 
the Constimtion does not mention the concept of a head of state. However, so 
long as AustraUa remains a constitutional monarchy, the Queen must be head 
of state. The Constitution makes it clear that the Queen Ues at the apex of 
government. She is expressly vested with executive power by section 61. Where 
the Governor-General is granted power, he or she exercises those 
responsibiUties as the Queen's representative. Hence, section 61 states that 
while executive power is vested in the Queen, it is also 'exercisable by the 
Governor-General as the Queen's representative'. Section 2 also states: 'A 
Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty's 
representative in the Commonwealth'. If the Governor-General is the head of 
state, it would leave AustraUa in the anomalous position of having a head of 
state who is the representative of a foreign power. The suggestion that the 
Governor-General is head of state is factuaUy incorrect. It was, however, very 
effective. It created doubt as to why the referendum was being held in the first 
place. For many people, the process came to be seen as a very expensive waste 
of time. 
Why did AustraUa keep the Queen? 
The repubUc debate exposed deep, entrenched problems in AustraUa's system 
of government that suggest why this referendum failed and why any future 
referendum on the repubUc may also faU. Two main weaknesses were brought 
to Ught. First, many AustraUans are aUenated from the poUtical process, and 
from the people who represent them in ParUament. In a context of uncertainty 
and insecurity brought about by rapid social and economic change, it is not 
surprising that there is distrust of poUtical leaders and the system of 
representative government that has produced them. It is not easy to feel part of 
a system that is not understood and in which there are very few oppormnities 
for participation. This has led to problems such as a lack of confidence in the 
poUtical system. The symptoms of this can be seen in the drop in support for 
the major parties (and consequendy, in the high number of minority 
governments at the state level), and in the rise of protest parties such as PauUne 
Hanson's One Nation. There has also been an increase in proposals for 
schemes that would give AustraUans a greater say in government, such as 
citizens' initiated referenda. 
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Second, AustraUans lack basic understanding and knowledge of their system 
of government. The repubUc model put to the people in the 1999 referendum 
was supported by a $24.5 miUion Government-funded advertising campaign 
(|9.5m for 'neutral' advertising, with $15m divided equaUy between the Yes and 
No campaigns), a 71 page Yes and No case booklet sent to every voter, and 
saturation coverage in parts of the media. Despite this, most AustraUans had 
Uttie or no idea of what a repubUc would mean, let alone how the proposed 
model would have worked. The referendum 'debate' generated considerable 
confusion, as well as strongly differing opinions on issues ranging from the 
mechanism for the dismissal of the president to who is currentiy the head of 
state. Such cUsagreement took place at a high level, and even produced a clash 
between former Chief Justices of the High Court. 
This high level of disagreement obscured the fact that the proposed model 
remained impenetrable to many AustraUans. The central reason for this was 
that AustraUans have Uttie understanding of how the current system of 
government works. The evidence bears this out. A 1987 survey conducted for 
the Constitutional Commission found that 47 percent of AustraUans were 
unaware that AustraUa has a written Constimtion (Constimtional Commission 
1987). Similarly, the 1994 report of the Civics Expert Group (1994) found that 
only 18 percent of AustraUans have some understancUng of what their 
Constimtion contains. Significantiy, only one in three people felt reasonably 
weU informed about their rights and responsibiUties as AustraUan citizens. 
These figures show why repubUcans faced an uphiU battle. They had the task 
not only of informing AustraUans about the merit of the proposed changes, 
but also of providing enough information about the current system to allow 
the changes to be evaluated. This proved an impossible task in the heated and 
partisan atmosphere of the campaign, and, given the spUt in their own ranks, 
between minimaUst and cUrect election repubUcans. Rather than being an 
example of informed deUberation, the debate was more an exercise of each 
side seeking to gain the support of celebrities and other notable figures in the 
expectation that this would attract voters to their side. 
The central arguments of the No case were 'Vote No to the PoUtician's 
RepubUc' and 'Don't Know — Vote No'. These slogans effectively exploited 
AustraUans' lack of engagement with, and knowledge of, the poUtical process. 
However, this is not to say that in voting No AustraUans cast their votes 
stupidly The most rational choice when faced with a change to a system that 
seems to work at least tolerably weU, but of which Uttie or nothing is known, is 
to reject that change. This wiU be particularly true where it seems that those 
promoting the change may have a vested interest in the result. It also does not 
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mean that AustraUans are, as a rule, apathetic about how they are governed. 
Rather, it suggests the need to provide an entry point into such debates. 
Two weeks before referendum day, a 'DeUberative PoU' (Fishkin 1997) on 
the repubUc was held in Canberra. The PoU aUowed 347 AustraUans, randomly 
chosen from all walks of Ufe and from many regions, to listen to, and question, 
experts and the supporters of each side. It created dialogue and deUberation 
amongst attendees so as to aUow them to assess the proposed changes. The 
results were dramatic. As a result of the PoU, over 50 percent of participants 
went from knowing Uttie or nothing about issues such as the proposed 
dismissal mechanism and the powers of the Governor-General to having a 
good level of understanding. Support for the Yes case jumped from 53"n to 
73%, while support for a direct election model as a first preference dropped 
from 50"/() to 19%. The PoU showed how the repubUc could, and should, be a 
topic of serious and considered debate at a community level, and that 
disinterest and confusion need not be the hallmark of AustraUan poUtical Ufe. 
The Poll demonstrated that the onus Ues on policy makers and Parliaments to 
do more to involve the Australian people in government. 
Where to nov^ ?^ 
AustraUans emphaticaUy rejected the proposed repubUcan model. However, the 
result on a repubUc in general was ambiguous. Over the campaign, the debate 
shifted from whether AustraUa should be a repubUc or monarchy, to what sort 
of repubUc it might become. Many AustraUans voted No because they were 
convinced by the No CoaUtion that the best way to achieve a directiy elected 
president would be to defeat this proposal. The monarchy drifted to last 
position on people's Ust of preferred models. The result, then, did not amount 
to a vote of confidence in the current system. Indeed, it suggested the opposite. 
AustraUans did not want this repubUc, but are strongly in favour of some form 
of repubUc in the future. The questions now are just how distant that fumre is 
Ukely to be and whether monarchists will be successful in continuing to delay 
the transition by taking advantage of disagreement between minimaUst and 
direct election repubUcans. 
It should first be reaUsed that the 1999 repubUc referendum, and indeed the 
focus on the repubUc as the sole issue of constitutional reform over the last 
decade, has hidden the need for other reform (WilUams 2001, 35). The -wider 
problems in the AustraUan poUtical system exposed by the debate show that the 
reform agenda must also include issues other than merely a change to the head 
of state. IvhnimaUsm faded as a strategy to achieve a repubUc because it did not 
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address the underlying reasons why AustraUans were Ukely to reject any such 
change. It also neglected the legitimate aspirations of AustraUans for more 
significant reform of the poUtical system and, in particular, change that would 
give them a greater say and sense of involvement in their governance. The 
repubUc campaign also revealed an obvious need for continuing improvement 
of the education system. However, the teaching of civics wiU not in itself be 
enough. More must be done to engage the community' in the poUtical process. 
Over the longer term, AustraUa needs a process of constimtional renewal. 
The Constimtion fails to explain how the current system works. The text does 
not mention the Prime Minister, and suggests that aU power is vested in the 
Queen and her representative, the Governor-General. The Constimtion also 
remains bound by the intentions of the framers of the 1890s, which are now 
out of step with the values of contemporary AustraUans. The need for reform 
is highUghted by the continuing presence of the races power in the Constitution 
and its potential to support racist laws. 
The scope of the races power was raised before the High Court in 1998 in 
the Hindmarsh Island Case (1998, 195 CLR 337). O n the one hand, it was argued 
by a group of indigenous women that the power only aUows the ParUament to 
pass laws that are for the benefit or advancement of a particular race. In 
response, the Commonwealth asserted that there are no Umits to the power so 
long as the law affixes a consequence based upon race. In other words, it was 
not for the High Court to examine the positive or negative impact of the law. 
The federal SoUcitor-General, Gavan Griffith QC, suggested that the races 
power 'is infected, the power is infused with a power of adverse operation'. He 
also acknowledged 'the direct racist content of this provision using "racist" in 
the expression of carrying with it a capacit}' for adverse operation'. The 
foUowing exchange then occurred between the SoUcitor-General and the High 
Court Bench: 
Justice Kirby: Can I just get clear in my mind, is the Commonwealth's submission 
that it is entirely and exclusively for the ParUament to determine the matter upon 
which special laws are deemed necessary or whatever the words say or is there a 
point at which there is a justiciable question for the Court? I mean, it seems 
unthinkable that a law such as the Nazi race laws could be enacted under the race 
power and that this Court could do nothing about it. 
Mr Griffith: Your Honour, if there was a reason why the Court could do 
something about it, a Nazi law, it would, in our submission, be for a reason external 
to the races power. It would be for some wider over-arching reason. 
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Of course, in the absence of a BUI of Rights or express constitutional 
protection from racial discrimination, there was no such oxer-arching reason. 
When the High Court handed down its decision, it was divided. The Court split 
on whether the races power could be used to discriminate against Indigenous 
peoples. This fundamental question remains unresolved. 
The Hindmarsh Island Case is just one demonstra t ion of how the 
Constitution was not written as a people's Constitution, and remains out of 
step \\-ith contemporary AustraUan societ)'. It does not expressly embody the 
fundamental rights of the AustraUan people, nor any spirit of reconciliation 
with AustraUa's Indigenous inhabitants. It has a chapter on Finance and Trade, 
but onl\- a few scattered provisions deaUng with human rights. As Lowitja 
O'Dcmoghue, former Chairperson of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission, has stated: 
It says very Uttie about what it is to be Australian. It says practically nothing about 
how we find ourselves here — save being an amalgamation of former colonies, it 
says nothing of how we should behave towards each other as human beings and as 
AustraUans (quoted in Brennan 1994a, 18). 
In the shorter term, Australians should focus on pragmatic options to re-
engage people with the poUtical system. I n ^ Bill of Rights for Austraha (Williams 
2000a), I argue for the drafting of a statutory Bill of Rights at the federal or 
state level. There is strong communit}' support for a BiU of Rights, with one 
survey showing 72%) for, 7% against, and 2 1 % undecided (GaUigan and 
McAIUster 1997, 149). A BiU of Rights enacted by ParUament would engage the 
communit}- in a reform process without the need for a referendum. Carefully 
drafted, it could be a document that sets out the place of AustraUans within the 
political system, without transferring the power to solve pressing social and 
poUtical concerns from Parliament to the courts. Rather than merely 
estabhshing legal rules, the aim would be to foster a culture of Uberty, including 
a tolerance and respect of difference. 
Conclusion 
Organisations such as the AustraUan RepubUcan Movement are already shaping 
up for round two of the repubUc debate and another referendum. As yet, the 
timing of any change is unclear. Another referendum is not Ukely while Floward 
remains as Prime MirUster, or even in the first term of any new Government. 
Hence, another referendum is unUkely within the next five years. 
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More groundwork must be undertaken before AustraUans are again asked to 
vote on the repubUc. Plebiscites, or some other form of non-binding vote, 
might work weU as a way of determining what t}pe of repubUc AustraUans 
would prefer, and of marshaUing support behind a particular model before 
another referendum. However, this would need to be carefull}- managed so that 
it does not produce constimtional deadlock with support evenly spUt between 
competing models. The task is to construct a model that is seen as being drafted 
other than by a poUtician dominated process, aUows a direct say by the 
AustraUan people in the selection of the President, and improves on the safety 
of the defeated model. Hence, the next model for an AustraUan repubUc should 
be a popularly created, direct election model that is more secure than the 
minimaUst model defeated on 6 November 1999. 
The chaUenge is not confined to the issues raised by an AustraUan repubUc. 
The recent repubUc debate had too narrow a focus on the head of state. It 
exposed more fundamental problems with the democratic system. This 
suggests that other reforms, such as the enactment of a statutory BiU of Rights, 
should be undertaken now, before any fumre repubUc debate. After aU, a 
repubUc wiU be of Uttie value unless it takes root within a system of 
government, known to and understood by the people, that fosters their 
participation. 

Chapter Eleven 
The Australian Republic: 
Still captive after all these years 
Mark McKenna 
On the evening of Thursday 18 November 1999, less than two weeks after the 
repubUc referendum was lost on 6 November, Prime Minister John Howard 
stood on a chair under a chandeUer in the dining room of KirribiUi House in 
Sydney. In his speech of thanks to Kerry Jones, head of AustraUans for 
Constimtional Monarchy (ACM), the Prime Minister appeared 'happy and 
ebulUent' as he described his own role in the campaign as 'respectful and 
dignified'. The guests who had gathered at the Prime Minister's invitation had 
come to celebrate the defeat of the repubUc. At dusk, looking across the blue-
green waters of Sydney Cove towards the Opera House, they sipped their 
chardonnay and gave thanks that the British Crown remained the sovereign 
power in AustraUa's Constimtion. In the words of the Prime Minister, 'the good 
sense of the AustraUan people' had prevailed. AustraUa would remain a 
constitutional monarchy and her people could sleep safe in the knowledge that 
the dire consequences of a repubUc had been avoided — at least for the time 
being {Australian, 19 November 1999, 1). 
Missing from Howard's drinks part}' were the many repubUcans who had 
bedded down with the monarchists during the campaign. Chief among them 
Ted Mack and Phil Cleary, the two Independent MPs who had advocated a No 
vote on the grounds that the repubUc model on offer made no provision for a 
directiy elected President. They had argued that a No vote would see a 
subsequent referendum on a directiy elected President, knowing that the 
immediate result of this strategy would see AustraUa continue as a 
constimtional monarchy. But now, when it came to drinks, this loveless 
marriage of monarchists and repubUcans was over before the reception began. 
Only the monarchists could bring themselves to raise their glasses in triumph. 
RepubUcans of all persuasions were left to sift the ashes and contemplate the 
rebuilding of the AustraUan RepubUcan Movement. 
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Who were the winners? 
In attempting to understand the referendum result, there arc some explanations 
that come readily to mind and over which few would cjuibble. The histor\- of 
referendum questions in Australia is notoriously bleak — at least if one favours 
constitutional change. C n^ly 8 out of 44 have been successful since federation. 
There seems to be Uttie or no prospect of achieving the necessary double 
majorit\- of states and voters without bipartisan support at least ameUorating 
the damage caused by misinformation and scare campaigns (see John Uhr's 
contribution to this coUection for possible solutions). 
The referendum on the repubUc was opposed by the Prime Minister and a 
convenient union of constitutional fundamentalists and democratic 
repubUcans. A union which made sense poUticaUy because the referendum 
combined two questions in one — did AustraUa want to become a republic — 
and did the electorate wish to embrace a president appointed by a two-thirds 
majority of federal Parliament? The referendum took place in a poUtical 
context that could only be described as indifferent Like many other liberal 
democracies in the late twentieth cenmry, AustraUan poUtical culture is marked 
by a deep cynicism towards elected poUticians and their meeting place; in this 
case Canberra, AustraUa's national capital. When this trend is combined with 
the traditional hard-nosed pragmatism of AustraUan politics, a tradition that is 
not renowned for its receptivity- to symboUc arguments for change, it might 
seem remarkable that five milUon AustraUans voted "^ 'es on 6 November 1999. 
In such a poUtical cUmate, it is difficult to see how any repubUc proposed in 
a national referendum might avoid being condemned as one initiated by self-
serving poUticians. As a monarchist might read the result on 6 November 1999, 
a repubUc for the poUticians, by the poUticians and of the poUticians was 
sensibly rejected by the people. In the words of Kerry Jones on 8 November, 
'The No campaign was the people's protest' (Australian, 8 November 1999), 
WhUe it might be tempting to see the repubUc referendum as a contest between 
the forces of popular sovereignt}- and parUamentary sovereignty, the truth is 
more elusive. 
The bald facts of the result teU several stories. The referendum was lost 
nationaUy by an approximate margin of 10 percent (55/45). The state 
breakdown was not encouraging — not one state voted Yes — although 
Victoria was lost narrowly. New South Wales, long seen as the strongest 
support base for the repubUc, struggled to reach a Yes vote of 46 percent. In 
Queensland, South AustraUa, Tasmania, and Western AustraUa, a 20 percent 
gap separated the Yes and No vote. Only in Canberra did the Yes vote reach 
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the resounding level of 64 percent: evidence perhaps that contempt for 
poUticians increases steadily with every additional kilometre one drives away 
from ParUament House {Financial Review, 8 November 1999). 
Of 148 federal seats, only 42 voted yes: 23 of these seats were Liberal held, 
whUe 19 were held by Labor. Every National Part}- seat voted No. Aside from 
two seats to the north of Melbourne and Sydney, aU the Yes seats were based 
in the inner suburbs of the major cities. Measured in terms of tertiary 
education, 19 of the 20 best educated electorates voted Yes whUe 93 of the 100 
least quaUfied voted No (Financial Review, 8 November 1999). Similar trends 
were evident in relation to income. It was not until income rose above $50,000 
per annum that the Yes vote managed to rise above 50 percent (Weekend 
Australian, 13-14 November 1999). 
The geographic distribution of the Yes vote is equally startUng. AU but 9 of 
the 42 Yes seats were in NSW and Victoria, and aU but 11 were in the 
metropoUtan areas of Sydney and Melbourne. In the words of Sydney Morning 
Herald columnist Alan Ramsey, those who voted No most resoundingly were 
among 'the country's least educated, most isolated, most insular, most 
uninformed, lowest paid, most prejudiced, and more than Ukely, hardest 
working an}'where' {Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November 1999). Some safe 
Labor seats did vote Yes, whUe others lost narrowly, except in Sydney. In 
addition 25 out of 35 of those seats with high ethrUc populations voted Yes. 
However, the Yes campaign did not place great emphasis on multiculmral 
support for the repubUc — perhaps many were fearful of aUenating the so-
called mainstream and One Nation. 
In the wake of the referendum result, a consensus has emerged among 
AustraUa's poUtical commentators in explaining the extent of the No vote. The 
headUne on the front page of the Australian on the Monday after the repubUc 
referendum neatiy captured the now generaUy accepted interpretation of the 
vote: 'One Queen two nations' (Australian, 8 November 1999). This view 
emphasised the sharp divide between cit}' and country, inner cit\' and outer 
suburbs, rich and poor, the constimtionaUy informed and the bUssfuUy 
ignorant. The referendum result cut across part}' aUegiances. The traditional 
home of Labor, the outer suburbs of the major cities, voted against the 
repubUc. With some irony, voters in the Prime Minister's own seat of 
Bennelong in Northern Sydney voted Yes. It was the letterboxes of John 
Howard's constiments in the 'RepubUc of Bennelong', which had received the 
Prime Minister's personal letter explaining his reasons for voting against the 
repubUc (Australian, 27 October 1999; Bob Hawke made the 'repubUc of 
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Bennelong' remark on ABC T\( 6 November 1999). Despite these facts, we 
should stiU be wary of accepting the yiustralian's. 'tv -^o nations' analysis. 
As soon as we divide the AustraUan nation into two categories — the 'elites' 
and 'ordinary people', as if there were five and a half million bright 'high flyers' 
who voted \ e s and seven million unwashed dullards who voted N o — we have 
adopted the categories of popuUsm. This is Uttie different from journalists and 
intellectuals dutifuU\- employing the Howard Government term 'mainstream' to 
describe AustraUan society-. When we use the language of popuUsm to 
understand poUtical behaviour, the popuUsts have won. It is also worth 
remembering that after every referendum, both the victors and the vanquished 
tend to beUeve that their supporters cast a 'sensible' and 'informed' vote, while 
those who voted against them were 'misled' or 'uninformed'. For example, 
when asked to explain the vote on the repubUc be had opposed, Howard 
praised the good sense of the AustraUan people, yet when he was asked to 
explain the poor Yes vote on the preamble which he had personally proposed, 
he blamed the apathy and ignorance of the people (Sydney Morning Herald, 8 
November 1999). 
Another factor which compUcates a simpUstic reading of the repubUc vote 
is the man\- reasons voters may have had for voting Yes or No, reasons which 
do not necessarily coalesce obediently in tidy geographic clusters. The first 
group of Yes voters were repubUcans who were wilUng to replace the Queen as 
head of state with a President appointed by a two-thirds majority of federal 
ParUament. Some in this category beUeved it would be the first step towards 
future constimtional reform, such as a directly elected president, a BUI of 
Rights, or a new Constitution. Others beUeved a Yes vote would act as a 
safeguard against further reform, arguing that it was far better to approve the 
more conservative change now, rather than risk the possibihty of a complete 
change to the system in the fumre. The latter group would have included both 
conservative repubUcans and a sprinkling of smaU 'm' monarchists fearful of 
direct election. Other Yes supporters may not have cast their vote with the 
future in mind. They were wilUng to accept the model, perfect or flawed, in 
order to get the repubUc through. 
Contrary to the beUef that aU the informed voters were on the Yes side, 
many of those who voted Yes would have done so without necessarily 
understanding the fine detaU of the bipartisan appointment model. They might 
simply have beUeved that the time had come — the monarchy had had its day 
— out with the old and in with the new. Some may also have voted Yes because 
they felt it was the only refuge for a patriot, others because they didn't want to 
agree with Howard, and a minority perhaps because they didn't Uke the No 
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campaign leader Kerry Jones or the sound of the word No. FinaUy, there were 
those who voted Yes for combinations of the above, or for none of the above 
— some of them fuUy informed, some partially informed, some misinformed, 
some not carrying information of any particular relevance to the poUing booth. 
No voters comprised at least seven different groups. First came the hard 
core monarchists who would vote No to any repubUc. We might describe them 
as the 'monarchy or death' cUque. Close on their weU-poUshed heels come the 
constimtional fundamentaUsts. They are the '1901ers' — whUe not attached 
deeply to the monarchy, they dread the prospect of any change to the sacred 
text of the founding fathers. WhUe the former may be able to draw the 
Windsor family tree from memory, the latter are more Ukely to be found at 
pubUc meetings with weU-thumbed copies of AustraUa's Constitution at hand, 
dutifuUy protecting 'the word' of the fundamental law. 
There were also No voters who were repubUcan but who voted No because 
they did not Uke the model, either because they were sympathetic to direct 
election, perhaps without necessarily understanding the constitutional 
ramifications of a president elected by popular vote, or because they were 
committed to a particular form of direct election, such as the models which 
exist in the Irish, American, Austrian or French repubUcs. This group were 
repubUcans who were not wiUing to compromise. There may also have been 
repubUcans who voted No because they preferred a President appointed by 
ParUament, but were unhappy with certain features of the bipartisan 
appointment model put before them on 6 November, such as the dismissal 
mechanism or the pubUc nominations procedure. 
While some No voters in the previous categories might also have harboured 
contempt for poUticians, there may have been some who voted No out of spite. 
They may have seen the repubUc referendum as an oppormnit}' to register a 
protest vote against poUticians. After aU, it was the poUticians who had 'wasted' 
120 milUon doUars on the referendum when there were 'real' needs in 
thousands of local communities across the country. These poUticians now 
wanted to appoint the President! There could only be one answer: 'Vote No to 
the poUticians' repubUc' (Sydney Morning Herald, 6 November 1999; see also 
Australian, 11 October 1999). JournaUsts who venmred into the bush at the time 
of the referendum came back with confronting reports of aUenation. The 
comments of one former Mayor of Gunnedah in NSW were t}'pical: 
Our electorate is the classic, they hate poUticians; they absolutely hate them. They 
blame them for the downmrn in the rural economy and it's every poUtician, every 
party ... rural people never had a chance to be part of the repubUc process, it was 
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raUroaded through by the likes of Malcolm Turnbull and his Uk' (Sydney Morning 
Herald 13 November 1999). 
Some No voters may also have been attracted by the various homiUes and 
cUches of the No campaign, which encouraged ignorance and exploited fear. 
Slogans such as 'Don't Know? Vote No' and 'If it ain't broke don't fix it' struck 
a chord with those who could not find the capacity, space, or time to 
understand the issues involved, as weU as those who were suspicious of change 
per se or simply apathetic (Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October 1999). The stark 
reaUt}' may be that many voted against the repubUc without understanding the 
proposal for change and with Uttie or no idea of the system they were 
pretending to protect. 
WhUe it may be true that the more wealthy inner metropoUtan areas tended 
to support the repubUc, whereas the outer suburbs of the cities and the bush 
were largely opposed, the 'tu'o nations' analysis is still far too simpUstic. Given 
the weU documented ignorance of the Constimtion in AustraUan society, and 
the numerous reasons that voters may have held for voting Yes or No, reasons 
which sometimes cross the city/bush divide, we should not assume too readily 
that those who voted Yes did so because they were more informed than those 
who voted No (see, for example, TurnbuU 1999, 249 who argues Yes voters are 
more informed). We should also refrain from casting Yes voters as an eUte. So 
far as the Constimtion is concerned, the wealthy may be no more informed 
than the poor. 
The reasons why university educated, upper middle class AustraUans of the 
inner cities were more Ukely to support the repubUc may Ue elsewhere. Perhaps 
it is this class that is more persuaded by the symboUc arguments for a repubUc, 
more convinced of the need for a repubUc as image, brand, identity, and an 
internationally recognised label of independence. Perhaps it is this class which 
is also more in touch with the production of information, new technology and 
the continual process of change and invention in a global market place: a class 
which does not hold poUticians in contempt precisely because it has benefited 
materiaUy from the economic reforms of the last two decades. Perhaps the high 
Yes vote in affluent areas of the inner cities is explained not by the fact that 
these voters were more informed about the Constitution, but rather by the fact 
that they have come to see change as a positive process, while others have come 
to fear it. 
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Who supported the republic? 
The Yes case was backed by a wide cross section of leading figures from the 
poUtical, legal, corporate, clerical and media environments (Financial Review, 29 
October 1999 on business leaders; Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 1999; 
also CathoUc Archbishop George PeU, ex Chief Justices Brennan and Mason, 
and ex Governor-General Cowen in the letters page of the Australian, Ili-IA 
October 1999). The Murdoch press, which comprises almost 70 percent of the 
mass circulation major metropoUtan daily newspapers in AustraUa, supported 
the repubUc. News Corporation Chief Executive Rupert Murdoch and his son 
Lachlan both made pubUc interventions in the campaign that were critical of 
the stance of Howard and supportive of the repubUc (Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
November 1999). 
The Murdoch broadsheet the Australian, Australia's only national daily, led 
the way with regular pro-repubUc editorials and comment. The Australian even 
sold car stickers for the Yes case, and organised its own pubUc forums on the 
referendum, which were namraUy given maximum coverage {Australian, 2 
August 1999). On the day of the referendum, th.& Australian's front page carried 
a large banner in fuU colour urging readers to 'Vote Yes'. The day after the 
referendum, the Murdoch tabloid the Daily Telegraph lamented 'Long to reign 
over us. Queen Uves but our repubUc dies' (Australian, 6 November 1999; Daily 
Telegraph, 7 November 1999). 
The Fairfax stable, most notably the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age, 
supported the repubUc with considerable enthusiasm. Like the Australian, the 
Herald'Andi the Age advocated a Yes vote largely on two grounds: firstly, because 
the model was conservative, involved minimal change to the Constimtion, and 
was aUegedly safe; and secondly, because the monarchy was no longer an 
appropriate or meaningful symbol for AustraUa in the twent}'-first century (see 
the series of weekly Sydney Morning Herald editorials on the repubUc beginning 
11 October 1999 and finishing 4 November 1999). These arguments were 
supported by the AustraUan Labor Party, a majorit}' of AustraUan Democrats, 
approximately 35 to 40 percent of the federal Liberal Part}-, every state Premier 
except Western AustraUa's Richard Court, and every state Opposition leader 
except Queensland's Rob Borbidge (Australian, 3 August 1999; only 10 out of 
29 of the Howard Cabinet support the repubUc). Despite all the powerful 
forces working in favour of the Yes Case, however, the 'manufacturing of 
consent' could not be arranged. 
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'Vote N o to the Politicians' Republic' 
Four days before the referendum on 6 November, the Australian carried a 
photograph of one of the final No campaign rallies in Sydney. The 
photographer's eye chose to faU on a small group of elderly monarchists. 
Seated on green plastic chairs, they floated their No balloons and held a placard 
that read '\'ote No to the Red RepubUc'. In the bottom right hand corner of 
the placard \\-as the unmistakable sign of the hammer and sickle, coloured 
appropriately in bright red (Australian, 2 November 1999). 
If the caption below the photograph had read 'Loyalists rally in favour of 
Menzies' attempt to outiaw the Communist Party', the photograph might have 
seemed entirely credible. The photographer had caught a fossiUsed form of 
opposition to an AustraUan repubUc — more relevant to the formative years of 
the generation holding the balloons than the 1990s — and one which had 
virtuaUy no bearing on the result of the referendum. The success of the No 
vote was not explained by popular support for the monarchy but by popular 
disdain for poUticians. The No vote succeeded because it tapped into the 
widespread contempt for poUticians in AustraUan society: 'Vote No to the 
Politicians' RepubUc'. Combined with this empty slogan were a number of 
contradictory but highly- effective messages. 
Firstly, the No campaign cast repubUcans as elites, as friends of the 
poUticians, the media, la-wyers, academics and other 'high flyers'. AU repubUcans 
were enemies of the people — enemies of the 'ordinary AustraUan' — except 
those repubUcans who intended to 'Vote No to This RepubUc', such as 
'poUticians' Ted Mack, Phil Cleary and Peter Reith, and 'lawyer' Jocelyn Scutt. 
These 'eUtes' were the friends of the people: at least until 7 November 1999. 
The popuUsm of the No case emanated as much from the direct election 
repubUcans as it did from the monarchists (see Peter Reith's article in the 
AustraUan, 3 August 1999, 13. Reith employs the phrases 'high flyers' 'backroom 
committees' and 'ordinary AustraUans'. Also see Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 
1999, where Reith states his reasons for voting No; and The No Case Papers, 
especiaUy Cleary 1999, 9-15 and Mack, 1999, 95-103). 
To convey this popuUst message, the No side were aided by Tony Abbott, 
Minister for Employment, Rhodes scholar, and the product of a struggle town 
on Sydney's north shore. More than any other federal Minister, Abbott 
exploited the class card, fanned fear of the disastrous consequences of the 
model and encouraged communit}- loathing of his profession. His was an 
outstanding contribution (see Abbott in the Australian Financial Review, 6 August 
1999. Abbott Ukens members of Conservatives for an AustraUan head of state 
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to aristocrats whom Lenin once caUed 'useless fools'. Also see any of the last 
three weeks before 6 November 1999 in the opinion pages of the Australian, 
where Abbott appears with alarming regularit}-). 
Hounding the elites wasn't enough. The N o campaign also concentrated on 
painting the repubUc as the end of AustraUan civiUsation. If a Yes vote 
succeeded, they claimed, the AustraUan flag would change. Crown land would 
be handed back to the Aborigines, the Weimar Commonwealth of AustraUa 
would become a fascist repubUcan dictatorship, and Perth businesswoman 
Janet Holmes a Court would be free to 'buy the AustraUan Presidency' 
(AustraUan, 3 March 1999; Geoffrey Blainey claims the repubUc model risks a 
dictatorship, AustraUan, 20 August 1999; Reith claimed the repubUc would 
inevitably lead to a change in the 'sX'A'g, AustraUan, 23 August 1999; Kerry Jones 
made the claim that Holmes a Court would buy the Presidency on ABC Radio 
National, PM, 1 November 1999; the Crown Land claim came from One 
Nation Senator Len Harris, AustraUan, 11 October 1999). 
The language employed in this fear campaign reUed cleverly on analogies 
that evoked the everyday experience of ordinary AustraUans: cars and their 
drivers. The leaders of the N o campaign argued that under the bipartisan 
appointment model, the Prime Minister could sack the President more easily 
than 'he could sack his driver'. With a thousand television commercials penned 
by second hand car dealers ringing in their ears, they asked the electorate a 
pertinent question — 'would you buy a used car without driving it first?' — 
'with no kilometre guarantee?' — 'just drive away and hope for the best?' (see 
the formal N o Case in the pamphlet Yes /No Referendum 99, produced by the 
AustraUan Electoral Commission). This clever mixture of deceit and scare 
campaign emanated from a range of voices across the poUtical spectrum — 
from the right wing One Nation part}' to former High Court judges, 
monarchists and radical repubUcans — something which made the task of the 
Yes case infinitely harder. They were attacked from right and left, and from 
within their own ranks. 
The N o campaign was also able to exploit the belief that the referendum 
would not be the last and only opportunity to vote on the repubUc. In the 
middle of the campaign, ACM leader Kerry Jones, a monarchist who opposed 
aU repubUcs, suggested that after the referendum failed, 'a better repubUcan 
model, based on a popularly elected President, should be drafted by a new 
convention and submitted to the people at a subsequent referendum' 
{Australian, 13 October 1999). Jones was caught by- Gerard Henderson (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 19 October 1999). During a TV debate, a coUeague sitting next 
to Jones claimed she was opposed to 'this model ' because 'we don't get the right 
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to vote'. \ \ hen she was asked by the BBC presenter David Dimbleby whether 
she did in truth support the removal of the Queen for a directiy elected 
President, she appeared uneasy. Jones then whispered in her ear, '[ust sa\' \-()u 
Uke AustraUa the way it is'. Her colleague then dutifully spoke the \\-ords). 
Since Justice Michael Kirby instigated the formation of AustraUans for 
Constitutional Monarchy in 1992, the organisation had claimed to be a staunch 
defender of AustraUa's current system of government, a s\-stem which its 
members frequently described as 'the Westminster system'. The essential 
feature of the Westminster system is the supremacy of Parliament. FLIected 
representatives are accountable to the people through Parliament. Ironically, 
while monarchists claimed to defend this system, a system which places 
enormous trust in poUticians and the instimtions of parUamentary democracy, 
they based their campaign on slogans which sought to denigrate politicians. 
The only notable exception to this crusade came from the monarchist 
Howard. In his 3,000 word decree on the repubUc, which was wideh- pubUshed 
in the press and covered extensively in the electronic media, Howard made it 
clear that he did 'not support a directly elected Presidency'. He stressed the 
benefits of AustraUa's stable democratic system and side-stepped the issue of 
anachronistic sy-mbolism by claiming the Governor-General was Australia's 
effective head of state. He concluded: '[e]ven among many who intend to vote 
Yes there is a read\- acknowledgement that there are far more important issues 
on the national agenda. In these circumstances AustraUans are right to be 
sceptical about the need for change. I hope they reject the republic. It will not 
produce a better AustraUa' {AustraUan, 27 October 1999). Howard's strategy 
was not to argue against a republic, but to make the issue appear 
inconsequential and trivial, as if the repubUc would only have legitimacy when 
thousands marched in passionate rage on Capital HiU. 
Regardless of the merit of Howard's arguments, they differed significantiy 
from those presented by the N o campaign. No t only had the monarchists 
abandoned the monarchy throughout the campaign, they also reviled the core 
features of the very system they claimed to defend: ParUament and its elected 
representatives. Their slogans did not promote the protection or understanding 
of the current system of government in AustraUa. In fact, they suggested that 
AustraUa should depart from its current system of government and opt for a 
repubUc with a directiy elected President. The N o campaign failed to articulate 
a conservative case for retaining AustraUa's constimtional monarchy The 
defenders of AustraUa's current system of government were the leaders of the 
\ e s campaign. The bipartisan appointment model aUowed for greater popular 
The Australian Republic: StiU Captive After AU These Years 155 
involvement through a pubUc nomination process, yet still retained the 
supremacy of ParUament. 
'Vote Yes for an Australian Head of State' 
From 1991, until his faU from power in March 1996, Labor Prime MirUster Paul 
Keating led the repubUc debate with a singular passion and determination, but 
at the time of the repubUc referendum three years later, the man who had done 
more than any other poUtical leader to push the repubUc to the top of the 
national agenda was absent. By 1999, with monarchists keen to cash in on the 
pejorative overtones of 'Keating's repubUc', Keating was a poUtical UabiUt}'. The 
only service he could perform for the Yes campaign was to remain sUent. 
SUence did not come easUy to Keating. On the one occasion he entered the 
referendum debate, he managed to provide one of the more memorable Unes 
of the campaign. With the same sharpness of wit and eye for vulnerabiUt}' in 
an opponent's position that he had demonstrated when Prime Minister, Keating 
described the No side's faUure to defend the monarchy as 'the love that dare not 
speak its name' {AustraUan, 28 October 1999). Oscar WUde would have been 
pleased. 
During the referendum campaign in October and November 1999, Labor 
leader Kim Beazley stepped into Keating's shoes with Umited success. Whereas 
Keating had made the repubUc his own, Beazley had never beUeved the issue 
should occupy the central position in ALP poUcy it had claimed under Keating's 
leadership. After the election of the Howard Government in March 1996, the 
repubUc debate fractured, losing the clear focus it had maintained under 
Keating's leadership. The sentiment for direct election increased at the same 
time the popuUst PauUne Hanson and her One Nation party rose to 
prominence. WhUe the Constitutional Convention of February 1998 capmred 
the pubUc imagination for a brief moment, by the time of the referendum 
campaign in November 1999, AustraUans no longer seemed to accept that they 
were about to vote on a repubUcan model that made no provision for direct 
election. 
The Constitutional Convention, and the compromise model that emerged 
from it, always struggled for legitimacy. With 50 percent of Convention 
delegates appointed, and only 45 percent of the AustraUan electorate 
participating in a non-compulsory vote to return the remaining 50 percent of 
delegates, the Convention was destined to be painted as a device engineered by 
'eUte poUticians' in order to deny the people their right to choose the repubUc 
model they desired (see McKenna 1998, 82-4). When the referendum debate 
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besan in earnest in October 1999, the context of the debate had shifted 
significanti\- from that of March 1996. Born of a process that could claim only 
partial legitimacy, hobbled by the necessary compromises forced on the 
'Keating-Turnbull republic' by the competing interests of the Convention 
delegates, and lacking the Prime Ministerial support it had enjoyed from 
1991-96, the repubUc model put to the people in November 1999 was weighted 
with a handicap it could never hope to carry to victory (for one perspective on 
the Keating-TurnbuU repubUc see FUnt 1999, Chapter 6). 
The dismissal mecharUsm in the repubUc model which allowed for instant 
dismissal of a President by a Prime Minister, while repUcating the existing 
s\-stem, still pro\'ed to be the Achilles heel of the Yes campaign, together with 
the method of parUamentary appointment. The proposed pubUc nomination 
system was also Uttie understood, either pilloried as a half hearted attempt to 
involve the people, or misunderstood as a feature which would be entrenched 
in the Constitution (an all-party parUamentary committee found that the pubUc 
nomination system is not understood by the electorate, AustraUan, 10 August 
1999). 
Added to these factors was the failure of repubUcans of various persuasions 
to find common ground before 6 November 1999. Those repubUcans who 
supported the bipartisan appointment model could not manage to persuade 
enough of their comrades who favoured direct election to vote Yes (see 
McKenna 1999, 24—9). Much of the referendum debate was drawn to focus on 
hypothetical scenarios. When would the next referendum be? Would there be 
another referendum? What would a Yes or No vote mean for the prospect of 
a further referendum on a repubUc with a directly elected President? 
Predictabh', the No case claimed there would be another referendum, while 
the Yes case stressed that 'No meant No', at least for the foreseeable future. 
Here was the rub. To attract direct election repubUcans to vote Yes, supporters 
of the model were forced to hold out some hope of another referendum in the 
near future. The result was a contradictory message. On the one hand, they 
claimed 'No meant No' for a very long time. On the other hand, they also 
suggested a Yes vote did not exclude the possibihty of a later referendum on 
the question of direct election. Beazley's attempt to capture Labor's traditional 
'battier' support base, where sympathy for direct election was strong, and his 
frequent stumbUng over the question of future referendums, revealed the 
impossible position in which the Yes case found itself (Sydney Morning Herald, 
27 September 1999. For an interesting analysis of the flaws in the Yes campaign 
see I-Cirby 2000). There were too many oUve branches to hold out and too many 
fears to alla^ -. 
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Consistent with the ARM's campaign since 1991, the Yes campaign reUed 
heavUy on nationaUsm and the anachronistic namre of the monarchy. On one 
occasion in July 1999 Malcolm TurnbuU, leader of the ARM, argued before a 
Senate Committee that the ARM preferred no mention of the word republic in 
the referendum question. He was mocked by the media (TurnbuU 1999, 
96-101). Funding and campaign management were controlled from the Sydney 
headquarters of the ARM. The pubUc face of the campaign was a cavalcade of 
media-friendly faces that included ex-Prime Ministers Whitiam, Fraser and 
Hawke, aU of whom quaUfied in their different wa\-s as celebrities. This 
procession of fading stars faded to have the expected impact. As the Yes case 
wheeled out more and more celebrities, it seemed merely to reinfc^rce the 'eUte' 
persona of the repubUcan movement painted so menacingly by their 
opponents. The Yes campaign's decision to employ the 1972 'It's Time' slogan 
of the Whitiam Labor Opposition demonstrated both the paucit}' of original 
ideas in repubUcan ranks, and the historical origins of the movement's 
nationaUsm. 
Perhaps it was the last star of the Yes campaign that best reflected the tenor 
of plan A: photo oppormnities for celebrit}' repubUcans. On 4 November 1999, 
a buU stood in front of Sydney Town HaU with an appropriately dull, blank and 
buUish look on his face. He was led ably by repubUcan stockmen before an\-
avaUable camera or microphone. He was there to teU the world that Prince 
Charles had just been appointed British beef ambassador. The media spin went 
as follows: when this AustraUan bull was put to death, the Prince of Wales, as 
ambassador for British beef, would be somewhere in Europe representing dead 
British buUs. AustraUa needed to become a repubUc so it would have its own 
head of state to represent its own dead buUs. It is difficult to teU just how many 
voters were won over by this strategy (Canberra Times, 5 November 1999). 
While the television image of the repubUcan case was one-cUmensional and 
simpUstic — replete with saccharine patriotic tunes and the shaUow slogans of 
grab nationaUsm — the model was explained in detail in other mediums. In the 
print media and on ABC racUo, there was much detaUed discussion of the 
model, both its merits and its flaws. For anyone wilUng to find the time to read 
and Usten, there was ample oppormnit}- to come to an informed decision. To 
claim that there was not enough information concerning the referendum 
proposal is misleacUng. There was a surfeit of information, buried in amongst 
the increasing cascade of information that already inhabits our daily lives. The 
truth is not that we were given too Uttie information, but that we faUed to find 
the time or interest to read and cUgest the information before us. For any 
advocate of constimtional reform in AustraUa, it is not only necessary to raise 
15S Mark McKenna 
communit}' awareness and understancUng of the Constitution, but to create the 
pubUc space and time for voters to concentrate on the detailed arguments 
involved. 
To achieve a more informed vote, the nation might be advised to take a 
coUective tea break, empty the mailbox, shut the door on the background noise 
of advertising, news and entertainment, turn off the TV, the radio and the 
stereo, take the phone off the hook, log off and sit down. Then, there might 
be some 'quaUt}- time' for the detaUs of referendum questions to be closeb 
examined and calmly discussed. Can Singleton, Ogilvy and Mather, the firm 
empkned to market the Yes case in the media for the referendum, offer us any 
advice? 
Where to now? 
On 13-14 November 1999, the broadsheet that had done more than any other 
daily paper to push the repubUc debate in AustraUa had reached the point of 
exhaustion. The editorial on this day insisted that the AustraUan was still a 
'repubUcan newspaper' but that it was time to press 'the pause button on the 
debate'. 'Enjoy the summer', said the AustraUan — a fUppant comment which 
perhaps begged a more serious question — just how long would the summer 
of AustraUa's constitutional monarchy last? Although AustraUa's love affair with 
the monarchy is certainly over, their presence wiU be difficult to remove, 
because it is perceived largely as benign. After the failure of the referendum, 
the anachrorUsm of the monarchy on AustraUan soU wiU clearly not be enough 
to solve the dUemma that AustraUa now finds itself in: knowing what it is not 
but not knowing what it wants to become. In some ways, the old paradigms of 
the repubUc debate have passed us by. The future debate wUl probably be less 
focused on symboUsm, oaths of aUegiance, and British beef In this sense, the 
referendum has been a crucial turning point. 
The history of AustraUan repubUcanism has been dominated by the Labor 
image of a repubUc. This was the repubUc championed throughout the 1990s 
by Keating and the ARM. The argument is famiUar. AustraUa needs to become 
a repubUc to demonstrate its independence, its identit}', and its mamrit}'. This 
nationaUst repubUcanism emerged gradually as a response to the history of 
AustraUa's colonial relationship with Britain. The change to a repubUc was 
represented frequentiy as 'breaking away', 'casting off, crucifying the cringe, 
rejecting British pomp, strutting some barrel-chested vision of national 
confidence or simply waUowing in 'AustraUanness'. 
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Prolonged repetition of similar themes during the referendum in November 
1999 faUed to convince enough AustraUans to support the repubUc, and when 
it was defeated, the Labor tradition of repubUcanism, which had reduced the 
repubUc to a symboUc expression of national identit}', was defeated as weU. The 
long-held beUef that the AustraUan repubUc promised a new national identit}' 
for AustraUa — a casting off from the imperial motherland towards a new, 
uniquely AustraUan identit}' — had been tested and faded. Not enough 
AustraUans were persuaded by the traditional repubUcan argument that 
AustraUa's identity, confidence and independence is diminished by the 
monarchical thread. 
For the majorit}' of AustraUans, the precise nature of the constitutional 
change involved in becoming a repubUc matters more than the symboUsm 
associated with the change. As always, AustraUans seem to assess the merit of 
proposals for change by placing their heads under the bonnet — the practical 
machinery matters more than the glossy concept. When the repubUc resurfaces, 
it is Ukely be a more interesting, potentiaUy more invigorating debate. The 
November 1999 referendum proved that a nation that has never sought to 
attach its national identit}' to poUtical instimtions stiU refuses to do so. The 
referendum defeat also suggests that it is time for repubUcans to bury the old 
Labor arguments for a repubUc and place less focus on nationaUsm and identity, 
and more emphasis on democratic repubUcanism. 
A brief guide of how to argue for an AustraUan repubUc in the wake of the 
referendum result might begin with the foUowing Ust of negatives. Do not say: 
• Becoming a repubUc wiU make AustraUa more independent. This argument 
was relevant when AustraUa was a colonial society. The declaration of an 
AustraUan repubUc today wUl have no effect on our national independence, 
but it could have an enormous effect on the fabric of our democracy; 
• We need to become a repubUc to be more AustraUan. This immediately 
becomes a personal attack on aU those who might be persuaded to vote for 
a repubUc, but who feel no less AustraUan if they do not do so; 
• We need to become a repubUc to estabUsh our identit}' on the world stage. 
The world stage exists only in the theatre of the AustraUan repubUcan's 
imagination. The repubUc is not a performance for a domestic or foreign 
audience; 
• We need to become a repubUc to be more confident, more inventive 
culturaUy, or more clever. In short, do not use the metaphor of maturation. 
WhUe the prospect of a repubUc may have been about 'coming of age' in 
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1901, since the 19~0s, AustraUa has come of age so many times we should 
now release ourselves from a state of perpetual adolescence; or 
• We need to become a repubUc to reject British pomp and ceremony, 
demonstrate we are no longer part of Britain, or that we have 'moved on'. 
AU of these arguments are now redundant. We ha\-c 'moved on' without 
becoming a repubUc. 
To give up these arguments for a republic wiU not be easy. Australian 
repubUcans have cast their vision of a republic in such terms for a century or 
more. If the repubUc is to have any chance of being approved at a referendum, 
repubUcans must thwart the beUef that the republic is a child of the elite. 
CUnging to the fantas\- that the electorate wiU approve a republic that denies the 
AustraUan people the right to vote can only mean that repubUcans are left to do 
battie w-ith the same hackneyed arguments. Advocating a minimaUst republic 
denies repubUcans the opportunity to cast their vision of change in terms of 
popular sovereignty, the one path that holds out the possibility of aUowing the 
repubUc to partialh- address the current dilemmas plaguing the body politic. 
Popular support for a repubUc wiU not be garnered until there is a sense of 
popular ownership of the repubUc. This requires a decision-making process 
that is democratically legitimate, such as a fully elected constitutional 
convention and sufficient pubUc space and time for pubUc deUberation. 
Ultimately, it can only mean a repubUc with a directiy elected President. Over 
time, this repubUc wiU come to be associated in the pubUc imagination with the 
popular festival of an election day — a pageant which might contribute 
something unpredictable and original to our poUtical culture and provide the 
sense of ownership that the Australian people demand. 
Despite aU of the misplaced and poorly conceived notions currentiy 
attached to the idea of a directly elected presidency, for many AustraUans it is 
stUl the only model that carries the potential to connect and involve them 
directly with the process of change. George Winterton, the architect of the first 
minimaUst constitution, now acknowledges that a directiy elected presidency is 
the only viable fumre for an AustraUan repubUc. There are, however, many 
hurdles to overcome (Winterton 2001b). In the federal and state ParUaments of 
AustraUa, there is a poUtical class that is largely opposed to direct election, whUe 
in the electorate at large there is widespread ignorance of the Constimtion. In 
addition, there is the undoubted potential for scaremongers to sharpen their 
knives once more on the many constitutional changes necessary to introduce a 
popularly elected presidency. 
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The powers of any future AustraUan President elected by popular vote must 
surely be codified in the Constimtion. The great balancing act required of 
law}'ers and poUticians will be to deal effectively with the 1975 crisis when 
codifying the President's powers. WiU a new repubUcan Constitution deny the 
Senate's power to block supply, a course of action that would seem destined for 
poUtical defeat? Will it entrench the Senate's power to block supply and insert 
the unpredictable office of a directiy elected president as the arbiter of 
constimtional crises? Or wiU it leave the issue of the Senate's powers untouched 
and aUow current constitutional conventions to be interpreted by a directiy 
elected President? Any of these courses of action is fraught with poUtical 
obstacles. Even if AustraUa were to adopt the Irish system, and arrange for a 
councU of state to advise the President in certain circumstances, this might still 
be portrayed as an 'eUte' attempt to control the power of the people's 
representative. 
FinaUy, there is the experience of the deUberative poU held in Canberra in 
October 1999, which suggests that support for direct election may weU 
evaporate in the face of prolonged scrutiny. The poll registered a 73 percent yes 
vote, an increase of 20 percent, and support for cUrect election feU from 51 to 
19 percent {Australian, 25 October 1999). There is every chance that a direct 
election model wiU also suffer defeat in a national referendum when subjected 
to sustained analysis. Future repubUc models wiU emanate from the existing 
players, lobby groups and poUticians who have so far been involved in the 
debate. Any compromise model that emerges from these competing interests 
can always be depicted as an eUte conspiracy. 
There is no one answer to the problems ahead for repubUcanism in 
AustraUa, but some things are clear. The fumre debate needs to be more 
inclusive and relevant, especiaUy to women and younger AustraUans (for the 
gender gap in support for a repubUc see Australian, 3 November 1999; for 
youth see AustraUan, 28 July 1999). It also needs to make the repubUc more 
meaningful, to write a repubUcan preamble, to forge a repubUcan position on 
reconciUation and human rights and to make these issues central to the 
repubUcan platform. A version of cUrect election alone, most probably 
designed and vetted by poUticians, wiU not be enough. The essence of our 
repubUcan democracy is not the nationaUty of our head of state, it is the 
democratic process we put in place to discuss issues of constimtional change. 
From this perspective, the way in which we become a repubUc matters as much 
as the model we evenmaUy choose. 
RepubUcans wiU also need to foster a community spirit that is more 
receptive to constimtional change and more convinced of the benefits that 
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change might bring. The onl\- way this can be done is to abandon minimaUsm 
and to think more broadly. Then the promise of a new national identit}' might 
be more believable. The alternative is a long hot summer for 'the captive 
repubUc'. 
Chapter Twelve 
Australia Deliberates? The Role of the 
Media in Deliberative Polling 
Rachel K Gibson and Sarah Miskin 
On the weekend of 22-24 October 1999, two weeks before the referendum on 
the repubUc, nearly 350 AustraUans gathered in Canberra to take part in an 
'imaginative innovation in democracy' that was designed to be an important 
indicator to aU those AustraUans about to vote on the republic. The 
'experiment', AustraUa's first 'deUberative poU', was organised primarUy by 
Issues DeUberation AustraUa, a private non-profit organisation based in 
Adelaide.^ AustraUa DeUberates aimed to show how AustraUans would vote on 
the repubUc if they had considered the issues in depth. It was promulgated as 
superior to orcUnary opinion poUs of pc:)pular feeUng in that its result would 
reveal 'what informed AustraUans thought about an AustraUan repubUc when 
given the opporturUt}' to consider the facts away from campaign rhetoric and 
sound bite advertising' (Issues DeUberation Austraha 1999, 26). The 
'representative AustraUans' were poUed six weeks before they assembled in 
Canberra and again on 24 October after their weekend of deUberation. The 
result was a dramatic increase in support for the model on offer in the 6 
November referendum, and a dramatic decrease in support for cUrect election 
of a President. 
Organisers claimed that the poU had revealed 'the voice of AustraUa' and 
would act as a 'recommendation to everyone else'. We contend in this chapter, 
however, that the poU faUed to optimaUy educate participants and faUed to act 
as a recommending force to the wider pubUc, and that changes in poU 
participants' views were more the result of emotive identification with the idea 
of a repubUc than rational deUberation over the issues. These faUures, we argue, 
were primarUy due to the presence of the mass mecUa at the poU and their use 
to disseminate the results. During the proceedings, mecUa constraints constantiy 
intruded upon, and shaped the timing and organisation of, the deUberations of 
the participants. After the event, coverage was Umited and that which did occur 
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mrned the poll's message into sound bites and headUnes, detracting from any 
educative effects that organisers claimed would occur. Our evidence for this 
argument comes from our observations of both the group discussions during 
the poU in our role as group managers throughout the weekend, and from the 
newspaper and television coverage during and after the event.^ 
Australia Deliberates and deliberative poUing 
The organisers of the AustraUa DeUberates poU claimed that it 'was intended as 
a pubUc education exercise — an attempt to air the informed voice of a 
representative sample of AustraUan citizens on the complex issue of 
constimtional reform' (Issues DeUberation AustraUa 1999, 11, emphasis in 
original). It represented another appUcation of the deUberative polUng concept, 
developed by James Fishkin in the early 1990s and used previously in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. ModeUed on ancient Athenian 
democracy, the deUberative poU works by bringing statisticaUy representative 
citizens together to debate the various merits of an issue before coming to a 
coUective decision (Fishkin 1991, 1995). 
The logic of the deUberative poU is premised on two basic assumptions. The 
first, a phUosophical one, is that face-to-face deUberation by citizens is a 
necessary component in any meaningful democracy since it prompts the 
rational thinking that produces informed and, therefore, legitimate decision 
making (Dryzek 1990; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Elster 1998). The 
second, an empirical one, is that such deUberation rarely, if ever, takes place in 
contemporary society, and certairUy not to the widespread extent necessary for 
true democratic legitimation. WhUe the practical issue of population size clearly 
mitigates such deUberation in society today, citizens' orientations to poUtics are 
central to this problem. As Fishkin argues, most democracies are fuU of 
'disconnected' citizens who are cUsengaged from poUtical issues and who 'show 
Uttie in the way of knowledge, sophistication, or consistency in their beUefs and 
opinions' (Fishkin 1991, 82). At best, he contends, the pubUc can be considered 
as a collection of 'rationaUy ignorant' individuals who lack the requisite 
knowledge to make informed judgments on many issues of national poUcy.^  
Given these deficiencies, the dUemma arises of how the true wiU of the 
people can be known. Ordinary poUs are practicaUy useless as guides to pubUc 
opinion, since they eUcit only a series of 'non-attimdes' or urunformed 'top-of-
the-head' responses. Fishkin argues that, most of the time, 'the pubUc may not 
be thinking very much [about an issue] or paying much attention' (Fishkin 1995, 
162). The results of such poUs, therefore, often have 'quite Umited relation to 
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the views people would hold if they had the chance of learning, thinking, and 
talking about the issues' (Fishkin and Luskin 1999a, 4). 
Into the breach, Fishkin offers the deliberative poll, in which a 
representative group of citizens is exposed to the information and debate 
necessary to develop optimaUy 'informed' opinions on significant poUcy 
matters. The resulting outcome is quite different to that of an ordinary opinion 
poU. According to Fishkin, 'An ordinary poU models what the pubUc thinks, 
given how Uttie it thinks, how Uttie it knows, how Uttie it pays attention. A 
deUberative opirUon poll, by contrast, models what the pubUc would think, if it 
had a better chance to think about the questions at issue' (Fishkin 1996, 134). 
The intensive period of knowledge accumulation and debate that Ues at the 
heart of the deUberative poll provides 'both opportunit}' and incentives for the 
participants to behave more Uke ideal citizens' (Fishkin and Luskin 1999a, 4). 
Participants discuss the issues in smaU groups, and come up with questions that 
they then put to expert panels. As with other deUberative microcosms, the 
result is that, 'at least temporarily', it becomes 'less rational' for the individual 
participants to be ignorant because their vote is not just one among milUons, 
but one voice among 10 or 20 in the smaU group and a few hundred across the 
poU group (Fishkin and Luskin 1999a, 4). The participants in the deUberative 
poU are surveyed in advance of the proceedings and again afterwards. The later 
survey, therefore, offers 'a representation of the considered judgments of the 
pubUc — the views the entire country would come to if it had the same 
experience of behaving more Uke ideal citizens immersed in the issues for an 
extended period' (Fishkin 1995, 162). The outcome of the deUberative poll is 
'the kind of pubUc voice that merits special attention' (Fishkin and Luskin 
1999a, 8). 
The role of the media 
In addition to offering a more authentic version of vox popuU, deUberative 
poUing has the broader aim of pubUc education. To achieve this goal, the media 
are assigned an integral role in the process. National broadcasting of the 
deUberations to the wider aucUence at home is seen as crucial to the entire 
enterprise, since this brings substance to the particular debate and thus to the 
pubUc's decision-making. Fishkin argues that through 'survey research, we can 
select the sample and formulate and tabulate the questions. Through television, 
we can attract the citizens and the candidates and disseminate the conclusions 
of the deUberative microcosm' (Fishkin 1996, 140). 
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Media involvement is clearh' seen as a key seUing point for the poll in 
attracting individuals to take part. The media 'dramatize the process so much 
that most citizens would be glad of the opportunit}- to play a serious role in 
important historical events' (Fishkin 1991, 9). Further, Fishkin notes that 
because they wUI be in the news, participants show increased interest in the 
issues before gathering for the deUberations, which he considers aids the 
deUberative process: 
Knowing that they will be on national television, and knowing that the issues arc 
important, they are Ukely to read the materials, discuss the issues w-ith friends and 
famU\', and pay more attention to the media. From the moment they are invited, 
they begin to become unrepresentative of mass opinion as it is. But the}- begin to 
become representati\e of our ideal pubUc (Fishkin 1995, 172). 
In summary, deUberative polUng appears to have two main aims: firsti)- to 
act as a 'social science experiment' that tests whether exposure tcj information 
and debate leads tcj a change in incUviduals' opinions; and secondly to use the 
resulting cjpinion change to educate the pubUc as to how they would vote if 
they, too, had had the opportunity to join with others for in-depth deUberations. 
Clearly, these were the aims of the AustraUan poU's organisers. In their own 
words, 'Australia Deliberates was an experiment in deUberative democracy: an 
attempt to faciUtate an informed vote for a representative group of AustraUan 
voters. Through wider media coverage, it was also an attempt to facilitate a 
more informed vote for the general public' (Issues Deliberation Australia 1999, 
26). 
While criticisms have been made of the deUberative polUng method, thus 
far, the role of the media in the process has escaped scrutiny."* We contend that 
the central role assigned to the mass media in the AustraUan deUberative poll 
invariably led to decisions that compromised the level of information and 
debate to which participants were exposed, and thus the internal vaUcUt}' of the 
experiment. In our position as observers of formal and informal group 
discussions, and our attendance at plenary sessions, it became clear that media 
demands drove the process and, more cruciaUy, acted as constraints on the level 
of knowledge that it was possible for participants to acquire. In addition, the 
media's methods for disseminating information to the wider pubUc reUed on 
the very sound-bite culture that deUberative polUng was designed to counteract, 
thereby corrupting the message the pubUc received and frustrating the broader 
educational ambition. 
Our critique of deUberative polUng as represented by AustraUa DeUberates 
is in tu-o parts. The first part examines the AustraUa DeUberates poU itself and 
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the role played by the media in reducing the quantit}' and quaUt}' of information 
disseminated to the participants. The second part looks at how the mecUa were 
used in an attempt to achieve a broader education of the pubUc at large and 
argues that this was unsuccessful. WhUe we accept that mecUa presence may 
serve to encourage incUviduals to attend the poU and take an interest in the 
issue, based on our observations of the AustraUa DeUberates poU we argue that 
the mecUa can also have a discordant and decidedly negative effect on poU 
proceedings. 
The Australia Deliberates poU: The facts 
AustraUa DeUberates was organised by Pamela Ryan (managing director. Issues 
DeUberation AustraUa and research feUow at the Hawke Research Instimte, 
University of South AustraUa), Professors James Fishkin and Bob Luskin 
(Center for DeUberative PoUing, Universit}- of Texas) and Professor John 
Higley (Clark Center for AustraUan Studies, University of Texas).^ The poU 
brought 347 representative citizens to Canberra for one and a half days of 
cUscussion on the weekend of 22-24 October 1999.'^  The participants were part 
of a broader sample of 1,220 voters poUed in a random cUgital-cUal telephone 
survey in early September 1999 about the forthcoming repubUc referendum. 
Of these 1,220, 770 interested respondents were contacted and asked to attend 
the deUberative weekend. Those who agreed to travel to the national capital 
were sent briefing documents in early October. 
On arriving in Canberra on Friday, 22 October, the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of 24 groups that met for deUberation three times, 
twice on Samrday and once on Sunday (see Appendix for program detaUs). 
Each discussion session was scheduled to last an hour and 30 minutes, and was 
designed to generate questions for a televised plenary question and answer 
session with a panel of experts that foUowed immecUately afterwards. (In effect, 
the sessions lasted an hour and 20 minutes because questions had to be 
deUvered to a selection team.) Groups were guided in their deUberations by 
moderators (group faciUtators), who could not prompt questions or inform 
participants in any substantive way. DeUberations and the subsequent plenary 
sessions were centred on a set of preordained topics: (1) The head of state role; 
(2) If AustraUa became a repubUc, what would change? What would stay the 
same?; (3) Why vote Yes? Why vote No? 
After these sessions, the participants were surveyed again before leaving on 
Sunday The main results were: 
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• Support for a Yes vote increased from 53 percent before deUberation to 73 
percent after deUberation; 
• Support for a No vote feU from 40 percent to 27 percent; 
• Support for a President appointed by ParUament increased from 20 percent 
to 61 percent; 
• Support for direct election of a President feU from 51 percent to 19 percent; 
• The proportion of those who beUeved the president should be non-poUtical 
('someone from outside of polities') increased from 53 percent to 88 
percent; and 
• The proportion of those who beUeved that the Australian flag would 
change as a result of a Yes vote at the referendum feU from 59 percent to 8 
percent. 
The education of poll participants? 
While we do not dispute the facts emerging from the deUberative poU as Usted 
above, we do question how far the basis for these shifts in opinion was the 
result of informed and rational debate by participants. Our central contention 
is that the media reduced the level of information that would otherwise have 
been made available to AustraUa Deliberates participants, both directly and 
indirectly. Directly, the demands of media coverage vis-a-vis location and 
scheduUng significantiy affected the quantity and quaUty of information 
avaUable during the event. Indirectly, the media coverage negatively affected the 
manner in which plenary speakers, particularly the advocates on either side, 
conveyed their case, and also the propensity of participants to listen to the 
messages being conveyed. 
Direct media constraints 
The first and most obvious media-driven constraint on participants' 
knowledge-gathering was the choice of venue, which organisers appeared to 
have selected for its media impact rather than its suitabUity for the purpose. Old 
ParUament House reinforced the gravity of the occasion, providing old-style 
poUtical imagery both for participants and the viewing/reading pubUc, as weU 
as a strong visual Unk with the earUer Constimtional Convention on the 
repubUc question. However, it was too smaU to host the event. Just over one-
third of the participants could fit into the plenary sessions held in the 150-seat 
House of Representatives. While four viewing gaUeries upstairs could hold 
another 150, three of these areas were taken up by the media and observers. 
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To combat the space problem, a large television screen was placed in the 
150-seat Senate chamber for the remaining participants, and a system of 
rotation into the one avaUable upper gaUery of the House was operated for the 
first session (on Samrday morning). The rotation system, however, resulted in 
considerable gaps in participants' abiUt}' to bear the discussion as they were 
being moved in and out of the chambers. An estimated 150 of the participants 
were without adequate access to the answers being deUvered in the House for 
at least 15 minutes of the one and a half hour plenary session. Of those, up to 
45 people were without proper access for up to 40 minutes. Given that the first 
plenary session was arguably the least advocate driven and most substantive of 
the three, this lack of access was of substantial detriment to a significant 
number of participants. 
Decisions about scheduUng were clearly made in deference to media 
concerns, rather than for optimal knc:)wledge gathering and deUberation on the 
part of the poU participants. Plenary sessions were the organising focus of the 
weekend, with three Uve ABC television and radio broadcasts of between one-
and-a-half and two hours taking place, as weU as a separate session for a 
commercial television station's current affairs programme. The expUcit goals of 
each group cUscussion were to generate up to four questions and to nominate 
a questioner for the plenary session that foUowed immediatel}- afterward. The 
questions were to be submitted to an 'editorial team' of poll organisers 40 
minutes before the Uve coverage began. This team selected a 'representative' 
sample of the questions to be put to the experts on the plenary panel, and 
primed the group questioners for the session. 'Editorial team' members were 
not involved in the deUberations of the groups and thus, when selecting 
questions, could not know what was most important to the groups. 
The constraints here were twofold. First, this schedule meant that groups 
spent the final 20-30 minutes of their cUscussions prioritising questions and 
choosing representatives, rather than deliberating the issues. These 
requirements restricted the amount of time available for participants to discuss 
the issues with their peers (supposecUy a primary purpose of the weekend), 
especiaUy given that 'where questions of fact arose' in the group discussions, 
they could not ask the group facUitator, but had to refer to their briefing 
documents or hold the question for the plenary session (Issues DeUberation 
AustraUa 1999,12). Of course, the former option took time and the latter could 
not be guaranteed to supply the information because of the number of 
questions to be asked and the 'mediated' process for asking them. 
Second, the editorial team selecting the questions to be put to the expert 
panels faced a pool of nearly 100 questions but had, at most, 25 minutes to 
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select a representative sample of approximately 25 that would be asked, 
because the group nominees had to be primed -with their cjuestions and seated 
in the chamber 15 minutes before Uve coverage began. Given this timeframe, it 
is doubtful whether sufficient attention to balance and relevance in choosing 
the questions could have been exercised, especially given that these selectors 
were not involved in the smaU-group discussions and were, therefore, having to 
exercise their own judgment as to the reason why the questions were being 
asked and how important they were to supplying information to the groups. 
Indirect media constraints 
The first two plenary sessions were designed as more neutral 'information 
gathering' exercises, and only the third session was supposed to provide 
oppormnities for partisan pleas by the Yes and No campaigns. The presence of 
the media, however, resulted in an increasing degree of grandstancUng and 
proselytising by the advocates from either side, rather than meaningful debate. 
The first session was most informative (but the least watched by participants, 
due to rotation problems). The panel included former Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser, former Governor-General Sir Zelman Cowen and former Secretary to 
three Governors-General Sir David Smith. In terms of abiUty to speak to the 
issues, clearly these individuals constituted the 'voice of experience' and were 
presented as such. The later sessions, however, became increasingly 'one-sided' 
affairs, more riotous and iU-tempered, with speakers from either side using the 
time on camera as a soap-box to reach the entire country, rather than engaging 
in genuine debate with one another or the seated audience. 
The media presence meant that the individual participants focused on media 
attention, that is, whether 'their' group was able to ask a question on television, 
rather than the substance of the acmal response and whether it added to their 
knowledge. Whether the group was seated in the House to Usten to the expert 
panels or watching the televised version in the Senate, participants paid most 
attention to whether 'their' question would be chosen and whether 'their 
representative' would get to have his or her say. Thus, whether 'the group' 
would get its 15 seconds of fame became a competing focus of interest with 
the relevance and importance of the question being asked and the answer 
given. This syndrome also operated at the individual level when participants 
were given the oppormnity in the plenary sessions to intersperse their own 
questions from the floor among those being asked by their group 
representatives.^ A few participants took advantage of the chance to grab the 
microphone to ask questions that were of Uttie relevance to the debate, but 
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were good for media attention and raising laughter. Examples of this include 
the participants who asked whether an AustraUan President could be expected 
to have an affair and what would happen if a President turned out to be insane.^ 
The media's presence and requirements placed direct and indirect 
constraints on knowledge accumulation, and thus also on the quaUt}' of 
participant deUberation in the poU. The unsuitable location Umited the amount 
of information participants received and led to 'mediated' rather than 'Uve' 
panel discussions for the majorit}' of individuals. Further, the scheduUng was 
too tight to aUow for in-depth discussion in the groups or for serious 
consideration of the selection of questions to be asked of the panels. 
Question-and-answer sessions suffered from experts 'playing to the camera' 
rather than giving information and participants being distracted by their desire 
to appear on television. These constraints clearly compromise the poU's claims 
to be a provider of an optimaUy informed microcosm of the pubUc, and its 
power as a recommending force to society as a whole. While the direct 
constraints could be viewed as unique to the Australia DeUberates poU, the 
incUrect constraints would appear to be endemic to the deUberative poUing 
process. These problems raise questions, particularly about the organisers' 
claims that 'poUtical information increased dramaticaUy among the participants' 
and that this was 'a major factor underlying the changes in opinions' (Issues 
DeUberation AustraUa 1999, 18).'' 
The education of the public? 
In addition to the media's disruptive effects on the education of poll 
participants, we also argue that its use to educate the broader pubUc feU short 
of the organisers' ambitions. One of Fishkin's key reasons for advocating 
deUberative polUng is to avoid traditional 'horse race' coverage of issues, in 
which one side wins and the others lose. In deliberative polUng, the idea is to 
move from sound bites and headUnes to serious deUberation of the issues. 
Sound bites Umit 'the abiUt}' of pubUc discourse to produce serious 
deUberation' (Fishkin 1995, 42; 1991, 62-3). While voters may pick up certain 
'cues' from poUtical candidates on where they stand and, from these, come to 
conclusions about how to vote (Fishkin 1995, 22), the 'production of cues 
comes from such an inevitably incomplete, manipulated, and accidental process 
of media and campaign coverage that it is hard to credit the prospects for 
rational analysis of the outputs when the inputs have such Umitations' (Fishkin 
1995, 85). DeUberative polUng faciUtates 'more rational cues' (Fishkin 1995, 86). 
When ordinary citizens see people Uke themselves on television and in the 
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newspapers questioning experts and having their concerns discussed, there will 
be an educative effect that wiU eUminate rational ignorance and 'non-attitudes'. 
The results of any such poU 'provide a critical supplement to the thinking of 
ordinary citizens' by giving voice to a 'deliberative microcosm of the country in 
a dramatic event avaUable to aU viewers who cared to tune in' (Fishkin 1996, 
135). 
It is ironic, therefore, that the very media that Fishkin sees as producing 
'headUnes' and 'shrinking sound bites' (Fishkin 1996, 135) are then trusted to 
convey the poU's message to the wider communit}'. Such a stratagem is cleatiy 
contradictory. The overaU result of the poU (in the AustraUan case, a big swing 
to a repubUc and away from direct election of a President) in fact becomes one 
of those very sound-bites and headUnes. Further, the broadcast of plenary 
sessions, rather than group deUberations, means that viewers simply see a few 
people questioning experts. Given that Fishkin himself has argued that 
'electronic town meetings', in which 'eclectic coUections of voters' question 
candidates directly, faU to provide significant deUberation (1996, 135), it is hard 
to see how his method improves on this. How, for example, is the viewing 
pubUc to discern between 'eclectic voters' and a deUberative sample, especially 
given their aUeged rational ignorance and disconnection from the issues? When 
Fishkin says that 'simply watching the proceedings of the deUberative poll on 
television ... or reading about it in newspapers can jump-start the often 
moribund deUberative process among the people' (1996, 135), it is far from 
clear how that broader educative process is to occur. 
For a deUberative poU to have an impact on the poUtical process, the results 
need to be 'widely cUsseminated' (Merkle 1996, 613). The mass media, 
therefore, has an important role, both in terms of a television network 
providing extended coverage of the deUberations and in terms of news 
coverage of the event itself However, television coverage of AustraUa 
DeUberates was neither extended nor extensive. The ABC aired the two 90-
minute plenary sessions on Saturday and the two-hour session on Sunday 
These broadcasts were 'mediated' in that the camera cut from speaker to 
speaker and across the audience, thus raising the question of just how different 
this t}-pe of coverage was to that of ordinary televised debates between experts 
and, say, a smdio aucUence. In terms of their educative effects on the wider 
commumt}', the broadcasts were screened neither at popular viewing times nor 
on a commercial television channel, Umiting the number of potential viewers. 
The only 'extended' commercial channel coverage, a Channel 9 60 Minutes 
current-affairs segment that was taped after the poU's final survey and broadcast 
a week later during a peak viewing period, foUowed a different and non-
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deUberative format. From the outset, the 15 minute segment emphasised the 
winner/loser nature or 'horse race' aspect of the referendum, with the No side 
described as 'narrowly ahead' in the regular opinion poUs. The presenter then 
introduced the deUberative poU with the statement that AustraUa DeUberates 
showed that, 'when fully informed, few AustraUans have any doubt what's best 
for our country'; that is, they voted overwhelmingly in favour of a repubUc. In 
making such a claim, however, the 60 Minutes coverage ignored the fact that 27 
percent of those who were 'fuUy informed' after considering the repubUc issue 
in depth voted against it, and some of those who voted No might previously 
have been Yes voters who came to see flaws in the repubUc. The wider pubUc 
were not given the more compUcated story that lay behind the overaU results. 
The 60 Minutes segment then presented a general picture of the poU, 
tracking participants as they arrived at the airport and settied into their hotels, 
before showing a session in the House of Representatives chamber. This was 
not footage of the poU's expert panel answering questions from the groups; 
instead, celebrity- host Ray Martin encouraged participants to stand up and give 
their views on the deUberative weekend and the proposed repubUc. Only rwo 
'experts' were present (one from either side of the campaign, preserving the 
'horse race' nature of the debate), and their opinions were secondary to those 
of the audience."^ 
Although the station taped an hour's worth of comment, only a few minutes 
of that was aired, aUowing 60 Minutes to select what it saw as the more 
'newsworthy' or 'interesting' comments." These included some that may weU 
have had an educative effect, with several participants noting that the weekend 
had been informative and had aUayed their fears to the extent that they would 
now vote Yes to a repubUc. The comments also included remarks from those 
who warned that in Germany, 'first we have the Kaiser, then we have the 
Fuhrer', who noted that 'the No case is so fuU of red herrings, I thought I was 
in a fish shop', and who gushed that the young Yes case representative would 
make an ideal first AustraUan President. Such sound-bites were not confined to 
the audience. One of Yat-Sen Li's comments warned against the prospect of a 
'King Charles and Queen Camilla', whUe Leeser said that if half the effort that 
had been devoted to the repubUc debate had been devoted to jobs and 
education, 'we'd be in a better place'. 
The item concluded with Martin holding a straw 'stand-up' poU of those in 
the House on the basis that 'you 300 or so people represent 12 milUon voters'. 
This showed overwhelming support for a repubUc, but was misleacUng in that 
the House held only half of the 347 participants, and that some of those in the 
chamber at the time who spoke and took part in the stand-up poU were not part 
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of the representative sample, but were volunteer group organisers.'^ Such 
coverage does not fit within Fishkin's parameters of the wider electorate seeing 
people Uke themselves having questions answered by experts. It is not 
information so much as soap-box rhetoric that provides dozens of sound bites. 
Looking at general media reports on the poU, the only newspaper that could 
be considered to have offered extensive coverage was the AustraUan, which was 
one of the poU's sponsors. Organisers themselves noted the minimal ccwerage 
of the poll in the weeks before it was held, which they noted had occurred 
despite 'a concerted effort to inform journaUsts and the pubUc about the 
concept of DeUberative PolUng and what to expect of AustraUa DeUberates' 
(Issues DeUberation AustraUa 1999, 9). They engaged a pubUc relations firm, 
which 'found the task cUfficult — with press release after press release receiving 
Uttie attention until the very last week' (Issues DeUberation AustraUa 1999, 9). 
Coverage in newspapers and on commercial television networks was Umited to 
short news items about the poU and its aims, and interviews with participants 
on why they chose to attend and what they thought of the process. Again, these 
tended to follow the old journaUstic adage, 'man bites dog is news, dog bites 
man is not news'. That is, while those whose pictures and comments appeared 
in the newspaper were undoubtedly 'ordinary' AustraUans, their presence at the 
poU could be considered exceptional for reasons of age or family and career 
commitments: the 79 year old retiree, the 25 year old labourer and father of 
two, the mother of a six week old baby, the full-time smdent and mother of 
seven, and the 52 year old computer expert. The AustraUa DeUberates 
organisers were themselves guilty of this, noting in that the 'occupations' of 
those attending the poll included a diverse range 'and even an unemployed ex-
convict' (Issues DeUberation AustraUa 1999, 13). 
Of course, sound bite and photo opportunity manipulation was not aU one 
way, with some participants recognising the opporturUty that the media 
presence provided for attracting attention to themselves. The 'it's me' syndrome 
resulted in some participants taking advantage of the media presence to play 
for attention. Also, one participant, having told her home town sewing circle 
before leaving for Canberra that the poU would be televised, wore a bright 
yeUow outfit — aU the better for them to see her. It worked, in that that 
evening's ABC news carried footage of her putting her group's question to 
panelUsts. 
Extensive coverage was given to the results of the poU, which neatiy fit 
within the traditional 'horse race' format. The mecUa could report that there 
was a big s-wing to a repubUc and a larger swing away from the direct election 
of a President, a winner and a loser. HeadUnes included 'PoU unlocks yes vote: 
Australia Deliberates? The Role of the Media in Deliberative Polling 175 
347 AustraUans show how education is the key to repubUc' (Steketee 1999d) 
and 'Weekend talk-shop results in huge swing to repubUc' (McDonald 1999). 
Again, poU organisers were themselves guUu' of perpetuating 'horse race' 
coverage, having arranged for what they termed 'headUne results' to be released 
at 5.30pm on Sunday (in time for evening television and morning newspaper 
deadUnes) and for a news conference at 11 am on Monday. 
However, after the reporting of the overaU results and a minor skirmish 
between the organisers and the No campaigners rj\-er accusations of 
'brainwashing', the deUberative poU received little attention in either the print 
or electronic media in the foUowing two weeks before the vote.'^ ^ By 8 
November, when the newspapers (most of which did not pubUsh on 7 
November, a Sunday) carried their major reports on the results of the 
referendum, deUberative polUng had aU but faded from \'iew. Only the 
Australian made mention of the poU, with a single sentence near the end of a 
story on page 10 noting that the 'repubUcans did not start to mrn the campaign 
around until the final two weeks, in the wake of the pcjsitive result for the Yes 
case in the deUberative poU in Canberra' (McGregor and Marris 1999). In terms 
of its 'educative effects', the deUberative poU canncjt be said to have made 
enough of an impact in the media for it to have fulfilled this aim. 
Conclusion 
This cUscussion has pointed to a number ol ways in which the media's presence 
at, and their reportage of, the AustraUa DeUberates poll compromised 
knowledge acquisition by- poU participants and the wider citizen body.''' Several 
factors relating to the media's presence at the poU and the organisers' tocus on 
mecUa requirements combined to reduce the quantity and qualit}- of the 
information imparted to participants. AustraUa Deliberates aimed both to 
reveal what AustraUans thought about the move to a repubUc after considering 
aU the issues and to educate the broader pubUc as to how they would vote if 
they had an oppormnit}' to fuUy consider the issues. These aims suggest that 
organisers beUeved the AustraUa DeUberates poU would have considerable 
impact on the outcome of the referendum vote. Hc:)wever, we believe that the 
weaknesses outUned in our discussion contributed to the deUberative poU 
having no noticeable impact on the referendum result. Despite the fanfare 
surrounding the weekend and its result, the deUberative poll cannot be claimed 
to have had any broader educative effect on the AustraUan pubUc. The result 
may have been a temporary addition to the Yes campaign's arsenal, but the 
weekend and the poU quickly sank without trace. 

Chapter Thirteen 
Rewriting the Referendum Rules 
John Uhr 
This chapter draws on the experience of the 1999 repubUc referendum to argue 
for reform of the underlying referendum process. It is not my purpose to 
canvass the merits of the 1999 repubUcan model or of any alternatives. My 
focus is on the merits, and more particularly the lack of merits, of the 
referendum process — as cUstinct from the merits or defects of any proposed 
referendum outcomes. Regardless of when or whether AustraUa adopts a 
repubUcan head of state, I think that it is timely to revise the way we conduct 
referendums. The process of constitutional change is just as important as the 
content of proposed changes. GeneraUy, the rules for referendums have 
changed very Uttie over the centenary of federation, apart from repeated 
attempts by early reformers to separate the routines of referendum campaigns 
from those of orcUnary elections. The aim of the reformers was to give voters 
an opportuiUty to participate in a genuine deUberative process, protected to 
some extent from the partisan ploys experienced in general elections. As I show 
in this chapter, not aU of those attempts were successful. 
A number of welcome changes to the referendum process in 1999 have 
opened up the renewed possibihty of rewriting the rules to strengthen the 
deUberative potential of referendums. In this chapter 1 sketch out one possible 
reform model. The first step is for ParUament to accept its special responsibiUty 
and estabUsh a dedicated aU-party committee on referendums and 
constimtional change. The next step is the estabUshment of a broacUy 
representative Referendum Commission to manage the conduct of 
referendums, including the prior organisation of national plebiscites where 
appropriate, foUowed by popularly elected constimtional conventions to work 
through the detaUs of possible constimtional changes. This reform model 
would help to generate a greater sense of pubUc legitimacy around any 
referendum topic, including an AustraUan repubUc. It is also fitting at the 
centenary of federation that this anniversary of achievement be accompanied 
by debate over 'constitutional renewal', including the renewal of the processes 
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ot constitutional change. Such a debate might bring unforeseen community-
benetits it the tocus is not exclusively on the wrangUng cwcr alternative models 
ot a head of state but includes an examination of how best to promote the 
integrity of pubUc determination of constitutional change. 
The problem with referendums 
Democracy is very demanding of process. As referendums illustrate, 
democrac}- is more than just a matter of registering the view of the majority 
Minorities too ha\-e rights, including the right to be heard. Man}- majorities are 
really coaUtions of a number of minorit}' viewpoints, each deserving separate 
consideration. AustraUan referendums show the cUfficult}' of obtaining a fair 
hearing for all antagonists in democratic decision making. A referendum is an 
important experiment in the capacit}' of a poUtical system to foster the levels 
of rational poUtical deUberation expected in ideals of deUberatixc democracy, 
where all interested citizens should have oppormnities to participate in public 
decision making (Uhr 1998a and 1999b). 
Referendums test the patience of the political eUte. They rely not only on 
the capacit}- of voters to pay attention to referendum activists, but also on the 
ability of activists to hear voters and to respond to the issues that they might 
want discussed. The 1999 referendum left many people — mirUmaUst 
repubUcans, direct electionists, even monarchists — with the feeUng that they 
were ncjt given an opportunity for their case to be fairly considered. 
What can be done to improve the referendum process? A standard view 
among man\- poUtical analysts is that the AustraUan electorate is generally 
apathetic about pubUc affairs and particularly ignorant when it comes to the 
merits of constitutional change. In this view, voter apathy and ignorance stack 
the deck in favour of the opponents of constimtional change. Cynics can argue 
that Howard rehed on this conservatism when allowing the republic 
referendum to be put to the people, even though that same conservatism meant 
that the people would not support his proposal for a new preamble. The loss 
of the preamble, the cynics say, was a smaU price Howard was prepared to pay 
to see the repubUc defeated. 
A version of this view is now commonplace in the poUtical science Uteramre 
on AustraUan referendums (consider MUes 1998; Uhr 2000a). This view notes 
that the AustraUan electorate is historicaUy unsympathetic to constimtional 
change, the conventional interpretation holcUng that the referendum system 
gives tcjo much weight to voter apathy and ignorance. One possible reform 
might be the aboUtion of compulsory voting, as was experimented with in the 
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partiaUy elected 'ConCon' of 1998, designed in part to restrict participation to 
those genuinely interested in the debate over constitutional change. I do not 
favour this option. 
This temptation to relax the rules for compulsory voting is irorUc, given that 
they were first introduced at national level precisely to help generate greater 
communit}' interest in debate over constimtional change. The initial, Umited 
reform was made by the Hughes Government in 1915 (introduced but in fact 
never used), nearly a decade before being introduced in 1924 by the Bruce 
Government for general elections (Uhr 2000b, 110-11). This chapter identifies 
a range of other possible reforms to the referendum rules clear of aboUshing 
compulsory voting. The legitimacy of the referendum process is just as 
important as the legitimacy of the constimtion or the head of state. A more 
open and honest referendum process can do much to ensure that the debate 
over republican options strengthens rather than weakens civic trust in the 
AustraUan system of government and constimtional change. 
My position is at odds with the standard reform complaint, which holds that 
the country requires greater consensual leadership and bipartisanship from the 
poUtical eUte. Sympathetic critics of the constitutional change process 
frequently complain that the basic deUberative defect of AustraUan 
referendums is the lack of bipartisan agreement within ParUament The usual 
evidence produced is the positive result accompanying open support from 
opposition parties for a government's change proposals, such as in 1967 when 
electors gave overwhelming approval to a constimtional change to delete 
raciaUy discriminatory provisions from the Constimtion. One lesson arising 
from the 1999 referendum results is that bipartisanship is not a guarantee of 
referendum success. The preamble question was defeated even though it had 
the support of the prime minister and the leaders of not only the official 
opposition but also of the third part}' with the balance of power in the Senate 
(the AustraUan Democrats). In point of fact, cross-partisan involvement in 
both sides of a referendum question might be just as conducive to a Yes vote 
as bipartisanship was once thought to be (Tvlulgan 1999). 
Describing the deliberative deficit 
Firstiy, I wiU provide some iUustrations of the 'deUberative deficit' often evident 
in AustraUan referendum practice that is unusuaUy prominent in the case of the 
tepubUc referendum. GeneraUy, the deUberative deficit refers to the imbalance 
between, on the one hand, resources avaUable to strengthen commuruty 
deUberation and, on the other hand, the deceptions and misrepresentations of 
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many referendum activists which weaken the deUberative process (consider Uhr 
2000b, 99-111). Despite the federal Government's commitment to many new 
prcicedures to inform the communit}' about the referendum options, this 
imbalance was starkly evident in the months leading up to the vote in 
November 1999. It is important to acknowledge that both sides were at fault in 
allowing various degrees of misrepresentation to muddy the referendum 
waters. 
Two very important sources of evidence of a deUberative deficit come from 
two of the most cUspassionate protagonists in the repubUc debate. I refer to 
Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of AustraUa and Barry Jones, former 
Labor Minister and immediate past President of the AustraUan Labor Party. 
Each iUustrates the degree of reasoned argument that the two opposed camps 
were capable of marshaUing. Each has also spoken out in protest against the 
unworthy elements that were aUowed to dominate their own camp's pubUc 
strategy. WhUe both Kirby and Jones have identified many annoying defects of 
argument found in their opponent's strategy, here I want to draw on what each 
has said about the defects of their own side's pubUc case. 
The relevance of KUrby's contribution cannot be underestimated, given that 
he was perhaps the main driving force in the original formation of the 
AustraUans for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM). In his 2000 Menzies memorial 
lecture, Kirby suggested two reasons why the Yes case might reasonably have 
expected to win the repubUcan referendum in 1999 (Kirby 2000). First, aU the 
polUng data has consistentiy shown that a majority of Australian voters are 
repubUcan in principle, with only a minorit}' registering as monarchists. Second, 
in the only reaUy fair test of the 1999 repubUcan model during the AustraUa 
DeUberates 'deUberative poU' held at Old ParUament House, Canberra, on 
22-24 October (Kirby 2000, 45; for a report on the deUberative poll see Issues 
DeUberation AustraUa 1999; see also Uhr 2000b, 95-6, 115-16; see also 
Chapter 12 of this volume), the minimaUst model won when the sample of 
voters were given an oppormnity for genuine poUtical deUberation. 
The AustraUa DeUberates experiment demonstrated that the 50 percent of 
the voting community supporting a cUrect election alternative to the 1999 
repubUc model coUapsed to less than 20 percent after the experience of the 
deUberative poU, thereby securing a comfortable if notional victory to the 
model on offer. To promote really effective pubUc deUberation requires that the 
tendency of referendum activists to engage in partisan misrepresentations of 
their opponents is held in check or neutraUsed through the intervention of a 
regulatory authorit}- capable of injecting balance into the poUtical debate. This 
'check and balance' activit}- need not require cumbersome bureaucratic 
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'communit}' information' campaigns but can be achieved more simply through 
'smart regulation' that minimises deceit and misrepresentation: examples 
include arrangements for pubUc retractions, rights of rebuttal, and the 
promotion of countervaiUng opinions. 
AustraUa DeUberates experimented with such elements to try to estabUsh a 
level playing field for poUtical contest, but the real referendum was quite 
different. Kirby hoped that it would be, and he could see good reasons for the 
No side to win, but he was honest enough to report that part of the 
explanation was that the No case played on voters' fears through deceptive 
misrepresentations and unworthy distractions from the core issues. Three 
examples of defective or dishonest argument mentioned by Kirby are: that a 
Yes result would mean that AustraUa might not be invited to rejoin the 
Commonwealth of Nations; that crown land might revert to Aboriginal 
ownership; and the false contention that the Governor-General was the 
AustraUan head of state (Kirby 2000, 45-7). 
Perhaps it is easy to acknowledge one's campaign weaknesses after one has 
won the war. Barry Jones went one step further and openly declared his side's 
campaign weaknesses even before the war was over. A few days after the 
AustraUa DeUberates victory for the repubUc, and a few days before the actual 
referendum vote, Jones told an audience at the Academy of Humanities that 
the repubUc case had itself to blame for the looming inevitable loss Qones 
2000, 115-29). He had shared the role of presicUng officer for AustraUa 
DeUberates with former National Party leader Ian Sinclair. He understood that 
in an ideal debating environment, where partisan misrepresentation was held in 
check and voter misunderstanding was given time to gather information and 
repair itself, the repubUc case could win. He also knew that the Yes case held 
itself back by 'dumbing down' the referendum campaign with cUstracting 
appeals to show business celebrity and flag-waving patriotism. Three of Jones' 
examples of the defective or dishonest poUtical argument made by the Yes case 
include: the comparative brevity of the official Yes case in the AEC pamphlet, 
with comparatively Uttie effort to respond in substance to the extensive No 
case; the 'lack of inteUecmal rigour or substance' associated with the appeal to 
sentiments of national pride and AustraUa's international standing; and the 
cUsastrous distraction of the use of the very dated 'It's Time' sloganeering from 
the 1972 Whitiam election victory (Jones 2000, 126-8). 
The testimony of Kirby and Jones highUghts the strucmral weaknesses of 
the current referendum framework. There is nothing to stop the widespread 
use of deception and misrepresentation, and Uttie to encourage the use of 
substantial argument that honesdy airs poUtical disagreements over the 
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debatable merits of constitutional change. My w-orry is not the lack of 
consensus but the absence of structures to faciUtate productive debate and 
disagreement. Democrac\- is all about acknowledging and sorting through our 
disagreements. Effective democrac}- requires decision making procedures that 
give decision makers, whether they be members of ParUament or the voters 
themselves, ever\- opportunit}- to take stock of the merits of alternative views 
(Uhr 2000c; see also Saunders 1984a). 
Democracy and disagreement 
I am confident that in a properly managed referendum system, electors can 
make their way through poUtical disagreement. The AustraUa DeUberates 
experiment shows not simply that we can do better but also that we owe it to 
our political community to devise a better system. The international 
experiments in what founder James Fishkin caUs 'deUberative polUng' show the 
power of 'citizen juries' gathered together as representative samples of their 
societ}' to deUberate over poUcy options under strictly-controlled conditions of 
balanced exposition of contentious poUcy arguments (Fishkin 1995). The 
AustraUan instance dramatically illustrated the deliberative gains made by 
sample citizenries when given opportunities to think through poUcy options in 
ways that differ quite fundamentally- from the partisan wrangUng experienced in 
normal politics. Part of the point of Fishkin's 'deUberative polUng' is to 
demonstrate the deUberative deficit that exists in an unacknowledged way in 
what routinely passes for the democratic deUberative process. For our purposes, 
the gap between the deUberative ideal of that interesting experiment and 
traditional referendum debate shows how much distance has to be covered to 
bring the real closer to the ideal. This chapter identifies one possibUity for 
beginning to bridge the gap. 
I acknowledge that the ideal of deUberative democracy sounds too abstract 
and distant from the everyday reaUties of AustraUan poUtics. In some very high-
minded theories of deUberative democrac}-, there is an unreal expectation that 
citizens and poUtical activists can be measured against the strict standards of 
'pubUc reason' (see Rawls 1999, 132-40). As used by theorists Uke John Rawls, 
this standard is only reached when poUtical disagreement converges on a shared 
framework of justifications held to be appropriate to a properly constimted 
democratic order. Think of this as an issue of stancUng: poUtical recognition 
wUl only be given to those who abide by civU argument addressing the 
authorised pubUc agenda. Thus an example of iUegitimate deUberation in this 
view might be the disruptive conduct of a member of a poUtical assembly who 
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works to a separate agenda, expUcitly caUing into question the good faith of 
other members and justifying his non-compUance on the basis of the higher 
value of his particular mission or calUng. The assembl}- can work as a 
deUberative forum ordy when aU members, including those in opposition, play 
bv the rules. 
To those of us who are not so high-minded, the rules of the deUberative 
game must also protect the rights of reformers and chaUengers. These civU 
rights of poUtical participation include the right, civUly, to challenge the 
reigning norms of 'public reasoning'. Rawls' most recent case for deUberative 
democracy is hea\T on deUberation but light on democracy. His model 
deUberators abide by 'pubUc reason' by favouring reasons that meet the highest 
deUberative standards of 'pubUc' reasoning about regime interests, which 
trump 'private' reasoning about individual or group interests. In this view, 
democratic deUberation operates as an exchange of different estimates about 
how best to promote constitutional democracy, with standing given only to 
those arguments that meet the form of pubUc reasoning; that is, with principles 
of poUcy justification that are open to acceptance by all participating citizens. 
Although many in the pubUc might not find aU arguments acceptable on their 
merits, the possibiUt}' of acceptance is proof of compUance with the formal 
standards of pubUc reason. 
Of course, in practical poUtics many disputes over fundamental values can 
never reaUy converge on any agreed principles of value or moraUt}-. DeUberative 
theorists Uke Rawls contend that democracy works best when there is a 
consensus on procedural or constimtional forms of argument and justification 
that comprise this ideal of 'pubhc reasoning'. It abstracts from many 
contentious substantial values in the hope of arriving at an agreed formal value, 
where citizens agree to accept as poUticaUy valid only those forms of reasoning 
that satisf}' what Rawls calls the test of reciprocit}' (Rawls 1999, 14; D'Agostino 
and Gaus 1998). This test holds that, ideaUy at least, one's argument should be 
potentiaUy open to free and unforced acceptance by others. It is up to them 
whether they are persuaded by the substantial merits of one's arguments. The 
'pubUc reason' seal of approval is a test of product quaUt}' and pubUc 
acceptabiUt}', but not a record of communit}' choice. 
In this scheme, arguments that comply with pubUc reason satisf}- an 
important test of poUtical legitimacy. Even where others are not persuaded by 
one's case, the weight of argument remains free from domination and coercion, 
and thus the decision making process generates legitimate and therefore 
acceptable results. Under such a framework, repubUcans would only criticise 
current constimtional arrangements with justifying principles that they honestiy 
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beUeve that their monarchist opponents could also accept as poUticallv 
reasonable, given their shared commitment to constitutional democracy 
Monarchists' defences of the current arrangements would equally be justified 
by reference to the sorts of 'pubUc reasons' open to acceptance by citizens 
sharing the rights and responsibiUties of a constitutic:)nal democracy. 
This ideahsed model of poUtical argument is not my standard for 
deUberative democracy. It would transform the referendum process into a 
stylised legal dispute over appropriate institutional principles tc:> give effect to 
constitutional democracy in Australia. Issues of national identity and 
so\-ereignt}- would be harder to format than issues of minimal republicanism. 
In many ways, Rawls' model of pubUc reasoning is that of the impartiality of 
the judge, whose determination hcjlds sway not because it reflects an\- particular 
set of personal interests or values but because it reflects a more general set of 
agreed conditions about problem-solving and fair dealing. Rawls asks ordinary 
citizens to ccjnform to a judicial model of impartiaUty. More appropriate, 1 
suspect, is that poUtical debate have space for the checks and balances of 
judicious process, short of the stricter requirement for judicial formaUty For 
my purposes, standing need ncjt be so narrowly defined, and reasoning need not 
be so restrictively reciprocal to contribute to better poUtical deUberation. 
I will return to some of the poUcy and legal issues later in this chapter, after 
reviewing the track recc:)rd of referendum reform. Contemporary observers of 
referendum practice should be aware that there is a long Australian tradition of 
reformist interest in improving referendums. Regrettably, there is also a long 
AustraUan tradition oi disquiet over allowing the people to get tcxj close to 
things Uke constitutional change, which the poUtical eUte think that the people 
are unUkely to understand. A preoccupation of referendum reformers has been 
the attempt to structure pubhc debate around the highest standards of sound 
argument as cUstinct from the usual standards of low poUtics. This requirement 
for open pubUc argument is potentiaUy one of AustraUa's great contributions 
to the practice of deUberative democracy (Uhr 2000b, 101-11). 
The importance of argument 
The earliest set of referendum reformers were those constitutional framers 
who struggled during the 1890s to entrench the referendum provision in the 
constitution. Their task was far from easy, as they had to combat traditional 
prejucUces against direct popular participation in government. The poUtical eUte 
in the decade of constitutional debate leading to federation included many 
prominent constimtionaUsts who had fundamental misgivings about the 
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prudence of entrenching the referendum provision in the Constitution. These 
foundational reservations about the wisdom of popular referendums reflect a 
widespread eUte view, still circulating, about the unsuitabiUty- of voters to the 
task of constitutional change. 
The constimtional right for change through popular referendum had to be 
fought for, against weU-argued opposition in defence of the rights of elected 
representatives, either in ParUament or in special conventions, to decide things 
on behalf of the community- (Crawford 1992, 177-92). As I have detaUed 
elsewhere, the advocates of referendums had to overturn at least three deeply-
held prejudices against referendums as incompatible with responsible party 
government, with parUamentary sovereignt}', and with majoritarian democracy 
(Uhr 2000b, 102^). 
ThankfuUy, there were champions of wider pubUc deliberation who worked 
hard to reduce the deUberative deficit of the emerging national poUtical system. 
The progressive view was put early by Alfred Deakin, who defended the 
emerging referendum practice because it promised 'an assistance to ParUament 
if they desire to obtain distinctiy and without the introduction of foreign 
matter the verdict of the people on any particular question'. Note this emphasis 
on mrning directly to the people 'without the introduction of foreign matter' 
(Uhr 2000b, 102-4). Deakin appreciated that the success of referendums 
depended on the abiUt}- of ParUament to keep the arena of pubUc debate free 
from 'foreign matter': partisan misrepresentation about either the intent or 
effects of change proposals. 
Deakin was one of those referendum reformers who carried their struggle 
over into the early years of federation. Under the Constimtion, ParUament has 
power to legislate for the machinery of referendums. The system that has 
emerged is one of compromise, reflecting the remarkable tenacit}' of poUtical 
eUte opinion about voters' lack of deUberative capacity'. The original 1906 
legislation estabUshing machinery for the conduct of referendums showed very 
Uttie signs of the influence of those reformers worried about how to protect 
voters against the conventional poUtical tricks of deception and 
misrepresentation. As the Prime Minister sponsoring the legislation, Deakin's 
aim was to equip the electorate with impartial advice about what would change 
under any given referendum: impartial here meaning free from partisan 
wrangUng of the t}'pe routinely experienced among the parUamentary eUte, with 
aUegations and imputations about the hidden partisan purposes of disputed 
proposals. 
Referendum proponents Uke Deakin feared that referendums would work 
only if elected representatives gave the people an effective oppormnit}' to 
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deUberate and arrive at what he caUed their 'verdict'. Just as a jury's verdict is 
preceded by an impartial process of cross-examination of disputed evidence, 
so too the people's verdict at a referendum should be preceded by some sort of 
imparaal process of weighing of the pros and cons. DeUberation literally 
means weighing up options, as on a set of scales. Those who warmly supported 
the principle of referendum began to search for new ways in which AustraUan 
citizens could be assisted to participate positively-. Two strategies emerged: first, 
protecting public deUberation from total reUance on the sorts of debating 
practices common in ParUament; and second, providing citizens with impartial 
information on the core arguments of the pro and con case surrounding 
referendum proposals. 
The original 1906 legislation was sUent on voter education. The next wave 
of reformers were more successfuk In 1912 the referendum legislation was 
amended to include, for the first time, provision for the preparation of a 
booklet containing the Yes and No cases as authorised by their parUamentary 
supporters for distribution to aU interested voters. The use of the term 
'argument' to describe the content of this voter education material is relevant 
here. The electoral officer was given responsibiUty for making available to each 
elector 'a pamphlet containing the arguments together with a statement 
showing the textual alterations and adcUtions proposed to be made to the 
Constitution' (Referendum [Constitution Alteration] No 2, Act no 35 of 1912, 
section 2; see Lenaz-Hoare 1984). 
Then and now observers wondered how legislators might ensure that voters 
are provided with genuine 'arguments': credible reasoning as distinct from 
clever but specious rhetoric? Debate in ParUament canvassed possible 
independent umpires capable of preparing impartial statements of the opposed 
arguments, including High Court judges, the Attorney-General, and 
parUamentary clerks. EvenmaUy, ParUament dropped the search for external 
authorit}' and mrned directly to the authors of each case: the warring poUtical 
parties in ParUament, aUowing them to resort to whatever form of 'argument' 
they thought appropriate, subject only to a Umit of 2,000 words. 
Deakin never gave up the struggle for a better deal for voters. From the 
opposition benches in 1912, he reflected on the experience of earUer 
referendums with their 'wide sway of mistaken opinions' resulting in the 
situation that 'a very large section remained very imperfectiy informed'. Deakin 
held that it was 'our duty to them' to assist electors to 'form an independent 
judgment'. The 2,000 words would not be burdensome for 'any person who is 
reaUy interested in the fate and fumre of this country'. In his view, the contents 
should not be allowed to dupUcate parUamentary debate since 'there are to be 
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no personal reflections or imputations', with the arguments entirely addressed 
to 'the merits of each question' (Uhr 2000b, 109). It is worth emphasising that 
this important quaUfication never made it into the legislation, despite a 
subsequent attempt by the Hughes Government in 1915 to once again amend 
this provision to ensure that the arguments focused on the constitutional merits 
and not extraneous matters. 
The beginnings of compulsory voting 
The next round of reform was the adoption of compulsory voting (Uhr 2000b, 
110-11). In 1915, ParUament slowly edged sideways towards a rather novel 
safeguard against voter misunderstanding and partisan misrepresentation: 
compulsory voting. With the defeat of its attempts to legislate to provide voters 
with information free from partisan misrepresentation, in August 1915 the 
Hughes Government devised a novel approach to electoral responsibiUt}': an 
experiment with compulsory voting. It was not until 1924 that compulsory 
voting was introduced for general elections and permanentiy for referendums. 
ParUament legislated in 1915 to provide for compulsory voting for a series of 
referendum questions that, given the changing conditions associated with 
AustraUan involvement in the first world war, were never put to the people. 
The conventional wisdom about the AustraUan introduction of compulsory-
voting is that it was introduced to make Ufe easier for poUtical parties, which is 
probably true to some extent. It is also important to recognise that in its very 
first national phase, compulsory voting was expUcitiy designed to repair the 
deUberative deficit. The idea was simple: if citizens knew that voting at national 
constimtional referendums was a legal duty, then perhaps they would pay 
greater attention to the debate over the merits of the proposals. The stated idea 
behind the proposal for enforced civic responsibiUt}' was that put in these 
terms: 'The majorit}- are able to discuss footbaU records, and make an accurate 
calculation of the time in which 6 furlongs can be done at Flemington, but, in 
many cases, those men have not had their attention sufficiendy directed to the 
affairs of their country to be persuaded to exercise their franchise' (Uhr 2000b, 
110-11; the author is Senator RusseU, assistant Minister in charge of 
introducing the biU for compulsory voting. See Commonwealth ParUamentary 
Debates, 13 August 1915, 5755). 
Critics have suggested that this is a device designed not so much to bolster 
pubUc deUberation as to Uft the referendum approval rating, which would suit 
reformist parties Uke Labor. There is a supposition that Labor voters have 
tracUtionaUy been among a majority of those who have faUed to mrn out when 
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elections have not been compulsory. While this might be true, it is stiU the case 
that compulsory voting might simply reinforce the conventional bias against 
constitutional reform by ensuring that the legions of reactive AustraUan voters 
turn out to register their disapproval. For )-cars, referendum critics have 
beUeved that there is a Unk between compulsory voting and No voting. One bit 
of evidence that should confirm this would be a high incidence of informal 
voting (deUberately spoUt baUots), but this is not in fact the case (Mulgan 1999, 
177-8). 
What can be said in defence of compulsory voting? The defences at the 
time were all related tc5 giving electors a spur to deUberation. For example, it 
was held that constitutional referendums were too important to be decided by 
a minority of the participating electors, and that compulsion will encourage 
electors to find out what a referendum reaUy turns on. The responses at the 
time also addressed the deUberative deficit, contending against 'compelUng 
persons to give a judgment, which may affect important decisions, on matters 
which they have not studied, and in which they take so Uttie interest that, if let 
alone, they would not record their judgment'. Compulsion alone would not 
generate voter diUgence: compulsion 'wiU not insure the predominance of 
intellect in the council of a nation's affairs. It does not foUow that everybody 
wiU cast a philosophic and intelligent vote' (cited in Uhr 2000b, 111). 
Compulsory voting stayed and was, as its critics feared, later extended to 
general elections. 
Capturing the momentum for change 
Between 1915 and 1999, referendums were held on 15 occasions, roughly half 
at the time of a general election and half separately. Of thirt}'-one individual 
proposals put to voters, six were successful: two at the time of general elections 
and four when held separately. In many ways, the two referendum proposals 
put at 1999 simply confirmed the historical trend in which 80 percent of 
proposals are defeated (for details, see House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 1997, 59-114). Trends can be 
bucked: the 1999 losses were a much closer thing than the four losses suffered 
in 1988, which so far mark out the bottom of the referendum barrel. I want to 
identif}- a number of important differences in the 1999 referendum process 
which point the way to reform (Uhr 2000b, 112-15). The momenmm from 
these 1999 rule changes can be used to bring in further sets of changes, in the 
event that we desire a more effective deUberative process. 
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Elected conventions 
The first and in many ways most fundamental issue is the potential value of 
elected constitutional conventions. The referendum trigger was the partly 
elected 1998 Constitutional Convention, which generated greater pubUc 
interest and participation than traditional referendum triggers, such as the 
1985-88 Constimtional Commission, which prepared some of the ground for 
the four unsuccessful 1988 referendums (Uhr 1998b, 13—15). The holding of 
the Women's Constitutional Convention in Canberra a few weeks before 
'ConCon' is proof of the benefits of taking even a half-step towards a fuUy 
elected constitutional assembly. The women's ccjnvention arose from a 
determination by interested women's groups to take seriously the Howard 
Government's commitment to a more open and representative community 
process of constitutional deliberation. This pre-convention served to 
strengthen pubhc interest in 'ConCon', and both conventicjns made it 
sigmficantly more difficult for referendum activists on both sides to get away 
with the rhetorical simpUfications of past referendum practice. Importantiy, the 
resolutions of the 1998 Constitutional Convention caUed for refcjrm of the 
constitutional change process to ensure greater pubhc participation as part of 
a larger agenda of constitutional renewal — an agenda that is independent of 
the fate of the minimaUst repubUcan model (Uhr 1999b, 191-6). 
The potential role of popularly elected constitutional conventions has the 
authority of that great constitutional expert, Rc^bert Garran, whose views 
should carry weight at the time of the centenary of federation. Speaking 50 
years ago at the mid-point of that century of constitutional development, 
Garran advised a group of non-Labor activists interested in constimtional 
amendment that popularly elected conventions promised valuable legitimacy 
for any scheme of constitutional change (Garran in Bland 1950, 181-3, 
187-97; on the history of constitutional conventions, see also Louat in Bland 
1950, 164—77). He reminded his audience of the pre-federation struggle for 
popularly elected constitutional conventions to take forward the issue of 
preparing a national constitution, and of the legitimacy that came from the 
equaUy important commitment to a series of colonial referendums to adopt the 
draft constitution. At earUer times in our national history, governments have 
opened the door to elected conventions as a way of mobiUsing pubUc interest 
in constitutional change: in 1921 the Hughes Government introduced 
legislation for a partly elected convention, which now appears to be a model for 
the 1998 Constimtional Convention. In 1925 the Bruce Government nearly 
opted for an elected convention, but turned instead to appoint the Peden Royal 
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Commission. In 1931, the L\-ons Cjovernment considered an appointed 
convention but decUned to proceed, perhaps because it recognised that a non-
elected bod\- would not carry pubhc legitimacy. 
Garran repeated his caU for elected constitutional conventions in his 
memoirs entitied Prosper the CommonweaUh (Garran 1958). This later, more 
considered, view is even stronger in its insistence on popularly elected 
conventions. Garran acknowledged that the version of referendum contained 
in the AustraUan Constitution was 'a conservative institution' with many 
restraints against the 'undue faciUt\- of amendment', such as the rules in s. 128 
insisting on parUamentary passage by absolute majorities in each hcjuse and on 
popular confirmation through the double majority mechanism. Two solutions 
were possible. First, one could either relax some of these rules to make it easier 
to get constitutional change approved, for example b\- replacing the 
requirement for majorities in more than half the states with a new rule 
requiring simply a majority in half the states, to cite the example favoured by 
Garran. Alternatively, one could revert to the spirit of the original 
constitutionaUsts and insist that change proposals be developed through 
popularly elected conventions before the referendum propcjsals are authorised 
by ParUament. Garran argues that in 'AustraUa, it was the people who put the 
seal of assent on the Constitution, and it seems to me that the best chance of 
getting assents to a systematic plan of amendment is to go back to the people'. 
Constitutional amendments 'framed and proposed to Parliament by a 
convention elected by the people for that purpose, would have a far better 
chance of acceptance at a subsequent referendum than any amendment framed 
and introduced by the Government of the day' (Garran 1958, 168-9, 207-14). 
Garran's warning was that any scheme for constimtional change would be 
greati}- strengthened by first convening an elected assembly to test public 
interest in reform priorities. That warning about the importance of generating 
pubUc interest stiU stands. The very Umited impact of the six appointed 
Constimtional Conventions from 1973-85 highUghts the paradox that carefuUy 
selected constimtional expertise is no guarantee of effectiveness. AustraUa stiU 
has no agreed approach to a stancUng process of constimtional revision. The 
1998 'Con-Con' concluded its final communique with a call for 'ongoing 
constitutional review process' involving a new convention with two-thirds of 
its members popularly elected (Uhr 1999b, 195-6). That is a good starting point 
for those stiU cautious about a fuUy elected convention. 
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The role of Parliament 
A second pointer was the enhanced role of ParUament in the development of 
the referendum process. A distinctive feamre of the 1999 referendum was the 
decision of the Howard Government to aUow considerable pubUc contribution 
to the detaUed definition of referendum options. The package of legislative 
bUls was released early for pubUc comment and the government particularly 
invited contributions to its draft preamble. This was an unusual but very 
welcome invitation to greater pubUc participation in the referendum process. 
Formnately, it went further than simply pubUc concessions granted by a 
tolerant government: another distinctive feature of the 1999 process was the 
role of the parUamentary select committee especiaUy estabUshed to examine the 
legislative biUs containing the referendum proposals. These smaU but welcome 
parUamentary contributions should be strengthened and built into the standard 
practice for referendums. The select committee chaired by- Government 
backbencher Bob Charles performed a very valuable task in two wa\-s: it took 
mountains of evidence aU around the country and it produced a report that had 
enough influence to force the Government to modify and clarify the precise 
wording of the head of state question (Joint Select Committee on the RepubUc 
Referendum 1999). That report stands as the best single resource for those 
wanting to revisit the great debates of the 1999 referendum when next we 
come to examine the details of a repubUcan option: cUsputes over the 
presidential nomination process, powers of the president, and the dismissal 
provisions. 
It is hard to overstate the importance of a parUamentary involvement in a 
referendum process. The usual practice is that many individual members of 
ParUament participate, but without any sustained institutional involvement by 
ParUament, or its committees taking responsibiUt}- to provide a pronrUnent 
pubUc forum for debate over the merits of the legislative proposals. The 1999 
select committee demonstrated the value of a forum estabUshed by ParUament 
as cUstinct from the government of the day. Legislators have a special role in 
the AustraUan referendum process: the Constimtion confines the initiation of 
constimtional change to ParUament and nothing can happen until our elected 
members are convinced of the merits of aUowing voters their oppormnit}' to 
vote. There have been recommendations to widen the scope of initiators to 
include, for example, the states as weU as the Commonwealth ParUament, and 
perhaps even popular initiative (see Constimtional Commission 1988, 856-72; 
Hughes 1984, 34—76). Whatever the merits of these suggestions, my contention 
192 John Uhr 
is that ParUament has room to demonstrate greater initiative in its own right, 
given that it can prevent as easily as it can promote a referendum proposal. 
ParUament already has one committee with dedicated responsibiUty to watch 
over the general state of electoral law and practice: the existing joint committee 
on electoral matters should now be supplemented by a new committee with 
dedicated responsibiUty for referendum poUcy and administration. The 
committee should have representation from aU parUamentary parties and 
operate with a community consultative council comprising a fully 
representative spread of perspectives on constimtional change, assembUng 
differences in regard to gender and region as well as party. Such a committee 
need not sit back and wait for referendum business to come its way, but could 
prove its worth right now by anticipating how a better process of community 
debate and decision making could be prepared weU before we get close to the 
next round of referendum voting. EstabUshing such a committee in the year of 
the centenary of federation would send a positive signal that ParUament was 
ready to protect and promote the spirit of popular participation that made 
federation possible. 
Community information 
The third and final reform pointer relates to pubUc instruction. The report of 
the 1999 parUamentary committee acknowledged the need for greater pubUc 
resources to be directed to community information during referendums (Joint 
Select Committee on the RepubUc Referendum 1999, 6-7, 97-9). Another 
unusual parUamentary pointer to reform was the amendment of the 
referendum law to overcome the severe Umitations on pubUc expendimre 
available for government use in promoting the referendum. As an experiment, 
the law was amended to permit the government to spend substantiaUy more 
than any earUer referendum and so generate a higher level of reUable 
information to voters. The main beneficiaries were the government-appointed 
Yes and No campaign committees, each given $7.5 mUUon. This is welcome 
because the tracUtional reUance on the official pamphlet is clearly past its use-
by date. The pamphlet alone cannot be expected to stay the hand of partisan 
manipulation, particularly as it is prepared by the interested parUamentary 
partisans. 
A related reform pointer was the Government's decision to estabUsh, with 
a budget of S4.5 milUon, an experts' group chaired by Sir Ninian Stephen to 
direct a 'neutral pubUc education campaign'. The 1999 experience was that this 
mechanism was not capable of 'neutraUsing' the deceptions of many 
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referendum activists. One important lesson is that this very traditional model 
of non-partisan pubUc education might have reached its limits: what works for, 
say, community health campaigns is not necessarUy appropriate for poUtical 
contests over constitutional change. The committee was too far removed from 
the real action: the simpUstic and possibly misleading referendum media 
pubUcit}' escaped the close scrutiny or the arm's-length control of the experts' 
group. Even if the experts had wanted to intervene, as constimtional law}'ers 
they would have taken particular note of the High Court's narrow reading of 
the provisions in referendum law designed to prohibit material that is 'Ukely to 
mislead or deceive' electors (see for example Evans v Crichton-Browne, \A1 CER 
169 [1981]). 
Many potential reformers doubt that much can be done to regulate 
misleading or deceptive campaigning. There is a conventional assumption that 
aU forms of poUtical speech are in a special zone beyond the reach of ordinary 
regulation. I disagree and can point to emerging new models of appropriate 
regulation. One precedent is the Howard Government legislation caUed the 
Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1988, the stated purpose of which is to 'faciUtate 
pubUc scrutiny of fiscal poUcy and performance'. Given that elections mrn 
substantiaUy on competing claims over fiscal poUcy, the Charter legislation 
authorises the leaders of the two major poUtical groupings (Government and 
Opposition) to request the Commonwealth departments of Treasury and 
Finance 'to prepare a costing of any of its pubUcly announced poUcies if a 
general election is caUed. The costing wiU then be pubUcly released' before the 
date of the election (s. 2, para. 6, and s. 22). The Charter is welcome because 
it opens the way for citizens to have competing poUtical claims tested against 
what the legislation terms 'the best professional judgment' of Treasury and 
Finance officers, i.e. independent and impartial pubUc servants (s. 25). 
Surely it is not impossible to devise a simUar scheme that could subject 
poUtical claims about constitutional alteration to independent review by a non-
partisan pubUc authority or speciaUst referendum commission. Another model 
or precedent is the South AustraUan Electoral Act, which is a leader in the 
campaign against misleading advertising. This legislation authorises the state 
electoral commissioner to take action against parties pubUshing 'a statement of 
fact that is inaccurate and misleacUng to a material extent' (s. 113 para. 2). 
UsuaUy, the electoral commissioner simply arranges for a pubUc retraction by 
offending parties, but there is nothing to stop such a scheme from going 
further and arranging rights of reply or rebuttal from those misrepresented. 
Note that this scheme targets only statements purporting to be factual, and is 
quite permissive about statements of opinion. The state Supreme Court has 
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upheld the constitutional validit\- of this restriction on poUtical communication 
as consistent with the legitimate pubUc interest in protecting the rights of 
electors to exercise a free vote, uninfluenced by misleading information. The 
Court has drawn attention to the importance of 'a truly informed elector', 
ruUng that a 'democratic election requires that the electorate be informed so 
that the electorate can exercise an informed \'ote' (Cameron v Becker 64 S.VSR 
238 [1995]: Lander J at paras 16, 18). 
Another precedent derives from the determination of the then leader of the 
Opposition, Kim Beazley, who in 2000 introduced the Government 
Advertising (Objectivit}-, Fairness, and AccountabiUt}-) Bill to draw up new rules 
in the wake of the Howard Government's aUegedly improper use of public 
money when promoting the GST changes (introduced into House of 
Representatives, 26 June 2000). Relying on a new regulatory framework devised 
by the Auditor-General, the Beazley bill identifies minimum standards of 
objectivity-, fairness and accountabiUty appropriate to government advertising 
campaigns. My point is that what can be done for government advertising can 
also be done for pubUcly-funded referendum campaigning. Referendum 
authorities can attach terms and conditions when providing pubUc mone\-s to 
Yes and No teams for the promotion of their particular perspectives. 
The search for appropriate terms and conditions regulating the use of 
pubhc assistance began in a modest and not altogether successful way in 1999, 
with a welcome if Umited focus on the financial accountabiUt}' and reporting 
requirements of recipients of pubUc assistance. To be successful, referendum 
authorities must go much further and devise a version of the minimum 
standards of objectivit}' and fairness used in the Beazley biU. For instance, 
material 'should not directiy attack or scorn the views, poUcies or actions of 
others such as the poUcies and opinions of opposition parties or groups'. There 
are other models of a regulatory regime that might be extended to cover the 
conduct of referendums. For instance, AustraUan Democrat Senator Andrew 
Murray's biU to estabUsh a Charter of PoUtical Honest}' is also designed in part 
to attack the misuse of pubUc funds in government advertising campaigns 
(introduced into Senate, 10 October 2000; see also Senator Murray's Electoral 
Amendment [PoUtical Honest}'] BUI introduced the same day). Murray's biU 
draws on earUer provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act that have since 
been cUscarded, which attempted to prohibit untrue, misleading or deceptive 
poUtical advertising. 
The current Murray biU has come forward because earUer attempts by 
AustraUan Democrats Senators to restore this provision have been unsuccessful 
(see StancUng Committee on Electoral Matters 1997, Senator Murray's minorit}-
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report at 152-3). The standards of poUtical honest}- contained in the Murray 
bUl relate to the promotion of materials 'in an unbiased and equitable manner', 
designed to promote 'information in a way that makes facts clearly and easUy 
distinguishable from comment, opinion and analysis'. Clearly, the momenmm 
is gathering for closer public scrutiny of the honesty of poUtical 
communication made by poUtical parties when using pubUc funds. 
The importance of a Referendum Commiss ion 
I mrn finaUy to my proposed Referendum Commission as the operational 
centrepiece of m\' plan for a more effective referendum process. While our 
deUberative deficit is bad for the prospects of an AustraUan repubUc, the 
existence of a deeper strucmral deficit in the referendum framework is even 
worse for the prospects of AustraUan democracy. My reform plan aims to 
strengthen communit)- deUberation through a new form of consumer or voter 
protection against the impact of deception and misrepresentation by 
referendum activists. AustraUan referendum practice still has plenty of potential 
for measures giving consumers or voters opportunities for better informed 
choices when deUberating and voting. 
It is not feasible to strike at every instance of partisan misrepresentation by 
referendum activists or to respond to every reported instance of voter 
misunderstanding. Nonetheless, one can bring greater balance to the 
deUberative process by reserving pubUc space for a more considered and 
measured exchange of contencUng views for those voters wanting to hear and 
contribute to a more informative process of pubUc deUberation. Strengthening 
the oppormnities for pubhc participation and information exchange can do 
much to advance AustraUa's claims as a deUberative democracy. Effective 
democracy presupposes an instimtional framework or set of rules to faciUtate 
open, free, and fair pubUc decision making (Uhr 1998a, 213-31). The rules of 
the game most certainly matter, particularly when it comes to electoral contests 
and voting exercises. Effective poUtical deUberation at referendums requires a 
new institutional framework and set of rules to protect pubUc space against the 
'market domination' and predatory partisanship of referendum activists bent 
on deception and misrepresentation. The solution is not to outiaw anti-
deUberative poUtics. A better strategy is to invest in balancing mechanisms 
capable of carving out a space for fairer exchanges of poUtical views. Think of 
this as a kind of reserved or slow lane (slow in the sense that deUberation 
suggests the importance of a lack of haste) for those interested in participating 
in a more open community dialogue. 
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ly is worth noting by way of comparison that the US approaches to 
referendum law and poUcv permit greater pubUc regulation of the content and 
format of taxpa\-er-funded 'voters' pamphlets ' containing political statements 
and arguments. For instance, Oregon referendum law- allows the election 
authorities to withdraw any proposed statement from a referendum activist that 
contains, for example, defamatory or hateful speech (see for example Oregon 
Revised Statutes, 251.055). It is therefore mistaken to suggest that it would be 
impossible to balance the competing requirements of tree and tair political 
speech. Current AustraUan practice allows the producers of so-called free 
speech to trample on the rights of the consumers of fair speech. A Referendum 
Commission could help redress the balance. 
Such a Referendum Commission should be estabUshed and funded, not by 
the government of the day, but by an aU-part}' parUamentary committee on 
referendums and constitutional change. As mentioned earlier, the current 
arrangement where the administration of referendums is the responsibility of 
the AustraUan Electoral Commission (AEC) has proved worthwhile, but is no 
longer keeping pace with international standards. When considering 
fundamental constitutional change, a democratic poUtical community has a 
right to expect that the change process will be conducted with a degree of 
honest}- and fairness typically absent from electoral contests over who should 
form the government of the day. 
This is not to deny the importance of promoting more open and fairer 
electoral contests. My focus here is solely on referendums. To cite another 
instance, the 1996 Nairne Commission in the United Kingdom investigated the 
feasibiUty of referendums for future British practice (Nairne 1996, 26-34). It 
r ecommended that responsibihty for referendums be separated from 
responsibiUty for everyday electoral administration. Again the case was that the 
sort of communit}' decision-making expected of referendums was unUke that 
expected or tolerated in routine electoral contests. This recommendation for an 
impartial pubhc authorit}' to manage referendums was also taken up by the UK 
Committee on Standards in PubUc Life in 1998, at the same time as a simUar 
recommendat ion by the UK Jenkins Commission on electoral reform 
(Committee of Standards in PubUc Life 1998; Independent Commission on the 
Voting System 1998). 
In these reports, there is no suggestion that electoral administrators are 
anything but impartial in their management of electoral rules, even-handedly 
apph'ing the law to aU parties and electors. The issue is that rule-bound 
impartiaUt}- does not quite capture the form of pubUc management required to 
faciUtate effective pubUc participation in referendum debate and decision-
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making. Electoral administration involves a largely reactive process of part}' 
registration, candidate approval, vote counting and, where it exists, the 
distribution of pubUc funding according to voter support. A Referendum 
Commission reporting to an all-party parUamentary committee could 
effectively engage in more appropriately proactive activities to stage a balanced 
pubUc contest addressing the issues and the merits as understood by the spread 
of protagonists. Staging a fair hearing of alternatives wUI not guarantee that 
voters converge on a rational consensus, but it can help provide for pubhc 
access to a fairer debate among aU the available perspectives (Uhr 2000c, 
206-10). The distinctive competence of a dedicated Referendum Commission 
would be its broadly representative (rather than neutral or impartial) character 
and, flowing from that, its capacit\' to stage debate and pubUc exchange 
involving aU segments of communit}' opinion. 
This Referendum Commission would take cjver responsibUit}' for funding 
and managing the pubhc process of the referendum once the proposed 
constitutional alteration leaves ParUament. One of the most important of these 
responsibiUties would be to work with the aU-part}' committee to arrange, 
where necessary, for plebiscites followed by popularly-elected constimtional 
conventions to replace the partiy elected 'Cc^n-Con', to aUow for greater pubUc 
participation in developing the detaUs of any agenda of constitutional change. 
Other responsibiUties closer to the holding of a referendum would include 
pubUc assistance to Commission-appointed Yes and No committees, neutral 
pubUc education programs, inclucUng provision of the contending arguments 
traditionaUy cUstributed by the AEC (the Yes/No booklet), and regulation of 
the content of pubUcly funded contributions to referendum debates to protect 
its basic integrity-, fairness and honest}-. 
Conclusion 
There are Umits to what can be expected of rational deUberation. What holds 
for referendums does not necessarUy hold for other democratic practices. 
Referendums are exceptional, and any reform of referendum rules does not 
imply that routine poUtics can also be reformed along deUberative Unes. The 
AustraUan constitutional framers appreciated that referendums were exceptions 
to the normal rules of AustraUan parUamentar}- poUtics. Special rules were 
devised to protect voters' rights to use their infrequent referendum exercise of 
sovereignty to make an informed decision on constitutional change. My caU for 
a Referendum Commission is consistent with this recognition of the distinctive 
importance of constitutional sovereignt}-. It is unreaUstic and perhaps unwise to 
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hope that routine parUamentary poUtics can attract similar protections against 
non-deUberative action. Theorists of deUberative democracy occasionaUy show 
impatience with \\-hat appear to be the unreasonable strategies of minorities, 
whose rights of protest, direct action and civil disobedience iUustrate valuable 
dimensions of democratic poUtical deUberation (Rawls 1999; compare Uhr 
1998a, 13-29). 
I also want to emphasise that m}- caU for reform is not a repubUcan case of 
sour grapes. My beUef in the importance of overhauUng the referendum rules 
would hold even if the repubUc referendum had won popular approval. As a 
committed repubUcan favouring greater democratic participation in 
government, I am convinced that the move towards an AustraUan head of state 
should be accompanied by moves to protect citizens' rights to a free and fair 
process of constitutional change through referendum. Even those who want 
AustraUa to retain the current system of constitutional monarchy should be 
interested in maximising the oppormnities for open and honest pubUc decision 
making when using the referendum provision in s. 128 of the Constitution. My 
motivation does not rest on a desire to increase the rate of referendum 
approvals. The fact that only 8 of 44 referendum proposals have won popular 
approval is not really evidence that the referendum system is broken. Voters 
have probably had good reason to withhold their approval except where the 
initiators of constimtional change have fairly and openly responded to, first, the 
unavoidable instances of voter misunderstanding and, second, the less 
excusable instances of partisan misrepresentation by referendum activists. 
EarUer generations of rule reformers have included some who hoped that 
changing the referendum rules would indeed increase the rate of popular 
approval of constitutional change. Some reformers have even sought to alter 
the terms of the constimtional provisions regulating the referendum process. 
For instance, the Whitlam Government put a proposal to the people in May 
1974 to alter s. 128 to reduce the measure of a required majority from a 
national majority- involving majorities in four states (i.e. a majority of states) to 
a national majorit}- involving majorities in three states (i.e. half of the states). 
Under these revised rules, three past referendum questions might have been 
carried: two for Labor in 1946 and one for the CoaUtion in 1977. This 1974 
proposal failed to pass, scoring a majority in one state only and not securing a 
national majorits- overaU (House of Representatives StancUng Committee on 
Legal and Constimtional Affairs 1997, 99-100). 
My argument is directed more towards a healthy process of democratic 
deUberation than to any particular scorecard or end result. The processes of 
democratic deUberation and good governance have value in their own right, as 
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ends in themselves proving that a people have the capacity to carry on self-
government. AustraUa has a long history with much to teach the world about 
democratic governance. A century ago, the constimtional entrenchment of a 
popular referendum was a daring experiment based on an AustraUan beUef that 
popular government was as viable in practice as it was admirable in principle 
(consider Garran 1958, 187-97; Uhr 1999b, 187-90). Referendum history 
shows that the regulatory framework has lagged weU behind the capacity of the 
people to make a greater contribution to AustraUan self-government. A century 
ago, national referendums were the exception to the parUamentary rule. Over 
that cenmry, considerable progress has been made in giving greater voice to the 
people, so that we can expect that the new century wiU continue to widen the 
scope of popular participation in government. There is no better way of 
putting democratic theory into practice than by rewriting the rules for 
referendums. 

Chapter Fourteen 
Insights from the Experience of the 
Constitutional Centenary Foundation 
for a Future Republican Movement 
Cheryl Saunders 
The Constitutional Centenary Foundation was estabUshed in 1991 to encourage 
and inform debate on the AustraUan constitutional system over the decade 
leading to the centenary of the Constimtion in 1991. It was a private rather than 
a government initiative, prompted by the success of a deUberative conference 
held in 1991 to commemorate the centenary of the National Australasian 
Convention. The conference was noteworthy because it brought together a 
cUverse group of AustraUans to cUscuss constitutional matters in an atmosphere 
that encouraged frank exchange of views and fostered mumal understanding. 
Whatever the differences between the participants on substantive constitutional 
issues, they agreed that the coming decade offered an oppormnity to encourage 
public understanding of the Constitution and that, Uke the conference itself, 
this should be done in a non-partisan way. The final closing session of the 
conference persuaded AustraUan poUtical leaders of this view sufficiendy to 
ensure support for the Constitutional Centenary Foundation by all AustraUan 
governments for the rest of the decade. 
The Foundation had a fixed Ufe: for a period ending 30 December 2000. 
During these nine years, the board and councU of the Foundation, its 
secretariat, its members and supporters around the country engaged in what 
with hindsight was a large-scale pilot project. Its principal purpose was to 
identify ways of informing AustraUans about their own constitutional 
arrangements and of involving them in constitutional debate whUe maintaining 
the independence that was the Foundation's raison d'etre. In the last years of its 
existence, the Foundation prepared a final report on its experience, so that the 
benefit of its work would not be lost (Constimtional Centenary Foundation 
2000). 
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Consistentiy with the objectives of the Foundation, the focus of the repon 
is the manner in which knowledge and understanding of the constitutional 
system can be made available and presented as relevant to AustraUans. The 
report identifies four broad strategies for the purpose. The first and most 
obvious is the provision of sources of information about the Constitution on 
which people can draw. The information must meet the needs ot intended 
users, in both design and mode of deUvery. It should be of high quaUt}-, in 
terms both of accuracy and of insight, without being unduly legal, bureaucratic 
or academic. During the period of its operation, the Foundation produced a 
wide range of such information, including a series of fact sheets ccnering nine 
key constimtional issues and an Annotated AustraUan Constitution. In addition, 
the Foundation provided expert assistance and advice to other bodies 
publishing constimtional information. 
Secondly, specific efforts are needed to actively engage interest in the 
Constitution. Presenting information in accessible form is a prerequisite, but it 
is not sufficient. One mechanism that the Foundation found effective for the 
purpose was the deliberative conference or 'convention'. Conventions were 
designed to encourage participants to discuss constitutional issues and to come 
up with their own solutions. The format was adapted for use by schools, in an 
integrated series of regional, state and national conventions and by local 
communities, through the Local Constitutional Convention program. Typically 
con\-entions based on the Foundation's model had a diverse range of 
participants, user-friendly background documents, and procedures that assisted 
agreement on outcomes. 
An impcjrtant conclusion from the experience of the Foundation was the 
need to develop pubhc trust in constitutional debate. AustraUans tend to 
suspect that constitutional events are party-poUtical in character. Wariness is 
fueUed further by lack of understanding of constitutional issues. Overcoming 
these attimdes was one of the greatest chaUenges for the Foundation. In all its 
activities, the Foundation was at pains to dispel any suggestion of poUtical 
partisanship. Both the Commonwealth Attorney-General and the shadow 
Attorney-General were ex-officio members of the board. Wherever possible, 
the Foundation tried to involve both sides of poUtics, if poUticians were 
involved at aU. The balance is difficult to strike. PoUticians have an important 
perspective on constitutional issues; their views are influential; the 
responsibiUt}- for the initiation of referendums Ues with the Commonwealth 
ParUament. Alternatively, the perspective of serving politicians is in some 
respects self interested or, at least, perceived to be self interested, and their 
presence tends to inhibit debate. 
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The Foundation sought to reach as many people as possible without 
sensationaUsing the issues and without incurring substantial costs, which also 
are Ukely to be controversial. It was greatiy assisted by the mecUa in this regard, 
both national and regional. The mecUa provided good coverage of Foundation 
activities. EquaUy importantly, the Foundation offered reUable background 
briefings to assist media understanding of constitutional issues. The 
Foundation also distributed its materials through existing networks and other 
organisations inclucUng pubUc Ubraries, parUamentary education offices, local 
government and schools. 
The methods used by the Foundation to actively engage the pubUc gave it 
some insight into what AustraUans think about the Constimtion and the system 
of government. The National Forum that reviewed the coUated conclusions of 
the Local Constimtional Conventions also reached conclusions about the 
processes used in AustraUa for constitutional review and change, including the 
effectiveness of the 1998 Constitutional Convention. The Foundation's final 
report summarises these conclusions as weU. They do not represent a scientific 
sample and therefore should be used with care. Nevertheless, they draw on the 
views of a wider range of AustraUans than usually is heard in constimtional 
debate. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify aspects of the experience of the 
Constitutional Centenary Foundation that might be relevant to further 
consideration of estabUshment of an AustraUan repubUc. I suggest that the 
Foundation's experience may be useful on three matters in particular. First and 
most obviously, it can assist -with the process of helping the pubUc to 
understand the issues involved in a move to a repubUc and the effect of 
proposals for change. Secondly, it may throw Ught on the process for 
formulating an acceptable repubUcan model. Thirdly, the Foundation's insights 
into the views of AustraUans about the Constimtion, anecdotal although they 
are, may assist with the development of a repubUcan model itself 
Information and understanding 
PubUc acceptance of sigrUficant constimtional change is desirable in any 
democracy based acmaUy or even symboUcaUy on popular sovereignty. This 
may be one reason why many countries use the referendum for the purpose of 
constimtional change, even when they are not constimtionaUy required to do 
so. Use of the referendum for this purpose assumes that the pubUc understands 
the proposals on which they have the final say. In Australia, pubUc 
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understanding is particularly important because the referendum is mandatory 
for constitutional change. 
If consideration of a repubUc is to proceed in Australia, pubUc 
understanding is critical, in several different ways. First, in order to determine 
whether to support a move to a repubUc, AustraUans need to understand the 
present system and the general implications of the change proposed. This is no 
mean feat. The constitutional monarchy is the product of a long period of 
evolution in Britain, which left the institutions of Queen, government and 
Parliament outv\-ardh- untouched, by changing the balance of power between 
them through convention and practice. The process of evolution was well 
advanced when the Constitution was written. Even so, the Australian 
Constitution put in place the traditional forms, leaving the cjpcration of the 
s\stem in practice to conventions barely reflected in the constitutional text. The 
process of evolution continued during the course of the twentieth century. The 
constitutional conventions changed accc^rdingly, but not the Constimtion itself 
To compound the difficulty- of understanding the system, Australia achieved 
full independence from Britain after the Constitution came into effect, by a 
parallel process of evolution. One consequence was that the British 
government and ParUament lost any authority in relation to AustraUa. Another 
was that the respective roles of the monarch and her representatives in 
AustraUa changed. In effect, the monarch now does nothing except to appoint 
and, if asked, to cUsmiss her AustraUan representatives, on the advice of the 
relevant head of government. The Governor-General and the state Governors 
have become the de facto heads of state. This transition, also, occurred without 
change to the Constitution and without public consultation. 
There are two principal arguments for an AustraUan repubUc, narrowly 
conceived. The first is that the time has come to abandon the hereditary 
principle, so that significant public figures in AustraUa are chosen 
democraticaUy or on merit. The second is that a repubUc is needed to remove 
the formal remnants of colonial ties with Britain. Given the disjunction 
between form and practice in the AustraUan constimtional system, it is hard for 
an uninitiated member of the pubUc to evaluate either argument and easy for 
those who wish to do so to misrepresent them. This potential was most evident 
in the 1999 repubUcan round in the argument that AustraUa already had its own 
head of state, in the person of the Governor-General. To combat misleading 
assertions with truth is a complex task. To assist voters to make their decision 
on the merits, however, it is necessary for this to be done. 
Lack of understanding of the current constimtional system is compounded 
by several specific misunderstandings. For example, during the 1999 repubUcan 
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referendum, some voters apparently thought that one issue at stake in the move 
to a repubUc was AustraUan independence itself This perception is not 
necessarUy an advantage for the repubUcan cause; at least some of these voters 
also took the view that AustraUa is not yet ready for independence. Statements 
made to me in the course of CCF activities included the observation that 
'AustraUa is too young to go out on its own' and raised concerns whether 
'England will stiU help us with things Uke East Timor' if we were to become 
fuUy independent. 
A second misunderstancUng concerns the role of the Queen and/or the 
Governor-General and is more significant still. Some voters apparently beUeve 
that the present position of head of state in AustraUa has the capacit}' to keep 
elected representatives honest and to restrain abuse of power, including the 
enactment of legislation that infringes human rights. This presents a further 
impediment to the very decision to move to a repubUc, to the extent that the 
'monarch herself is perceived to have such a role. In any event, it compUcates 
the model for a repubUc, if codification of the powers of the head of state is 
required. For these voters, the famiUar rhetoric that AustraUa is prepared to rely 
on parUaments and the common law to protect their rights, rather than on 
constimtional guarantees, is clearly inaccurate. In the absence of a specific 
constitutional safeguard, some voters put their faith in the Queen and her 
representatives, despite the lack of any evidence in support. 
It is impossible to know how widespread these misunderstancUngs are. The 
Foundation encountered them often enough to suggest that they might be 
more pervasive than we Uke to think, or hope. ObUque support for this gloomy 
cUagnosis may be provided by the confusion evident in a series of cases that 
emerged in the AustraUan court system over the same period. Each case was 
designed to persuade a ccjurt that the AustraUan Constitution and the laws 
made pursuant to it are invaUd. One recurring argument referred to a 'break in 
sovereignty' that is aUeged to have occurred when AustraUa acquired 
independence, shifting the underlying authorit}' for the Constitution from the 
ParUament of the United Kingdom to the AustraUan people themselves. A 
second argument refers to the change in the legal person of the monarch, from 
the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland to which the Constitution refers, to the 
Queen of AustraUa, who now assents to AustraUan legislation, through her 
representatives. In Joosse v AustraUan Securities (& Investments Commission (1998) 
(1590ALR260) the High Court rejected all aspects of the chaUenge, which 
nevertheless continued to be made in subsequent cases, in the High Court and 
elsewhere. Extraordinary though the arguments are, the fact that they have 
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been taken seriously by some people over an extended period of time says 
something about the clarity- of AustraUa's constitutional arrangements. 
PubUc information in connection with an AustraUan repubUc needs to 
explain the main elements of the proposed alternative, as well as the existing 
arrangements. Even on minimaUst assumptions, the information wiU need to 
cover procedures for appointment and dismissal of the head of state, the 
powers that the head of state would have and the manner in which the powers 
can be exercised. Even after the initial information has been distributed, it will 
be necessary to provide ongoing information resources to help voters to 
evaluate issues that subsequently arise in pubUc debate. The point is 
demonstrated by the experience of the 1999 referendum campaign, during 
which a range of unexpected objections to the referendum proposal were 
raised. One, made repeatedly on talkback radio, was that if AustraUa became a 
repubUc, all Crown land would be distributed to Indigenous people. Another 
was that AustraUans who had served in the armed forces would be cUsquaUfied 
from standing for President on the ground that they held a 'pension payable at 
the pleasure of the Crown'. 
It foUows that, if there is to be further consideration of a repubUc, there 
should be at least three elements of the information campaign. The first should 
explain the current arrangements and the imphcations of the move to a 
republic. The second should explain the proposed alternative. The third should 
be designed to deal with queries that arise during the campaign, before the vote 
takes place. 
Some specific guidance on each of these may be drawn from the experience 
of the Foundation. Firstiy, the information must be tailored to the needs of the 
voters, in recognition of their right to understand the proposal on which they 
are required to vote. This would be a major shift in AustraUan practice. So far, 
it has been based on the assumption that fairness in a system of pubUc 
information for the purpose of constimtional change involves equal treatment 
of both sides of the argument. This approach is not necessarUy fair to voters, 
however. It does nothing to assist them and actively confuses them if the 
protagonists mount arguments that are extreme or incorrect. 
Secondly, a pubUc information campaign should be flexible enough to suit 
the information needs of different voters. The Foundation learnt this the hard 
way, during preparation of its own information for the 1999 referendum. The 
first draft of the referendum broadsheet was written clearly and simply. It used 
graphics and was weU designed. It included material that the Foundation 
thought was relevant, inclucUng an explanation of what a referendum is and of 
how the referendum process works. The Foundation tested the draft on a 
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group of young AustraUans at the YWCA. They rejected it out of hand, in 
favour of information that stated briefly, cUrectiy and at the beginning of the 
broadsheet what the principal elements of the proposal were and how it 
differed from the present system. The Foundation revised the broadsheet 
accorcUngly and tested it again, this time with a group of AustraUans in Sydney, 
from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. They suggested the need for another 
section, also at the beginning, to explain why the referendum was important 
and worth spending time to understand. In another repubUcan round, with an 
effective information strategy, this process should be repeated with a wider 
variety of groups. 
ThircUy, people must be able to trust the information that is prepared and 
disseminated, in terms both of impartiaUty and of quaUty. This is not 
necessarUy achieved by putting the protagonists on the body responsible for the 
information campaign. On the contrary, it is preferable to involve people who 
are respected for their knowledge, integrity and pubUc commitment, and who 
have no particular stake in the outcome. In New Zealand, the panel that 
prepared the pubUc information for the plebiscites on the electoral system was 
headed by the Ombudsman, who in New Zealand is a highly respected, 
apoUtical figure. Members of the panel need not be la-wyers, although they 
should have high quaUty legal and constimtional expertise available to them, to 
ensure that the pubUc can rely on the accuracy of the information cUstributed 
to them. 
Fourthly, the pre-referendum period should not be rushed. People take time 
to absorb information. They are entitied to have an oppormnity to think about 
it, to cUscuss it with others, to ask questions. In terms of the categories of 
information identified earUer, basic information about the current system 
should be prepared and cUstributed as soon as possible. Information about the 
principal options and a preferred model (if any) should be cUstributed as detaUs 
of the proposal become available. Plenty of time should be aUowed between 
that release and the referendum itself During this period there should be a 
mechanism for answering questions authoritatively and for making the answers 
as widely avaUable as possible. Mechanisms for the latter include a question and 
answer booklet and the internet. 
Fifthly, whUe the state itself should take central responsibiUty for informing 
voters about proposed changes to the Constimtion, the auspices under which 
the debate is conducted can and should be more cUverse. AustraUans do not 
necessarUy want to engage in activities that have an exclusively constimtional 
focus, but may be wilUng to tackle constimtional issues in a context that is 
famiUar, with others with whom they have discussed other matters of 
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importance. In the Foundation's experience, there are a range of groups wilUng 
to host discussions for this purpose, including service clubs, Provis clubs, 
business groups, teachers' associations and rural organisations. 
I-inally, there is a question about the nature of the official infijtmation 
distributed at the time of the referendum. The "i'es/No cases have been 
discredited in their current form, by their irrelevance to the infi)rmation needs 
of the pubhc. IdeaUy, the principles identified earUer for the provision of public 
information in the lead-up to the referendum, should be followed for the 
referendum itself 
Formulating the republican model 
The scheme for alteration of the AustraUan Constitution involves the initiation 
of proposals for change by the ParUament and gives voters the essentially 
passive role of approving or refusing to approve them. In some respects it is 
remarkable that a country as imbued with the culture of responsible 
government as AustraUa chose to adopt even the passive referendum at the end 
of the nineteenth century. The explanation lies principally in the fact that 
AustraUans had almost no choice, given the requirement for approval of the 
initial Constitution by voters in each of the six colonies. In addition, the 
convention debates suggest that some of the framers at least were driven h)-
what they perceived as the more democratic spirit of direct popular 
involvement in constimtional change. 
Nevertheless, they anticipated some problems. In particular, some concern 
was expressed that voters would not understand the proposals on which thev 
were required to vote. For some of the framers, at least, the solution lay in the 
debate on the biU in parUament during which its purpose, effect, advantages and 
disadvantages would, it was hoped, be examined. No one foresaw that an even 
more significant problem would be disjunction between the views of the 
parUament and the voters about proposals for change, leading to a substantial 
record of rejection at referendum and a defeatist attitude towards further 
attempts. With hindsight, however, the danger was obvious. In an adversarial 
parUamentary poUtical culture, it is predictable that constitution alteration bills, 
Uke all cjther legislation, wiU be used by governments to advance their own 
agenda, leading to an equally predictable opposition response. It is inevitable 
also that in such circumstances voters, given the chance, often will register a 
protest irrespective of the merits of a measure. 
There are several ways of responding to this difficulty. One, widely and 
probably wrongi}- assumed to be a panacea, is to secure bipartisanship on 
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proposals for constimtional change. A second is to provide an alternative 
mechanism for the initiation of proposals for change, using competition to 
encourage a broader approach by the Commonwealth ParUament itself A third 
is to attempt to ensure from the outset that proposals wUl appeal to voters. One 
way of doing this is to involve voters in the formulation of proposals. While 
this is difficult, it provides a form of active engagement that the Foundation's 
experience suggests can bring substantial rewards. 
In a sense, the partiy elected Constitutional Convention that met in 1998 to 
design the repubUcan model was a form of active engagement. The 
Convention gave AustraUans an oppormnit}' to participate in the formulation 
of the repubUcan model, by voting for delegates to represent them. The test of 
the Convention's success was whether it could produce a model that was 
acceptable to those prepared to support a repubUc, either because it suited their 
own preferences or because they accepted that the process was fair. There were 
various reasons why this did not happen. The speed of the Convention process 
cUd not aUow a sense of ownership to develop. There was insufficient 
oppormnity for reflection and consultation between delegates and the pubUc, 
compounding the problem of making the representative principle work in such 
circumstances. There were too many appointed delegates. Not only was an 
OpporturUty wasted, but two new difficulties were thus placed in the way of a 
further repubUcan round. Firstly, voters were sensitised to the relevance of the 
repubUcan model and more Ukely to be suspicious of it. Secondly, the effective 
faUure of the Convention makes it more cUfficult to use again one of the 
principal mechanisms for securing early voter involvement, which also had 
resonance with AustraUa's constimtional tracUtions. 
The experience of the Constitutional Centenary Foundation offers less 
insight into this problem because it did not seek to promote particular projects 
for constimtional change. Nevertheless, the Foundation's emphasis on active 
involvement as a way of encouraging interest in the Constimtion has some 
relevance to the question of the process that might be foUowed in relation to a 
new repubUcan round. 
Direct popular involvement is not necessary to a successful outcome if 
those who develop the proposal for change have the requisite leadership 
quaUties. The first option therefore presupposes the emergence of a leader who 
is visionary in the design of the repubUcan model, who responds appropriately 
to popular opinion and whose judgment voters are prepared to trust. It is 
possible that such a person could pick the popular mood, design an acceptable 
repubUcan model, negotiate support from other parUamentary parties and 
succeed at referendum. Given the genuine cUvisions in the community between 
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direct election of a head of state and some other fi)rm of selection, this inay 
be unUkely, however. Alternativeh-, a poUtical leader of this kind might develop 
several models and release them for pubUc consideration, through an open 
deliberative process, before making a final decision on the one to be put to the 
vote. In either case, information resources of the kind described earlier w-ould 
be needed. 
A second option for try-ing to ensure that the repubUcan model takes 
account of \-oter preferences would be to provide an opportunity for the votets 
themselves to choose between different repubUcan models. Typically, this could 
be done through a plebiscite, although less formal mechanisms for determining 
public views could be devised as well. Prime Minister Keating suggested a 
version of this option at the beginning of the first repubUcan round. His 
prcjposal involved asking voters whether they wished to move to a republic 
before appointing a parUamentary committee to develop the model. New 
Zealand experience offers a precedent of a different kind. New Zealand gave 
voters the opportunity' to choose between models, in a two-stage plebiscite 
prcjcess that resulted in sweeping changes to its electoral system. More recently 
the Australian Labor Part}' undertook to use a plebiscite to test pubUc opinion 
on the appropriate republican model if it were returned to government. 
Several questions arise. One is whether it is still useful to ask the AustraUan 
electorate whether it wants to become a repubUc, in isolation from suggestions 
about the model, given the sensitivities of voters to the detail of the model 
following the last failed repubUcan round. There are the usual questions about 
how to avoid the manipulation of plebiscite results by strategic voting and 
whether voting should be compulsory. A further issue, to which the 
Foundation's experience has more appUcation, concerns the way in which 
models are developed for the purpose of a plebiscite. 
The New Zealand plebiscites rehed on options adapted from the 
recommendations of a highly respected Royal Commission on Electoral 
Refcjrm. AustraUa has had no such process and would need to develop another 
mechanism to settle the models. Extrapolating from the Foundation's 
experience, the chaUenges are simUar to those explored earUer in relation to the 
provision of pubUc information. It is necessary to identify a process that people 
can trust, that will honestly identif}' the range of reasonable options and that is 
capable of presenting them in accessible form. 
A third option for matching a referendum proposal to the views of voters 
would involve another Convention. NecessarUy, this option must be developed 
with the experience of the 1998 Convention in mind. The National Forum of 
Local Constitutional Conventions identified one problem with the repubUcan 
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convention as the lack of capacity to adequately represent the views of 
AustraUans. The cUfficult}' lay both in the initial process of election and in the 
manner in which Convention decisions were made and settled. The National 
Forum suggested as a solution that another Constitutional Convention should 
be preceded by a series of local conventions around the countr\-. This would be 
cumbersome, however, and require a substantial infrastructure. A process of 
this kind might be justified for a new Constitution. It seems over-elaborate for 
the relatively confined issue of estabUshing a repubUc. 
It may nevertheless be possible to structure a National Convention to avoid 
some of the difficulties of 1998. On the one hand, voters must accept it as 
adequately representative. On the other, delegates should retain enough of the 
flexibiUty to negotiate, which is one advantage of a Convention over a 
plebiscite. At the very least, the election process should be less rushed and the 
Convention should adjourn to provide an opportunit}' for pubUc debate on its 
interim conclusions. This is one aspect of the proceedings of the Convention 
of 1897-98, from which contemporary Australians could learn. 
Two further general observations about process are relevant for any options 
that seek directiy to test the views of voters. The first also is drawn from the 
experience of framing the initial Constitution. The entire process should be laid 
down from the beginning, preferably in statutory form, to make it clear to 
people that their involvement has a purpose, as weU as to assist lo avoid 
subsequent manipulation. Secondly, unnecessary cost should be avoided. Any 
constimtional process costs money and the expencUture can be justified by 
reference to the national significance of the issue. Nevertheless, AustraUans are 
sensitive about the use of pubUc funds and the issue can easUy be exploited. 
Costs can be minimised by, for example, timing election of Convention 
delegates or a plebiscite to coincide with a national election. 
Substance 
FinaUy, the Foundation's insights into the views of voters about the 
Constitution itself may assist in the design of a repubUcan model. Some of the 
views expressed to the Foundation affect the Constitution as a whole. There 
was a widespread view that the Constitution should be relevant and clearly 
expressed and that it should reflect more accurately the way in which AustraUa 
is governed. The Foundation encountered no support for retaindng the casing 
of the British Act in which the Constitution presently is found. Not 
surprisingly, it found broad acceptance of the need for the Constitution to say 
that AustraUan government draws its legitimacy from acceptance by the people. 
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In addiuon, there was perhaps predictable support for greater accountabiUty of 
parliaments to people, effective checks and balances and a federal system that 
deUvers the local responsiveness for which it is designed. 
More revealing for present purposes were the views expressed about the 
head of state and particular proposals for change. The Local Constitutional 
Conventions generally advocated a head of state who was above poUtics. They 
accepted the nouon of the Governor-General as a guardian of the Constitution 
and sought a repubUcan head of state who would perform a similar role. As a 
generaUsation, they were not averse to the dismissal of a Prime Minister who 
was unable to obtain supply or, for that matter, who acted illegally. Consistentiy 
with this picture, the Local Conventions that considered the issue of a republic 
tended not to support a cUrectiy elected President. It is not clear why this was 
so, given the level of support for direct election in the poUs at the time. The 
explanation may Ue in the fact that participants in this process had the 
opportunity- to reflect on the confUct between direct election and their 
aspirations for a non-poUtical president 
On the other hand, most of the Local Conventions wanted a process for 
selection of a repubUcan head of state that involved the people cUrectiy in some 
way. For this reason, many identified a consultative procedure for appointment 
that was similar in essential respects to the one unsuccessfully put to 
referendum in 1999. There was no support for the mode of cUsmissal proposed 
in 1999. Almost aU delegates were puzzled by the notion that the states might 
retain their Unks with the Crown, even if a national referendum succeeded. 
These findings would seem to have the following impUcations for a fumre 
republican model. The first concerns the approach characterised in the 
repubhcan debate during the decade of the 1990s as minimaUsm. MinimaUsm 
involves creating a repubUc by changing as Uttie as possible of current 
constitutional arrangements. The underlying assumptions of this approach are 
that voters are basicaUy satisfied with the current system and that broader 
proposals for change should be resisted, if only because they court unnecessary 
opposition. It may be accepted that the repubUcan model should not be 
widened to absorb unrelated proposals including, probably, constimtional 
protection of rights. On the other hand, at least in the Foundation's experience, 
AustraUans are not necessarily opposed to wider change. There is no reason to 
cUstort an otherwise satisfactory and forward-looking model in the interests of 
preserving the status quo. 
Secondly, there appears genuinely to be divided opinion between cUrect 
election of a president and another mode of choice that would allow pubUc 
opinion to have some influence. TypicaUy, the latter suggests a form of 
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selection by a special parUamentary majority, with an oppormnity for pubUc 
involvement in nominations through a process perceived to be less open to 
Prime Ministerial influence than that of 1999. If the process for the next round 
of the repubUcan debate aUows for a period of pubUc deUberation on 
alternative models or an incUcative choice at plebiscite, these are the two 
options that need to be fuUy developed and clearly explained. 
A third model also has been discussed in the debate so far. It was initiaUy 
advanced by former Victorian Governor Richard McGarvie. It would retain the 
present system, apart from substimting three former Vice Regal representatives 
or presidents as a councU to appoint and remove a President on the advice of 
die Prime MirUster. There is a question whether this model should also be 
developed for pubUc consideration. The answer may be yes, because of the 
attention it has attracted in eUte, inclucUng leading poUtical, circles. On the other 
hand, it does not appear to respond to pubUc preferences at aU. The McGarvie 
proposal is even more qtUntessentially a poUticians' repubUc than the 1999 
model. Support for it could be portrayed as self-serving on the part of Prime 
Mirusters or prospective Prime Ministers, whose power it essentiaUy preserves. 
The model itself would have the effect of preserving monarchical forms, albeit 
severing the Unk with the estabUshed monarchy. 
On present indications, only the first two models are Ukely to have popular 
appeal. Both make it desirable and perhaps even necessary to articulate the 
powers of the head of state and the manner of their exercise. A statement of 
the powers of the head of state also would bring the text of the Constimtion 
more closely into Une with the system of government as it acmaUy works. If the 
powers of the head of state are set out in the Constimtion, it wUl be necessary 
to decide whether the President should have the power to cUsmiss a Prime 
Minister. The difficulties of resolving this cUvisive issue are obvious. It may be 
possible to mirumise some of the angst by looking to the fumre rather than the 
past, so that the decision does not involve a judgment about the actions of 
1975. As far as the choice itself is concerned, however, the Foundation's 
experience suggests that AustraUans may favour giving the head of state a 
power to cUsmiss, at least in some circumstances. If power to cUsmiss is 
accepted, there is a further question: whether it should be balanced by the 
removal of the power of the Senate over supply, or whether that is too 
controversial an extension of the repubUcan issue. 
In any event, the model would need to incorporate mechanisms to ensure 
the accountabiUty of the president for the exercise of any discretionary powers. 
The 1999 proposal sought to ensure accountabiUty through deterrence, by 
enabUng the Prime Minister, in effect, to cUsmiss a President at wiU. This 
214 (. -beryl Saunders 
approach was not acceptable then and would be unUkely to be acceptable in the 
future. Alternative, more subtie, options to secure presidential accountability 
include judicial review; the use of alternative sources of advice where a 
President is exercising a power against a Prime Minister with the confidence of 
the lower house; and automatic termination of the term of the President if a 
dismissed Prime Ahnister wins an ensuing election. 
Finally, fumre repubUcan models should have symbolic features, befitting an 
important national moment. Two stand out. Firstiy, the AustraUan Constitution 
should be estabUshed as an instrument for AustraUan government in its own 
right, independent of its British origins. Secondly, the formal abandonment of 
the sovereignty of the monarch should be recognised by expUcitiy 
acknowledging the sovereignty of the AustraUan people. These and other 
changes might weU help to estabUsh a 'wattle repubUc' that encourages unit}', 
pride and hope for the future amongst aU the people of AustraUa. 
Conclusion 
The experience of the Constimtional Centenary Foundation, coupled with 
insights into the history of AustraUan constitutional change, suggests the 
following broad guideUnes for the next round of the repubUcan debate in 
AustraUa. Creation of a repubUc should be an occasion to present the 
AustraUan Constitution as a symbol of independent AustraUa, proud of its 
egaUtarian, democratic traditions, with a government that expUcitiy draws its 
authoritv' from the people themselves. The outcome of Foundation events 
suggest that key elements in a repubUcan model should be choice by the people 
or by ParUament following popular consultation. The Umited powers of the 
head of state should be set out in the Constitution. Serious consideration 
should be given to including a power for the head of state to dismiss a Prime 
Minister, in specified circumstances. 
Given the long history of the matter, a far-sighted and respected leader 
probably could achieve the transition through a successful referendum without 
complex interim stages. This would involve development of several alternative 
models, honestiy devised, a period during which they are exposed for pubUc 
consideration and discussion, and a final choice for reasons that are explained 
openly and honestly. 
The alternative is to have an interim phase in which the models are 
developed and the pubUc is given an oppormnity to express a choice, both to 
identify its preferences and to develop a sense of ownership of the repubUc. 
Because of the importance of trust in the process of ccjnstimtional change, it 
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would be desirable for these options to be developed by a group highly 
regarded by AustraUans, without interests of their own in the outcome. An 
appropriate leader of such a group, for example, would be Sir WilUam Deane, 
if he could be persuaded to act. Mechanisms for the expression of voter choice 
include a plebiscite or a constimtional convention. Whichever is adopted, the 
plan of action should be clear from the outset, open, free from manipulation 
and prescribed by law. 
Finally, the entire process must be backed by a communication strategy 
designed to serve the information needs of the people, to assist them in 
understancUng the proposals and in making their decisions accordingly. The 
strategy should provide information about the existing system as weU as about 
the proposals for change. It should respond to the ways in which cUfferent 
groups of voters absorb information. Inevitably, it should take a range of 
formats and, where possible, provide for active engagement. It should be 
organised in a way that attracts community respect and should not be rushed. 
It should provide a faciUty by which questions can be authoritatively answered, 
to deal with the host of unexpected queries that inevitably wiU arise. 

Chapter Fifteen 
Rethinking the Republic 
Frank Brennan 
Where do we go now with the repubUc debate? There are four possibiUties. 
Firstiy, John Howard may be right; he may have won one of the great poUtical 
gambles. AustraUa wiU keep the monarchy for generations to come, there now 
being no prospect of any repubUcan model winning a majority thanks to the 
cooperative efforts of Kerry Jones, Ted Mack and PhU Cleary during the 1999 
referendum campaign. Secondly, everyone puts the debate to bed for a 
generation and dusts off the Turnbull model for recycUng at a future time. 
Thirdly, the poUticians decide to run with the Richard McGarvie minimaUst 
model in the hope of winning a majority coaUtion of those who accept the 
inevitabiUty of a repubUc but who want absolutely minimaUst change to the 
existing arrangements. Finally, the repubUcans take seriously the pubUc 
sentiment for direct election and start the hard work on reshaping a 
Constimtion with the unique AustraUan combination of an upper house having 
the power to reject supply together with a popularly elected President. 
If option one, two or three is adopted, there is not much further thinking 
to be done. It wiU be aU a question of timing and fine mning. Option four 
requires a lot of fundamental constitutional thinking and poUtical spade work 
if it be the only viable option for AustraUa's transition to a repubUc. Now is the 
time to plant the seeds, if only to estabUsh that any attempt wiU encounter very 
rocky ground in the AustraUan constimtional garden. 
The 1999 referendum result showed that we are a nation of diverse 
groupings: monarchists, those who favour the status quo simply because 'if it 
ain't broke, don't fix it', and repubUcans of aU shapes and sizes. The repubUcans 
cover a spectrum of views but can be placed in three camps: McGarvie 
minimaUsts, TurnbuU pragmatists and Cleary/Mack direct electionists. There is 
no shortcut to a repubUcan consensus. The received wisdom prior to the 1999 
referendum was that it was not possible, poUticaUy or constimtionaUy, to graft 
an elected presidency on to the existing AustraUan system of government. The 
TurnbuU model with the resultant beUs and whistles added bv the 1998 
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Constitutional Convention was a compromise between involving the public in 
the mode of selection and maintaining the existing power relations between 
Prime Minister and Governor-General. This compromise feU between t^ vo 
stools; it appealed neither to the cUrect electionists Uke Mack and Cleary nor to 
the minimal repubUcans Uke McGarvie. The AustraUans for Constimtional 
.Monarchy (ACM) succeeded by following the advice of Malcolm Mackerras, 
hancUng their trump cards to Howard 'because he, as Prime Minister, would be 
in the best position to play the cards'. 
There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority- of AustraUans want 
to sever aU Unks with the British crown. In that sense, we are a nation of 
republicans. Only- 9 percent of those intending to vote No at last November's 
poll said the\- liked having the Queen as our head of state when they were 
polled by AC Nielsen. 70 per cent of AustraUans want us to be a republic. At 
the 1998 Constitutional Convention, 89 delegates voted 'That this Convention 
supports, in principle, AustraUa becoming a repubUc'. Only 52 delegates were 
opposed with 11 abstentions, which included repubUcans such as Richard 
McGarvie and Greg Craven. 
In 1996, there were suggestions that there should first be a plebiscite of the 
people: 'Should all references to the Queen be deleted from the AustraUan 
Constitution by 2001?' The Howard Government had no interest in conducting 
such a plebiscite. The Constimtional Convention proceeded in February 1998 
and attempted to wrap together the plebiscite question and a preferred model, 
forging a No coaUtion of monarchists and radical repubUcans. Only 73 of the 
delegates supported 'the adoption of a repubUcan system of government on 
the bipartisan appointment of the President model in preference to there being 
no change to the Constimtion'. A majority of the delegates were opposed or 
abstained (57 opposed, 22 abstained). 
It was only in the closing days of the 1999 referendum campaign that, for 
the first time, Howard gave a pubUc explanation why he was opposed to a 
plebiscite. He thought it could have left the country 'in a constimtional no-
man's land'. More significantiy, monarchists Uke Howard and Nick Minchin 
knew that any plebiscite would favour the repubUcans in builcUng a momenmm 
for change. Whereas any particular model of repubUc put cold to the people at 
referendum would be unUkely to gain acceptance. The opponents would always 
be a combination of monarchists, advocates of the status quo and those 
repubUcans whose model was not on offer. 
The RepubUc Advisory Committee chaired by Malcolm TurnbuU in 1993, 
which investigated repubUc options for the Keating Government, the 
AustraUan RepubUcan Movement, and the 1998 Constimtional Convention, 
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had good reasons for rejecting a cUrectiy elected President. They thought it 
could not be grafted onto the existing constitutional arrangements. Despite 
this, the pubUc remains unconvinced. The International Social Science 
Surveys/AustraUa (IsssA) has charted AustraUan repubUc sentiment for the last 
twenty years. Since 1996, support for a repubUc has run at 66 percent. The 
Survey calculates that a direct election presidency 'would have won handily in 
AustraUa as a whole' in November 1999 with 55 percent in favour of that 
model. 
There are many voters who say they do not understand much about the 
complex provisions of the Constimtion; they do not trust poUticians, and 'If 
there is going to be a president, we should have some say in choosing that 
person who wiU represent us as the head of state'. After aU, in countries such 
as Ireland, there is an elected President and there are no constimtional 
problems. This may be true, but in Ireland the upper house cannot reject or 
block supply. In Ireland, the President has recourse to a Council of State for 
seeking advice, and there is no prospect of a John Kerr sacking a Gough 
Whitiam as occurred in 1975. 
We need to revisit 1975 and see if changes can be made to the AustraUan 
constimtional arrangements so that we could safely advocate a cUrectiy elected 
president. One theoretical option would be to take away the Senate's power to 
block supply, making the Senate in that regard more Uke the House of Lords 
and the Irish upper house. Can you imagine trying to run a referendum 
campaign on the need to take away the Senate's power? It would be mrned into 
a referendum about the propriet}' of Kerr's and Malcolm Fraser's actions in 
1975. Advocates of the rights of the States would run rampant, exclaiming 
'how dare you attempt to wind back the powers of the states' house'. At the 
1976 Constimtional Convention, Whitiam cUd propose that the Constimtion be 
amended so as to remove the power of the Senate to 'reject, defer, or in any 
other manner block the passage of laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or 
imposing taxation'. 
It was no surprise that Sir Charles Court, Premier of Western AustraUa, 
countered on behalf of the non-Labor parties and the minor states proposing 
a constimtional amendment provicUng that a faUure by the Senate to pass a 
supply biU within 30 days would be the equivalent of a rejection and the 
Governor-General would be required automaticaUy to cUssolve both Houses. 
After the election, the House of Representatives would then be able to deUver 
supply to the government regardless of the Senate's composition and 
disposition. The debate went nowhere. Douglas Lowe from Tasmania 
succeeded by 46 votes to 45 in having both motions sideUned and sent to 
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committee. Observing 'that to adopt either ... would be meaningless because it 
has been prcwen that where there are deep shades of division within the nvo 
pnncipal poUtical parties ... there is no chance of getting the numbers through 
that is required by the Const i tut ion ' (Proceedings of the Australian 
Constitutional Convention 1976, 113). Both sides were intractable and could be 
expected to remain so. 
The only practical option is to refine the constitutional arrangements, 
smoothing out some of the difficulties and inconsistencies highlighted in 1975 
while leaving intact the Senate's constitutional power. Whatever the mode of 
election and whatever the powers granted the President, it would be essential 
to assure electors that the model on offer would not cause greater instability 
and uncertaint}', were the events of 1975 to recur. 
If the President is directly elected by the people, there has to be some 
symmetry between the mode of appointment and the mode of dismissal. ,\ 
directiy elected President could be removable only for proven misbehaviour or 
incapacity estabUshed either before a court or determined by impeachment 
proceedings involving both houses of ParUament. Given the mix of politics 
and law in any decision to sack a head of state, it makes sense to vest the power 
of termination in the ParUament with each house being required to pla\' a role 
in the impeachment process. One consequence of this constitutional symmetry 
would be that an elected Kerr in a re-run of 1975 would be guaranteed absolute 
security- of tenure throughout the crisis. There is no way that the Senate would 
vote to sack him. He would be in a stronger position against the Prime Minister 
than if the Prime Minister were stiU able to contact the Palace and order 
cUsmissal. 
Given the increased security of the President, there is a need for better 
safeguards to avoid the questionable practices of Kerr in 1975 or to render 
those practices beyond reproach. Three matters would need reform before 
there could be consideration of a directiy elected President. In 1975, Kerr 
consulted the Chief Justice despite the Prime Minister's expressed desire that 
he not do so. He cUsmissed the Prime Minister without notice, having 
previously made the Leader of the Opposition more aware of his intended 
course of action than the Prime MirUster. He decided to grant a double 
cUssolution of the ParUament on the advice of the new Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Fraser, who had no intention of proceeding with the Whitiam biUs, 
which had been blocked by the Senate. These 21 bUls related to issues such as 
health levies and state electoral redistributions to which the CoaUtion parties 
were opposed. 
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Paul KeUy revisited the 1975 crisis in his 1995 book November 1975: The Inside 
Story of AustraUa's Greatest PoUtical Crisis. He concluded that, '[g]iven the 
magnimde of the decision Kerr had reached — resort to the reserve powers to 
cUsmiss the Prime Minister — there can be no decisive argument against his 
consultation with the supreme judicial figure. In such an extreme circumstance 
the Crown must possess a right to such consultation' (Kelly 1995, 229). On the 
death of Sir Garfield Barwick, the then Chief Justice, Sir Gerard Brennan, 
observed that: 
P]t seems that the most newsworthy event in his varied career was the tendering of 
advice to Sir John Kerr in November 1975, a course for which he could find 
precedent in the tendering of advice by some of his predecessors in office. It was, 
and remains, a controversial matter but, if only on that account, wiU not happen 
again. It can now be seen as a subject of academic interest, not the defining event 
in a Ufe of other achievement (2001, 187 CLR vUi). 
If the reserve powers (including the power to dismiss a Prime Minister and 
commission a new one, and of necessity without the advice and the consent of 
any Minister) are to be retained without being codified, the President needs to 
be able to consult with advisers who are not serving High Court judges. In 
1994, I suggested that there must be 'a Council to provide advice to the Head 
of State if and when it was sought with the approval of the Prime Minister. 
Such a CouncU of eminent persons could include retired prime ministers, chief 
justices and representatives of incUgenous people. The councU might also play 
a role in nominating the Head of State' (Brennan 1994a; see also Brennan 
1994b). 
More recently, McGarvie has suggested a three member Constimtional 
CouncU, which would perform the tasks presentiy performed by the Queen. 
His Council would not give advice; it would receive advice when acting as the 
post box for appointment and dismissal of the head of state. The CouncU 
would simply appoint or dismiss the head of state on the Prime Minister's 
advice (McGarvie 1999a, 217-19). He favours the appointment of retired 
Governors-General, state Governors, state Lieutenant Governors and then 
judges, with a guarantee that at least one member be a woman. I favour a larger 
CouncU of Advisers (say seven) consisting of those persons wilUng and able 
who have held the office of President, Prime Minister, Chief Justice or 
SoUcitor-General provided any such person is no longer a member of 
ParUament, a judge or a member of a poUtical party and provided any such 
person has not attained the age of 75 years. 
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The two most unsatisfactory aspects of Kerr's actions in 1975 were the 
privileged access Fraser had to Kerr's thinking while Whitiam \\-as still Ptime 
Minister, and Kerr's pre-emptive decision to act before supply ran out. Kerr 
claimed he needed to keep Whitiam in the dark for fear that the Palace would 
become involved with Whitiam providing advice to the Queen for the 
termination of Kerr's commission. That would not be a fear with an elected 
presidency subject to removal only by impeachment. The perception of 
subterfuge could be overcome if the Constitution provided, 'The President 
may exercise a power that was a reserve power of the Governor-General in 
accordance with the constitutional conventions relating to the exercise of that 
power, provided the President first publishes a proclamation of intention to 
exercise such a power after a period of at least two days'. This way there would 
be no risk of a Prime Minister being ambushed and reduced risk that the leadet 
of the opposition would be better informed than the Prime Minister. 
Kerr's poUtical strategy was posited cjn finding what he described as 'a 
democratic and constitutional solution to the current crisis which wiU permit 
the people of AustraUa to decide as soon as possible what should be the 
ciutcome of the deadlock which developed over supply between the nvo 
Houses ' (Kerr 1995, 346). He could always dissolve the House of 
Representatives on advice from a wUUng Prime Minister. The Senate was a 
different matter. Senators are elected for fixed six year terms. The regular 
election for half the Senators can be held up to a year before the Senators' 
terms expire. The Senate can be dissolved only under the double dissolution 
procedure. y\ double dissolution cannot occur within six months of the 
scheduled dissolution of the House of Representatives. It can occur only if the 
House of Representatives has twice presented legislation to the Senate which 
has then twice faUed to pass i t 
Should a repeat 1975 crisis be assured adequate resolution under option 
four, there will still be the problems stated by the 1993 RepubUc Advisory 
Committee: 
While the option of popular election of the head of state is one which appears to 
have significant pubUc support, it should be recognised that it would be expensive 
(particularly if held separately from a parUamentary election), would almost 
certainly involve poUtical parties in the endorsement of candidates, and by its nature 
could discourage suitable candidates from standing. Moreover, the process of 
popular election may encourage the head of state to beUeve that he or she has a 
popular mandate to exercise the powers of that office, including the ability to make 
pubUc statements and speeches, in a manner which could bring the head of state 
into confUct with the elected Government (RepubUc Advisory Committee 1993,4). 
Rethinking the Republic 223 
If the head of state is to be democratically- elected, there wUl be a need to 
redraw the pubhc understanding of the different roles of Prime Minister and 
President. Being elected by aU AustraUans and not just the electors of 
Bennelong, an elected Deane would be seen as having democratic legitimacy, 
especiaUy on issues where there was a difference of perspective from the Prime 
MirUster. This legitimacy would be emphasised by Howard critics, Deane 
supporters and media outiets. Even an elected President who has run the 
gauntiet of party preselection would be expected to be head of state for all 
AustraUans. 
In the lead-up to the 1999 referendum. Sir Zelman Cowen, who had been 
Governor-General after Kerr and who rightiy enjoys the reputation for having 
healed many of the wounds on the body poUtic foUowing the events of 11 
November 1975, joined with ex-Chief Justices Mascjn and Brennan to say that: 
It is a central aspect of the office of president that he or she should always be 
concerned to promote the unity of the nation. He or she is Head of State, and not 
of government. He or she should possess the capacip', intuition and skiUs to 
promote the unit^' of the nation. By speech, conduct and example, the president can 
help to interpret the nation to itself, and foster that spirit of unity and pride in the 
country which is central to the well being of our democratic society- (Cowen, Mason 
and Brennan 1999b). 
They doubted that this role could be performed by someone coming to office 
through the machinations of party politics, fund-raising, and election 
campaigns. At his press conference following the referendum, Howard went 
out of his way to offer a rejoinder to this proposition: 
Can I just say in relation to the mood in the AustraUan community — I Ustened to 
the debate about the mood and one of the arguments that was put in favour of the 
repubUcan cause was put by Sir Zelman Cowen the former Governor-General, the 
idea of having somebody who is head of state who would interpret the nation to 
itself With the greatest respect to him and others who hold that view, I don't think 
that can ever happen in this country. We are too incUviduaUstic to ever find one 
single person who is going to interpret the nation to itself (Howard 1999). 
One could argue that Howard cUd achieve this role himself in his memorable 
address at GaUipoU on Anzac Day 2000 when he honoured the faUen on behalf 
of the nation: 
We come to draw upon their stirring example of unir\' and common purpose. To 
believe that whatever our differing circumstances, we are aU companions with each 
of our countrymen and women, and together we travel a single path. We come to 
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join with those that rest here in a shared love of our nation, bathed in sunlight and 
so blessed with bounp-. NX'e come to stand on soil rich with the lives of our kin and 
\-ow that what they began, we wiU finish. 
For they fought to build a nation wliich would stand proud and respected amongst 
the free people of the world. A nation where ordinary men and women would live 
long lives of happiness and fulfUment. A country where children would grow 
nourished by the land's harvest, and by the love of their parents. A country where 
prosperity and opportunin- are derived not by birth, but by endeavour. A people 
made independent united and free for aU time. And in the attainment of these 
ideals, in the keeping of a decent and responsible AustraUa, in every year of peace 
berween the nations of the world, we wiU buUd for aU those who have served and 
suffered in war, a monument upon which evening wiU never fall (Howard 2000,11). 
The nation would be weU served by a head of state, rather than a party 
poUtician, who can promote the uruty of the nation, interpreting the nation to 
itself If the task is to be performed by an elected President, there wiU be a need 
for a clear demarcation of functions between the president and Prime Minister. 
Some elected presidents would rightiy want to continue Sir WiUiam Deane's 
style of leadership, which annoys some powerbrokers who resent leadership 
not managed from offices in the mirUsterial wing of ParUament House. 
During the 1999 referendum campaign, some Aborigines went to London 
to see the Queen. Sir WilUam Deane assisted -with their request to meet the 
Queen at Buckingham Palace. Ex-Minister Peter Walsh was horrified. Writing 
'1975 revisited' in Christopher Pearson's Adelaide Review, he said, 'If however it 
can be safely assumed the government neither knew nor approved of this self-
indulgent exhibition of vice-regal vanity, it foUows that Sir WUUam, behind the 
government 's back, faciUtated the Queen's involvement in what is a 
controversial poUtical issue in AustraUa' (Walsh 1999, 13). A month later, Glenn 
MUne took up the theme in the Australian: 'In doing so, Deane acted without 
the knowledge or advice of the Prime Minister — the convention that 
underpins the legitimacy of our constimtional monarchy' (MUne 1999, 15). 
MUne had asked Deane's spokesman what consultations had occurred. 
Following protocol, the spokesman was not prepared to disclose the details 
of such consultations, if any, but added, 'It was just facUitating the caU [to the 
palace]. The Governor-General would not normaUy feel the need to consult the 
Government in such circumstances' (Milne 1999, 15). The ecUtorial of the 
AustraUan went weU over the top: 'Intensifying disquiet is the news that Sir 
WiUiam supported the meeting without telUng the Government. This not only 
violates convention, it is sneaky' (Australian, 7 December 1999, 14). The 
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Government remained sUent, leaving the Governor-General hanging out to dry. 
Four days later, Peter Yu, one of the Aboriginal delegates, clarified the matter 
with a letter to the editor: 'We also, as a matter of courtesy, advised the 
AustraUan Government of the trip, and its aims, to avoid any perceived 
embarrassment to our Government' (AustraUan, 11 December 1999, 18). An 
elected President would be expected to perform more controversial poUtical 
tasks than acting as postman for the Palace. The powers and functions would 
need to be clearly articulated so that aUegations of sneakiness when the 
President is simply doing the job wiU be readily perceived, even by the 
President's critics, to be misplaced. 
It may be another decade before the repubUc is revisited at the poUs. An 
elected presidency has popular appeal and many constimtional pitfaUs. If an 
elected presidency is the preferred path for the AustraUan people, now is the 
time to face the fact that nothing is as simple in this debate as Mack and Cleary 
claim. On reflection, maybe Mack and Cleary should be offered krUghthoods 
for their contribution to the maintenance of the monarchy in a time of rising 
repubUcan sentiment. Maybe TurnbuU and Keating had it right, and maybe 
Howard had good grounds for cUsplaying smugness at his cleverness when the 
true monarchists came to the party, popping champagne for a victory of lasting 
consequence. Contrary to the wUl of the people, we are Ukely to remain tied to 
the regal apron strings for some years to come. 

Chapter Sixteen 
Presidential Powers Under 
Direct Election 
George Winterton 
The way of the reformer is hard in AustraUa' Gough Whitiam observed in 
1957 (Whitlam 1977, 44), a considerable understatement in regard to 
constimtional reform. AustraUan constimtional reformers remind one of the 
hardy residents of Florida and Kansas who pick themselves up after each 
hurricane or tornado and rebuild, hoping that this time their homes may be 
strong enough to survive the next one. SimUarly, after each referendum defeat, 
AustraUan would-be constimtional reformers hope that a new device — be it 
royal commission, joint ParUamentary committee, constimtional convention, 
constimtional commission, senU-popularly elected convention, now plebiscite 
— may succeed in framing a Constimtion alteration proposal able to withstand 
the next referendum but, alas, very few do. 
UnUke some defeated constimtional amendments, the repubUc wUl remain 
on the poUtical agenda, although the electoral fate of the poUtical parties wiU 
determine whether the mecharUsm for its advancement wiU be the incUcative 
plebiscite proposed by Labor or some alternative favoured by a non-Howard-
led CoaUtion. In any event, after the defeat of the 'ConCon' model in the 1999 
referendum, a cUrectiy elected presidency is certain to be on the agenda, at least 
for consideration. The principal issue raised by any repubUcan model is the 
namre of the presidency and, consequendy, the methods of appointing and 
removing the President and the powers of the office, aU of which are inter-
related. 
Executive Presidency? 
The first issue requiring determination is whether an AustraUan repubUc should 
retain the present system of responsible parUamentary government (the 
'Westminster system') or adopt a cUfferent system, the ob-vious cancUdate being 
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one based on a greater separation between legislative and executive powers, 
essentially the American model. It is sometimes suggested, especiaUy bv 
constitutional conserxativcs and monarchists (although the bona fides 
underlying some of these assertions may be questioned), that, if the Crown is 
remoxcd from Australian gcwernment, the legislative-executive relationship 
must be completely rethought, as if the essence of the Westminster system 
depended upon a hereditary monarch rather than merely a politically neutral 
head of state, whether hereditary or elected. The United States model is 
frequently propounded as the only model based on genuine repubUcan 
principles (for example, RusseU 1998, 68-9), though why parliamentaty 
repubUcs such as Ireland, Austria, Germany, India and Italy should be 
dismissed as sham repubUcs is never explained. 
The I 'nited States government is sometimes viewed from abroad thtough 
rose-tinted spectacles due, perhaps, to that country's economic, cultural and 
mihtary dominance. Fcjr some too, the term 'President' probably connotes the 
only presidency with which they are famiUar. It should be remembered, 
howe\cr, that after virtually every major poUtical crisis, such as Watergate, some 
American poUtical scientists advocate reforming their poUtical system to 
resemble Westminster's. That reform is occasionally advocated, even in the 
absence of crisis, in order to cwercome the endemic problem of deadlock or 
stalemate between the President and Congress, especially when they are 
controlled by different political parties. 
Several features of the American system of government ought to give 
potential transplanters pause. First, it vests enormous pcjwer in one person. The 
United States executive ccjnsists essentially of cjne person: the President. All 
other cjfficials of the executive branch, including cabinet secretaries, have 
merely ad\'isory powers, except when power is vested directly in them by 
legislation. Mrjreover, the President enjoys a sphere of executive power beyond 
the power of Congress to Umit or control by legislation. The manner in which 
it is exercised is similarly beycjnd judicial review on administrative law grounds. 
Apart from poUtical constraints thereon, including Congress' aU-important 
power over appropriation, the principal legal constraint on such power is the 
BiU of Rights, though the exercise of some presidential powers is considered 
non-justiciable. Such powers vested in an Australian executive President would 
not even be Umited to this extent in the absence of an AustraUan BiU of Rights. 
Seccjndly, like all successful systems of government, the American system 
reflects the nation's history and poUtical culture, which are unique to it. It lacks 
the Westminster sy-stem's paternaUstic constitutional umpire, a head of state 
able to resohe disputes between legislature and executive by referring them to 
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the people. The pc:)Utical branches of government must resolve these disputes 
for themselves by negotiation. If, for example. Congress were to refuse to pass 
appropriations untU the President resigned, there would be no ccjnstitutional 
umpire, Uke the Governor-General, empowered to intervene to resolve the 
deadlock. Similarh-, there would be Uttie to prevent Congress from impeaching 
the President on the ground of mere poUtical disagreement, since Supreme 
Court intervention would be unUkely, especiaUy if Congress purported to apph-
the constitutional formula of 'treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors' (US Constimtion art II, § 4. Cf Ni.xon v United States [1993] 506 
US 224, holding judicial impeachment non-justiciable). The 7\merican system 
requires considerable restraint and poUtical sophistication. Despite adoption in 
Latin America and the PhiUppines, it has operated successfull}- only in its 
countr)' of origin; even so, the saiUng has not always been smooth. 
AustraUa shares some of the same history and political culture as the United 
States, but it has operated under the Westminster system for a cenmry and a 
half, during which it has developed one of the world's strongest pc:)litical party 
systems. If the American system were transplanted to Australia, with the latter's 
highly disciplined poUtical parties, not only would it operate ver\- differently-
from the way it does in the United States, but it would effectively combine the 
worst features of both systems. It would create an aU-powerful executive 
presidency supreme, Uke its American original, over the executive branch but 
also probably dominant over the legislature, or at least its lower House, if the 
present electoral system were maintained. Morecjver, there would be no Bill of 
Rights to Umit presidential power. The AustraUan part}- system w-ould probably-
weaken in time, as indeed occurred in the United States, but the hybrid mutant 
would probably exhibit some unpleasant feamres for a considerable transitional 
period (see Winterton 1994a, 101-2). 
Notwithstanding the undeniable merits of the American system — which 
would be a serious candidate for adoption if one were creating a constitutional 
system from scratch as, to some extent, the AustraUan constitutional founders 
were in the 1890s — its transplantation into the present Australian 
constitutional environment would entail a reckless and unnecessary risk of 
radical and possibh' undesirable constimtional metamorphosis. Moreo\-cr, the 
Umited evidence of pubUc opinion poUs offers no support to the introduction 
of this aUen system of government. WhUe one may doubt the respondents ' 
knowledge of the American system, let alone the AustraUan, polls indicate a 
strong preference for retairUng our present system of government over 
adopting the American: 65 percent tc:) 24 percent in a Bulletin poU of Februar\-
1998 and 72 percent to 21 percent in a Time Morgan poU of January 1994 
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(Bulletin, 17 February 1998, 23; Time, 3 January 1994, 7). A Quadrant poll 
conducted for the AustraUan RepubUcan Movement in October 1992 indicated 
that only 12 percent of respondents (not merely those favouring a republic) in 
aU state capitals except Hobart favoured adoption of the United States system 
(Australian RepubUcan Movement 1992; for earUer poll statistics, see Winterton 
1993a, 41-2). It wUI be assumed that an AustraUan repubUc -with a ditecdy 
elected President would retain the present system of responsible parUamentary 
government. 
There are tw-o principal concerns regarcUng a directiy elected President: that 
the type of person Ukely to be elected and the method of choosing the 
President are inherentiy unsuited to the position of a head of state in a 
parUamentary repubUc; and that direct election would so enhance the power, or 
at least authority-, of such a head of state that the stabiUty, and perhaps even 
continuit}-, of the present governmental system would be jeoparcUsed. The 
second issue wiU be considered here (for further discussion of both issues, see 
Winterton 2001a, 7-19; 2001b, 3 2 ^ 4 ; 1997a; 1995, 142-5). 
Presidential powers 
The most worrisome aspect of a directly elective presidency is that the 
enhanced authority that wiU inevitably accrue to that office wUI destabiUse and 
radicaUy alter AustraUan government. A directly elected President wiU be the 
only person elected by the entire nation — or at least 50 percent plus one — 
whereas members of ParUament, including the Prime Minister, are elected only 
by one electorate. Even if the President's election platform is devoid of poUcy 
content, as it should be, the President wUl be able at least to claim a 'mandate' 
from the entire electorate to ensure probity, compassion and wisdom in 
AustraUan government. As Irish President Mary Robinson asserted during her 
election campaign in 1990: 
As President directly elected by the people of Ireland, I wiU have the most 
democratic job in the country. I'U be able to look [the Prime Minister] in the eye and 
teU him to back off if necessary because I have been directiy elected by the people 
as a whole and he hasn't (Mee 1996, 3). 
The concern is that a directiy elected President wUl chaUenge government 
poUcy in speeches, perhaps addresses on television, and by meeting foreign and 
domestic leaders both at home and abroad, leaving both the AustraUan people 
and foreign governments confused regarcUng government poUcy, destabiUsing 
government, and jeopardising the poUtical neutraUty of the presidency. Barry 
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Jones graphicaUy described such a system as 'a car with two steering wheels' 
(Jones 1999), and John Howard has warned that it: 
[Wjould alter for aU time the nature of our system of government. It would 
entrench rival centres of poUtical power ... [A]n AustraUan president, having a 
popular mandate, would feel infinitely more powerful in deaUng with an incumbent 
Prime Minister than would any Governor-General, irrespective of the formal 
powers which might be given to that president. (Howard 1994, 130-1; for simUar 
comments, see Winterton 1995, 143^). 
Some commentators see value in a President able to 'provide a balance to 
an otherwise autocratic prime minister' (Evans 1994, 16) or at least beUeve, 
perhaps correctiy, that 'opposing centres of poUtical authority ... is just what 
most people want' (White 1999, 8). However, the virtue of such a 'checking' 
President must be strongly questioned on at least two grounds. First, such a 
President would have Umited information sources, be unaccountable to 
ParUament and to the electorate unless stancUng for re-election, and possibly 
have a 'mandate' which is several years old and, in any event, not based on 
specific poUcies. The value of checks and balances should not be exaggerated; 
it aU depends on who is checking whom, and to what end. One ought to be 
wary of a single unaccountable individual, possibly dependent for re-election 
on special interests, checking a government which enjoys the support of the 
House of Representatives and is subject to numerous checks including the 
party room, the mecUa, ParUament and, ultimately, the electors. 
Secondly, for better or worse, such a 'checking' President would amount to 
a significant deparmre from the present role of the Governor-General; if the 
AustraUan people reaUy favour such a development, they should be fuUy aware 
of the possible consequences of governmental deadlock and instabiUty. Harry 
Evans, Clerk of the Senate, has remarked that 'an elected president, with an 
independent mandate, would mos t closely approximate the existing 
constimtional arrangement' (Evans 1995, 36) but, with respect, there is no basis 
for this view. 
What measures might be taken to address these concerns? Littie can be 
achieved by way of constimtional provision to prevent presidential speech-
making or social conduct which embarrasses the government. The Irish 
attempt to control speech-making (Constitution of Ireland art.13.7) has not 
been particularly successful (see Winterton 1997a, 35—6), and it is doubtful 
whether the electorate would approve such measures. The best guarantee of 
presidential impartiaUty and discretion is the election of cancUdates possessing 
those quaUties. 
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The present Constitution confers power on the Governor-General and 
Ciovernor-General in Council on the assumption that the powers will be 
interpreted against the background of the conventions of the monarchy; 
consequently, apart from the few 'reserve powers', the Gcwernor-General's 
powers are exercisable only in accordance with ministerial advice. However, this 
principle should not be left merely to convention under a republic, especiallv 
one with a directly elected President, but should be expressed as law in the 
Consutution and be judicially enforceable. 
The 1998 G)nstitutional Convention resolved that 'the non-reserve powers' 
should be 'speUed out so far as practicable' (Report of the Constitutional Convention 
1998, 45), but the proposed constitutional provision put to referendum did not 
do this since it failed to specify which were reserve powers and which not 
((Constitutional Alteration [EstabUshment of RepubUc] 1999, proposed s. 59). 
Such a provision would be inadequate for a directly elective presidency, since it 
is essential that it be expressly provided that 'the executive power of the 
Commonwealth ' conferred by s. 61 of the Constitution be exercisable only on 
ministerial advice (see, for example, Winterton 1994b, 20 |s. 61]). It may even 
be preferable to provide that such power is vested in the gcwernment, as it 
essentially is in Ireland: 'The executive power of the State shaU ... be exercised 
by or on the authority of the Government ' (Constituticjn of Ireland art. 28.2). 
If s. 61 IS not amended to make it crystal clear that 'the executive power of the 
Commonwealth ' is not exercisable by the President except pursuant to 
ministerial advice, there would be a real risk of a directly elected President 
exercising executive pcjwer independendy oi the government, ultimately 
converting our system of gcjvernment into cjne resembUng the French. The 
Ccmstituticjn should Ukewise make clear which powers are reserve powers and 
which not, either by a general provision or by expressly providing in regard to 
each cjf the latter that it is exercisable only on ministerial advice (see, for 
example, the present writer's draft Constitution: Winterton 1994b). 
The power to assent to legislation is sometimes considered a reserve power, 
but this should not be so. The Constitution should either dispense with 
presidential assent to legislation and constimtional alterations or make it clear 
that presidential signamre is a purely ceremonial function involving no 
independent discretion (see Winterton 1994b, 17, 36 [ss. 58 and 128]). The 
executive power to prorogue ParUament appears to be unnecessary and could 
be aboUshed. 
There is understandable fear that a directiy elected President, bolstered 
perhaps by pubUc opinion, wiU feel unconstrained by the conventions hitherto 
governing the exercise of the reserve powers and exercise those powers 
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accorcUng to personal whim, thereb\- undermining the constitutional system. 
Such a President might appcjint a personal crony as Prime Minister (such 
person need not initially be a member of ParUament, Commonwealth 
Constimtion s. 64) and prorogue or even disscjive ParUament to avoid a House 
of Representatives vote of no-confidence in the government or, perhaps, 
dismiss or force to a general election a Prime Minister who is unpopular or out 
of favour with the President. (VC'e can be sure that the monarchists and their 
republican alUes of the moment wiU dream up even scarier scenarios to terrify 
the electorate.) While the more extreme scenarios are no doubt fanciful, the 
concern that a directiy elected President would feel less constraint than a 
Governor-General in exercising reserve powers is re-aUstic (contrast the view of 
Harry Evans, as noted in Winterton 1997a, 37 n. 49). Hence, the present 
constitutional position of granting power in unUmited terms, leaving its 
exercise to be governed by convention, wUl not suffice for such a repubUc. 
There is nothing sacrosanct about the present reserve powers: to appoint 
and dismiss the Prime MirUster and to refuse to dissolve ParUament (including 
a double dissolution under s. 57 of the Consti tution). They reflect 
constitutional history rather than logic. The power to appoint the Prime 
Minister could effectively be left to the House of Representatives as in Ireland, 
Germany, Sweden and Japan; the parUamentary term could be fixed, subject to 
early dissolution if the House passes a simple vote of no-confidence in the 
government, thereby dispensing with a presidential power to dissolve 
ParUament; and it is doubtful whether a presidential power to dismiss the Prime 
Mnister is really necessary (for further discussion, see Winterton 1993a, 43—4; 
Winterton 1993b, 251-2; Ward 2000, 120-3; HuU 2000). The Irish and German 
presidents have no such reserve power (the German President's dismissal 
power, conferred by Basic Law a r t 67(1), is not discretionary). Concerns 
regarding incompetent or poUtically partial Presidents would certainly be 
diminished if the reserve powers were reduced or even aboUshed. 
However, our constitutional tradition sees an impartial constitutional 
umpire or guardian as necessary and there are strong arguments for a head of 
state exercising that function, whose value was demonstrated in Tasmania in 
June 1989 (see Winterton 1993a, 45-6). The Austrian and Portuguese directiy 
elected Presidents have a similar to\&, as indeed does the Irish, though with 
fewer powers than our Governor-General (the Irish Senate can defer Supply for 
only 21 days. Constitution of Ireland a r t 21.2.2°). Moreover, opinion polls 
support the impression gained during the 1999 referendum campaign that the 
pubUc would ncjt support a significant reduction in the head of state's powers 
(Winterton 1997a, 36—7). The three current reserve powers should probably be 
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retained, but the Constitution should make it clear that they are the only powers 
that the president can exercise without or contrary to ministerial advice. 
It is generaUy accepted that the conventions governing the exercise of 
reserve powers should be codified if the President is directiy elected (Winterton 
1997a, 37). Complete codification would be both inadvisable — because the 
flexibiUt\- necessar\- for deaUng with poUtical crises would be lost — and 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, because the communit}- is divided on 
some powers, especiaUy the power to dismiss a Prime Minister denied Supply 
by the Senate. However, partial codification, along the lines suggested b}- the 
RepubUc Advisory Committee (RepubUc Advisory Committee 1993, 101-6) 
would be desirable, and received considerable support at the 1998 
Constimtional Convention, especiaUy from proponents of cUrect election 
(Report of the Constitutional Convention 1998, 125-9). 
The principle underlying codification should be that the President is granted 
only such power as is absolutely necessary (Winterton 1993a, 46-7; McGarvie 
1999a, 146) to enforce the fundamental constitutional principles of the rule of 
law and representative and responsible government (for High Court 
recognition of these principles, see, for example, AustraUan Communist Party v 
Commonwealth [1951] 83 CER 1, 193 per Dixon J.; I^nge v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation [1997] 189 CLR 520). The Constitution should provide that after a 
general election the President should appoint as Prime Minister the person 
most Ukely to enjoy the confidence of the House of Representatives. The 
President should be obUged to refuse a dissolution of ParUament to a Prime 
Minister who has lost a 'constructive no-confidence' motion (that is, a motion 
that expresses confidence in a named person [such as the leader of the 
opposition] as well as no-confidence in the Prime Minister or the government); 
whUe a motion of no-confidence is pending; and before the House of 
Representatives has met after a general election, unless the House has proved 
unable to elect a Speaker. 
The most controversial reserve power to codify is the power to dismiss the 
Prime Nhnister and thus the government. The power should probably be 
exercisable only if the Prime Minister refuses to comply with an order of the 
High Court or has contravened a fundamental constitutional provision or, 
more questionably, a fundamental constitutional principle. The last provision 
would include an attempt to ignore a House resolution of no-confidence and, 
for those who beUeve that Kerr was entitied to dismiss Whitiam in November 
1975, could include an attempt to ignore denial of Supply by the Senate. The 
Labor Party may have to compromise on this issue in order to achieve a 
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repubUc, by leaving open the possibiUty of the Prime Minister's dismissal on the 
ground of faUure to secure Supply from the Senate. 
The exercise of power in the interstices of the reserve powers — that power 
remaining after the partial codification has been implemented — should 
continue to be governed by the estabUshed constitutional conventions. The 
Constitution should expressly provide for continuation of the present 
conventions notwithstanding aboUtion of the monarchy (see Constimtional 
Alteration (EstabUshment of RepubUc) 1999, proposed s. 59; Joint Select 
ComnUttee 1999, paras 4.10—4.22), and provide for their continuing evolution 
(see Constitutional Alteration (EstabUshment of RepubUc) 1999, Sch 2, cl. 7; 
Joint Select Committee 1999, paras 4.58^.60). 
A wise precaution, especiaUy since a President may have no experience of 
government or the law, would be to estabUsh a constitutional council whose 
advice must be sought, but not necessarily foUowed, before a reserve power is 
exercised without or against ministerial advice. Such a councU of perhaps three 
to five members might include former Presidents and High Court justices (see, 
for example, Brennan 2001, 24; Brennan 2000, 31—2) selected accorcUng to a 
formula simUar to that proposed by Richard McGarvie (McGarvie 1999a, 
218-20). However, since an automatic formula would not guarantee 
appointment of suitable members, the appointment power might be vested 
joindy in the state chief justices or, less satisfactorily, in a two-thirds majority of 
the Commonwealth ParUament (Winterton 1997a, 39). The pool from which 
counciUors are chosen could be Umited to former Presidents and High Court 
justices; alternatively, the selectors could be left at large subject, perhaps, to 
minimum requirements regarcUng the appointee's expertise. Provision might 
also be made for the eventual pubUcation of the councU's advice. Precedents 
for such advisory councUs are found in Ireland and Portugal. 
Further checks and balances could be introduced to constrain presidential 
power, if considered necessary or advisable. Concern that a directiy elected 
President might too readUy dismiss the Prime Minister could, for instance, be 
addressed by providing that a President who dismisses the Prime Minister 
vacates office forthwith, either permanentiy or subject to re-election, which 
would enable the electors to pass judgement on the President's action 
(Winterton 1997a, 40). 
Conclusion 
It has rightiy been observed that a cUrect election repubUc wiU 'encounter very 
rocky ground in the AustraUan constitutional garden' (Brennan 2000, 30). It wiU 
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face condemnation as a 'constitutional catastrophe', a 'disaster' involving the 
utter 'destruction' and 'repudiation' of our system of government (Craven 
1999, 22, 28, 43, 44, 48). That, with respect, is a considerable overstatement. 
Direct presidential election could change AustraUan gcwernment significantly, 
which some, perhaps man}-, consider a virtue, not a defect. Ho\ve\cr, we ate 
surely capable of constructing constitutional architecture, including checks and 
balances, to protect against undesirable consequences. Ultimately, it must be 
decided whether the goal of an Australian repubUc is worth the possible tisks. 
Neville Wran has argued that 'provided that the powers of the Head of State 
are properly defined and contained ... a popularly elected president is preferable 
to no president and no repubUc at aU' (Wran 1997, 199). Prcwided precautions 
Uke those outUned here are taken, many who believe y\ustraUa should have its 
own head of state or consider hereditary succession tc:) public office abhorrent 
wiU probably conclude that it is, indeed, preferable. 
Notes 

Australia Deliberates? The Role of the Media in DeUberative Polling 
Rachel K Gibson and Sarah Miskin 
1. Australia Deliberates was sponsored by organisations including the Australian National 
Universit)', the Hawke Research Institute of the University of South Australia, and the 
Centers for Deliberative Polling and Australian Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. 
Major funding and in-kind support were provided b\' the Australian, Ansett Airlines, Rydges 
Hotels, Peter Baker, Ghostwriters/Michelles Warren PR, World Exchange telephone 
company, the Sheppard Consulting Group, Social Options AustraUa and Issues Deliberation 
Australia. 
2. Poll participants were divided into 24 groups. Each group was assigned a group manager, 
who was pnmarily responsible for ensuring group facilitators and participants adhered to 
time schedules. Other group manager functions included resolving problems with 
accommodation, transportation, directions and so on. 
3. Fishkin uses the argument of Anthony Downs that individuals in large nation states have 
incentives to be 'rationally ignorant' because if they have only one vote in millions then it 
is not worth their while to spend a lot of time and effort becoming informed about a 
national policy debate or a poliucal campaign' (Fishkin 1995, 21; Fishkin and Luskin 1999a, 
1). 
4. For a critique from a polling perspective, see Sanders (1999) and Merkle (1996). For a 
critique of its underlying aims, see Elkin (1999) and Lustig (1999). For a critique of the 
assumption of rational ignorance among voters, a claim that underlies deliberative polling, 
see Uhr (1999a). Commenting on the republic referendum, Uhr points out that a downfall 
of previous Australian referendums has been the assumption of ignorance in the Australian 
electorate. The real reason for Australia's record of conservatism at referendums (with a 
rejection rate of 80 percent) is not that the people are apathetic or ignorant but that they 
resent governments that presume that they are ignorant or apathetic' (Uhr 1999a). 
5. Those assisting the organisers included Professors Ian McAllister and Frank Casdes 
(Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National Universit)-), and Professor Alison 
MacKinnon (Hawke Research Institute, University of South Australia). 
6. Although participants arrived in Canberra on Friday and left on Sunday, the deliberative 
process was held only on Saturday (9am—6pm) and Sunday morning (8.30am-noon), with 
the final survev filled in between noon and 12.45pm on Sunday. 
7. This created an associated problem in that often a question from the floor was the same as 
one that was about to be asked by a group representative, who would then resort to asking 
another of the group's questions, often then displacing the question of another group. Such 
was the focus on each group feeling that 'their' question had been answered that at the 
Sunday plenary session, one group which had missed out on asking questions the previous 
day was specially called on to have one of its questions put, seemingly whether or not it was 
related to that session. 
8. To an extent, Fishkin acknowledges such 'group' effects in deliberative microcosms such as 
deliberative poUs, citizens' juries and consensus conferences. He notes that 'the necessity' of 
talking to and in front of one's fellow participants creates social incentives to inform oneself 
and think about the issues' (Fishkin and Luskin 1999a, 4) but he fails to acknowledge that 
such 'social incentives' can also have negative consequences. 
9. The evidence presented in Australia Deliberates: Pinal Report to support the claim for 
increased political knowledge among participants does not appear substantial on close 
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cxaminauon. Of the fi\e questions used to show 'dramatic' increases in knovvletlge, one 
relics simply on a self-assessment b)- paracipants. Further, while 78 percent of participants 
felt that the\ knew enough to vote on the issue after the poll, a clear majonr\' of participants 
had actualh' considered themselves informed enough on the issues to vote e\-en before the 
deliberative poll began (57 percent). In terms of the objective evidence for increases in 
knowledge, onh' rwo of the four questions posed pro\ided unambiguously 
correct/incorrect responses (the current appointment mechanism for the Governor-
General and the procedure for removal of president). Both of these did register impressive 
increases (the former registered a 46 percentage point rise and the latter a 57 pereent.icc 
point rise). Howe\cr, the other questions used were less straightforward. These were, 
whether, under the proposed model, the powers of the President would be the same relative 
to the Cjovernor-General, and whether the president would be no more powerful than the 
Cjovernor-General. (Organisers determined the Yes response as the 'correct' one. Ilowexer, 
the complex implications ot the Governor-General's 'reser\e powers' and the Pnnic 
.Minister's new right to instant dismissal of the president make an\- correct/incorrect reading 
of these respcinses problematic. Claims for dramatic increases in knowledge based on these 
data, therefore, are questionable. 
10. ,'\lthough the item was termed a 'debate', most comments were statements from 
participants on the weekend and how they would vote. The 'experts', Jason Yat-Sen IJ (N'cs) 
and Juhan Leeser (No), were shcjwn five times each, with two of these depicting them 
arguing. 
11. It was olnious from the outset that the show intended to do this when its organisers 
specificalh singled out for a seat in the House the participant who had in an earlier session 
asked whether an /Xustrahan President could be expected to 'have an aftair' (a reference to 
hjrmcr US President Bill Clinton's extra-marital affairs while in office). 
12. For this session, three groups were seated in the upstairs galleries, but 12 groups were 
scheduled to remain sitting in the Senate. Many of these participants drifted away, howe\cr, 
as organisers had neglected to arrange for the ABC televised link to the Senate to connnuc 
during the commercial channel's filming. 
13. A post-referendum report in the Philadelphia Inquirer claimed that the poll had had 
considerable impact in that it boosted the Yes campaign. 'Support for the referendum, 
which was dropping like a rock in mid-October (hitting 33 percent in one sampling), turned 
around and started chmbing after the deliberative poll. The rise wasn't enough to bring 
\'ictcjry, but the gap closed to 55-45 in Saturday's vtjte' (Boldt 1999). However, it is not 
possible to prove this as cause and effect; that is, how much of the upswing could be 
attributed to the dehberative poU and how much to the massive coverage of the referendum 
in the media in the final two weeks of the campaign. In the week before the poll, the 
/\ustralian alone was running three to five pages a day on the referendum. It also published 
a special 20-page supplement, 'Your Guide to the Referendum', in the Weekend Australian, 
9-10 October 1999, as well as two special four page supplements in the Weekend Australian, 
30-31 October 1999 and 6-7 November 1999. 
14. There are, of course, other questions about deliberative polling that we have not addressed. 
These include the effects of the 'screening' of questions by the echtorial team, and the 
possible effects on participants of reviewing materials about deliberative polling before 
their deUberations that highUght organisers' expectations that significant change in opinions 
will occur as a result of deUberations. 
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Chapter Nine Technical Appendix 
Data: International Social Science Surveys Australia (IsssA) 
The IsssA data are from simple random samples ot Austrahan citizens drawn 
by the Electoral Commission from the compulsory electoral roll. They are 
conducted by maU using a modification of Dillman's Total Response Method 
with up to four foUow-up maiUngs, two with fresh copies of the questionnaire, 
over a six month period. The 2001 data are from a preUminarv sample of the 
first 1006 cases processed, the latest avaUable as of the time of writing; the 
other surveys are the complete samples (3,012 cases in 1984; 1,528 in 1986; 
1,663 in 1987; 6,136 in 1989/1990; 1,503 in 1994; 2,396 in 1995; 2,130 in 1996; 
and 1,672 in 1999). Missing data on incUvidual items typicaUy runs from 2 
percent to 6 percent. Completion rates run about 65 percent, which compares 
favourably u-ith recent experience in Austraha, the USA, and many other 
industtial nations (for example, the weU regarded 1989 International Crime 
Victim Survey averaged 41 percent in 14 nations). Results for IsssA surveys 
conducted around the time of the 1991 AustraUan census show that the survey 
samples (1989-93; 8,234 cases) are representative of the population (Table 9.1). 
Analyses based on IsssA data appear regularlv in the world's leading sociology 
journals (for example Evans, KeUev, and Kolosi 1992; KeUey and De Graaf 
1997; Kelley and Evans 1993; 1995). Further detaUs are available at 
www.international-survey.org. 
The Canberra surveys 
The Canberra Times/Data.col surve\-s were coUected bv computer-assisted 
telephone interview techniques based on random-cUgit diaUing. XK'ithin each 
household, the potential respondent was selected at random. The selected 
person was pursued by up to 12 foUow-up caUs, at cUfferent times of the day 
and different days of the week. The first survey was conducted at the very 
beginning of the campaign in 1988, with 860 completions. The second survey 
was conducted about two weeks before the vote on the referendum in 1999, 
with 521 completions. 
Question wording in the Canberra surveys: 
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Table 9.1: Comparison of IsssA surveys with the census 
Cicnder 
Male 
Female 
Age gr( lups 
18-24 
25-34 
3,5-44 
45-54 
45-64 
65-H 
Educauon: .\ge left school 
Under 15/none 
15 
Id 
17 
18 
19 and over 
Emplovment status 
E^mployed 
L'nemploved 
Not in labour force 
Occupation ot employed persons 
Managers and administrators 
Professionals 
Para-professionals 
Tradespersons 
Clerks 
Sales, service 
Plant & machine operators 
Labourers 
Cen.ws 1991 
49% 
51% 
15% 
22% 
21% 
15% 
12% 
16% 
18% 
24% 
22% 
19% 
11% 
7% 
58% 
7% 
36% 
14% 
14% 
8% 
14% 
16% 
13% 
8% 
13% 
IsssA 1989-9) 
51% 
49" „ 
11% 
21% 
23% 
17% 
14% 
14% 
18% 
23% 
23% 
21% 
11% 
3% 
65% 
2% 
33% 
13% 
19% 
11% 
12% 
16% 
12% 
7% 
10% 
1. A referendum wiU be held in just under two weeks' time on the question of 
AustraUa becoming a repubUc. You wiU be asked to choose either: 
The present system, that is keep the Queen and Governor-General as now, 
or a repubUc m which a president who wiU be elected by a two-thirds 
majority- of the federal ParUament, wiU replace the Queen and governor-
general. In the referendum, wiU you vote to keep the present system as it is 
now, which would be a No vote, or wiU you vote to change to the proposed 
repubUc, which would be a Yes vote? 
Constitutional Politics: The 1990s and Beyond 245 
3. Thinking about the question of AustraUa becoming a repubUc some time in, 
say, the next 10 years. GeneraUy, are you in favour, neutral, or against 
AustraUa becoming a repubUc? 
4. If AustraUa was to become a repubUc, the head of state would change from 
being the Governor-General to being a President. There are a number of 
different ways to choose a President. One way is to have the President 
elected by members of ParUament, another is to have the President elected 
by the AustraUan people in a vote, another way is for the President to be 
appointed by the Prime Minister of the day Which method of appointing a 
President would you prefer: elected by ParUament; elected by the people; 
appointed by the Prime Minister or some other way? 
Measurement, methods , and models in the IsssA surveys 
For the regression analysis, we scored answers to the Queen and repubUc 
questions in equal intervals from 0 to 100, with high scores indicating 
repubUcan sentiment: 
1. How important do you feel the Queen and Royal Family are to AustraUa? 
Very important [0 points] 
Fairly important [33 points] 
No t very important [67 points] 
No t important at aU [100 points] 
and: 
2. Do you think AustraUa should retain the Queen of England as head of state 
or become a repubUc? 
Definitely retain the Queen [0 points] 
Probably retain the Queen [33 points] 
Probably become a repubUc [67 points] 
Definitely become a repubUc [100 points] 
The items have good measurement properties. The test-retest correlation 
over an approximately two year period is r = 0.79 for the first item and r = 0.80 
for the second (n = 1311). This impUes a scale reUabiUt}' of alpha = 0.95 for 
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the four items together. In 1995, we asked the nvo items twice in the same 
questionnaire, once toward the beginning and a second time about 40 pages 
later. Correlations between the two versions were high: r = 0.84 for the first 
item and r = 0.88 for the second. The four items together would form a scale 
with a reliabiUry of alpha = 0.96. 
To reduce random measurement error, we combine the two questions into 
a single scale by averaging them. The scale shows good measurement 
properties, with high reUabiUt}- (alpha = 0.85) and very similar correlations 
between the component items and other variables in the analysis. 
The question on how the head of state should be chosen is: 
If Australia did become a republic, how would you prefer the head of state 
to be chosen? 
Chosen b\- the cabinet (the government ministers) [0 points( 
Chosen by the fuU parUament [50 pcUnts] 
Chosen by the voters [100 points] 
For the regression analysis, the answers are scc:ired in equal intervals as shown 
above. 
Measurement of other variables is straightforward. Class and demographic 
variables: age is in years; education in years of school and university training; 
occupational status is measured in Kelley's worldwide status scores. 
Government employee is an incUcator (dummy) variable, as are self-employed 
and union member. Supervision is scored 1 (supervises other superviscjrs), 0.5 
(supervises ordinary workers only), and 0 (does not supervise). Family income 
is in doUars per year. Urban residence is in 5 categories from rural (0) to 
metropoUtan (100). 
PciUtical party identification is measured by a set cjf dummy variables, one 
for National Party- supporters and a second for Labor supporters. Liberals are 
the omitted (reference) category. Interest in poUtics is measured by direct 
questions, scored in equal intervals from 0 to 100. 
Distrust of poUticians is measured by a scale averaging answers to five 
standard items, aU scored from 0 to 100: 'Would you say the gcwernment is 
prett\- much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is 
run for the benefit of aU the people?'; 'In general, do you feel that people in 
government are only interested in looking after themselves, or do you feel they 
can be trusted to do the right thing?'; 'Now some questions about this country 
and the people and organizations in it. How much confidence do you have in 
Constitutional Politics: The 1990s and Beyond 247 
... The federal government in Canberra? ... The federal parUament?'; and a 
feeUng thermometer rating of 'The federal parUament in Canberra'. The 
average inter-item correlation is x- 0.52 and the scale reUabiUty is alpha = 0.84. 
Valuing citizen participation is a scale based on two items developed by 
CUve Bean, both scored 0 to 100: 'It is vital that ordinary citizens participate in 
aU decisions that affect them personaUy' and 'It is vital that ordinary citizens 
participate in aU decisions that affect their community' The scale reUability is 
alpha = 0.85. 
Warmth of feeUng about AustraUa is measured by a Michigan thermometer 
rating of 'AustraUans' and warmth toward Britain by another for 'Britain'. 
Scores range from 0 (for 'Very cold or unfavourable feeUng') to 100 (for 'Very 
warm or favourable feeUng'). 
Admiration for AustraUa's system of government is measured by a single 
item (with corresponding items for the American and British governments): 
'Now we would Uke to ask about the different types of government in the 
world today — not about the people in power at the moment but the about the 
general system of government ... First, do you approve of the democratic type 
of government we have in AustraUa? ... And the British system of government? 
... The American system?' 
Views on privatisation (used only in the 2001 analysis) is a 5 item scale 
averaging the answers to: 'There has been some talk about privatisation — 
about seUing government owned industries x.o the private sector. Should the 
government ... a. SeU the rest of the airUne, Qantas?' with similar questions on 
railways, Telecom, AustraUa Post, and the Commonwealth Bank. 
Perceptions of the economy in the past (used only in the 2001 analysis) are 
a single item: 'Do you think the kind of economic system Australia had 
between 1950 and 1985 or so brought the majority of AustraUan people ... 
Much more benefits than harm/ More benefits than harm/ As much benefit as 
harm/ More harm than benefits/ Only harm?' The question on the economy 
now foUowed immecUately: 'b. And AustraUa's economic system now, does it 
bring the majority of AustraUans ...' with the same answer categories. Answers 
were scored in equal intervals from 0 (for 'only harm') to 100 (for 'much more 
benefits than harm'). 
Sympathy for poUtical parties (used only in the 2001 analysis) is measured 
by Michigan feeUng thermometer ratings, separately for each of the parties. The 
ratings range from a low of 0 to a high of 100. 
AustraUan self-identity (used only in the 2001 survey) is measured by a single 
item, part of a 21 item battery of self-identity' questions: 'In describing who you 
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are, how important is ... Being AustraUan?'. It was scored from a low ot 0 to a 
high of 100. 
Pride in Australia (available onl\- in the 2001 survey) is measured by a set of 
questions originaUv from the International Social Survey Programme: 'How-
proud are \'ou of AustraUa in ... a. The \\-a\- democracy works here? b. /AustraUa's 
economic achievements? c. Australia's scientific and technological achievements 
— proud of them? d. Its achievements in sports? c. Its achievements in the arts 
and literature?' There were four answer categories (Proud!!, Proud, Not, Not!!) 
scored in equal intervals from 0 (for 'Not!!' ) to 100 ('Proud!!'). Items A on 
government and B on the economv were treated as separate variables and the 
remaining three items, which are highly correlated, combined into a single scale 
of achievements (Kelley and Fwans 1998). Dislike of Britain (used only in the 
2001 anah'sis) is a Michigan feeling thermometer question on 'Britain', rcxerse 
Table 9.2: OLS regression analysis of support for a republic. Effect of 
attitudes in 1995-96 on views about a republic in 1996-97. Metric partial 
regression coefficients for the IsssA 1995-97 Panel Survey. N=1368 
Age 
Education (vears) 
Occupational status 
Cjovernment emplovee 
Self-emploved 
Super\-ises 
Family income 
Union member 
L'rban resident 
Part\': National 
Parr\': Labor 
Distrusts politicians 
Political interest 
X'alues citizen participation 
\X arm feeling; Australia 
Warm feeling: Britain 
Admires government: Australia 
Admires government: Britain 
Admires government: USA 
For republic 1995 
(Constant) 
Adjusted R-sc|uare 
Standard error 
Model 1 
b 
-0.164 
0.562 
0.067 
-2.855 
7.199 
1.316 
0.034 
6.045 
0.064 
-9.806 
15.651 
-0.282 
0.099 
-0.051 
-0.054 
-0.338 
0.121 
-0.295 
0.106 
-
94.279 
275 
27.251 
s.e. 
0.072 
0.395 
0.041 
2.279 
2.930 
2.403 
0.024 
2.302 
0.030 
4..378 
2.062 
0.055 
0.036 
0.047 
0.053 
0.051 
0.067 
0.060 
0.044 
-
10.192 
-
— 
Model 2 
b 
0.019 
-0.279 
0.031 
-1.1.54 
4.152 
-0.451 
0.012 
2.102 
0.023 
-8.692 
0.,308 
-0.042 
0.034 
-0.020 
-0.011 
-0.077 
0.057 
-0.103 
0.039 
0.780 
24.048 
.712 
17.19 
s.e. 
0.(145 
0.250 
0.026 
1.438 
1.850 
1.516 
0.015 
1.455 
0.019 
2.761 
1..362 
0.035 
0.023 
0.030 
0.033 
0.033 
0.042 
0.039 
0.028 
0.021 
6.690 
-
._ 
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scored from 100 (for 'Very cold or unfavourable feeling') to 0 (for 'Very warm 
or favourable feeUng'). 
Support for a republic: Detailed results 
Models are estimated by orcUnary least squares. No corrections are made for 
random measurement error. Each analysis is based on a single equation 
including the variables shown here in Tables 9.1 to 9.5. 
The analysis of changes over the course of the campaign is based on 
separate OLS regressions for each of the two Canberra surveys, one conducted 
at the very beginrUng of the campaign and the other a few weeks before the 
vote (Table 9.3). To analyse the complex pattern of changes, views on the 
Table 9.3: OLS regressions on support for a repubUc, Canberra before 
the campaign (1998) and after (November 1999) separately. 
Metric partial regression coefficients 
Variable 
Age 
Male 
Labor supporter 
Republic: 
Against 
Undecided 
For, elected head 
For, parliament choose 
(Constant) 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Table 9.4: OLS regressions on support for a republic, Canberra, 
November 1999, and estimates of support AustraUa-wide for a 
hypothetical referendum offering a head of state elected by the voters 
Variable 
Age 
Male 
Labor 
For republic 
President 
(Constant) 
Estimate, sum= 
lefore campaign 
b 
0.089 
-1.159 
4.602 
44.986 
87.604 
94.803 
-4.513 
0.57 
28.03 
s.e. 
0.072 
2.003 
2.794 
3.654 
3.312 
3.458 
4.736 
— 
— 
After can 
b 
-0.173 
4.402 
21.441 
19.651 
54.143 
86.141 
-1.886 
0.46 
34.45 
ipaign 
s.e. 
0.097 
2.974 
3.961 
5.691 
4.631 
4.801 
6.364 
— 
-
b 
-0.20 
3.48 
22.61 
66,21 
-27.17 
15.50 
s.e. 
0.10 
3.04 
4.03 
4.29 
3.30 
7.10 
Model mean 
45.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0.66 
0.29 
1.00 
b times 
mean 
-8.83 
1.74 
11.30 
43.69 
-7.88 
15.50 
55 
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republic and preference for a direct versus appointed head of state are 
combined into a four-fold typology: (1) a reference group consisting of those 
against the republic, irrespective of their view about the head of state; (2) a 
group undecided about the repubUc, again irrespective of their view about the 
head of state; (3) a group who favour the republic but prefer an elected head 
of state; and finally (4) a group who favour the repubUc and prefer a head of 
state chosen by ParUament. The regression model includes dummy (indicator) 
variables for these four t}'pes, together with age, sex, and party preference. 
Among other things, the analysis shows that the gap between Labor and 
Coalition supporters (net of their own attitudes about the repubUc and the 
head of state) grew over the course of the campaign, from a 5 point difference 
to a 21 point difference (Table 9.3, row 3). 
These estimates are based on the regression model given in Table 9.4, a simple 
linear model oi opinion on the referendum vote at the very end of the 
campaign. The regression coefficients are estimated from the Canberra 
Table 9.5: OLS regression on support for an elected head of state, 
AustraUa 1995. [1] Metric partial regression coefficients 
Variable 
y\ge 
Education (years) 
Occupational status 
Government employee 
Self-emploved 
Supervises 
Farrdly income 
Union member 
Urban resident 
Party-: National 
Party: Labor 
Distrusts politicians 
Political interest 
Values citizen participation 
Warm feeling: Australia 
Warm feeling: Britain 
Admires government: Australia 
Admires government: Britain 
Admires government: USA 
(Constant) 
Adjusted R-square 
Standard error 
Note 1: Scoring: 100=elected by the voters; 50=appointed by parliament; 0= chosen by the 
Prime Minister 
b 
-0.126 
-0.896 
-0.042 
-0.419 
0.022 
-2.242 
-0.025 
-0.038 
-0.009 
-3.632 
-3.784 
0.280 
-0.074 
0.181 
-0.005 
0.041 
-0.072 
-0.105 
0.136 
86.787 
0.143 
24.140 
s.e. 
0.063 
0.350 
0.036 
2.019 
2.595 
2.129 
0.021 
2.039 
0.026 
3.878 
1.826 
0.049 
0.032 
0.042 
0.047 
0.045 
0.059 
0.054 
0.039 
9.028 
-
-
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T;>WDatacol survey (column 1). We then evaluate that estimated vote for a 
simulated typical AustraUan population (age 45, half male and half female, half 
Labor and half CoaUtion supporters; see column 3 of the table). We assume 
they have the existing AustraUa-wide view on a repubUc, about two-thirds in 
favour (a figure that has changed Uttie in recent years). 
Crucially we then assume, contrary to reaUty, that the referendum offered an 
elected head of state. Our data show that this would be strongly favoured by 
citizens AustraUa-wide, 71 percent in favour and only 29 percent against (Figure 
9.5; this figure is inserted for the simulated population in Table 9.4, column 3). 
We know from the regression (in column 1) that voters in the actual 
referendum who were offered a method of choosing the head of state that they 
disliked (appointment by parUament) were 27 percent less likely to support the 
referendum. Analogously, we assume that voters in the hvpothetical 
referendum who were offered a method of choosing a head of state that thev 
disUked (elected by the people) would be 27 percent less likely to support the 
hypothetical referendum. 
With these assumptions, we estimate the outcome implied for the 
hypothetical referendum from the actual regressicjn coefficients (column 1) and 
Table 9.6: OLS regression on support for a republic, AustraUa 2001. [1] 
Metric partial regression coefficients 
Variable 
Age 
Male 
Education (j-ears) 
Government emplovee 
Union member 
Family income 
For privatisation 
Economy in the past good 
Economv now good 
Sympathy: Liberals 
Sympathy: Labor 
Sympathy: Nationals 
Sympathy: Australian Democrats 
Australian self-identit\-
Pride in /Vustralian government 
Pride in y\ustralian economy 
Pride in y\ustralian achievements 
Dislikes Britain 
(Constant) 
Adjusted R-square 
Standard error 
b 
0.000 
5.099 
1.154 
1.949 
-1.444 
0.112 
0.051 
0.065 
-0.011 
-0.121 
0.185 
-0.202 
0.197 
-0.094 
0.057 
-0.103 
0.113 
0.527 
7.282 
.346 
25.211 
s.e. 
0.065 
1.821 
0.359 
2.319 
2.413 
0.025 
0,041 
(1.049 
0.045 
0.049 
0.()41 
0.057 
0.049 
0.040 
0.051 
0.056 
0.067 
0.041 
8.599 
-
— 
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the modeUed population (column 3) in the usual way for OLS models (vix. 
coefficient [frc^ m column 1] times mean [from column 3], summed). These 
estimates imply a vote approximatelv 55 percent in favour of the hypothetical 
referendum with an elected head of state. 
Estimates with an alternate, more complex mc^del with a statistical 
interaction between repubUc and president (viz. the variable of row 4 times that 
of row 5) suggest a narrower win for the hypothetical referendum, 51 percent 
for and 49 percent against. We are inclined to trust the simpler model of Table 
9.4, but a reasonable argument could be made for either model. 
Chapter Twelve Appendix: 
Australia Deliberates Timetable 
Friday, October 22 
5pm Participants arrive at Old ParUament House 
6.30-7pm Welcome to participants 
7.30-9.30pm Introduction to deliberation, to the referendum dinner 
Saturday, October 23 
9-10.30am Discussions in grc:)up rocjms 
10.30am Morning tea 
Group managers deliver questions to the editorial team, who decide on the 
questions and sequence, and present to plenary session chair and panellists 
10.45am Participants move to chamber ready for plenary session 
llam-12.30pm PLENARY SESSION 1 
12.30-1.15pm Lunch 
1.30-3pm Discussions in group rooms 
3pm Afternoon tea 
Group managers deliver questions to the editorial team, who decide on the 
questions and sequence 
3.15pm Participants move to chamber for plenary session 
3.30-5pm PLENARY SESSION 2 
5.15-6pm Day 1 debriefing in discussion groups 
Sunday, October 24 
8.30-9.45am Discussions in group rooms: why vote Yes, why vote No and 
finaUse questions to leaders of advocate groups for Yes and 
No.. 
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9.45am Mornintj Tea 
Editorial team decides on questicms and sequence 
10am-12pm PLENARY SESSION 3 
12pm Lunch — participants complete final surve\' questionnaire 
Editorial team sort questions with 60 .Minutes production 
team 
12.45pm Participants moxc to chamber for 60 Minutes taping 
1pm PLENARY' SESSION 4: 60 Minutes, Ray Martin moderating 
2.30pm Farewell 
3pm Special BBC World taping 
4pm Newspoll provides preUminary results 
Editcjrial team begins analysis 
5.30pm HeadUne results released to televisit^n networks 
ABC special program 
6pm Announce results on television networks' new programs 
Monday, 2 October 
11am News conference to anncjunce complete results 
Bibliography 
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